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
THE TRAGEDY OF ABYSSINIA

What Britain feels and thinks
and wants

*A selection of some recent expressions of
feeling and opinion by
British men and women*

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SPEECHES
CARTOONS

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION

15, GROSVENOR CRESCENT, S.W.1

June, 1936

SIXPENCE


THE TRAGEDY OF ABYSSINIA

Foreword

Despite its title (titles must be short) this selection does not attempt to reflect all sections of British opinion on its subject. It is concerned neither with support of nor with attack on the Government, except so far as criticism of its policy is implied in individual contributions. It ignores the opinion of the isolationists who have never believed in the League; of the extreme pacifists who believe in it only as an instrument of moral suasion; of the defeatists who want to acknowledge failure and meet Italy with a white flag; and of the many people who hardly know what they want, except to bury a painful subject and pass on.

What this selection does attempt is a temporary rescue from oblivion of typical specimens of the feelings and opinions of an immense number and variety of British men and women who cannot take any of these easy paths of escape from painful thought and difficult endeavour; who feel bitterly the past failures of the League in this Abyssinian matter, but refuse to accept that failure as final without a further effort to snatch a victory out of the jaws of defeat. Its objects are, if possible, to help to reassure those in authority of the weight and extent of the public opinion they will have behind them if they take a firm stand at the approaching meetings of the League; and at least, to keep a record of that opinion in a more concentrated and accessible form than now exists, for the consolation of those who would like to remember that if our nation has somehow failed a weaker nation that trusted in her, at least she has not taken her failure lightly.

The compilation has had to be hurriedly made and the selection has been difficult, because of the huge mass of material. Some of those quoted are among the best-known authorities on international affairs; others are ordinary members of the rank and file, such as many of the five thousand who wrote to Viscountess Gladstone in response to her appeal for a Red Cross aeroplane. But it has been thought worth while to quote rather freely from those of the latter type, even at the risk of monotony, because only so can one hope to reproduce the picture that has been brought vividly before the compilers—of innumerable men and women so torn by indignation with Italy, sympathy with Abyssinia, disgust at the failure of the League to rescue her, that we see them taking the whole affair as a personal sorrow and disgrace, straining their resources and cudgelling their brains for a means of repairing something of the damage and ready to cudgel their leaders if they will not take that means.



The invalid who sends 2/6 out of her widow's pension and "feels so sad and crushed about it that I can scarcely lift up my head but feel like sinking through the floor" is perhaps an extreme instance of this feeling. But it is at least a good omen for a democratic State when its citizens take their responsibilities so seriously. *Si sic omnes!*

A few extracts from speeches by Ministers and ex-Ministers are added; just to point the contrast between the solemn warnings, the brave words, the imperfect and tardy actions of the past, and the sorry outlook of the present.

Thanks are due to the Editors of newspapers and periodicals and to the writers of articles and press letters and to the Abyssinia Association and Viscountess Gladstone, who have kindly given permission for the use of extracts; also to the Editors of *Punch* and the *Evening Standard*, who have allowed the reproduction of drawings; also to the Controller of H.M.'s Stationery Office, who has given permission for the use of extracts from Hansard; also to the many unnamed correspondents whose consent has been taken for granted; also very specially to the several friends who have undertaken the main burden of compilation.

ELEANOR F. RATHBONE.

June 6th, 1936.

Letters to the Press

Sir,—Which would we rather be? The Abyssinians or our European selves?

The Abyssinians to-day are dying painfully because they have the courage to fight to the death against an aggressor who is overwhelmingly stronger than they are, and who is using a devilish weapon which he has sworn to renounce. We Europeans (as Mr. Baldwin told one European audience last Saturday) are perhaps going to die the same painful death to-morrow because some of us have not scrupled to commit a double breach of faith and morality by making an aggressive war and waging it with poison gas, while the rest of us have not dared to carry out more than a fragment of our covenant, for fear of the immediate risks to which we might expose ourselves by keeping faith completely.

The penalty for these interwoven sins of commission and omission surely stares us in the face. If we Europeans persist in our present course, we are going to turn our arms against one another and then die in droves, like sheep penned in slaughter-houses, from the poison which European airmen will spray over European cities.

If our death is to be a premature and painful one anyway, which matters more? To make sure of dying it to-morrow instead of to-day? Or to make sure of dying it with honour instead of with dishonour? This question, which forces itself upon all parties concerned in the present international issue, has been answered by the Abyssinians already. They have chosen to die a painful but honourable death to-day. Have we Europeans quite made up our minds to take the other option?

I venture to enclose some Greek verses in which I have tried to picture the two choices as they may perhaps appear hereafter in the longer perspective of history.

I am, &c.,

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

The Times, April 22, 1936.

ΑΙΘΙΟΠΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΩΝ ΕΠΙΤΑΦΙΟΣ

κείνοι μὲν, γυμνοὶ καὶ βάρβαροι ἄνδρες ἔοντες,
ὄργανα φρικώδους οὐκ ἐφοβοῦντ' Ἄρεως,
ἀλλ' αὐτοσχεδίη, ἔτ' ἐλεύθεροι, οὐ τι τρέσαντες,
εἰς Ἀΐδην καλῶς μαρνάμενοι κάτεβαν.
ἡμεῖς δ' οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ κάρτεροι, οἱ σοφοί; ἡμῖν
τῶν αὐτῶν ὀδυνῶν γευσάμενοισι θανεῖν
μοῖρ', ἀλλ' οὐ θάνατον τὸν Ἀρήϊον' οὔποτε τοῖον
τοῖς ἐπιτοκοῦσιν δῶρον ἔδωκε Θεός.

Sir,—Finding myself in passionate agreement with the eloquent letter of my friend Professor Toynbee, I venture to submit an English rendering of the Greek verses with which he concludes, for the benefit of those who may not have understood them:—

EPITAPH ON ABYSSINIANS AND EUROPEANS

Without our arms or art, these men could dare,
War's utmost frightfulness, since men they were,
And, in close fight, to death untrembling passed,
As freemen, battling nobly to the last.
But we, whose science makes us strong and great,
Are doomed to share the tortures of their fate,
Yet not their soldiers' grave; the gods in scorn
Withhold that privilege from men foresworn.

I am,

G. M. GATHORNE HARDY.

The Times, April 25, 1936.

Sir,—Sir Austen Chamberlain in his speech overlooked the fact that the predominant purpose of the sanctions now in force against Italy was to support the authority of the League. That support has certainly not become unnecessary. Since the violent transgression of the Covenant by Italy it remains of urgent importance to the usefulness of the League to strengthen its authority so weakened. I suggest that existing sanctions ought not to be laid aside until at least a plan for amending the mechanism of the League so as to hinder future transgressions like the Abyssinian war has been approved and has been fully assented to by Italy. Then, and not till then, can it be said that sanctions serve no useful purpose.

Secondly, it must frankly be said that there cannot be on the part of this country, for some time to come, any attitude of friendliness towards Italy. To most of us the Italian Government just now seems like Ahab when, after he had heard that Naboth's executioners had gallantly and efficiently stoned that uncivilised person to death, the King went down to the rough vineyard with intent to make it a civilised and cultivated garden of herbs. The Italian Government has killed and is about to take possession. Friendliness to Italy would seem to British opinion morally intolerable; and what is morally intolerable is not politically expedient.

Sir Austen was right in recognising that the conquest of Abyssinia is a reality of which account must be taken. *Fieri non debuit, factum valet*. But there are other deplorable realities resulting from the Abyssinian war. These are the alienation of British sentiment from France and the much deeper and stronger alienation from Italy. All these realities are important and must be reckoned with. Stresa has been washed away by Abyssinian blood.

I am, &c.,

HUGH CECIL.

The Times, May, 1936.

Sir,—I have received copies of communications from the Italian Government to the League of Nations referring to alleged Abyssinian atrocities. These have presumably been circulated widely in England in order to arouse a general prejudice against the Abyssinian nation. In the circumstances it is only fair to point out that the evidence of the photographs with which these documents are illustrated is, to say the least, equivocal. I refer especially to the photographs of mutilated bodies in the communication on alleged Abyssinian atrocities committed against Italian workmen (Official No.: C.123.M.62). These show quite clearly to the medical eye that the mutilations were made on corpses, probably some considerable time after death. The question may be raised, therefore, whether they were in fact made by the small party of Abyssinian soldiers who, according to the document, made a surprise attack on an Italian labour camp. It seems unreasonable to suppose that such a raiding party, after carrying out a sudden and successful attack of this kind, would have lingered so long in order to mutilate these dead bodies.

If the Abyssinian army had been provided with a staff of photographers no doubt they would have been able to furnish abundant photographs showing the mutilating by poison gas of non-combatant men, women, and children. However revolting a mutilation of a dead body may be, it bears no comparison with the ghastly mutilations of the living body which can be produced by vesicant poison gases.

I am, &c.,

W. E. LE GROS CLARK,

Dr. Lee's Professor of Anatomy, University of Oxford.

The Times.

. . . The primary purpose of Article 16 is not to defeat an aggression which has begun, but to put before the potential aggressor a prospect which will deter him. For this purpose certainty, before the aggression has become inevitable, that sanctions would be applied is essential.

The cause of failure in the Abyssinian case is thus clear. League machinery should have been put into operation and the position of League members defined in the spring, and not the autumn, of last year. At least, we should have made it clear at Stresa that we intended to urge sanctions if Abyssinia were invaded. By that date Italy's intentions were known—but they had not been made irrevocable by the dispatch of a large army to the Italian colonies. But our representatives were then silent. The dispatch of men continued. By the autumn some 250,000 men were on the spot. There was never any reasonable hope that a threat of sanctions could then prevent the aggression. Failure in the primary purpose of *preventing* war was then inevitable; all that remained was to stop it. For this, only the most drastic action could be successful. This was not undertaken, for reasons which are familiar and need not be repeated. All that needs to be emphasised now is that these reasons are to be found in French and British policy, not in any defects of the League organisation.

The *mechanism* of the League has not failed. It did all it was possible for any mechanism to do. Within the limits set by the policies of the two principal League countries it was both rapid and effective. It evoked and applied all the will to co-operate which existed in the Member States. It put into operation all the sanctions which Great Britain and France were both prepared to authorise. These sanctions have, indeed, as the recent official statistics have shown, operated with a surprisingly small margin of leakage. Both the delays in decision and the limitations in the scope of the sanctions were due—and due wholly—to the limits set by British and French policy, not to any defect in League organisation. . . .

SIR ARTHUR SALTER.

The Times, May 11, 1936.

. . . It is clearly incorrect to say that, since the United States, Brazil, and Germany are not members of the League, an overwhelming superiority of force could not at this moment be brought to bear against Italy. The co-operation of none of these States is necessary to sever the communications between Italy and her armies in Africa, and if Italy should resist such intervention by force, the League States are quite strong enough to prevail. A "world war" between many different nations is one thing: a war between one nation and 50 others is very different. That the League has the power to coerce Italy is indubitable. Whether it has the will has yet to be shown. It is important at this moment to ascertain which States are prepared to go all lengths in support of their Covenant obligations and which are not. If it be proved—it has not been proved yet—that the League has not the will to make the coercion of a great Power effective in order to preserve the independence of a small Power, then it would become clear that no security is to be found for small States in the collective guarantees of the Covenant, and it would then be necessary to revise the constitution and procedure of the League.

THE RT. HON THE EARL OF LYTTON.

The Times, May 1, 1936.

. . . As Captain Victor Cazalet said in your issue of April 23, the League can be a success only if the nations composing it are prepared to fight. It aims at peace, but its method must in certain circumstances mean war. Just as vaccination aims at preventing smallpox by producing the disease in a milder form, so a collective war waged against a peace-breaker who will not yield to gentle treatment is very much preferable, it is held, to a war waged by a nation for its own hand. . . .

Even to-day the Powers of the League could stop Italy's aggression instantly if their peoples were willing to face war with Italy. It is an ironical reflection that the very same fear of war which won so many thousand votes for the League of Nations in what was termed a "Peace" Ballot is the thing which paralyses the League even in face of an aggression so brutal and atrocious as the Italian. . . .

DR. EDWYN BEVAN.

The Times, April 30, 1936.

Sir,—I am one of the many people in this country who have regarded with the greatest apprehension the dangerous obligations that we incurred when we signed the Covenant of the League, and have been sceptical as to its power to prevent or to settle disputes in which the Great Powers are involved. That these fears were justified has been shown by the events arising out of the war between Italy and Abyssinia. But having signed the Covenant of the League, and having taken the lead in the imposition of sanctions against Italy, can we afford to draw back now that her policy of aggression has proved successful? If we do so our prestige will be destroyed completely and the dangers to the future peace of Europe which will arise will be far greater than those involved in the continuation or intensification of the present policy of sanctions.

I suggest that the only policy for the Government to pursue, if it is to retain the respect of the world, is to advocate the continuation of the present sanctions and to express its readiness to concur in more drastic measures, until such time as Italy shall agree to honour her obligations. It is true that such a policy may involve a certain risk of war, but if we condone Italy's action, acts of aggression by other Powers will certainly follow from which a European war is certain to result. For such a war we would have to bear a large part of the moral responsibility and into it we would be drawn.

If the other Powers refuse to support us, then I suggest that our right course is to withdraw from a League of Nations as constituted at present. At any rate, we will have shown that there is one great nation whose word can be relied upon, and potential aggressors will know that we are unlikely to stand by with folded arms in future while they help themselves to the territories of their weaker European neighbours. Do not let us present to a horrified world the infamous spectacle of our representatives at Geneva sitting down to discuss the future of collective security with the representatives of a ruler who has shown that he will allow no laws, either human or Divine, to restrain the fulfilment of his own inordinate and unscrupulous ambitions.

I am, &c.,

S. BURDETT-COUTTS.

The Times, May 13, 1936.

Modern barbarism has triumphed over primitive savagery. Italy, having broken seven treaties, has carried the banner of "Roman Civilisation" to Addis Ababa behind a screen of mustard gas. Signor Mussolini's heart "quivers with pride," and well may it do so, for Britain and France and 50 other nations, pledged to preserve "the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of every fellow member of the League, cower before the might of Italy and tremble at his threat of war with them. The Duce has annexed the territory of a member of the League, who became a member because of Italian and French insistence. The King of Italy is to be crowned Negus.

Was there ever such a degrading spectacle in the history of European so-called "civilisation?" And there are people in this country and elsewhere who desire that we should forthwith wash our hands of the whole business, who weep crocodile tears over "the failure of the League" or openly gloat over it, who choose to ignore the pledged word of their respective countries, shrug their shoulders at "the sanctity of treaties," advocate that "sanctions" should be withdrawn lest they smack of mere "revenge" or "punishment," and would allow Italy to get away with the spoils of her dishonourable acts.

. . . I suggest that there is but one course that the members of the League can honourably pursue, having regard also to the chances of establishing permanent peace in the world. They must refuse to have any dealings whatsoever with a country that has violated every law, human and divine. This would not be a matter of "sanctions," of "revenge," or of "punishment." It would be a world demonstration of horror at the action of a people who, having allowed themselves to be misled and dictated to by a bombastic leader who saw bankruptcy staring him in the face, have placed themselves outside the pale of the modern civilisation which the Great War induced most nations to endeavour to build up with other methods, other minds.

The League must stand and, even at this late hour, exert its authority. Through no other agency can the grim spectre of another world war be conjured. But Britain must arm. Quiverings of flaccid obesity cannot command respect or ensure peace.

RT. HON. SIR MALCOLM O. ROBERTSON, G.C.M.G., K.B.E.

The Times, May 15, 1936.

Sir,—The idea that economic sanctions by themselves would be adequate was never, I believe, contemplated by those who drafted or negotiated the Covenant of the League. They were suggested as a contribution to collective security which might be made by all its members, irrespective of their population, power, or proximity to any possible conflict. The obligation of military sanctions was bound to rest primarily on the powerful members of the League nearest to the aggressor. The Abyssinian war was precipitated when Mussolini was able to assure himself at Stresa that one at least of those greater Powers would not participate in military sanctions; and Italian success was facilitated

by the failure of the League to apply even economic sanctions whole-heartedly, promptly, or comprehensively.

Nevertheless it is illogical to contend that sanctions should cease on the ground that, having failed in prevention, they have become merely a penalty. Punishment indeed, as Sir Frederick Pollock has pointed out, was never their intention, but the preservation of peace and prevention of war. That also is the intention of our criminal law; but we do not release a criminal convicted of attempted murder if and when, or because, his victim dies of his wounds. Prevention, like prescience, appertains to the future.

The immediate problem is the question of survival. Is Abyssinia dead after five centuries of national life? Between 1772 and 1795 Russia, Austria, and Prussia combined to extinguish their common neighbour, and for a century and more the soul of Poland vexed the conscience of Europe, till restitution was made in 1919. For four centuries the Turk held Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks in servitude. Portugal was a Spanish province for 80 years, and instances could be multiplied. Wars of conquest have been more ephemeral in their effects than wars of liberation. The soul of a people is the least destructible of its assets, and resurrection rather than death its ultimate consummation. Italy herself was, for the most part, subject to alien domination for a thousand years, and became, in Metternich's phrase, merely a geographical expression. Has she forgotten her own *Risorgimento* in the fantasy of a new Roman empire built on the ruin of national States?

I am, &c.,

A. F. POLLARD.

The Times, May 26, 1936.

Sir,— . . . What are the admitted results of Signor Mussolini's substantial and spectacular successes? British prestige has suffered a serious blow throughout the world, particularly among the tribes and peoples of the East, and especially among the natives of Africa, always responsive to the achievements of force. The threat to the naval position in the Mediterranean and to British communications throughout the Continent of Africa, needs no elaboration. These dangers are immediate and apparent. In 25 years the menace may become more serious. To give one example. The United States, owing to their dwindling supplies, may not be able to export oil. Then Great Britain, her Fleet, and her Air Force may become dependent (apart from Trinidad supplies) on the Middle East for their oil, conveyed through the narrow seas of the Mediterranean controlled by the warships and areoplanes of the imperialistic Italy, ready for fresh fields to conquer.

That is why, as a citizen of a country which is already, so to speak, in the first line of trenches, I plead for the continuance of a resolute sanctions policy against Italy. To remove them provides no solution, but merely the respite which postpones the day of reckoning to a date chosen by Italy and not by us.

I am well aware of the main reasons which are being used to justify the withdrawal of sanctions—the reconstitution of the Stresa front and the alignment of Great Britain, France, and Italy against the menace of Germany. In South Africa, and I believe in the other Dominions, we are not so convinced that Germany is our enemy as to feel any desire to create a “front” against her nor so conscious of our own weakness as to feel the need of an ally in Italy which has just broken most of the international agreements to which it was a party. Another reason is given by Lord Rennell in your issue of to-day. He argues that concession—I call it surrender—may pave the way for improving relations with Italy. I contend that the exact contrary will be the case. Abyssinia is merely an “appetiser” to a man—and unfortunately also to a nation drilled into a detestation of everything English—hungering for more, and Italy is not the only country looking for expansion at the expense of the British Empire. . . .

I am, &c.,
ABE BAILEY.

The Times, June 3, 1936.

Sir,—. . . Those of your correspondents who extol “the old diplomacy” and advocate gracious concessions to Italy in the matter of “sanctions” seem to be as thoughtlessly glib as are the soldiers and pacifists who talk of the “next war” in terms of the War of 1914-18. “Sanctions” cannot be made the subject of concessions, gracious or otherwise, by any one member of the League. Under Article XVI they followed, albeit haltingly, upon the designation of Italy as the aggressor, that is to say, as a violator of Article XII of the Covenant. Surely it is for the League Assembly to say whether the breakdown of Abyssinian resistance, and the means by which that breakdown was brought about, have now made “sanctions” useless or inexpedient; and whether, in any event, it is prudent for members of the League to encourage future aggression by granting impunity to a present aggressor.

These matters are of wider dimensions than those in which the “old diplomacy” was wont to work. Nothing less than a decision upon the worth of collective security is involved. If collective security be worthless—as the simple dropping of “sanctions” would make it appear to be—the question would arise of finding another basis for British foreign policy both towards Europe and as a concerted course of action among the members of the British Commonwealth.

All the Dominions belong to the League. Unless I err, all of them have supported our declared policy—that aggression shall not be allowed to profit the aggressor. Simply to drop or passively to accept the dropping of “sanctions” against Italy would stultify this policy. The League Assembly may or may not think it wise to continue indefinitely the mitigated economic pressure upon Italy which “sanctions” represent; but if the British Commonwealth is not to suffer humiliating—and, possibly, disintegrating—defeat, it seems clear that any change of League tactics must be preceded or accompanied

by more than one definite decision. Of these decisions the first might be to withhold any recognition of the Italian conquest in North-East Africa. Another might be an undertaking that no member of the League will grant Italy financial assistance in any form, or share, directly or indirectly, in loans or credits designed to relieve the Italian exchequer or to cover the cost of “developing” Abyssinia. A third and most important step would be for those members of the League who oppose aggressive war to declare, jointly and severally, that all their financial, economic, and military resources will henceforth be used in concert against aggression.

If and when these things were done, the arguments for and against the dropping of present “sanctions” might be considered on their merits. Unless and until they are done the dropping of “sanctions” would be equivalent to the dropping of collective security. There is reason to believe that the armed anti-war forces of the world are still—even in Europe—superior to the war forces. Potentially, the anti-war forces are vastly superior. But if this superiority be not organised, the peace of Europe will be at the mercy of any strong aggressor who, having thought out the bearing of the speed factor upon modern warfare, may seize and hold the advantage of the initiative. Hence the importance of not putting a premium upon future aggression by making gracious, that is to say, weak, concessions to Italy now. The League may have lost the first round in the struggle against war as an instrument of national policy. But surely, Sir, it is too early for its backers to throw up the sponge.

I am, &c.,
WICKHAM STEED.

The Times, June 4, 1936.

Sir,—. . . Circumstances, chief among them the hesitation of France to keep the Covenant, have hitherto hindered any immediately effective action to stop the war. Is the alternative, in default of that complete unanimity which we can hardly hope to have this side of Utopia, for all those Powers loyal to the Covenant to sit back in a new kind of neutrality and watch the aggressor exterminate his victim? The desperate situation of Abyssinia reminds us that, outside the sphere of the Red Cross, no practical assistance of any kind has been given to her, and her modest requests, such as those for League observers and for a loan, have been dismissed, apparently with little consideration. The reason, of course, was that effective international action to stop the war would make all lesser measures superfluous and all national efforts—of the kind we have taken before in history—improper. Instead of such action we have watched a prolonged game of musical chairs in which the Powers have walked round each other determined not to be left alone in doing the right thing. . . .

For Britain, quite apart from her great share in the need for international justice and security, the forward policy has become especially necessary. The layman realises that the Government must have very grave reasons hitherto for its hesitation to take this course independently of France. But the layman, shut out from the secrets of the council chamber, has an eye upon the horizon

and sees even greater dangers there. One is that the refusal to take risks in the clearest imaginable issue of international right and wrong to-day may increase the risks of an old-fashioned balance-of-power war to-morrow. Another is that the apparent discrepancy between our words and actions at Geneva may cost us the trust of the world, and especially that of the coloured people upon whose loyalty our Empire stands.

Finally, in the event of the League breaking down over this issue, it is important that Britain should be clear of responsibility for that failure. Otherwise she will have disqualified herself for the task that must be hers in another generation, that of helping Europe to rebuild a more effective international order.

I am, &c.,
MARGERY PERHAM.

The Times, April 29, 1936.

. . . To-day we are faced with a situation that is the complete negation of our hopes; the most bare-faced aggression carried out in violation of the most solemn treaties with complete ruthlessness has resulted in the destruction of the victim under the eyes of some 50 States, Members of the League, none of them completely helpless or quite unarmed and all pledged to support each other if attacked.

We are now invited to watch the process of one member of the League calmly digesting another one and growing fat and strong on the meal. It seems to me very much like assisting at a cannibal feast. . . . Having failed in our object there is but one thing we can do and that is to ask for Italy's expulsion from the League. Better a small clean League than to take our place in a school of sharks where the rule is that the greater swallows the lesser.

BRIG.-GEN. E. L. SPEARS, M.P.

The Daily Telegraph, May 16, 1936.

. . . How did Al Capone with a few machine guns come to dominate Chicago? Because millions of honest people would not bestir themselves and face risks. How did the Nazi thugs with their revolvers beat down the multitudes of German social democrats? Because the ordinary German citizen would not fight for the constitution. . . .

The League is not yet defeated; it has had a bad set-back. In some respects it has done better than ever before; Mussolini has brought his country to the verge of bankruptcy; he has a vast army to keep up and probably a guerrilla war to sustain for a year or so. He will collapse unless he has a loan. The League cannot save Abyssinian independence, but it may yet secure a settlement not too ruinous to the Abyssinian peasants and not too dangerous to the future peace of the world. Therefore, I say, no defeatism!

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY.

Time and Tide, May 16, 1936.

. . . It is the British Imperialists who in order to destroy the League have been led by the wily Mr. Baldwin into giving away British control of the Mediterranean, the route to India, and her strategic position in Egypt and the Sudan, and indeed throughout the whole Near East. Any one of these issues would have been enough to make our British Imperialists see red, if they had been presented as British interests. In that case Britain would have been at war long ago. Alternatively, if the Government had supported the League whole-heartedly and told Mussolini that he knew not the stomach of the British people if he thought his aggression would not meet with a resolute resistance of the British fleet—then in all probability British interests (as well, incidentally, as Abyssinia) would have been preserved and there would have been no war. But because British Imperialists hated the League more than they loved the Empire, Mr. Baldwin was easily able to persuade them to be the complacent spectators of an Italian victory and a British defeat. Was ever an Empire so cunningly and willingly surrendered by its most vociferous champions?

. . . Yes, my interpretation of the last five years of British diplomacy is that British prestige and power have been voluntarily surrendered by British Imperialists, who have fought the Little Englanders' battle in the belief that they were doing down the League of Nations. If this was not deliberate Machiavellism on the part of Mr. Baldwin, if he is not really a subtle and long-sighted diplomat, determined to rid the Worcester countryside of the vulgar excrescences which fly the Union Jack in so many parts of the world, if he is not the most astute of British Prime-Ministers, what alternative explanation is there for the surrender of the British Empire?

EUROPEAN OBSERVER.

The New Statesman and Nation, May 16, 1936.

There can be no doubt that it was the grave economic and financial position of Italy which caused Mussolini to plan his Abyssinian adventure.

At the beginning of 1935 he was up against the fact that Italy's foreign income had declined by over two-thirds since 1929—income from her exports, from tourists and from her emigrants working abroad, by means of which she procures her necessary imports of food and material.

Further, he did not know what to do with his unemployed. He had spent immense sums of borrowed money since 1929 in finding them employment and needed to discover some new way of providing them with work and, at the same time, of inducing Italian bankers and investors to supply the necessary loans with which to meet the expenditures.

Abyssinia seemed to offer the opportunity of enabling him to meet the difficulty. A dazzling investment, occupation for the unemployed and the

means of inducing bankers and investors to supply the necessary funds. He thought he could not afford to stop or to fail.

But his calculations were entirely erroneous. Abyssinia has been a costly business and is likely to remain a costly business for many years. Even if Italy were to be allowed to retain it, it would be a liability, not an asset.

In the meantime the application of sanctions has cut Italy's attenuated income of 1935 in half. Indeed, Italy's foreign income in the current year with the official maintenance of the present sanctions is not likely to be more than about 15 per cent. of the income she enjoyed in 1929.

Moreover, were the official sanctions to be removed, the horror with which her dreadful deeds in Abyssinia has been and is likely to be regarded by the people of America, of this and other countries will prevent any appreciable recovery in her foreign income for many years to come.

Thus the grave position of Italy in the early months of 1935, when the Abyssinian invasion was decided on, has become infinitely graver to-day. . . .

SIR GEORGE PAISH.

The News Chronicle, May 25, 1936.

Sir,—We believe that we are voicing the inarticulate opinion of a large section of the British public when we express our dismay at the suggestion made in certain quarters that sanctions against Italy should be abandoned and Mussolini's *fait accompli* accepted. We consider that such a policy would be a menace to world peace, whose greatest hope lies in a strong and unequivocal support of the League of Nations and a determination to uphold existing treaties and international law. The results of a wavering attitude have already been shown by the re-occupation of the Rhineland, and further dangerous consequences are indicated by recent comment in the German press.

M. Blum has clearly stated his firm support of the League and of collective action: a similar statement from the British Government would not only be welcome in this country but would, in our opinion, be a step towards the re-establishment of order in the present anarchy of international affairs.

The organisation for which we are writing has the support of many men and women distinguished in the sciences and arts and in academic life, and it urges you to renew, in no uncertain terms, the assurances for which the British people are asking.

We are, etc.,

LASCELLES ABERCROMBIE, J. B. S. HALDANE, NORMAN ANGELL, F. GOWLAND HOPKINS, ERNEST BARKER, JULIAN S. HUXLEY, A. M. CARR SAUNDERS, STORM JAMESON, HILDA CLARK, W. E. LE GROS CLARK, F. M. CORNFORD, F. L. LUCAS, K. D. COURTNEY, GILBERT MURRAY, C. DAY LEWIS, PHILIP NOEL BAKER, MARGERY FRY, D. N. PRITT, G. T. GARRATT, HERBERT READ, G. P. GOOCH, OLAF STAPLEDON, CHARLOTTE HALDANE, R. H. TAWNEY, C. K. WEBSTER.

THE ORGANISATION FOR INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY.

Time and Tide, etc., May 16, 1936.

Sir,—In the crisis created by the departure of the Emperor and some of his Ministers it seems desirable that this association should express its considered opinion through some of its members.

So far the Italian military successes amount to no more than what many military experts expected would be achieved; and only about two-fifths of the country has been occupied. That the Emperor has chosen to leave the country may be due to his conviction that he can defend its integrity more effectually by diplomatic than by military measures. He is probably hoping to have the opportunity of making direct representation to the Powers which are members of the League of Nations, fully realising that his country can alone be saved through the intervention of the League.

Meanwhile it should not be concluded that resistance is at an end; nor should any such resistance be considered "rebellion." Certain Ministers and their staffs with the archives are still carrying on the Government in the West.

What then should be done? To allow Italy to annex Abyssinia would be not merely to destroy all confidence in international law, but to create many grave problems. We suggest that the policy must be that of bringing such pressure to bear on Italy that she is obliged to accept that solution of the problem that may be determined by the League.

A clear lead by Britain is now imperative. Indeed this association has such an overwhelming evidence of the intense feelings of the British people as to the policy which has been and which should be pursued that the British Government is clearly called upon by public opinion to give that lead which will bring about a final settlement and maintain Abyssinian independence under League protection.

Public opinion in France has already expressed itself through those returned to power at the polls upon the policy which the situation demands. It is of vital importance that public opinion in this country should stiffen the back of the British Government so that the aggressor may be prevented from reaping the fruits of his aggression, while the victim of this aggression may be restored and enjoy effective protection in future.

We are, &c.,

SNOWDEN, GEORGE PAISH (Chairman), VYVYAN ADAMS, NORMAN ANGELL, PHILIP NOEL BAKER, G. T. GARRATT, MARGERY PERHAM, ELEANOR RATHBONE, H. STANLEY JEVONS (Hon. Sec.).

Abyssinia Association, 225, Grand Buildings,
Trafalgar Square, W.C.2, May 9.

The Times, May 11, 1936.

Sir,—Many of us have read with pleasure Dr. Martin's letter in your recent issue, in which he states that a band of loyalists survive in Abyssinia. This means that our work there is not over. Just as Belgium was overrun by Germany in the War, and just as a bare fraction of that gallant country remained unoccupied for the Allies to succour, so a remnant of Abyssinia is

still trying to keep the flag flying. How deeply mistaken we should be if we failed this remnant now. By raising money still for relief on the lines of my original letter we can perhaps help right to triumph in the end over might. I write, therefore, to thank your readers for their splendid support.

We raised over £3,000 in 10 days, and our representative, Major Count Bentinck, was not only the last to leave Dessie, to which he brought 1,922 gas masks, but he subsequently, as *The Times* showed, took charge of the relief unit.

May I, therefore, in giving this short statement of what we have done, ask for any further help which your readers can spare, and assure them that we are carrying on?

I am, &c.,

NINA HAMILTON.

Chairman, Abyssinian Relief Appeal.

St. Stephen's House, Westminster, S.W. 1.

The Times, May 11, 1936.

For seven days without break enemy have been bombing armies and people of my country, including women and children, with terrible gases. Our soldiers are brave men; they know that they must take the consequences of war. Against this cruel gas we have no protection, no gas-masks, nothing. This suffering and torture is beyond description, hundreds of countrymen screaming and moaning with pain. Many, many of them are unrecognisable since the skin has been burned off their faces. These are facts. The Ethiopian Women's Work Association decided to appeal to women of the world to use influence not to use these ghastly methods. With all the power that is in me and with the greatest appreciation for what the women of England and Scotland have done to help our wounded and suffering, on behalf of my mother Empress and members of the Association, may I appeal to the Women's Council, League of Nations Union, to protest against this criminal breach of the 1925 protocol?

TSEHAI.

Message from the Princess Tsehai to Viscountess Gladstone of the L.N.U.

Sir,—We, the undersigned, having been deeply moved by the terrible sufferings of the Ethiopian men, women and children as described by the message from Princess Tsehai, daughter of the Emperor of Abyssinia, and since confirmed by independent observers, wish to protest against the deliberate bombing of the Red Cross units by the Italians and their inhuman use of poison gas.

The use of poison gas is a violation of the 1925 Protocol ratified by Italy on April 3, 1928; and the bombing of the Red Cross is a contravention of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1906, to which Italy has adhered. These criminal acts, which are against the laws of God and man, are "justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world."

We call upon the women of Great Britain to unite in condemning the cruelty inflicted by a ruthless aggressor against the victim of aggression and to use every means in their power to give expression to their detestation of such wanton inhumanity.

E. M. SCOULER (Association of Assistant Mistresses), E. R. GWATKIN (Association of Headmistresses), N. K. ARGYLL (Association of Higher Women Officers in the Civil Service), DOROTHY EVANS (Association of Women Clerks and Secretaries), FRANCES H. MELVILLE (British Federation of University Women), HILDA M. TAYLOR (British League of Unitarian and other Liberal Christian Women), LILIAN STOREY BARKER (British Women's Total Abstinence Union), GRACE THURLOW (Church of England Zenana Missionary Society), HELEN BERRY (Congregational Union of England and Wales, Women's Guild), MARY FIELDEN (Council for the Representation of Women in the League of Nations), EDITH COCKCROFT (Federation of Soroptimist Clubs of Great Britain and Ireland), LOUISA DENHOF (Jewish Association for Protection of Girls and Women), DOROTHY GLADSTONE (League of Nations Union, Women's Advisory Council), MIRIAM BARSON (London Congregational Union, Women's League), ETHEL WATTS (London and National Society for Women's Service), EVA M. HUBBACK (National Council for Equal Citizenship), EVA HARTREE (National Council of Women), CATHARINE BUCHANAN ALDERTON (National Sisterhood Movement), MARY STEWART PARNELL (National Union of Women Teachers), AMY J. MANN (National Women Citizens' Association), DORA ROSENFELD (Union of Jewish Women), MARY WOLSELEY LEWIS (Women's Gas Council), ALISON GARLAND (Women's National Liberal Federation), JOYCE ANSELL, IDA HALL, NANCY ASTOR, DOROTHEA LAYTON, EDITH BIGLAND, MEGAN LLOYD GEORGE, MARGARET BONDFIELD, EDITH LYTTTELTON, VIOLET BONHAM-CARTER, MARY MURRAY, E. MARION BRYCE, MARGERY NUNBURNHOLME, THELMA CAZALET, MARION PARMOOR, ELEANOR CECIL, ELEANOR RATHBONE, MARGERY I. CORBETT ASHBY, MAUDE ROYDEN, KATHLEEN COURTNEY, HILDA RUNCIMAN, BLANCHE DUGDALE, ALICE SALISBURY, GERTRUDE EMMOTT, IRENE WARD, PHILIPPA FAWCETT, ELLEN WILKINSON, H. FRANKLIN, C. M. WILSON.

15, Grosvenor Crescent, London, S.W.1.

Birmingham Post, etc., April 17, 1936.

Sir,—There is a movement on foot (how widespread I do not know) amongst ex-Servicemen who received honours from the Italian Government for service rendered during the Great War to return those honours as a protest against the treatment of the Abyssinians. I for one have joined in this movement. I wish to disassociate myself in as emphatic a manner as possible from any favours received at the hands of this Government. To-day I have written to the Italian Embassy to this effect. . . . I feel I am voicing the opinion of the overwhelming majority of ex-Servicemen in expressing strong condemnation of the methods of warfare used against the Abyssinians. We hold these methods to be cowardly, brutal and unchivalrous. I am not writing simply to protest against the murder of men but against the slaughter of women and children as well. In common with most men, I hate war, and four years of it was quite sufficient. But I want to emphasise the fact that the present issue is not between war and peace but between law and treaty rights on the one hand, and on the other aggression, greed and brutality. I hope that every progressive will make his protest and register his disgust in the most effective way he can. I have registered mine.

MICHAEL BERRY, D.C.M., Croix de Guerre
(late Intelligence Section).

Manchester Guardian, April 16, 1936.

. . . If the League will not act now to secure justice for one of its members, Great Britain should sever her connection with it until a new constitution is drawn up by which the League cannot be governed by two or three interested big Powers. . . .

It is for the Cabinet, and for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary especially, to say whether the head of Britain, bowed in humiliation and shame, shall be raised up in honour once more. Great Britain will test itself before the eyes of the world next Monday. The events of last week-end have vastly increased our responsibility. It is a deplorable fact that great masses of the people to-day no longer trust our Government or believe that they have the will, the moral courage, or the capacity to do the right but difficult thing and follow a straight, definite, and consistent policy. The reported comments of Mr. Eden at Leicester fill one with despair.

Speaking of Gladstone, John Morley once said: "When he saw a nation going on a wrong path he saw, high in the heavens, the flash of an uplifted sword, and the gleam of the arm of an avenging angel." If that sword descends upon the nations of Europe, as it may, it will be the price they pay for their betrayal of Abyssinia and the Covenant of the League.

WILLIAM REES.

Manchester Guardian, May 8, 1936.

. . . It is indeed the irony and ignominy of the situation that the policy we have pursued would be equally repudiated by Machiavelli and by Christ. Machiavelli would have said, "Your problem was whether to rely on the friendship of Italy or the support of the League. By your policy, you have offended without weakening the first, and have deprived the second alike of the fear of enemies and the trust of friends."

What would Christ have said? Recent correspondence in *The Times* and in your columns has shown that the question can be debated fruitlessly and interminably, so long as we confine ourselves to interpreting His opinion of war as an institution. Yet on the broad issues of duty to our neighbour, the teaching of Christianity is surely clear and illuminating. I submit, therefore, in all reverence, that He would have said this:

"A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among thieves. So he cried to more than fifty of his fellows, who had solemnly sworn to keep that way safe for travellers. But they answered, 'We can only act together; one of us is leagued with the robbers, so none of us can come.' And by chance there passed by a certain priest that way, and he muttered, 'It is written, resist not evil,' and passed by on the other side. And there came likewise an isolationist, who said, 'It is no business of mine,' and passed by. But a certain Samaritan plunged into the fight, slew some robbers and dispersed the rest, and rescued the victim." Would He not then have concluded with the same question asked in the original parable, expecting the same reply?

I fear, too, that He might have extended to those who refused in these circumstances the effective help required the awful condemnation of the words, "Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to Me." Let me say in conclusion that I write from the standpoint of a life-long and zealous Conservative.

I am, etc.,
G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY.

Time and Tide, May 9, 1936.

Sir,—Now that it is over we can point the moral. It is said—and probably with truth—that lack of money never prevented a war, but it may gravely affect the manner in which the war is fought.

Italy was short of money when, in breach of the Covenant and without a declaration of war, she invaded Abyssinia. She could not afford a long war; in order, therefore, to quicken the end she decided from the first to use gas—in breach of another treaty. The bombing and machine-gunning of the enemy from the air was war according to the rules, though, in fact, as the Abyssinians had no fighting aeroplanes it was little better than the slaughter of unarmed opponents. The use of yperite from the air in bombs and in liquid form inevitably brought death and appalling suffering to the civilian population—to men, women, and children alike. The ambulance units belonging to neutrals were a menace to the Italian plan of action; they contained numbers of impartial witnesses whose evidence as to these atrocities would be accepted all

the world over. The Italians therefore decided that these ambulance units must be destroyed or, at any rate, driven away, and in consequence we had the grisly spectacle of a nation which boasted of its civilisation deliberately attacking the Red Cross.

Thus the barbarism of Italy triumphed over the comparative civilisation of Abyssinia.

Most people are saying that the League of Nations should be strengthened. I entirely agree, but I venture to suggest that first of all it should be purified by the expulsion of a nation which has shown itself unworthy to be considered civilised. Can anyone now put any faith in any treaty signed by Italy? If not, why should she remain a member of the League? *Cui bono?*

I am, &c.,
W. BLAKE ODGERS.

The Times, May 12, 1936.

Sir,—. . . So far as I can gauge public opinion at the moment, two firm rocks stand in the whirlpool. First, whatever may be the new constitution of the League, Italy must be penalised for her conduct by a continuance of sanctions. The man in the street would wish France to be told that unless she agrees to this we can no longer have faith in her. Secondly, we must cease to doubt Germany's future justness, at any rate until we have given her present justice.

I am, &c.,
D. H. BARBER.

The Times, May 12, 1936.

Sir,—If the Abyssinians have paid their subscription to the League of Nations might they not at the least have their money back?

I am, &c.,
J. W. ROBERTSON SCOTT.

The Times, May 6, 1936.

Sir,—Your correspondence columns sufficiently attest the bewilderment and disgust of all good people whose ideals are peace and liberty. I do not think we ought to despair even for the Abyssinians. The Italian dictator is already in search of loans, to judge from reports that his agents are busy trying to borrow in London, Paris, and New York. He is obviously in the predicament of Horace's King of Cappadocia, who had plenty of serfs but no "brass" ("Mancipiis locuples eget aeris Cappadocum rex.") The lust for territorial aggrandisement has brought him to these straits; but the tragedy of poverty and unemployment in Italy is reduced to comedy by his boast that he will "colonise" Abyssinia with 1,000,000 Italians. Even if he confiscates a

tenth of the land already occupied by 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 unfriendly tribesmen, the unfortunate Italians who are selected for export can hardly be settled in the country and provided with suitable implements, seed, &c.. at a cost of less than £250 apiece. As the Italian Budget is already heavily unbalanced that would mean a loan of £250,000,000 sterling which would have to be raised abroad from admirers of Fascism or very innocent investors at, say, 10 per cent.

Though the main and most insistent duty of the British Government is to maintain peace and to defend our own free institutions, we may, I feel sure, look forward with confidence to a very rapid change for the better in Italian psychology as soon as the organised rejoicings are over and the process of confiscation begins. Then will be the time for the League of Nations to act, and for British diplomacy—if it can recover its nerves and its self-respect—to resume the initiative.

Yours, &c.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

The Manchester Guardian, May 11, 1936.

Sir,—Replying last week (April 21st) to a suggestion that if an embargo on oil to Italy had been put on in January the virtual co-operation of the United States might have been secured, Lord Cranborne told the House that:

"The information in the hands of H.M. Government gave no reason to suppose that the United States Government were ready to co-operate at that time."

This is astonishing. As stated by the Washington correspondent of *The Times* on February 26th, the United States during the early months of the war "was not working in concert with the League, but was in advance of the League" in discouraging the traffic in oil with Italy. Government action and public opinion, however, had been much damped down by the Hoare-Laval proposals. Sir Arthur Salter, confirming this view in a *Times* letter on February 29th, described it as "doubtful—but not worse than doubtful" whether the position could then be retrieved. But immediately afterwards this doubt seemed removed by President Roosevelt's renewed appeal, on the occasion of his signing of the new Neutrality Act, to American business men not to sell goods of any sort to either of the combatants beyond the normal peace-time quantities and his statement that "the policies announced by the Secretary of State and myself" last October "will be maintained in effect." This (said the New York correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* on March 1st):

"is interpreted here as giving notice to the League of Nations on the eve of the meeting to consider oil sanctions against Italy that if such sanctions are imposed the executive branch of the American Government will do all it can to support the effectiveness of the sanctions."

He added that the measures already taken were believed to have been "large effective in curtailing the activities of the big oil companies, which are, in any case, inclined to regard Italy as a poor credit risk," but that Government pressure had been less effective with the small producers. The measures alluded to included

"strict examination of the exporters' Federal income tax returns, discouragement of Government aid to ships engaged in this kind of commerce, and the creation of public feeling against offenders."

Further details of the forms of action taken and statements made were given in my previous letter to you on February 29th.

All this suggests that the United States Government has some reason to resent attempts made here to impute responsibility to the United States for the League's failure to impose an oil sanction. Lord Cranborne indeed repudiated "any criticism of the United States" on the ground that "they are not members of the League and are entitled to take what view they like on questions of this kind." It would seem in fact that both the "views" and the actions of the United States have been more helpful in this matter than our own. The question is whether it is even now too late to impose this sanction.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

The New Statesman and Nation, May 2, 1936.

Sir,—It is difficult to understand the mood of defeatism in regard to the League which has followed the occupation of Addis Ababa by the Italian forces.

Military success creates obligations: it confers no rights. The defeat of Abyssinia is not a defeat of the League. If it was right and necessary to impose sanctions when Italy went to war in contravention of international law and morality, it continues to be right and necessary to maintain these sanctions now that she has won it. The same body of public opinion which rejected the Hoare-Laval proposals will be behind Mr. Anthony Eden and the Government in continuing sanctions—in a refusal to condone or accept a settlement of the Abyssinian question imposed by the sword.

We have not prevented Italy winning her victory, but we can still render her victory as barren of advantage as it is devoid of honour.

Yours, &c.,
H. G. ALEXANDER.
H. G. WOOD.

Woodbrooke, Selly Oak, May 8. *Manchester Guardian*, May 11, 1936.

Sir,—Sir Austen Chamberlain says that the Abyssinian war is over and that sanctions should be withdrawn. Thirty-six years ago he and his father said that the Boer War was over because Pretoria was taken and President Kruger had fled. A general election took place on that basis, but the Boer War continued for two years after that. Perhaps Sir Austen is as wrong now as he was then.

Yours, &c.,
ALFRED BEESLY.
Manchester Guardian, May 11, 1936.

Sir,—I strongly recommend your readers to read the letter of General Smuts to the chairman of the League of Nations Union which appeared yesterday in some newspapers.

General Smuts says:—"Sanctions must be bleeding Italy white, and the process must be continued even if she annexes Abyssinia. Unless this happens the League is broken. . . ."

It is all nonsense to talk about the League being beaten. On the contrary, the League has such a stranglehold as will crush the life out of Italy unless she comes to terms in accordance with the Covenant of the League. No nation, although far more powerful than Italy, can long withstand economic boycott by 47 other nations.

As General Smuts says:—"Economic sanctions must prove effectual if persisted in to the bitter end." . . .

Some politicians are saying that to continue sanctions after the war is over would be to seek revenge. But that is a misrepresentation. Sanctions no doubt give well-merited punishment for criminal aggression, but their main objects are to force the aggressor to give up his ill-gotten spoils and to be a warning and deterrent against other aggressions.

Again I quote from General Smuts:—"If Italy succeeds in getting away with it . . . the thing will be repeated on a much greater scale than that of Abyssinia."

Britain after setting her hand to the plough has not been accustomed to turn back. She has good reason to be proud of the lead which she has given to the League, and it is unthinkable that she should now do otherwise than press for continuance of sanctions. Any other course would mean disaster and humiliation. . . .

In the present world crisis let us adopt the slogan of Clan Grant: "Stand fast, Craigellachie."

I am, &c.,
ALEX. WHYTE.

Glasgow Herald, May 9, 1936.

Sir,—. . . For several years, and not only since the regrettable Italo-Ethiopian dispute, a subtle campaign has been carried on almost daily in all Italian papers and by radio, also at frequent intervals by means of lectures and books, defaming our nation in every field of activity at home, in the Empire and abroad, past and present. The so-called comic Press has abounded in obscene caricatures, such as British soldiers bayoneting babies, thrashing natives, &c.

Without such carefully organised and controlled propaganda, the frequent anti-British demonstrations all over Italy, condoned by the authorities, could never have taken place. During the most recent one, on the evening of May 9, the crowds at Milan made allusions to British Somalia, the Sudan, etc., and, of course, the inevitable, customary vulgar references to our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

There is no doubt that the Italian Government, helped also by the excuse of sanctions, has succeeded in its plan, conceived as a matter of policy years ago, in convincing, by Press propaganda, the great majority of Italians and the entire youth of Italy that our nation is decadent, that we played a very minor part in the Great War (few Italians know that many British dead lie in Italian cemeteries), and that we are their only enemy in Europe. Public opinion has been kept systematically and constantly inflamed against us so that Italians should be well prepared and aroused in advance against any eventuality.

Every Italian is now persuaded that we supplied dum-dum bullets to Abyssinia, and that our allegations of the use of gas by the Italian troops are false. It is openly stated by the "man in the street" here that within five years Italy will have conquered the whole of Africa! Italy's anti-British propaganda in India, Egypt, etc., is well known.

We allow authoritative Italians to state Italy's case to our Members of Parliament in the House itself, and to the British public through the medium of our periodicals, but we are denied any access to the Italian public. The Press here frequently reports the speeches of our Ministers at home and at Geneva in a distorted form. The Italian Press carefully suppresses anything printed in the foreign Press that may appear favourable to us, and gives prominence to anti-British opinions expressed abroad. . . .

It is my desire that good relations should be re-established with Italy, but it is well that the Italian Government and people should realise that we are not ignorant of what is going on here, and how deeply we resent their propaganda, which is out of all proportion to the present differences separating the two countries, and is a blot on a nation of Italy's standing. . . .

Yours, etc.,
FAIRPLAY.

Italy, May 14

*The post-mark shows the above letter to have been sent, May 15, from an important Italian city.

Yorkshire Post, May 19, 1936.

. . . Two things we must realise now: First, France is more willing to act with us now than at any time during the last twelve months. Second: that in the world view, and particularly in the near Eastern view, British prestige is bound up with the success or failure of the League now. The recent pacts between Iran, Iraq, Suadi-Arabia and the Yemen; the demand in Trans-Jordania for an Arab union with Syria; the riots in Palestine; the Turkish wish to refortify the Dardanelles; the situation in Egypt—all signify the belief or fear that we are not prepared to play our effective part, that the balance is altering, and that Italy is the master of the Red Sea exits to Australia and India.

There is yet time to prevent Mussolini's successful absorption of his gas-gotten gains. For this purpose the existing sanctions are a lever of the first

importance, for Italy is near financial collapse, though her agents here and her short-sighted "friends" are active in attempting to minimise the effect of sanctions and secure their removal, while there are also those who see profits to be made out of exploitation loans to "develop" Abyssinia.

It is not always clear that the interests of justice and peace are so demonstrably British interests, in a narrower sense, too. The bubble of Mussolini's bluster would be pricked. Are we really to be bluffed into saying we have no further interest in the game when in sanctions we hold the trump card?

The Foreign Secretary asks for a free hand now. It would be disastrous if he were fettered by instructions to surrender at the very moment when with France it is possible to prove that aggression need not be allowed to "pay" in the long run. Future peace depends on it.

DARDANELLES AND SUEZ, 1915.

Yorkshire Post, May 8, 1936.

Sir,—. . . A great deal of misunderstanding has been caused by the fact that Italians—Fascist and otherwise—have believed that Britain is not serious in the attitude she has taken up. I have personally been asked by scores of Italians: "Is your Government really serious; we don't believe it is?" If Mr. Eden, at the next meeting of the League, would move a resolution that Italy be expelled from the League, it would prove more than anything else that we really are serious, and this would have an enormous effect on Italy. Fascist Italy has already assumed that the trouble is over. As the representative of several English firms, I have already received orders for delivery on the 16th June.

The "Victoria" arrived from Bombay a few days ago with every cabin occupied, 90 per cent. of the passengers being British—Government employees, officers, etc., coming from India on leave and most of the fares paid for by British taxpayers. The receipts from fares amounted to 2,000,000 lire (£33,000). Bookings on the "Rex" and the "Conte di Savoia" are normal.

All this has given the impression that sanctions are a thing of the past and that England and Italy will soon be better friends than ever. What a shock it would be, and what an impression it would make, if on the 15th June Italy were expelled from the League. How quickly Mussolini would come to terms if all Italian ships were prohibited entry into the ports of civilised countries!

Yours, etc.,
VICTIM.

Yorkshire Post, May 21, 1936.

Sir,—I am surprised at the statements made in Mr. R. R. Stokes's letter in *The Times* of April 18.

In 1909 I sent in a report showing the need of the conservation of the forests at the headwaters of the Nile, but especially in the catchment area of the Blue Nile. Now since the country has been explored there is also the land to be considered at the sources of the Takkaze (on the east), or better known as the Atbara in the Sudan, and the Sobat rivers (on the south). Both the Blue Nile and the Atbara are big tributaries of the Nile, and as such, in flood time, affect the flow of the Nile in the Sudan and especially Egypt.

The main object of a dam on the Blue Nile on Lake Tana was the storage of flood water of the Blue Nile so as to have sufficient at all times of the year and in all seasons, especially drought periods, for the perpetual needs of irrigation in Egypt and the Sudan.

In other words, Egypt needs the preservation of the forests and with them the control of the catchment areas of the Blue Nile, the Atbara and Sobat rivers. If with the rapid exploitation of Ethiopia in the near future the forests should be destroyed, and with them worse alternating drought and floods ensue, very serious consequences would be felt lower down the Nile. The increase in the quantity of silt brought down by the Nile and especially the great irregularity of its flow would very materially affect the welfare of Egypt and the Sudan.

Last, but by no means least, in the future further irrigation will be needed in the Sudan with its virile and rapidly increasing population, both locally and by immigration. Therefore Egypt and the Sudan are naturally vitally interested in the conservation of the forests and rivers rising in the neighbourhood of Lake Tana and within the watersheds of the Blue Nile, the Atbara, and Sobat rivers.

In the hands of the Ethiopians the position has, up to the present, been safeguarded by treaty duly honoured. Is the future equally well or better safeguarded? The ally and protector of Egypt and the Sudan must always be alive to the most vital needs of these countries and ensure the safety of their water sources of all kinds, both now and in the future. Great Britain and the Empire generally are, after all, the ultimate trustees of the Egyptian, and especially the Sudanese, people towards posterity.

A. H. UNWIN.

Royal Empire Society, London.

The Times, April 30, 1936.

Sir,—. . . That all members of the League of Nations who failed to apply the sanctions that might have saved the country are to blame for the catastrophe is self-evident. Whether these same members will now condone the crime of Italy we do not yet know. But it is to be hoped that all—and they are very many—persons who wish to show their abhorrence of Italy's crimes will con-

tinue to refuse to purchase any goods known to be of Italian origin and, above all, to refuse to visit and spend money in Italy, no matter what Geneva may decide.

Yours, etc.,

M. E. DURHAM.

The Manchester Guardian, May, 1936.

Sir,—I read with much interest the impassioned article of Sir Austen Chamberlain headed "You Cannot Pick and Choose," appearing in the current issue of *Headway*.

I can understand his concern about the fate of the Locarno Treaty, which is his child, but did he not in effect "pick and choose" when he preferred his Locarno pact to the Geneva protocol, which as an instrument of world peace was far superior to the pact, but which he deliberately chose to destroy?

I believe in the sanctity of agreements, but there is a prior agreement to which we as a country are deeply committed. That agreement is the Covenant of the League and the promises based upon this. This country has broken in three matters that solemn obligation:

- (1) Disarmament;
- (2) Japan and Manchuria; and, most horrible of all,
- (3) Italy and Abyssinia.

These three acts of dishonour are bringing disaster to the world.

Sir Austen has a wonderful influence with the Government. I would urge him to use his great power with all the passion he can arouse to see that the Government endeavours to wipe out the terrible stain upon our character as a nation in the lukewarm and supine way the Government has acted in the case of Italy. All the sanctions under Article 16 should be imposed at once, not only including oil, but the withdrawal of our Ambassadors and of all intercourse with Italy, to force her to stop her murderous conduct towards the Ethiopians. Will he do it?

HERBERT H. ELVIN.

National Union of Clerks and Administrative Workers,
(T.U. 916), 17-20, Holborn Hall, Grays' Inn Road,
London, W. C. 1.

Headway, May 1936.

. . . The Court of Arches unfrocks a minister of religion for certain crimes against his cloth; the Jockey Club warns a rider off the turf; the legal and medical professions exercise similar powers; and there is practically no use in the delinquent appealing against their decision.

Yet Italy is still a League member. The decision to stay is being left to her. And, if she does quit, the utmost efforts will be made, as in the case of Germany, to get her to return. . . .

FRED C. HARVEY.

. . . Would not a most effective sanction be the withdrawal from Rome of Ambassadors of League Powers and the expulsion from League countries of Italian Ambassadors? The moral impetus of such an action would surely be very great if not decisive; and it is moral courage and moral action which just now are so imperative. Failing unanimous agreement, it would be desirable for this country to take action independently; almost certainly it would be followed in similar fashion in many of the smaller countries, who regard aggression such as that of the Duce as a direct threat to their own independence.

Such action is well within the international rights of any country, and was actually applied to Soviet Russia in 1925, following the "Arcos" raid. No war or threat of war resulted. Nevertheless, it may be said to have assisted materially in bringing about a new international outlook in Russia. And, whatever her sins may have been, they do not compare with those of Mussolini.

As well as being contemplated by the wording of Article 16 of the Covenant, which is to the effect that all Powers shall confer regarding measures to break off economic and diplomatic relations with an aggressor, this seems to me both a common-sense and a Christian suggestion. It is common sense to refuse to continue associations with a criminal in his crimes. It is obedient to the words of Christ to "wipe off the dust" as a witness against those who offend against His laws.

L. N. U.

Birmingham Post, May, 1936.

Sir,—Canon Villiers emphasises the word "peace" in the following expression of the Pope's rejoicing: "The triumphal happiness of a great and good people in a peace," etc. Would the Pope have spoken so, even omitting "great," if the peace had been secured by Abyssinia's triumph? No! And therefore in his statement it is the word "triumphal" which should be italicised. The Pope has taken up the Italian hymn of praise for a triumph which is morally revolting.

Further, the Pope cannot be excused on the ground which excuses the Italian masses, viz., that he has been misled by Mussolini. The Pope is in a position to know the facts about the Italian betrayal and aggression; he could have opened the eyes of the Italian people at any time; he is the only person who could probably have stopped the war. How *can* one have sat still who claims to be infallible in faith and in morals? Catholics, as well as Protestants, wonder.

R. D. RICHARDSON.

The Vicarage, Harborne, May 16.

Birmingham Post, May, 1936.

Sir,—. . . It would be absurd for a mere layman to presume to call the Pope to account. The war may have been falsely represented to the Italian people by means of a muzzled Press; but this surely could not include the Pope. He, above all men, should be aware of the "ambition and unscrupulousness of the Duce." Therefore, I still say, and that without "arrogance," that the Pope's speech, if correctly translated, was unhappy; and that, in this instance, silence might have proved golden.

May I remind Canon Villiers that there were Englishmen who were brave enough to denounce the Boer War when they thought it unjust?

A ROMAN CATHOLIC.

Birmingham Post, May, 1936.

Sir,—I note that in your issue of to-day you express the opinion that since the Government of Abyssinia has collapsed the time has now come for the abandonment of existing sanctions against Italy. The difficulty which I believe many of your readers, like myself, feel, is that in that case Italy, by being allowed to remain unpenalised in the League, will have, in effect, destroyed the authority of the League from within. Of what use would it be to labour to get Germany into a League which, by condoning Italy's presence in it, had lost all authority?

The question that we all have to consider deeply concerns not only Abyssinia but the very basis of collective security for all.

I am, etc.,

D. S. CAIRNS (Principal Cairns).

The Glasgow Herald.

Sir,—. . . Is the League, having solemnly condemned Mussolini's war of aggression, now to bow before the accomplished fact and allow him to dictate his own terms of conquest? Or is it, at long last, and with full recognition of the possible consequences, to summon its available resources in the interests of such a settlement as would be congruous with its own declarations and obligations? If the League is to surrender Abyssinia and retain Italy as an honoured member on its councils, then we must be prepared to hand down to our children and our children's children a legacy of deep dishonour and a Europe abandoned to moral anarchy and the tyranny of force. If, on the other hand, the League is to assert its authority and demonstrate that the Covenant cannot be violated with impunity, then we must be prepared for the possibility—and probability—of armed conflict. It is, in fact, the same moral issues, albeit set to a grander scale, as that which faced the United States when South Carolina first openly violated the American covenant and defied the Union. Lincoln held the American people to the one imperative of saving the Union in time to secure its being worth the saving. A League that withdrew sanctions and abandoned Abyssinia to the covenant-breaker, and

at the same time recognised that covenant-breaker as a League member in good and regular standing—such a League would not be worth saving and could never command the conscience of the world. And most assuredly it could never save us from future wars. It would be dominated by Mussolini and his imitators, who believe in war and recognise no limit to their will to power, save the limit of available power itself.

This seems to be the issue. It is not a pleasant one for the moral idealist to contemplate, nor yet for the political realist. It will not become more pleasant if we palter with it and leave its settlement to our children.

GWILYM O. GRIFFITH.

The Old Meeting Church, Bristol Street, May 9.

Birmingham Post.

Sir,—The empire of Abyssinia is prostrate, and our Government will be asked to “accept the situation” and leave Italy to do her will. But the probabilities of the future are worth considering as well as the present “facts”—which are not the whole of the facts.

Italy, as long as she can afford to keep her present large forces in Abyssinia, will probably be able to keep that large country down, or at least to keep the main roads open. But the work will be expensive of life and treasure for Italy. “Order may reign” in Addis Ababa while Badoglio’s headquarters remain there—but for how long after? Abyssinia has a way of throwing up native men of leading like Menelek, who cannot be put down.

May we not maintain that, whatever our Government does now, it should do nothing to prevent Great Britain from acknowledging the right of such a leader to rule in Abyssinia? But the acknowledgment of any Italian stranglehold on Abyssinia will recoil upon every European Power which has African subjects, and especially upon our own country.

I am, &c.,

W. EMERY BARNES.

(Emeritus Professor).

The Times, May, 1936.

If a policeman is in the process of restraining a man from a crime he is attempting, does he cease all action when, in spite of his efforts, the criminal succeeds? Surely not. Rather does he hasten up his reinforcements and see that the criminal is brought to trial.

Why, then, this talk of removing Sanctions? Surely they should be maintained and, if necessary, strengthened until Italy has been dealt with, first for aggression and secondly for illegal use of poison gas.

It is only natural that those who were never in favour of the League of Nations wholeheartedly should try at this stage further to weaken its power. Although the League may have failed to stop it, yet it still has time to show

that an aggressor cannot “get away with it,” and that violation of solemn pledges, such as the use of poison gas, do not go unheeded.

Abyssinia placed her case in the hands of the League, and but for that she might have mobilised earlier or acted differently. Is she to suffer thereby? If she does, it may well be good-bye to the prestige of the League and the position this country hitherto held among coloured races. . . .

VICE-ADMIRAL GORDON CAMPBELL, V.C.

Daily Telegraph, May 12, 1936.

Sir,—Is it conceivable that the prestige of Britain has fallen so low that she is now willing Italy should resume her seat at the League without having purged her crimes of breaking the League Covenant by her barbarous attack on Ethiopia and of deliberately contravening the Convention against the use of poison gas?

I believe that a very large body of public opinion, not only in this country but throughout the world, would favour the imposition of progressively more severe Sanctions until Italy shows herself willing to accept a peace treaty with Ethiopia drawn up by the League.

. . . The more severe the punishment the more it may impress other possible Covenant breakers, and deter them from disturbing the peace. After having exhausted her resources in the Ethiopian adventure, is Italy’s cooperation in Europe of any great value? Let Britain remember Caporetto.

Yours faithfully,

H. T. KENNY.

Daily Telegraph, May 12, 1936.

“THE WAR IS FINISHED”

Sir,—Just a word of sincere thanks to the writer of the leading article in to-day’s *Western Mail and South Wales News* under the above heading. It expresses the opinion of millions of people in this country in connection with this ghastly crime against civilisation, and it is refreshing to read such a wholesome and uncompromising condemnation of its author.

If the whole press of this country were as unanimous in its expression of detestation and abhorrence of this abominable outrage as this article, and our leaders in the Government equally as outspoken, the mighty Roman tyrant would soon be made to realise that he has made a hideous mistake and that retribution *will* come—if not through man, by God.

Yours, &c.,

FRED T. COLES.

Western Mail, May 8, 1936.

Sir,—“ We must have arms for 10,000,000 men and sufficient aeroplanes to obscure the sun,” proclaimed Mussolini, and to-day there are thousands of Abyssinian peasants from whose eyes the sun will be perpetually obscured.

Is humanity also blinded, also powerless to challenge such diabolic force? Surely not. Surely it is time for humanity to use the power of the League to restore their rightful heritage to the Abyssinians, to end Italian terrorism and to bring back order to the world. . .

Yours, etc.,
HAZEL M. NAPIER.

Daily Telegraph, May 18, 1936.

Sir,—In the *Daily Telegraph* I read that Signor Grandi, the Italian Ambassador in London, called at the Foreign Office to deliver the text of Signor Mussolini's recent proclamation of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia.

I wonder how long it is since England received such a cool, calm, and calculated insult? How are the mighty fallen! When I fought against Germany in the Great War I little dreamed I should live to see the day when well-known men in the House of Commons would speak as though England were afraid of Italy.

Yours, etc.,
C. M. SWATMAN.

Daily Telegraph, May 15, 1936.

Sir,—. . . Talk of “ national interests! ” Could there be a national interest of this or any other country more important and urgent than to prevent gas warfare from becoming a precedent, and hereafter a commonplace in every future war?

No other breaches of covenant by Italy need be cited. They are trifling compared with this new breach. This is the first time since the anti-gas conventions that gas warfare has been admitted and its overwhelming efficiency proved.

The world is paralysed by the fear of gas, and is barging down to ruin in fascinated impotence. Cannot Great Britain break the spell?

Is it really impossible for the 50 nations at Geneva, or a sufficient number of them, to be made to realise how deeply this new precedent affects each and all?

Here is the greatest rallying cry since the Great War. Let Britain say openly: “ Such and such nations are prepared to go all necessary lengths, if honourably supported, in order so to deal with Italy as to discourage all future aggressors from gas warfare; such and such have declined to help.”

Even the French, if they have secret pacts with Mussolini, cannot have bound themselves to condone gas. . . .

Yours, etc.,
EDW. H. EDE.

Western Mail, May 12, 1936.

Sir,—. . . Might I suggest as a perfectly practicable extension of sanctions that League countries might adopt a measure based upon the idea that Italy, having made war upon one member of the League, has set herself at war with the whole of the League Powers? Under these circumstances, it is not necessary or, if my understanding of the Suez Canal company's powers is right, even possible to close the canal to the vessels of a belligerent Power. But it would be possible to treat every Italian resident in the territory of a League Power as an enemy alien, to intern Italian ships in foreign ports, to both withdraw our ambassadors and to expel the Italian ambassadors, and to arrest all property belonging to Italian subjects in League countries.

In short, it should be possible to institute a complete cessation of intercourse between Italy and the League countries, and this could be done without any military or naval act at all. This should have been done, could have been done from the commencement of Italy's aggression.

Yours, &c.,
JOHN C. L. SIMPSON.

Liverpool Post, May 1, 1936.

Sir,—As the League of Nations may shortly be compelled, by force of circumstances, to raise “ economic sanctions ” against Italy, though many would be glad to have them continued till peace terms were agreed “ within the framework of the League,” may I suggest that all lovers of fair play should refrain from participating in private or organised tours to Italy until such time as by her deeds she may be judged as having returned to the fold of practical Christianity?

Yours, &c.,
WATCH.

Liverpool Post, May 23, 1936.

Sir,—It is a commonplace with us to-day that the Churches failed as the voice of Christ during the last war. We have reproached ourselves with great severity for our half-heartedness in urging the claims of humanity at that time. Many of us are now deeply concerned lest a similar charge should be made, and with greater relevance, when the present state of things is ended. A great nation has renounced its solemn covenant and treated its pledged word with contempt. That is grave; and strikes at the foundation of honour, security and civilisation itself.

But that is not the most serious charge to be laid against Italy. The insolence that has flouted its own vows is now adopting methods of warfare against an undeveloped race which is choking, blistering and blinding hundreds of helpless women and babies with poisonous gas. Italy promised not to do so, as other nations have promised. The question with which I am concerned

is, can the Churches do nothing? Archbishops, bishops, presidents, moderators, scholars can meet to speak at a time of crisis; and occasionally we have a common pronouncement from them. Why do they not unite now to say that, speaking for the Church of Christ, they abhor and denounce what Italy is doing? The Church, as such, has a liberty and an obligation which Governments cannot acknowledge. . . .

(REV.) R. PYKE.

The Methodist Times, April 23, 1936.

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS TO VISCOUNTESS GLADSTONE,
ACCOMPANYING DONATIONS IN RESPONSE TO SECOND APPEAL
FOR RED CROSS AEROPLANE FOR ABYSSINIA

“People here voted for this Government on the promise to support the League of Nations and Collective Security and prevent the criminal and awful slaughter of these poor defenceless people. This breaking of their pledge and the betrayal of the Ethiopians is an outrage on humanity for which we shall have to pay dearly in the future.”

“Your name recalls a great one who would not, as he did not, dally on great issues—he would have raised our Nation to the point where your appeal would not have been necessary—his righteous indignation would have stirred this country to action.”

“I have never known such unanimity of opinion (and I travel much and ‘tap’ opinions of the man in the train and in the hotel) in condemning the French Government (chiefly) and our own, for their undoubted responsibility for the laggard processes which have made possible the continuation of the war, and above all, for the postponement of Oil Sanctions. Had the latter been enforced, your fund would not be in so much need—many men feel with me that we have been disgraced.”

“Would that we had a G.O.M. to move the English nation and shame the French concerning the above [Princess Tsehai’s Appeal]. But we have no Gladstone, no Bright, no Campbell-Bannerman, no John Clifford to rouse either. . . I do trust that some of the *Women of England* will take part in the Albert Hall meeting and that they will *lash, sting* and *scourge* the ‘unprofitable (male) servants’ for their criminal cowardice in thus leaving defenceless Abyssinia to the tender mercies of Mussolini the damned!”

“I am ashamed at the apathy displayed by our Government through the League of Nations, instead of taking the lead in imposing sanctions, they allow France to block the way. My policy towards France in the future would be to let her stew in her own juice if Germany should attack her. Now the Germans have occupied their own territory, France is squealing for Sanctions,

but not against Italy, and now the League is meekly asking Italy and Abyssinia not to use poison gas in future, it is news to me that the latter has ever had any to use. Mussolini has declared a War of extermination of all Abyssinian Forces, it is imperative that the League should take whatever action it may be necessary to prevent this, even if it means War on Italy. If the Statesman whose honoured name you bear had been living to-day, there would have been no Dictator to have troubled Europe so long as the two we have to-day, as W.E.G. would have soon made it an international question. The cause of Liberty and Freedom was the very essence of his soul.”

“We are two very old ladies with very slender incomes, so please accept the enclosed with our best wishes for your success in aid of humanity.”

“The conduct of Mussolini’s wholesale slaughter must make even the most callous of Englishmen cringe with disgust that this man can ride roughshod over a nation of simple people with the world looking on, and the idle chatter of the Committees and still more Committees still going on passes the comprehension of even ordinary people like us.”

“At a League of Nations Union meeting recently I said we needed a Gladstone to deal with the Bully Mussolini as he did with the Sultan of Turkey when the Armenians were massacred in the same way as Italy is now doing in Africa. . . To me we seem to have degenerated terribly since the days of Gladstone, Cobden and Bright and many others like them.”

“I am anxious to send a donation from my oil shares’ dividend to one of the organisations which are trying to help Abyssinia. . . I am filled with horror and consternation at the recent happenings and the way in which that unfortunate people seem to have been let down by the League of Nations.”

“Having been in Belgium and France, 1914-1919, I know from experience what a Hell on earth war can be. . . I realise the great danger of exerting stronger pressure on Italy to end the war, but ‘safety first’ is not always a good motto and extreme caution can verge on cowardice as well for Governments as for individuals.”

“A mite from a lonely old widow of 80 years. I pray the League of Nations will hearken to the cry of these poor peoples and act at once. My warmest approval to Viscount Cecil for all that he has done for the League of Nations.”

“I do hope that something will be done quickly to stop the terrible torture at present being inflicted on the Abyssinians. We in Yorkshire are doing our utmost to get the oil sanctions imposed by writing to our M.P.’s and the Foreign Secretary.”

“I wish there were some means of giving public expression to the indignation so many of us are feeling at the weakness the League is showing in dealing with the Abyssinian question.”

"One feels ashamed to belong to a civilised nation which allows an innocent victim to be savagely attacked by a ruthless aggressor."

"We are all so terribly sorry about the plight of the Abyssinians and so grieved at the way they are apparently being 'sacrificed' by the League, that we feel we should like to send you something for your new Red Cross aeroplane. Even the children of their own accord send one week's pocket money and Nurse also has added a contribution."

"I am a limbless ex-service man. I lost my leg in an aeroplane raid on our lines in the last war. The barbarous and vile cruelty of the Italians in the present war of aggression fills me with horror, and I am fast reaching the stage when I am becoming ashamed of being one of the white races. Can any steps be taken to ensure that Mussolini's murderers do not bomb any further Red Cross aeroplanes . . . while the whole world looks on."

"In answer to your appeal, please accept enclosed as a 'thank offering' for first week's pay after five years' unemployment."

"Please accept this small P.O. . . . from some of the children attending the above-mentioned [Girls' School, Sonning], who wish to associate themselves in helping you to aid the Ethiopian Red Cross."

"I have shown your appeal to other African students in the University with me and the enclosed sum represents what we could raise between us." [Birmingham University.]

"I feel most horrible shame that our country is content to let the poison gas atrocities go uncensured (as in the recent debate on Government foreign policy, ostensibly on the supply question . . .) and to sit in friendly conclave (over the Rhineland matter) with representatives of the nation deliberately guilty of them. In the days of W.E.G. such things *could* not have been done."

"I . . . feel very strongly that we should do something to help Abyssinia in its struggle—something to atone for the procrastination of our own and other Governments."

"As an Australian who is studying here in London, I am filled with a bitter fury at the inertia of the present Government, which will not lift a finger to help Abyssinia because it is afraid. . . An Englishman says he is beginning to feel ashamed of his colour—I, an Australian girl, am ashamed of my race."

"I am ashamed of the silence and impotence of the Government and of the dilatoriness of the League of Nations, which seems to be threatened with disastrous failure."

"To me it seems a disgrace that the British Government is delaying all practical help from this most inhuman war so long thus permitting the aggressors every favourable opportunity for continuing their scandalous procedure."

"I just boil with wrath the way the poor Abyssinians are being treated and I do feel the League of Nations with their endless delays are letting the Abyssinians down badly."

"I do hope that you will do all in your power to stop this use of poison gas and the bombing of towns and civilian population. Of course, everyone knows that our Government could exert more pressure on Italy if it was keen enough. The policy of drift is suicidal from the nationalist point of view and from the point of view of European peace."

"What a pity this devilish work cannot be stopped. As the League of Nations seems almost helpless in the matter, chiefly I think because France desires to stand well with Italy, all that can be done seems to be to relieve the sufferings of the unfortunate Abyssinians."

"I have pleasure in doubling my first subscription to the L.N.U. aeroplane for Abyssinia as a protest against not only the abominable behaviour of the Italian Government but also against the shameful condonation of that behaviour on the part of our Government and those of other great Powers."

"I am ashamed of my country for standing by and letting this devilry continue."

"The attitude of the present wretched Government towards the Italian-Abyssinian war makes one feel ashamed of being an Englishman. Oh, for another W. E. Gladstone. I don't think England would have sunk to the low level in the opinion of the world that she has done if he had been alive."

"It is quite a relief to *do* something to show that we *English* folk *do care* in spite of the terrible procrastination of our politicians in applying sanctions as rigidly as possible and so to help to end this terrible war."

"It is a great pity that a powerful organisation like the League of Nations Union of Great Britain cannot use their influence upon our Government more effectively as hitherto. . . I would strongly suggest an immediate monster demonstration in Hyde Park against this brutal aggressor Mussolini. After this demonstration send a strong committee to the Government insisting that they should stop Mussolini at once at all cost, regardless of France. Or are we allowing to-day to France to rule Europe?"

"I gladly send you a cheque from the Holy Land. . . I trust that there has been a very great response to your appeal. Surely it is up to every true Britisher to subscribe to such an urgent and necessary fund. When one reads of the horrible deeds perpetrated by so-called Christian men, on men, women and children, one feels it's more the acts of devils than of men. Italy must stand disgraced in future."

"I enclose herewith a cheque and may perhaps be permitted to express the hope that the total sum required for the purpose indicated in your appeal may speedily be subscribed. I have lived in Italy for 25 years."

FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE FILES OF THE ABYSSINIA
ASSOCIATION

"Years ago, my son Lt.-Col. H. P—, R.E., was sent by the Khartoum Government to map Lake Tana with a view to draw water for the Sudan—with the consent of the Ethiopian Government. His work was much impeded by a subordinate official and at last Col. Pearson was obliged to stop work and to appeal to the Emperor, who was in a distant part of the Empire. In due time the answer came back—"What is the meaning of this? Have I not agreed to the mapping? The word of a King is the word of a King. Let the work go on." The waiting time my son spent in making firm friends with the women and children. For his services the Emperor bestowed on him the ribbon and star of Ethiopia. It is one of my greatest treasures and memorials of a gallant life laid down in further survey work in Africa.

For his dear sake my whole heart is with the Abyssinians he so loved."

"It must be bitter to a great many British people to feel the justice of Rose Macaulay's comments in last week's *Spectator* about 'the gang of perjured crooks who have obligingly stood aside' and allowed Mussolini to get away with it. It is the word 'perjured' which rankles, for one feels it is the right word."

"My whole heart is sick at the abominable treatment meted out to the brave Ethiopian people by a so-called 'civilised' nation in the most unjustified aggression of any times, modern or ancient. Surely punishment must be meted out at last."

"I believe thousands of ordinary people are feeling a burning sense of shame at our inaction in this matter of heathen versus Christian—save the mark—and would rather be bombed or gassed with the heathen than be associated with our friends the Italians.

I would suggest that we (1) immediately break off all relations with Italy, (2) that we refuse to act with her in our negotiations re European contacts, (3) that we send a peace army of women to Abyssinia.

I have a day too full of common tasks (dish washing and such-like) to permit of any time being spent on 'outside' affairs, but in this matter one feels one's personal honour involved."

"Most people will be glad to do anything in their power to show their detestation of the barbarity which is now taking place in Abyssinia.

May I therefore point out two small things that many people may have an opportunity of doing?

(1) To dissuade any thoughtless acquaintance from visiting Italy, who may be tempted to go there by the cheap lire that Mussolini is now offering, so as to bring much-needed foreign money into that country.

(2) To refrain from buying any travel tickets that they may require from any agency which is now advertising Italian tours or pushing them in any way."

"I have pleasure in enclosing a P.O. for 10/-, and shall be glad if you will kindly enrol me as a member of the Abyssinia Association. I wish I could make it £10, but I cannot give any more just at present, since I have only a temporary job.

I helped with relief work in Russia for 12 months during the famine, after the civil war, and I only hope that Abyssinia will deal a mortal blow to her enemies, as Russia has done."

"It is indeed time there should be a strong and earnest protest against these most cruel and wicked methods of warfare, and our hearts are full of anguish and of sympathy for the victims in Abyssinia.

It is with feelings of relief and gratitude I read of the Abyssinia Association being formed and hope and pray it may prove successful in helping to end these fearful atrocities."

"I am glad to hear the Emperor is coming to London and I trust he may receive a welcome that will assure him of our friendship—in spite of the fact that, as a Nation, we have *so far* given very little practical proof that it is worth having."

"The man in the street is sickened at the spectacle of the League looking on impotent while Abyssinia is done to death with every circumstance of torturing horror."

"I suggest hostile demonstrations in front of the Italian Embassy, processions and the like. . . . I do urge most strongly that instead of merely giving reasons for helping Abyssinia we should give help itself, and that can now only be done by something approaching the nature of rioting."

—(From a Clergyman.)

"I can only send 2/6 out of my Widow's Pension to supplement my prayers for the poor, poor creatures who are subject to such cruelty. In fact, I am so sad and crushed about it that I can scarcely lift up my head, but feel like sinking through the floor."

"I have always been a Conservative, but I feel raging at all the delays and hesitations of the past months. Worst, that England should knuckle under to a bully."

"I cannot help feeling that there is a great body of feeling in the country at the moment which is getting no adequate expression in the press and which is quite prepared to stand by its vote in the Peace Ballot and take all the risks of extending Sanctions to the necessary point. . . ."

"I only wish I could send more and that I were in a position to offer myself.

I feel that not only is a little nation fighting bravely for its life against a cowardly bully but that Britain's honour is in danger.

How it makes one long for a Cromwell and what he did in a similar situation.

Now it seems so like—

‘Mercy and Honour departing, and ever a tepid remonstrance,
Colourless protest, meek, hesitant, halting reproof,
Different notes from these,
Oh! Watchman sound to the midnight,
Loud in a deep lulled land
Trumpeter—sound an Alarm.’ ”

“I enclose 10/- and trust it will help, although nothing can eradicate the shame that one feels as an English subject at the woeful inadequacy and lack of firmness shown by the League of Nations.”

“The appeal of the Abyssinian Princess was heart-breaking and ought to have led to immediate action. It is like standing by and watching the murder of a defenceless boy, without taking the action which in our opinion, every true Christian is bound to take. The Pacifists are surely making a mistake. Honour cannot be upheld without force—nor cruelty stopped, either.”

“It is with the greatest sense of relief that I read in this morning’s edition of *The Times* that a Society had been formed to try to help the unfortunate Abyssinians. It is tragic that so little can be done to help these brave souls fighting for their homes and country.”

“It is an appalling wholesale massacre of people of another race that makes one so disappointed with the League of Nations and its slow inadequate sanctions.”

“I am much obliged for your letter and enclose £1 note. There seems a faint chance of Sanctions being continued, but I fear not from any lead of our short-sighted Government.”

“No public event has ever caused me such intense disgust and humiliation as an Englishman. This pitiable Government has allowed Mussolini to wipe the floor with us. Baldwin’s assertions that the whole object of his policy is peace have been nothing but bleats; but nations do not differ from individuals, and a state of trembling fear has never brought anybody safety yet. What an infinite pity that this Abyssinia Association was not started a year ago. I wonder how the assembly of diplomats at Geneva managed to look each other in the face. We could perfectly well have made France toe the line if we had chosen, and everybody else would have followed.”

“Will you please send me some literature and let me know if there is anything I can do to help, for this appeal does not just mean Abyssinia—it means at heart something common to the dire need of the whole world—it is the call to a crusade.”

FROM THE POST-BAG OF ONE M.P. DURING A FORTNIGHT

(Each extract from a separate correspondent)

“I suppose we are all responsible to some extent, and I find people so ashamed and disgusted with ourselves and our Government that they cannot bear to read the papers.”

“I am feeling sick to my heart and disgraced to my bones about this Abyssinian business.”

“There must be thousands of English men and women who . . . can rest neither by day or night until this monstrous crime is atoned for, or at least partially remedied and the aggressor baulked of his triumph.”

“I write to beg you to press for continued and firmer League pressure against Italy. The latter cannot profit from her victory if the League puts her into Coventry.”

“Nothing since the Boer War has aroused in me such a strong feeling as their [the Italians’] horrible attack upon a brave and independent people. . . This present Government, collectively and individually, will, I believe, be blamed in future histories of these times, and especially will the Prime Minister’s part in the sorry business be condemned.”

“(1) The declared aggressor should not be allowed to profit.

(2) The military success of Italy should cause sanctions to be increased rather than decreased. . .

(3) Great Britain should take the lead in this matter. . .

(4) If we do not do this, not only will it be a terrible blot on our National honour, but Collective Security will be discredited and the danger of a big war in the near future will be greatly increased.

(5) We must be prepared to risk even war, if we are to destroy war.”

“Among my limited circle of friends, there is not one that is not ashamed and disgusted at the course of events, especially of the last few days, when the Government appears to be preparing to give up all further efforts. Sir Austen Chamberlain said, to continue against Italy would be fighting not for peace, but for revenge. Apparently he has never heard of—or has no place for—justice or right; and he is too short-sighted to see it is the best way to ensure peace.”

“I am sure there are many who wish that something further could be done to show how deeply we feel the disgrace of our present failure to help where help was promised and where help is needed.”

“My faith in God impels me to believe that He could have caused the Italian armies to be completely destroyed. But I feel it has been part of His

purpose to allow this terrific sacrifice as a TEST to the Governments, peoples, etc., comprising the League of Nations. How *disgusted* He must be at their dismal and selfish failure. . . My baby is waiting for his bath, so I must conclude."

"This betrayal of the League from within, with its sacrifice of Abyssinia, is one of the most shameful things in our recent history."

"One feels . . . hopeless and wonders if there is anything else which the ordinary 'man in the street' could do to counteract this flagrant aggression, or assist those who are suffering as a consequence of it."

"Certainly the sanctions should not be abandoned or relaxed, but increased, until there is a final settlement of the Abyssinian case."

"This crime against decency and humanity as a whole must not be allowed to continue."

"Tell the Government from us: (a) that we are disgusted with them; (b) that unless a drastic policy of sanctions against Italy is carried out we will agitate against the fulfilment of Locarno . . .; (c) that obligations under the Covenant are joint and several . . .; (e) that we would rather act faithfully and find ourselves involved in war single-handed with Italy than not act . . .; (h) that it is revolting to maintain diplomatic relations with that dastardly criminal Mussolini or to sign any agreement or pact with him; . . . This is a message of warning from many thousands."

"I believe that millions of us must be burning with a feeling of shame and impotence and long for some way to prove to the people that we will not stand for their betrayal."

"I think I voice the opinion of the vast majority of the English electorate when I say that in my view the only thing that can now save the League of Nations is a really bold lead on the part of Great Britain."

Leaders and Other Articles

From the crisis precipitated by an act of aggression as black as any in the history of the world the Emperor emerges as a man not only wise and brave but great. For months he restrained impetuous Rases from hurling back the invader's advance guard, before Mussolini had made his dishonourable intentions clear beyond all question. In every particular the Emperor's conduct of affairs scrupulously conformed to those international conventions by which both he and his adversary were bound; only when those conventions were wantonly broken by the Italians did he throw his armies into the field and his country's cause on the mercy of her fellow-members of the League. Disillusionment and defeat awaited him—disillusionment at the hands of tangled, perplexed and collectively ineffectual Europe; defeat at the hands of an enemy immeasurably better equipped and ruthless to a point beyond barbarity. Gas, in the foulest forms which the ingenuity of man has yet been able to devise, was employed as much against women and children as against the ragged black soldiery; the Red Cross was bombed repeatedly and deliberately. The Emperor—heartbroken, as all who saw him testified, at his country's plight—still kept his head. His diplomatic utterances retained that calm dignity which had distinguished them from the first; and, when his country's cause seemed doomed, instead of seeking a place of safety he went north to join his armies at the front. Here, while bombers scoured the mountains for his retinue, he directed the campaign until it was clear that all was lost.

From the first he had been alone—the only leader in a country which had never known a leader before. To remain in Abyssinia—to die, perhaps, months hence, leading a guerilla raid in the mountains west of Addis Ababa—would have been an empty gesture. The Emperor has served his country with heroic devotion; the strain of his responsibilities has been enormous. Now that those responsibilities no longer, in effect, exist, none will blame him for leaving Abyssinia. The world to-day sees in the Emperor—frail but indomitable, firing a machine-gun while the bombs dropped round him in the heat of the day—a worthier representative of humanity than his conqueror, mouthing self-praise in the Roman limelight.

Times Leader, May 5, 1936.

Mr. Eden goes to Geneva with a mission to consider, along with the Ministers of other nations, what can best be done in the face of existing facts to insist upon their united abhorrence of aggression and to make common action against it more effective hereafter. The British Government can no more abandon its search for these objectives than it can abandon its name.

Times Leader, May 9, 1936.

The liabilities of a lawless act of aggression, and of the flagrant breach of a dozen solemn pledges, cannot be liquidated all in a moment. Nor, it may be added, will the Italians liquidate in a moment the liability now imposed upon

them by the subjugation of vast undefended territories—the goal, as Signor Mussolini tells us, in an unguarded moment of exuberance, of fourteen years' ambition—and by the creation for this purpose of great armies which have still to be restored to civil life. To put it on the lowest ground it would be sheer folly, just when the world is called upon to deal with these new problems, to throw away whatever value there may be in "sanctions."

Times Leader, May 13, 1936.

STOP IT

Horror and anger have swept the civilised world as the full story of Italian brutality and frightfulness in Abyssinia has been revealed and confirmed.

The League must make it bluntly plain that it simply will not tolerate the prosecution of this war. We need new moods, new attitudes, now.

Oil Sanctions must be immediately applied. The war began with October. The Committee of Experts presented its report on petroleum supplies nearly eight weeks back.

Maimed, screaming and blinded Abyssinians are the terrible memorials of that delay. Surely the peaceful nations—not least the United States—cannot still be capable of selling the fuel which alone makes this abominable wickedness possible.

There must be a shipping embargo. No League ships must supply Italy with war essentials. No Italian ships can be served in League ports.

There must be immediate financial assistance to Abyssinia by the League. Is there any who does not blush with shame to think that in their hour of trial, fighting for their free existence, the Abyssinians have had no help from the League members save that of a few Red Cross units which the Duce rapidly smashed out of existence?

And there must, if these measures fail, be the severance of Italian communications with East Africa. The Canal must be closed.

Risk? It is slight. The French have promised "unlimited solidarity of action in the matter of military, naval, and air assistance" against a "mad dog" act.

So have the Turks, the Czechs, the Rumanians, the Greeks, the Yugoslavs, and the Spaniards.

A "mad dog" act would mean that the Duce would be overwhelmed with ruin.

Italy has agreed to peace talks. The Duce must now be firmly warned that his aggression must stop, and that he must accept peace on the League's terms.

He must be given a fair chance, a last chance.

If he refuses, then he must be told that he leaves the League no option. Irresistible Sanctions, collectively decided upon, collectively executed, must come into force.

And he must be told one thing more. While the war goes on, he will not to be asked to give, and he will not be given, any of the frontier guarantees which Europe will be discussing at Geneva on the basis of the French and German proposals.

He will be a self-outcast from the European family.

Daily Herald Leader, April 6, 1936.

The National Council of Labour, beyond all doubt, expresses British opinion in calling for stiffer Sanctions. If only the League will show courage to equal that of its challenger, that call will be answered, and justice will yet triumph.

Daily Herald Leader, April 23, 1936.

LEAGUE MUST WIN

Sanctions were imposed because an aggression had been committed. They must continue to operate, and if necessary they must be stiffened, until the aggression has ceased.

It must be so. For unless, in this instance, the aggressor is made to submit to the law, it is useless to work out new pacts, new schemes of collective security.

None of them can be of any value unless it is firmly established that once an aggressor challenges the League, the League must and will, in the long run, beat him.

That, and not any visionary Italian menace to the Sudan or Kenya is the matter in hand.

Daily Herald Leader, May 25, 1936.

Even if Abyssinia is conquered, the League's account with the Fascist dictator is not settled. How could there be any truce with this man who authorises the use of poisonous gas against defenceless savages and who has the effrontery to say that he did it in reprisal? Was it in intelligent anticipation of the need for reprisals that poisonous gas was sent out to the seat of war months ago?

News Chronicle Leader, April 21, 1936.

GO THE WHOLE WAY

Talk is in the air about "re-forming the League," the imputation being that the League has failed. This talk is dangerous because it diverts attention from the real failure. The machinery of the League is all right: the trouble is that the Powers have failed to put it into action.

The solution of the problem is not to remodel the Covenant, but to use it. The Covenant has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found

inconvenient and not properly tried. There is, of course, a strong case for laying down procedure more exactly and making real provision for backing the League's authority by the ultimate sanction of collective force. But that is a very different matter from saying that the League is a failure.

All the machinery exists for the League still to achieve full success in its present dispute with Italy. . . The choice is between a risk now and the certainty of calamity at no distant date if the European democracies are too cowardly to make this stand in defence of their collective security.

There is one other step to be taken, which should have been taken long ago. Italy should be expelled from the League.

News Chronicle Leader, April 28, 1936.

Italy's haste to annex Abyssinia, and the proclamation of the King of Italy as Emperor of Abyssinia before the throne is vacant, the Negus not having abdicated, has created consternation even in France. It is interpreted quite rightly as an indication that Signor Mussolini intends to do what he pleases with his conquest, and the French are becoming a little nervous about their own interests, especially the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway. Apart from that, it is obvious that Signor Mussolini intends to ignore any claim which the League Council may put forward to be consulted regarding the future of the country. The Negus has appealed to the Council not to recognise the sovereignty which Italy claims to have established over Abyssinia, and he might refer to Article X of the Covenant in support of his appeal. It may be assumed that the League Powers will have no difficulty in deciding that they cannot recognise Italian sovereignty in Abyssinia; but that is a purely negative way of helping Abyssinia to recover her independence. . . . The League will, however, have to act quickly and decisively if it is to restore Abyssinia to the Abyssinians; and the conclusion may well be that it is already too late.

The Scotsman Leader, May 12, 1936.

The Prime Minister on Saturday warned the country that, in the long run, no aggressive Dictator can be restrained unless there is the will and the ability to use force if necessary. The question, therefore, is whether it is worth while for the nations concerned to take that risk together. For Great Britain, there can be no doubt of the position. She cannot afford, in view of her world-wide interests, and of the variety of races living in the Empire, to remain associated with a system which proves its futility in practice and which, when it is tried, only discredits itself and thereby also discredits gravely this country which has based its policy upon it. The collective system is not condemned to failure because of its physical inability to cope with aggression. It can still restore its prestige and the authority of the League if all who comprise the system think it worth the risk and the effort.

Yorkshire Post Leader, April 21, 1936.

Even if Abyssinia is capable of any great development, Italy has not the resources to provide for it. A desperate effort to gain such resources could take one of two forms—taxation and deflation, which means increasing unemployment at home; inflation, the easier and more popular way so far adopted, which spells eventual collapse. These are the realities which, when the enthusiasm stimulated by drum beating and flag wagging has evaporated, Italy will somehow have to face. And the issue may be between the downfall of the régime or the postponement of the evil hour by another desperate adventure.

Yorkshire Post Leader, May 8, 1936.

What is the best attitude to take up towards a defamer of this bullying sort? Certainly not one of undisguised fear. Some people seem to think that our sole care should be not to irritate Italy, lest Signor Mussolini retaliate, even to the point of war. They fail to realise that his overbearing attitude grows by what it feeds on, and the more we show ourselves frightened, the more he will be emboldened to frighten us. Has not that been the history of the past eight months? Not that we would dissent from the calm and passionless tone in which Mr. Eden handled this particular subject. He knew that he had an overwhelming case, and that his words, which must in any event circulate to every Foreign Office in Europe, would gain weight in proportion to their moderation and objectivity. But behind a civil exterior we expect firm action. Italian statesmen have come to treat Great Britain as a sort of butt; and the Italian masses are taught to regard her Empire as a vast but helpless prey, that will eventually let itself be harpooned and despatched without resisting. These are illusions no less baseless than the tale of the dum-dums, but even more dangerous and even more assiduously impressed upon the minds of the Italian people. They, also, require to be exposed and disproved, as they can be by firm action. Otherwise we may find before long, that by trying to avoid war at any price we have only helped to bring war about.

Yorkshire Post Leader, May 20, 1936.

While Mussolini, in the hope of paralysing the League nations, roars out threats of the consequences of sanctions, his Finance Minister endeavours to persuade Italians that "sanctions are good for you." "The only nation which has perhaps gained more than she has lost by sanctions was Italy," he says. And he reaches this remarkable conclusion by retailing figures which show that imports have fallen more than exports. To the figures themselves no one outside Italy will attach the least value. But even if they are accurate—and it is impossible to verify them from the League statistics, which of necessity are incomplete—the argument they are used to sustain is in itself worthless. As well might an individual who had had his income halved claim that he was really better off because he had halved or even more than halved his expenditure! But if he were a student of Italian methods he would

describe the economies enforced upon him as counter-sanctions. In addition, the Finance Minister failed to refer to the severe decline in the income from tourist traffic, upon which Italy depends to redress her adverse commodity balance. Nor did he refer to the fact that gold reserves had been poured away until only some £20,000,000 remain—a circumstance that in itself proves that Italy's external income has declined more rapidly than her external expenditure.

Italy is in fact engaged in the game of issuing bogus prospectuses, the necessity for which she foresaw when the decision was taken to abandon the publication of trade and financial statistics. Exactly how bad the position is no one can say. She began the campaign financially crippled after a long and exhausting struggle with adverse economic conditions. She has had to bear the effects of sanctions—and the anger of the Duce can leave no doubts that those effects have been real—and the great cost of the campaign. Her outlay in Abyssinia is only beginning; another instalment of £32,000,000 was demanded this week. The effort to persuade Italians that all this is profitable and for his own good will require the Fascist régime to ascend, step by step, still dizzier heights of deception. If no outside assistance is forthcoming, escape from this unpleasant eminence will be difficult indeed.

Yorkshire Post Leader, May 21, 1936.

How can the League submit to those accumulated wrongs? Italy is not less the law-breaker because she breaks all laws. Is it suggested that the League of Nations should talk conciliation with the aggressor while he consumes the victim limb by limb? Even the British Government seems to have doubts about the propriety of cannibalism under League Chairmanship.

Manchester Guardian Leader, April 8, 1936.

If Governments can learn by experience, then the last year must have made Europe wise indeed. Some of the lessons are old—for instance, that it is a fatal mistake to leave one Government in doubt as to the intentions of another—but many were necessarily new. For the first time in its history the League was faced with an act of aggression so clear that not even diplomats could hide it; it was not only a test case (as were Corfu and Manchuria) but, if one can use the phrase, an ideal example of wanton aggression. In the circumstances the League was forced to act, and it is to its credit that it did so. Now that its action has been proved inadequate it is easy to say that it was mistaken and that only military sanctions could have saved Abyssinia. That is true enough, but it is only fair to remember that this was the first time that the League had ever imposed sanctions at all and that until then the great majority of League supporters believed that economic sanctions alone were sufficient. The economic sanctions imposed on November 18 were neither thorough nor comprehensive, but against that Italy seemed especially vulnerable to such measures, and only experience has taught us that economic sanctions alone, unless universally and thoroughly applied, can never stop a

State organised for war. It should be remembered also, not as an excuse but for the sake of perspective, that until February of this year no military expert, either in Italy or out of it, believed that Abyssinia would be conquered in six months. Two years or even three seemed the minimum, and it was probably not until the last few weeks that Mussolini dreamt he might claim the whole country. The reasons for this downfall—the superiority of modern arms, the ruthless use of poison gas forbidden by covenant—provide still more unwelcome lessons for our time. . . . Abyssinia, as far as anyone knows, is a land of desert and mountains, without riches of mineral or land, unsuited for European settlement. It is no more than a patch to paint on the map in yellow, green, or blue, or whatever colour represents the Roman Empire to the Roman children. Yet for this Mussolini has killed thousands of Italians, Abyssinians, and his own native subjects, has brought Europe to the edge of war, and undone all the slow labour of fifteen years spent in an effort to construct a new world. The few great ideas of the post-war period—international order, the proper treatment of native races—have been trampled on to make a Roman holiday. Yet now the rest of Europe must begin to build again, for, though the League may have failed in this, it cannot afford to be beaten in the end.

Manchester Guardian Leader, May 4, 1936.

How can any statesman get up to say "I propose that sanctions be abolished, and that Signor Mussolini be now invited to sit with us in order to administer the Covenant"? That is what must happen if sanctions merely lapse. There are some things against which the conscience instinctively revolts. It was so with the Hoare-Laval proposals. It was possible for the British and French Governments, experienced hucksters in the colonial market, to give away other people's property had the League not taken its stand, with them for trumpeters, on moral principle. But moral principle having been accepted as the spring of action, any plan for surrendering Abyssinia died as soon as it was brought to light. So it must surely be now with any proposal to abandon sanctions and take Mussolini back as a loyal trustee of the Covenant, whether against some small State like Latvia or a giant like Germany. The League could not survive such a hypocrisy; it would have inflicted on itself a spiritual death. The choice is not between the maintenance of sanctions on the one hand and their abandonment together with the continued partnership of Italy as a League member on the other. If sanctions go, if Italy is left triumphant over the Covenant, she can have no place in a League which exists to vindicate it.

Manchester Guardian Leader, May 12, 1936.

BOMBING THE RED CROSS

A White-paper, issued last night, discloses in detail Italy's excuses for her admitted bombing, last month, of a British Red Cross ambulance unit. It also shows, beyond question by any reasonable man, that the excuses are so inadequate as to be puerile. Rome admits the bombing of the ambulance unit

—*prima facie* a gross violation of the few decencies that still survive in civilised warfare. Her excuses, as Sir Eric Drummond plainly tells Signor Suvich, are bad in fact and no better in law. Even if the Italian facts were admitted, the Italian law would be rejected. The Italian case for this bombing is two-fold. It is said, first, that Italian aeroplanes, passing on their lawful occasions over Quoram, were attacked by ground fire; and, because of that attack, bombed the unit. It is said, second, that the effect of the bombing was to produce, in the unit's camp, a "dense smoke." From this is deduced that "there was a munitions dump there." And the general effect of the Italian *aide-mémoire* is to warn Great Britain that, if she will insist on sending Red Cross units to help the Abyssinians, she must "have a care and be very careful" that they are not used to thwart Mussolini in his great battle against barbarism. On the matter of fact, of course, the Italian case is nonsense. Nobody in his senses really believes, or can even profess to believe, that this ambulance unit was a screen for attack on Italy's aeroplanes; and nobody really believes that the "dense smoke," said to have followed the bombing, proves that the ambulance tents were camouflaging a munition dump. But, even if the Italian facts were agreed; even if it were true that (from somewhere near the tents where Italian bombers were killing doctors and patients promiscuously) Abyssinian guns were firing; even if it were true that (somewhere near the unit) there was a munitions dump—even so, there would be no case in law for bombing the Red Cross. The effect of this correspondence, to our mind, is two-fold. On the one hand, the extravagance of the Italian charges on points of fact must throw the gravest doubt on similar charges of Abyssinian "atrocities"—Italy's justification of her use of poison gas. On the other hand, the weakness of Italy's case on the legal side must confirm the gravest doubts of Italy's desire to work to the rules of civilised war. In all the circumstances, public opinion in this country may perhaps be a trifle disappointed that Sir Eric Drummond contemplates no more than reserving the right "at the appropriate time and in the appropriate way to claim compensation." It might have been glad of earlier and more drastic action. Meanwhile, Rome will be wise to realise the implication of our renewed protest. For all the diplomatic courtesy of a Note that attributes a piece of barbarism to the ignorance or folly of Italy's agents, Great Britain to-day is increasingly disposed to regard the barbarism as part and parcel of a policy fundamentally barbarous.

The Birmingham Post Leader, April 18, 1936.

SANCTIONS BALANCE SHEET

Lord Davies, moving yesterday in the House of Lords a resolution for which very little could be said, drew from the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs a surprisingly cheerful account of the effects on Italy—and so indirectly on the system of collective security—of such "sanctions" as the League of Nations has managed to get generally, and more or less loyally, accepted. . . . The League has not stopped the war—but Italy has not won the war, either.

"The Italians are faced with the most appalling difficulties as they get further and further from their base. . . . It will be months, if not years, before they can reduce their forces. . . . The war will test Italy's finances and her resolution. . . . The present economic sanctions are having their effect—a rapidly increasing effect as the months go by." At best Italy may still be prevented, by economic sanctions, from getting her way in North Africa; at worst, even if she wins the war, she and the world can be convinced "that war does not pay." If that can be done, and Earl Stanhope is evidently speaking from a Foreign Office brief when he expresses his belief that it can be done, then "we shall have achieved something of which we need not be ashamed."

The Birmingham Post Leader, April 30, 1936.

A "ROMAN" PEACE

Sharp on the entry of Italian soldiers into Addis Ababa, Mussolini last night made his anticipated "broadcast" to the Italian nation of his idea of a reasonable peace settlement. The peace that is "re-established" is to be a "Roman" peace. In a word, Italy has had her way in Abyssinia—and insists on getting her way with the civilised world, the world that still affects to believe in collective security and still professes its faith in collective action against the aggressor. Perhaps the Duce is a little unhappy in his use of the epithet "Roman." It calls to mind rather too easily the complaint of the British chief, quoted by Tacitus, that the Romans, "when they have made a desert, call it a peace." Only in that spirit, surely, can even Mussolini profess that "the people of the Lion of Judah have shown clearly that they wish to live under the 'shade' of the Italian people." After all, the peace now "re-established" was broken by Italy.

The Birmingham Post Leader, May 6, 1936.

Even at this late hour, with opportunities missed (as many of us would say) through cowardice, with "great refusals" made *per viltate*, Great Britain can still save the League by demonstrating, actively and even aggressively, her faith in the League. Sir Austen Chamberlain is honest—and pessimistic. Home from an Austria that fears German aggression and has lost faith in the League, he asks us (in effect) to go back to "power politics"; to regard Austrian independence as a British interest—to be preserved by Britain and France (and even Italy) outside the League. Frankly, with the utmost respect for a great Foreign Minister, we do not think Sir Austen's implied policy is right—or practical. We do not think, in the long run, the cause of world peace can be served by the salvage of Austria—if the instruments are a law-breaking Italy and a condoning France and Britain. Nor do we think this cause of world peace can be served by a Britain that, having allowed French influences to cramp her League loyalty in Africa, now allows French influences to undermine irrationally her League and Locarno loyalties in the Rhineland. Sir

Austen Chamberlain's plan, to our mind, is to go back to 1914 and to the policies that preceded 1914—to "balance of power," with a tendency to regard France as the big weight in the scale. That way, it may be, lies victory in another Great War—a war that may end civilisation. Mr. Eden's job—the job in which British opinion and Dominion opinion is anxious to support him—is to prevent another Great War. Can it be done outside the League? Can it be done, inside the League, unless Mr. Eden has the pluck and the power to do what Sir Samuel Hoare failed to do?

The Birmingham Post Leader, May 8, 1936.

The crucial issue, for the moment, is the retention or the abandonment of economic sanctions. It is suggested, plausibly and comfortably, that one can give up sanctions and still retain all the important things for which the League stands. We find it quite impossible to take that view. Admit, as Sir Austen Chamberlain tells us bluntly, that sanctions have failed "to prevent war or to protect Abyssinia from conquest." Admit that Abyssinia's "independence" cannot to-day be restored "by anything short of a war, the end of which no man can see." Is it still true that sanctions cannot so hamper Italy in reaping her harvest as, in some measure, to remind her and warn others that all is not gold economically that glitters politically? Is it true, either, that sanctions can be abandoned without shaking the world's faith in the whole League system? Shakespeare talks of high failures that overleap the bounds of low success. Here, surely, we are invited to belief in a success founded on the lowest of low failures.

The Birmingham Post Leader, May 11, 1936.

The adjournment of the Council, which everybody confidently expects, with sanctions operative still as a gesture and not much more, gives Great Britain an opportunity to resume her normal hegemony of Europe—if she is prepared to pay the material price. If she believes the League has failed, if she believes "power politics" are the only safe line, then she can say so frankly and act accordingly. We doubt, for our part, if public opinion here would support even a National Government on these lines. We doubt even more whether, in the long run, emasculation of the League will serve even the "power politic" interests of the Empire. But if, as seems to follow from the argument, the true "power politics" of Great Britain are League politics; if only the League can bring together differing parties at home and Dominions with differing interests abroad; if in fact, our true national and Imperial policy is to support the League—then the Council, when it re-assembles in June, may reasonably expect a lead from Great Britain comparable with the lead Sir Samuel Hoare gave at Geneva last autumn—and a lead that will be followed up in this country less fearfully and with more resolution.

The Birmingham Post Leader, May 12, 1936.

For our part, we do not exaggerate the effects of continued sanctions nor underrate the possible cost. We do hold that, whatever the price and however inadequate the return from continued sanctions, it would be fatal to relax them now. Nor is that view altered after reading the Pope's astonishing address at the opening ceremony in Rome of the Catholic Press Exhibition. If the Holy Father can, even in Rome, broadcast a reference to "the triumphal joy of a great and good people at a peace which it is hoped will be a prelude to true European and world peace," it becomes more than ever imperative that mere heretics, with ordinary ideas of greatness and goodness and ordinary ideas of what constitutes "peace," should maintain, if only as a gesture and a gesture that must involve risk and may involve sacrifice, their resistance to a wicked war, wickedly waged.

The Birmingham Post Leader, May 13, 1936.

Mussolini's shriek of triumph will find no echo outside Italy. There are none so poor to do reverence to his victory of aggression. . . . His ruthless and indefensible aggression belies the policy of the League and every solemn assurance that he has given to it; and as he has succeeded thus far in this criminal course without suffering any penalty, none can say which Power will be the next to follow his evil example. . . .

Retribution is not in human hands, but if it were there ought to be a day of heavy reckoning for this Fascist scourge, the like of which has not been seen in Europe since the days of the infamous Borgias.

Western Mail Leader, May 6, 1936.

It is contended that because sanctions have failed to defeat Italy, they should be buried at once with as little ceremony as possible, and Mr. Eden is being urged to turn round and "scuttle" the League. We do not believe the Government will pay much heed to these counsels of despair. They are not likely to add to the general humiliation which successful wanton aggression has inflicted upon Europe by stultifying themselves and the policy to which they have steadfastly adhered throughout the crisis. Their task is not to scuttle the League but to salvage it if possible. . . .

It is specious to argue in the present situation that sanctions having failed are worthless and should be permanently abandoned. The truth is that they have failed because they were not faithfully and promptly applied.

Western Mail Leader, May 11, 1936.

Obviously, nothing would suit Signor Mussolini's book better than for the League to consent to ignore Italy's shamelessly brutal aggression upon a fellow-member and let him proceed quietly with his self-styled civilising mission. It is hardly conceivable, however, that the League could survive such a surrender of its fundamental principles as acceptance, as a thing done and finished with,

of the seizure of Abyssinian territory. In some way Italy has to be made to feel that she has played the robber-State, repudiated her international engagements, and brought Europe into grave peril. It is the urgent business of the League, if it is to survive the shock of the Abyssinian episode, to turn back the tide of violence which, in existing circumstances, Signor Mussolini's conduct is liable to evoke not in Africa alone.

Liverpool Daily Post Leader, May 12, 1936.

The history of eight months has certainly shown that the League is not wholly powerless. If the League now managed to exert such pressure as would ensure it a say in the future settlement of Abyssinia, the way would be clearer for that reconstruction which is an essential of the situation. Such a course would neither be a dangerous challenge to a victorious Italy nor an admission of the fatal principle that might is right. As Sir Austen Chamberlain has said, we cannot reverse the position in Abyssinia without a war. But that is no reason for letting Italy walk away unconditionally with the spoils.

Nottingham Guardian Leader, May 12, 1936.

It is practically certain that before long Italy must take steps for financial rehabilitation; yet if she wants a loan she is not going to get it while sanctions prohibit such assistance from any League Power. She could solve the problem by making to the League such a gesture as would result in the calling-off of sanctions, but in her present temper of determination not to be done out of her victory there is not only no prospect of her submission but the view is taken in Geneva that she may go so far as to leave the League. In that event she would find it still more difficult to raise her loan, and her financial and economic position would grow progressively worse.

The situation is, in fact, not much less tangled and difficult for Italy than for the League.

Nottingham Guardian Leader, May 14, 1936.

It (the War) has been won by an equally shameless breach of the solemn Geneva agreement prohibiting poison-gas. It is difficult to conceive a nation placed more completely in the posture of the treaty-breaker than Italy has been, alike by her war and by her victory. . . . Signor Mussolini's idea that, because he has killed Naboth and entered his vineyard, he can quietly do what he likes with it and its fruits in perpetuity, ought not to be entertained. The League is in a position to impose a different solution. To do so, the co-operation of the French Government with our own will be needed; and all the signs suggest that, when the new Cabinet resulting from the General Election takes office, that co-operation will be much more cordial, and go much further, than has ever been the case in this sphere during the past twelve months. The League has been severely tried. But it is premature to talk of its abdication. The right word is "steadfast."

The Sunday Times Leader, May 10, 1936.

IF THE LEAGUE DIES

If the League dies on May 11th, its cowardly betrayers will vie with one another in protesting that the League is still alive; that the blow dealt to it by Mussolini has not been fatal; that Great Britain has suffered neither defeat nor diplomatic humiliation; and that, after giving Abyssinia a hasty burial the Stresa powers can settle down together again as though nothing unpleasant had ever happened to disturb their harmony. We venture to predict with some assurance that this is not the way in which—if the League dies—the next chapter of history will unfold.

We may be asked: Why should Britain not swallow pride and humiliation alike, and after a decent interval bury the hatchet with Italy? There is a conclusive answer. The people of this country are, by now, fully sensed of the importance of Japan's and Italy's acts of wanton aggression. If a British Government asks them peaceably to lie down with one proven aggressor in the hope of turning away the covetous eyes of another, the same shrewd indignation will arise as almost swept the Government from its seat four months ago. Even considerations of power-policy show that Britain's interests can in no way be served along that path. For the conquest of Abyssinia, which France has made possible for Italy by sabotaging the League, is only a first step towards Mussolini's intended re-acquisition of the African and Asiatic provinces of the Roman Empire. His next step will be to extend his dominion over the whole of the Mediterranean and the Nile Basin and the Red Sea.

Economist Leader, May 2, 1936.

. . . Haile Selassie is neither a Leonidas nor a Chinese war-lord. Fate cast him instead for that most difficult of all political rôles; a mediator between things new and old. Haile Selassie's mission was to save the immemorially old independence of a backward African Christian country by bringing it up to the level (such as that now appears) of our Christendom in Europe. Everything indicates that he would have succeeded if one European Christian Power had not planned a crime and if the rest of Christian Europe had not flinched from the duty of bringing the criminal to book.

If we call the roll of statesmen concerned in the international tragedy of the first twelve months and compare their performances, the fallen Emperor of Abyssinia stands out in moral stature head and shoulders above the Mussolinis and Lavals and Hoares and Baldwins. And his last message to the world as a reigning sovereign ought to cut to the heart. "I must still hold on," he said to *The Times* correspondent of Addis Ababa as lately as April 29th, "until my tardy allies appear, and if they never come then I say prophetically and without bitterness: 'The West will finish.'" Haile Selassie may live to witness the Apocalypse from Jerusalem.

Economist Editorial Note, May 9, 1936.

The maintenance of sanctions, then, was the right course as things stood this week. It is absurd to describe it, as a correspondent in *The Times* did the other day, as merely a method of giving vent to our indignation. It is childish—with that supreme childishness that we have learned to expect from Italian journalists—to talk of it as spiteful malignity towards Italy. And the so-called logical argument for the ending of sanctions is specious. The purpose of sanctions, we are told, was to stop the war. The war has stopped. Ergo, sanctions should stop. But the answer is that what has stopped is the Italian war against Ethiopia, not the Italian war against the League and the rule of law. It is still imperative to settle that issue—and not merely for the sake of vindicating abstract principles; it is a life and death matter for millions of human beings and for civilisation itself. To surrender tamely to Mussolini to-day is to encourage him—and another, who may be a still more formidable danger—to further aggression to-morrow. As for the notion of welcoming him back, black with treachery and red with blood, to assist us against that other—do we really believe in Satan casting out Satan? . . . If sanctions are to be continued, they ought to be intensified. And that brings us to the second question. Do the League Powers really mean business? Is it their intention to make the effort now, at this eleventh hour and fifty-ninth minute, to defend the Covenant and salvage even a remnant of Abyssinian independence? If so, they will have to show, and that quickly, a new unity and a degree of determination that has been sadly lacking all through this tragic episode. They may have to face the risk of war with Italy—a risk which they ought to have faced six months ago when it would have been a far less serious one. It is a grim prospect, to be sure. But what is the alternative? Not merely a shock to our moral sense by the triumph and reward of the aggressor, but the collapse of the League and what it stands for, and with it the risk of other wars.

The New Statesman and Nation Leader, May 16, 1936.

A MEDITERRANEAN PACT?

At the moment Conservative opinion is divided on everything except the desirability of more armaments for an undefined policy. Even those who have most derided the League are troubled by the new Italian menace. But since the Government does not intend to risk war and finds it embarrassing to propose the removal of existing sanctions a kite is being flown to see if the dilemma can be solved by a Mediterranean pact. Hence official propaganda, which last week blew hot about dum-dum bullets and the maltreatment of Mr. Bunner, is this week preparing the way for a settlement with Mussolini. The Duce on his side is co-operating by granting interviews in which he declares that he will respect British interests and that Italy is now a "satisfied Power." If this new plan succeeds, Italy's absolute possession of Abyssinia will be recognised and, under the pretence of rebuilding the system of collective security, she will take her place on the League Council and accept a pact of

mutual assistance with all the Mediterranean Powers on the understanding that she co-operates in preventing German expansion in inconvenient directions. Behind the Duce's reasonable tone lies his need for money. He cannot raise it directly in France or Great Britain, but rumour is strong in official quarters that he hopes to use the League and the Mediterranean settlement as a screen for a loan on condition that he promises gradually to pay his debts in foreign countries. It would also enable him to keep things quiet at home, to train his African troops and to pursue his Balkan and Near Eastern ambitions. It would, incidentally, have the result of finally disgusting many of the smaller Powers with the League and of dividing Europe again into a system of alliances.

The New Statesman and Nation, May 30, 1936.

NATIONALISM RUN MAD

It is satisfactory that the illuminating exposure of the amazing origins of the allegation that this country had supplied dum-dum bullets to Abyssinia has forced the Italian authorities to withdraw this charge. Meanwhile, the aftermath of the Abyssinian war is proving as grotesque and gruesome as was to be expected. In Italy all Fascists between twenty-one and fifty-five years of age have been ordered to join the Militia, "thus confirming the inexhaustible warlike spirit of the Blackshirts and the character of the Roman peace"—"peace" is good! Amongst the worst of the inhumanities that are now taking place in Addis Ababa is that of shooting Ethiopians for carrying arms before they even had time to know that this age-old, and indeed, largely necessary, custom has been declared illegal. Mr. George Steer, *The Times* correspondent, gave an amazing instance of the kind of thing that is happening, in the last report he was able to send home before being ejected from the country: "Herr Adel, an Austrian banker living within the confines of the Belgian Legation, returned home in the afternoon of May 9 to find that all his servants had been removed by Italian soldiers. He immediately went to the Military Governor to protest and to request the return of his servants. He was asked to return the next morning, when he was informed that they had been shot during the night. Some of them had been with him for twenty years and had guarded his house faithfully during the recent looting when the Belgian Legation was attacked. It is believed that they were all unaware of the new decree." Marshall Badoglio's decision, to which we refer overleaf, to get rid of as many impartial eye-witnesses as possible is a wise one. Though the horrors will go on, we shall doubtless hear little more of them.

Time and Tide Note, May 23, 1936.

THE POISON-GAS CAMPAIGN

The citizens of this and other countries have read for six months and more with sickened disgust of Italian military successes owed to the aeroplanes which detect every movement of an enemy "blind" himself, and drop tons

of bombs on his camps and concentrations while he has hardly a machine that can attempt a response. But that is in a sense legitimate warfare, except when the objectives of the attentions from the air are Red Cross units or open towns like Harar. It was the memory of gas-war in Europe from 1915 onwards that led to the treaty of 1925, whose signatories, including Britain and France and Italy and Abyssinia, bound themselves to abjure absolutely and for ever the use in war "of asphyxiating, poisonous and the other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices." That was in 1925. This is 1936. For so long and no longer has Italy's signature been honoured. She has broken her pledge without even the hollow excuse of military exigency. She did not need gas to win the war. Her aeroplanes and tanks and heavy guns were blasting from her path an enemy devoid of all such weapons. Her assumption of the badge of barbarism is gratuitous and deliberate.

The Spectator, April 10, 1936.

The report of the head of the Dutch Red Cross unit in Abyssinia, to the effect that he had lost 64 out of his 67 mules owing to the grass being poisoned by mustard-gas bombs dropped by Italian aeroplanes, should not go unnoticed. A fortnight or more ago, when the first reliable reports of the use of poison-gas were being received in this country, a British General commented on the immense suffering that would be caused to animals, quite apart from the injuries to human beings. Men and women can at any rate make some attempt to protect themselves from asphyxiating gases, but animals are obviously blind and helpless victims, and the lot of any beast wandering into a gas-area for weeks afterwards may be simply a lingering and agonising death.

The Spectator, April 17, 1936.

A DEFEATED LEAGUE?

While a Budget is being introduced and discussed in the House of Commons events are happening in Africa which through their ultimate reactions will determine the character of British and many other Budgets for a generation to come. Mr. Chamberlain has given us this week a trifling foretaste of the bill we are going to have to pay for armaments in the future because the attempt to substitute law for force in the world has broken down. But that part of the bill concerns only money. The Prime Minister on Saturday in guarded and inadequate words hinted at the other part, payment in seared bodies and agonising deaths, not of men in the trenches but of men in their offices and women in their homes and children in their schools in London and Manchester and Birmingham and Newcastle, and in the Londons and Manchesters and Birminghams and Newcastles of a dozen countries in Europe. Mr. Baldwin was emphasising the argument that fulfilment of the pledges which every civilised State has given not to use gas in war must be insisted on.

The argument, actually, is not worth framing, much less emphasising. If there is war at all there will be war with every circumstance of barbarism and hideousness that the ingenuity of the world's greatest geniuses and most elaborately trained scientists can impart to it. Even the excuse that a nation with its back to the wall must clutch any weapon in reach is superfluous. Italy has had her back to no wall in Ethiopia. She has tanks; the Ethiopians have none. She has heavy artillery; the Ethiopians have none. She has aeroplanes enough to darken the sky; the Ethiopians hardly have a machine worth calling an aeroplane at all. Yet in cynical violation of one more solemn pledge she sprays her naked victims with poison-gas from the sky, and it is to gas, as *The Times* Special Correspondent at Addis Ababa asserts categorically, that her recent spectacular successes on the northern front are mainly due. The conclusion is inescapable. To abolish gas-warfare, it is necessary to abolish war.

The Spectator, April 24, 1936.

RED CROSS AND LEAGUE

The sustained refusal of the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva to give the League of Nations access to information in its possession regarding attacks on the Red Cross in Abyssinia, raises questions which must be taken up vigorously by national Red Cross organisations in different countries. The so-called International Committee, it is stated, consists solely of Swiss citizens and renews its personnel by co-option. That is an astonishing anomaly in itself. This body now withholds information from a League of Nations anxious to protect the Red Cross, on the ground that the League is a political organisation, and has taken up a political attitude by imposing sanctions on Italy. If the attempt to substitute law for force is alien to the ideas of the International Red Cross Committee, so much the worse for the Committee. But the matter comes nearer home than that. If the national Red Cross organisations, which the International Committee professes to represent, do not protest sharply and with effect against the action of M. Max Huber and his colleagues, they will rightly share the discredit attaching to it.

The Spectator, May 1, 1936.

THE DESTROYER

The Foreign Secretary is not to be envied the task that faces him next week at Geneva. Italy is in possession of half Abyssinia. The Emperor and his Ministers have fled. Most of Addis Ababa is in ruins. A war openly prepared for nine months by a Great Power in the face of the world against an unarmed and unoffending African people has run its inevitable course, and Abyssinia has appealed to the League for effective help in vain. Italy, having made a desolation and called it peace, will no doubt urge plausibly that the

past be treated as past, Abyssinia be left to the civilising care of Marshal Badoglio or General Graziani, and the number of League States be quietly reduced by one. That would be the final humiliation, and there is no ground for believing that either this country or the League of Nations is prepared to drink that cup yet. The League stands committed to certain principles which it cannot abandon and survive. It has declared formally—what was of course blazoned in any case across the sky—that Italy was guilty of an unprovoked attack on Abyssinia. A League committee drew up a scheme for the reform of Abyssinian administration which, while it never came up for formal approval, was generally accepted as the maximum limitation that could in justice be laid on the sovereignty of Abyssinia. Justice has not become a different thing because Italian aeroplanes and gas have shown themselves more effective weapons than Abyssinian rifles. And the question once more poses itself, whether the aggressor is to be allowed to profit by his perjury and aggression and retain his place in a covenant-keeping society of nations.

The decision on that will determine whether the League of Nations is for the future to be a philanthropic society or a political force. The first problem that arises is whether any recognition can be given to an Italian annexation, open or veiled, of Abyssinia. The answer to that can hardly be in doubt. No League State—with the momentous exception of Salvador—has yet recognised the achievement of Japan in Manchukuo. Sanctions, moreover, are, of course, still in force. To remove them at this moment would be a plain condonation of Italy's crime; the case for extending them is strong. Can the League go so far as to insist that Italy shall not profit by her aggression? Or is it with its fifty members, three of them Great Powers, incapable of doing what groups of States, or even single States, have done repeatedly in the past? When a Great Bulgaria was constituted under the aegis of Russia in 1877, the Conference of Berlin was summoned, and Russia and her *protégé* gave way. When Japan conquered China in 1895 and annexed the Liao-Tung peninsular, three European States, Russia, Germany and France, compelled her to relinquish her booty. When a French force set foot in the Nile Valley in 1898 this country, single-handed, forced its withdrawal. It is still not too late for the League to insist on the establishment in Abyssinia of a *régime* consonant with justice, without Italian domination, though the difficulties of its task are immensely aggravated by Signor Mussolini's faculty for destruction, which has substituted anarchy and chaos for the cohesive influence of a wise and strong personality. But whatever the League may be able to achieve, there is no question what the League ought to attempt. Of Mr. Eden no one will ask the impossible. This country cannot and should not take individual action; it remains to be discovered what the attitude of the new Government in France will be. But it would be unjust to charge other States with hanging back till they have been challenged to go forward. If Mr. Eden presents the challenge and finds no response, then and only then will he be entitled to claim that Great Britain has done all it could. In that event our whole relation to the League will be called in question.

The Spectator, May 8, 1936.

THE PLIGHT OF ITALY

Italy is said to have won the war. That is triumphantly proclaimed in Rome and impetuously echoed by a limited company in this country. Has she? The ultimate profit and loss account must be compiled in a more temperate atmosphere than prevailed in the Piazza Venezia at Rome on Saturday night. . . .

Now the shouting is dying down, and the prosaic business of the payment of the bill presents itself. Of Italy's financial situation nothing definite is known, for all information bearing on that is withheld. But she is believed to have lost practically all her gold, and to have exhausted the possibility of realising her holdings of foreign securities. The figure to which the national debt has risen since the inception of the Abyssinian campaign can only be conjectured, but it is computed in responsible quarters that the interest on it amounts to not much less than half the Budget revenue. Tourist traffic this year will suffer heavily. Peace, moreover, brings its problems no less than war. The industrial population of Italy has so far fared reasonably well, for the needs of a quarter of a million men in East Africa have kept the war industries in the widest sense booming. Now all that ends. Peace has been re-established. Most of the quarter million will soon be coming home, either to flood the labour market or to continue an unproductive life with the colours at the public expense. To what employment will the war-industry workers transfer themselves? Not to any export trade, for Italy's export trade has been strangled by sanctions. An intensive production of substitute-commodities may be attempted, but at the best an insoluble employment problem is looming up. Only through an external loan can Signor Mussolini find salvation, and there is no country in the world to which he can turn for that. . . . Even the existing sanctions are proving more effective every month. The most recent returns from 19 countries that have reported to Geneva show that the imports of those countries from Italy in March, 1936, reached a value of 1,802,000 American dollars, against 7,194,000 in 1935. Exports to Italy, on which there is little restriction except Italy's dwindling purchasing-power, fell from 9,836,000 dollars to 5,742,000. April's figures will be more striking still.

The plain truth about the present situation could not be better stated than it was in the opening words by Admiral Gordon Campbell, V.C., in Tuesday's *Daily Telegraph*. "If a policeman is in process of restraining a man from a crime he is attempting, does he," asks the Admiral, "cease all action when in spite of his efforts the criminal succeeds? Rather does he hasten up his reinforcements and see that the criminal is brought to trial." The League has still reinforcements to call up, in the form of more vigorous sanctions. There is no punitive, still less any vindictive, purpose in their adoption, or in the mere maintenance of existing sanctions. The League's only concern is to make naked annexation in cynical defiance of Covenant obligations impossible. If force is to be the deciding factor in world affairs, there is no place for a League of Nations. If aggression is allowed to pay, there will soon be more

aggressors. And the converse is no less true. If this country and France can at last, as may reasonably be hoped, co-operate in the framing at Geneva of a just peace-settlement, and jointly lead in the maintenance of economic pressure on Italy till that settlement is accepted, it will be the League, not the Fascist hierarchy, that emerges victor from the contest. That is a war that Italy has not won—and may yet lose.

The Spectator, May 15, 1936.

THE FUTURE OF THE LEAGUE

... What we have to face to-day is the division of the Great Powers into what one may without offence call the Civilised and the Backward. This is not to impugn the patriotism and single-mindedness of the rulers of Germany and Italy. The massacre of Drogheda may be set beside the events of June 30th, 1934, in Germany. But would Cromwell, with his 17th-century mind, be a helpful member of a 20th-century international association?

Thus the first question to be decided is whether the existing League should be continued without reference to the political principles and domestic *régime* of its members, or whether it would not be better to fall back upon a more limited association, the members of which would be inspired with common ideas, forming a natural basis for common policies.

If we wish the existing League to continue, with or without changes in the Covenant, we must face the anomalies and unrealities—one might go further and say indecencies—involved. Thus Italy was in September last appointed by her fellow-members of the Council to be Rapporteur for Legal Questions. She also conducts, under the auspices of the League, an International Institute for the study of Private International Law. She has broken five international treaties since she assumed her Rapporteurship. This is only one among the many major and minor incongruities involved by the existing Geneva system.

Until recent events it could be argued that the moral authority of the two liberal Great Powers and of the smaller European democracies was sufficient to outweigh the active influence of the disciples of Macchiavelli and the dead weight of the large crowd of nondescripts. We have to face the fact that this will no longer be the case. For some time at least the famous "atmosphere of Geneva" will be chilly—not to say glacial. This is not a reason for winding-up the League or for conducting a heresy-hunt among its members—an impossible task. But it *is* a reason for the British public to realise that the League in which Italy remains a member and wherein we profess eagerness that Germany should join is not the symbol of that New Order which President Wilson proclaimed.

It is also a reason for considering whether the time has not come for closer association, however informal, between the peoples who still hold fast to liberal and constitutional principles, or, to use the language of Sir Alan Anderson, in a recent letter to *The Times*, between "those nations which wish to substitute justice for force as the international arbiter." Perhaps an

even better formula would be "peoples between whom war has become unthinkable," because considerations of relative power do not enter into their calculations. These, in terms of 20th-century politics, are the truly civilised peoples.

The Spectator, May 15, 1936.
Article by Sir Alfred Zimmern.

When Serbian Revolutionaries murdered their Queen, we withdrew our minister. When civil war was raging in Russia, we sent arms and armies to support one side in that war. When our citizens there were in danger we took instant and effective economic measures, acting on our own. No corresponding things are being done to restrain Italy. We could withdraw Ambassadors; we are not doing so. We could stop completely the supply of British oil. We are not doing so. We could have raised the whole question of the use of the Canal; we have not done so. We could supply Abyssinia with anti-gas medicines and masks; we are not doing so. We could give to France such assurance of undoubted and automatic action on the Rhine in the event of her being in danger from Germany that her hesitations about the alienation of Italy would be overcome; we are not doing so. None of these things or similar things are being done or are likely to be done.

It is not that our statesmen are monsters, indifferent to these abominations, or that they would not personally make almost any sacrifice to bring them to an end; still less are they swayed by "capitalist" considerations, or any other nonsense of the Marxist. Nor are our people callous. They are deeply stirred by what is going on in Abyssinia. But also they are direly confused, and their confusions spell, for the statesmen, paralysis and impotence.

For the least move made for really effective action is at once stopped. By whom? Not by vested interests, not by the armament makers, not by the oil concerns, not by evil men moved by selfish considerations. They are stopped by good men moved by the very highest considerations; by that section of the Churches which takes the early Christian view; by a large section of the Peace Movement; by the more uncompromising element in the Labour Party; and by the indecision of men of all parties and all creeds; by a division of opinion which cuts athwart all the old doctrinal boundaries.

The protests might be disregarded by the politician if it were confined to the Churches, to sections of the Peace Movement, to the Left, to the extremists. But this attitude is also, suggestively, that of the other end of politics and doctrine: it is the attitude of the true blue Conservative, the Imperialist, the militarist, the Jingo. Lady Houston joins voices with Mr. Lansbury. And that becomes significant. Motives may be different, but votes go into the same box.

Says a Government spokesman:

There is only one way to save Abyssinia: to close the Suez Canal to Italian ships. It might mean war with Italy. Does the Opposition suggest that we should risk war with Italy? Would you throw this country into a war with Italy in order to stop the war between Italy and Abyssinia?

That question quite effectively silences criticism because no one dare answer plainly, Yes. And yet—and this is the tragic paradox of the situation—it is precisely because at no stage in the past have our Government or our people been ready to answer, Yes, that war has come; that the mustard gas to-day flays alive the women of Ethiopia and to-morrow may flay alive the children of our cities.

Had we been prepared in the past to say in effect to Italy:

If you invade Abyssinia we shall do certain things, even if you do interpret those things as an act of war and make war upon us;

Had we said that, there would have been no invasion, no war, no mustard gas; no blinded children.

Foreign Affairs Supplement to *Time and Tide*, May 2, 1936.

Article by Sir Norman Angell.

Speeches and Statements by Church Leaders

THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, held at Church House, Westminster, April 29, 1936: He had never in his life found it so difficult to restrain his language as he did in speaking about what was happening in Abyssinia at that moment, when a professedly Christian nation told the natives in one sentence that it was bringing peace and civilisation, and in the next that, unless they accepted peace and civilisation as they were brought by bombs and poison gas, their people might expect to be massacred. What was so trying was the impotence of Christian Europe. He asked the meeting to think and pray as to how in the future the united powers of Europe—he would say the civilised world—might so strengthen the League of Nations that such things would become impossible. He mentioned that because he knew with what intense concern all the peoples of Africa were watching the way in which Christian Europe was dealing with one of them.

The Guardian, May 8, 1936.

THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORK (Dr. Temple), in a message to his diocese, says: The stories which have reached us concerning the conduct of the war in Abyssinia by Italy have aroused a greater volume of indignation in this country than any event for a long time past. And most rightly so.

The war itself is an outrage. But for a civilised Power to use poison gas dropped from aeroplanes on a people scarcely equipped with any of the weapons of what we are pleased to call civilisation, is a horror past description. Every Christian heart should be filled with shame and anger, and every Christian voice loud in protest. Our Government will have the eager support of Christian public opinion in England in any step that they can take in conjunction with other members of the League of Nations for ending so monstrous an evil.

The Church of England Newspaper, May 1, 1936.

DR. NORWOOD, at meeting of Free Churches of London, held at the City Temple, April 16, 1936: We loathe to the point of nausea the Italian descent on Abyssinia, and even more the iniquities with which the warfare is being conducted against a defenceless people. We loathe the Italian claim that they are carrying on a civilising mission. Our detestation is no less severe of the propaganda by which the noble Italian people have been led to believe that they are doing something fine and great with methods which inspire the disgust of all the world.

THE BISHOP OF ST. ALBANS (the Rt. Rev. M. B. Furse), addressing the Diocesan Conference at Hitchin yesterday, said that they looked in vain for any outspoken denunciation of Italy's criminal conduct from the head of the largest Christian communion in the world, whose seat of government was at Rome, and who claimed to be the Vicar of Christ on earth.

During the last eight months there could be few if any of them who had not felt an unceasing sense of shame and humiliation at the impotence of the civilised world to stop a great powerful Christian nation, itself an original member of the League of Nations, from waging war on a fellow State member,

and waging it with all the callous ruthlessness which modern science had placed at its disposal in direct violation of the sanctity of its word and of its own definite and solemn repudiation of such barbarous methods of warfare as poison gas.

"I dare to say that Signor Mussolini and those associated with him in the government of Italy have made the name of the so-called civilised white man stink in the nostrils of native peoples, not only in Abyssinia, but in every part of Africa," he said.

THE BISHOP OF BIRMINGHAM (Dr. Barnes), addressing the Diocesan Conference at Birmingham, yesterday, said: I read yesterday that "Te Deums" were sung in nearly all the principal churches in Italy in thanks for the triumphs of Italian arms.

We praise Thee, O God—for incendiary bombs and poison gas which have overwhelmed a wretchedly armed, but nominally Christian people, fighting for its freedom. Were I an Italian ecclesiastic, I should have cause for fear. As George Herbert wrote: "God's mill grinds slow but sure."

Liverpool Daily Post, May 13, 1936.

Letter from the BISHOP OF BRISTOL (Dr. Woodward), in his Diocesan Gazette: I cannot avoid asking myself, as I believe tens of thousands of Englishmen are asking themselves, whether there is any limit to the methods which a civilised nation such as Italy thinks fit to adopt before she is treated as an outcast and a pariah . . . There are pages in the history of our own country of which most Englishmen are now heartily ashamed but we have never perpetrated a crime against God and humanity as Mussolini has exalted in.

News Chronicle, April 25, 1936.

Shall we ever be able to go back to Italy? The fair name of this delectable country has been foully smirched by the pinchbeck Cæsar who rants, storms, and swaggers at Rome.

There is no use in mincing our words. The Abyssinian adventure has been the blackest outrage in our time. The League of Nations has been murdered. Never again will a weak nation feel the slightest confidence that by belonging to it it will be protected against wanton aggression.

Abyssinia has given Italy no shadow of justification for making war; the object was grab, naked and unashamed. And if the campaign itself was a treason against agreements into which Italy had voluntarily entered, the methods of conducting it were a scandalous violation of the laws of civilised war.

I cannot agree that we ought to remain silent, for fear of alienating the Italians. It is our duty to speak out, and to let the intensity of our moral indignation be known. One caution only is necessary. Some Socialists, who have shown by their attitude towards Soviet Russia (in the Sidney Webbs' last book, for example) that they have no objection to tyranny and cruelty in themselves, are urging us to take drastic measures against Italy, because they hate and fear Fascism.

Mussolini has passed through Marxian class-hatred, and has come out on the other side. He has led the Italians to a newer form of State, resting not on social envy and greed, but on heroism and devotion to their country. Misguided as we are convinced that the form of this new nationalism has been, and dangerous as it undoubtedly is to the peace of the world, it is less ignoble than class-war; and if we do not take care we shall find ourselves in queer company when we clamour to punish Mussolini.

And yet we must denounce him, in the name of good faith, civilisation and humanity. If this sort of conduct is to be condoned, right and wrong have no further meaning. Nothing is too diabolic for civilised men to do to each other.

Article by The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D.

Evening Standard, May 13, 1936.

Sir Austen Chamberlain's opinions always carry great weight, but his opinion that the continuance of sanctions will amount to a futile act of revenge against Italy was adopted too hastily, and, so far as affecting popular opinion goes, already seems to have missed its mark. The general feeling is that the issue is too critical for easy surrender to Signor Mussolini. The issue is seen to be a choice between a public law and anarchy—

the simple plan,

That they should take, who have the power,

And they should keep who can.

The memory of many people goes back to the South African war and Lord Roberts's optimistic announcement that the war was finished when Pretoria had been occupied. A long and expensive guerrilla warfare followed. Signor Mussolini will probably not find all the tribesmen amenable in Abyssinia; his expenses will be enormous; his treasury is nearly depleted; and under the present sanctions no State member of the League can lend him money. At this juncture the Pope's language is unfortunately ambiguous. His phrase about the "triumphant happiness" of Italy may only record a fact but we fear that it will be taken as a phrase of approval.

The Guardian Leader, May 15, 1936.

Italy has still to reckon with the League of Nations, and it is not to be supposed for a moment that the disappointing result of the imposition of sanctions, so far as paralysing the aggressor nation is concerned, implies anything like a surrender by the League of its obligations towards Abyssinia as a loyal and grossly ill-used League member.

The Christian World Leader, April 9, 1936.

Only thirteen years ago Abyssinia appealed for admission to the League of Nations. The document is one of the most pathetic in modern annals. "The Holy Scriptures bear witness that, since the year 1500 after Solomon, we have been contending with the heathen by whom we are surrounded for the faith and the laws of God, and to maintain the independence of our country and the freedom of our religion. . . . We know the League of Nations

guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the world, and maintains peace and agreement among them; that all its efforts are directed toward the strengthening of friendship among the races of mankind; that it is anxious to remove all the obstacles to that friendship which give rise to war when one country is offended; that it causes truth and loyalty to be respected." That was the confidence of 1923. And now?

From "Methodist Table Talk" in *The Methodist Times*, May 21, 1936.

It seems to us that the immediate task of all Christian people is to uphold the principles of the League of Nations in spite of all the immense difficulties created by Italian aggression. Whatever may be said in favour of the policy of non-resistance—and we would not regard the Christian pacifist movement in any other than the greatest respect—it seems to us that at this present juncture no essentially negative policy will serve. Positive constructive thinking is needed. No pacifist, we take it, would urge the abandonment of police law in England, or the abolition of law courts, prisons and other such methods for the enforcement of order. Why, then, should there be any objection to a step forward in international law which aimed at establishing a League capable of compelling law-breakers among nations to conform to civilised procedure? Human progress can be achieved only step by step. Nations, like individuals, must learn to walk before they can run. Let us by all means preserve the full Christian ideal of the sanctity of individual personality and the inviolability of life; but let us also as a Christian Church contribute towards practical ways of progress by fostering the idea that humanity is to be regarded as one great community subject to one code of international law. And let us see to it that means are provided whereby that law shall be enforced.

The Methodist Times Leader, May, 1936.

In this temporary inactivity, the members of the League of Nations should indeed sit still; but they should not go to sleep. . . . In a word, they should make of this necessary delay a positive weapon. Let them continue such sanctions as they had imposed. From the point of view of the League, as the instrument of moral principles, nothing has happened to make a difference in their attitude. The League is still being flouted. A constituent member of the League still affects to disregard any authority except its own desire and ambition.

The League, if it could but make up its mind that this is so, can sit longer at Geneva than Italy in Abyssinia.

The British Weekly Note, May 14, 1936.

We welcome the outspoken utterance of the Bishop of St. Albans apropos of the complete silence of the Pope while the members of an ancient Church are being barbarously subdued by bombs and poison gas at the bidding of the ruler of the Pope's own nation. . . . One thing the Pope could have done: he could have proclaimed the wrath of God against those who delight in war and do evil to their neighbours, and have faced the consequences. His gain in esteem would have been as great as is his present loss.

The Record Note, May 15, 1936.

Resolutions

Resolution passed unanimously by the Executive Committee of the Council of Action on March 30, 1936, Mr. Lloyd George presiding:

That with regard to the Abyssinian situation, the Council protests against the apparent indefinite postponement of the application of full sanctions, and it further urges the Government to summon at once the Committee of 13 and press for the imposition of full sanctions, including oil sanctions. The Council further considers that the inclusion of Italy among those invited to judge upon a declared violation of Locarno, while she continues a flagrant and brutal invasion of a defenceless country belonging to a fellow-member of the League to be completely at variance with the whole conception of international justice.

The National Executive of the Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction, under the Presidency of the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, O.M., M.P., together with representatives appointed from each Area and the Women's National Committee, published on June 2nd, a full statement on the Italo-Abyssinian problem. The main features are as follow:

It declares that Italy "has perpetrated a crime against the conscience of the world by flagrantly repudiating her obligations under the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg Pact, the American Pact of 1933, and the Geneva Agreement of 1925 prohibiting the use of poison gas." It affirms that "if this crime is condoned, directly or indirectly, belief in collective security will be undermined" and the nations will seek their own national policies and alliances, backed by "heavy armaments, leading inevitably to war."

Any settlement other than that approved by the League will be regarded by Italy "as a victory over the League, and particularly over Great Britain." The international and imperial consequences of this cannot help but be highly dangerous.

The Council sets out the following main points upon which it suggests a League peace can be secured:

- (a) Refusal to recognise the annexation of Abyssinia.
- (b) Application of an oil sanction and prohibition of the ships of League countries from carrying goods to Italy and of Italian ships from entering their ports.
- (c) The tightening up of the control of credits to Italy.
- (d) Closing the Suez Canal to cargoes of oil and materials for poison gas.

Resolution adopted by the National Liberal Federation, May 5, 1936:

The executive of the National Liberal Federation, speaking on behalf of Liberals throughout the country, feels that it must give expression to the shame and horror with which all Liberals regard the fate that has befallen Abyssinia, a primitive country which trusted to the honour of the civilised countries, and has been betrayed. The shameless repudiation of every treaty obligation which has marked the policy of Fascist Italy if it is sub-

mitted to by the rest of the world must destroy all confidence in international agreements.

By its attacks upon the Red Cross and by its barbarous use of poison gas, as well as by its cynical disregard of treaties, Italy has outraged the conscience of the world. By their pitiful weakness in resisting this defiance of the League system, the Governments of the Powers, including Britain, have jeopardised the League of Nations, have terribly increased the menace of war, and have ensured that, if it comes, this war will be so ruthless that it will probably bring down our civilisation in ruins.

The executive implores the Government to reflect before it is too late "upon the awful consequences that have resulted and may still result, from the policy of timorous inaction and half-heartedness which it has pursued."

Declaration of the National Council of Labour, May 5, 1936:

The invasion of Abyssinia by Fascist Italy constituted and still remains a threat to the League of Nations and to the future of civilisation. The dispute between the League and Italy is not settled by the present military situation in Abyssinia.

The National Council of Labour reaffirm their previous declaration that Italy should not be allowed to gather the fruits of her lawless and brutal aggression. It is more than ever the duty of all loyal members of the League to maintain and intensify the measures adopted against Fascist Italy until the authority of the League is vindicated.

Extracts from pamphlet on Labour and the Defence of Peace, issued by the National Council of Labour, May 5, 1936.

Fascist Italy, in defiance of the League of Nations, has invaded the last surviving independent community in Africa. By poison gas and the indiscriminate murder of the civilian population, including women and children, and by deliberate aerial bombardment of open towns and Red Cross Units, Italy has violated her solemn pledges and outraged world opinion.

Labour must be prepared to accept the consequences of its policy. A man who joins a Trade Union accepts the obligations of collective action in defence of its principles. A man who enjoys the collective security of a Trade Union must be prepared to take the risks of loyalty to his principles when a strike or lock-out is threatened. Similarly, a Movement which supports the League system cannot desert it in a crisis.

The spectacle of ruthless attacks upon a primitive people, while the nations of Europe fail to carry out their solemn obligations to the full, has profoundly disturbed and shocked public opinion. It shows very clearly what may happen in Europe unless the League system is made a reality.

The British Labour Movement has continuously urged that in the interests of the Abyssinians and the peace of the world, effective action should be taken to defend the rule of law. Italy must be prevented from reaping the fruits of a lawless, cowardly and brutal act of violence. It can be done if the penalties imposed by the Members of the League are maintained and extended until Mussolini is willing that the League and not Italy should make the peace.

Any member of the League who hopes that Fascist Italy, with its cynicism and brutality may be a useful ally in its own distress, and permits Italy to collect the spoils of war in Africa, will endanger its own freedom and independence.

Meeting held by the League of Nations Union at the Royal Albert Hall, May 8th, 1936.

Resolution:

This meeting affirms its support of the League of Nations and the principle of collective security; pledges itself to take all constitutional means to strengthen the League as an instrument of international peace and of peaceful change; expresses its indignation at the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy in defiance of her treaty obligations and at her barbarous methods of warfare; and calls upon H.M. Government to urge the maintenance of sanctions against Italy until she is ready to accept terms of peace approved by the Council of the League.

Resolution passed at a meeting of the Abyssinia Association on May 12, 1936:

This meeting is confident that the British Government will refuse to recognise in any way the annexation of Abyssinia by Italy in breach of no less than seven treaties, and urges the British Government and the States members of the League through the Committee of 18 to continue and intensify sanctions without delay until Italy submits to the League.

Resolutions on the same lines, usually demanding the maintenance and intensification of sanctions, were passed by many District Councils and Branches of the League of Nations Union, political and church societies, etc.

Between March 28th and April 30th, 141 Branches of the League of Nations Union wrote to their local Member of Parliament and/or to H.M. Government assuring them that our people will regard it as an outrage if Italy's war is not promptly stopped on terms showing that aggression has not paid.

Meeting of the Free Churches in London, held at City Temple, April 16, 1936:

Dr. Hughes moved a resolution, which was carried later without a single dissident, and sent to Mr. Anthony Eden at Geneva. It expressed the horror of Free Churchmen "at the infamous methods of warfare to which the Italian

Government is having recourse in Abyssinia," and assured Mr. Eden of "their prayerful support of any action on which the League may decide in order to bring the war to an end." "We are entitled to remind Italy," said Dr. Hughes, "that there is such a thing as the honour of a written pledge. We desire to place on record the judgment of Christian people; and while we protest against these infamous methods of warfare, we offer our full support to the efforts for peace which our Government is making in co-operation with other Powers."

London Assembly of the Baptist Church Union, April 30, 1936:

The members of the Assembly of the Baptist Union record their indignant protest against the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy in violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and against the employment of poison gas and the attacks on the Red Cross by the Italian forces in Abyssinia. They desire also to assure His Majesty's Government of their warm support of every step taken, or to be taken, for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the supreme authority of the League of Nations in international affairs; and they urge His Majesty's Government to continue and to intensify their efforts at Geneva to vindicate the rights of Abyssinia, and to uphold the policy of collective action against the declared aggressor as an essential part of a system of collective security.

The Executive Committee of the British Christian Council for International Friendship, Life, and Work, in the name of the Churches which it represents, has sent the following resolution to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the Lord Privy Seal:—

Inasmuch as incontestable evidence from eye-witnesses of the use of mustard gas by the Italian Air Force in Abyssinia against defenceless men, women, and children, as well as against Red Cross ambulances has been received by the British Government,

The Executive Committee of the British Christian Council for International Friendship, Life and Work protests, in the name of the Churches which it represents, against this barbarity aggravated by the breach of the Gas Convention signed by Italy at Geneva in 1925.

It condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of this method of warfare, which inflicts permanent and most cruel suffering on the civil population of Abyssinia.

It welcomes the protests made by Mr. Anthony Eden at Geneva, and urges His Majesty's Government to continue using all means at its disposal to put an end to this atrocity which conflicts not only with the principles of Christianity, but also with the dictates of common humanity as recognised in the Geneva Gas Convention.

Methodist Times, April 23, 1936.

Statement issued by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (Church and Nation Committee):

LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND SANCTIONS

The nervous state of Europe, the breaking of treaties by Germany, the endeavour to find security by increase of armaments, and the inability of the League to stop the attack on Abyssinia without endangering the peace of Europe, have engaged the attention of the Church and Nation Committee. . . . Attention is directed to the appendix embodying a report by the Scottish Churches Committee of the World Alliance, in which the position of the League of Nations is discussed. The attack of Italy on Abyssinia, it is pointed out, furnished the clearest possible case for applying the principle of collective security. From the outset the Abyssinian Government have been scrupulously loyal to League procedure, and have patiently made one appeal after another to the Council with a truly pathetic faith. Italy, on the other hand, has claimed the right to act independently of the League, and has defended this position by sophistries which insult the meanest intelligence. When sanctions were adopted the experiment was a wholly new one, and it was no doubt right to defer military sanctions till the effect of milder measures had been tried. But it must be remembered that, while France and Britain ruled out from the first military sanctions on behalf of Abyssinia, this did not prevent Britain from arranging with the other Mediterranean Powers for armed support in the event of her own security being threatened by Italy. Apart from military sanctions, an embargo on oil was obviously the most likely measure to hasten the end of the war; but though approved in principle it has been deferred on one pretext after another. Once Italy's aggression had begun, the time for efforts at conciliation was past, and the only way to end hostilities was to compel the aggressor to desist. Abyssinia has found that the collective security of the League is a broken reed; and though sanctions are continuing, Italy keeps her place of honour in the councils of Europe instead of being outlawed as a breaker of the Covenant. In all this melancholy story there is nothing to shake one's faith in the League of Nations, but there is much to shake one's faith in the nations of the League.

The Scotsman, May 12, 1936.

Speeches at L.N.U. Albert Hall Meeting, 8th May, 1936

VISCOUNT CECIL: I do not remember in my political life, any occasion on which the people of this country have been more moved than they are at the moment, since the death of General Gordon. That is past history, but here, too, we have seen a heroic figure deserted by those whom he trusted; who, after desperate resistance, has had to face defeat and the destruction of all he stood for.

And what was the fault of the Emperor of Ethiopia? He has preferred exile to dishonour, and has left a great example to all those who, like him, stand for a great ideal. No wonder the people are deeply moved.

In saying this, I have no wish, and I make it quite clear, to attack the present Foreign Minister, Mr. Eden. He is not the person to blame. As he said himself in the House, he may have made mistakes, but broadly speaking we shall all admit and gladly admit that he has stood for the fulfilment of the promises which our country has made (applause).

How, then, stands the matter? There has been a great triumph of evil. The aggressor has succeeded, not completely but to a large extent, and we are forced to say to him, as was said long ago to another evil ruler, "Hast thou killed and also taken possession?" But, in that case, as in this, the end is not yet (applause). Even if the victory were complete, even if all resistance had been crushed, there is still the price of victory to be paid.

Meanwhile, our duty is as clear as it possibly can be. While there is a shade of hope remaining, we can recognise no other Government of Abyssinia (applause). The native rule of Ethiopia still remains. She is still a member of the League of Nations: she is still entitled to the joint protection which she was promised in that capacity. Surely then the League must maintain its policy of Sanctions, yes, and even intensify them if that becomes necessary. Nothing but the blackest treachery can urge any other course.

As we hope for help in our time of need, so must we give it now in the fullest measure to those who have trusted us.

MR. ATTLEE: My party has taken its stand in support of the League system, and when this issue arose we unhesitatingly pledged ourselves to support the League in this particular instance. It is not surprising really, because my party is composed very largely of persons who have a close experience of the meaning of collective security and they know that it involves advantages and that it involves obligations. Every Trade Unionist who joins a Union knows that when he does that he may be called upon to jeopardise his position by coming out on strike and it is a poor kind of Trade Unionist who joins up only for the sake of the Sick Benefits, and resigns directly he is called upon to stand for collective security. . . .

Now it is true that this military victory has been won. But I must say that it came to me as a great surprise when men of great eminence, experienced

statesmen like Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that, Abyssinia having been beaten, we must now take off sanctions (hear, hear), we must accept that might is right; and others say we must hasten to make friends with Mussolini so that he may join us in policing the world. It had not occurred to me that people who supported the League had been relying on the climate of Ethiopia, and the fighting quality of the Negus and his men to fight the battle of civilisation against barbarism (hear, hear, applause). Surely if they relied on Abyssinia to win the League's battles they might have seen that Abyssinia was adequately equipped (hear, hear, applause), they might have prevented Italy receiving supplies. I had conceived the issue as one essentially between the League and the aggressor. My mind went back to 1914. I remembered Belgium being overrun. I am not aware that people then said, "Belgium has been overrun, it is all finished." I should be disturbed if I found such a thing happening in civil life, if I found the village postmistress, having fought to withstand a burglar with a revolver, and lost all the money in the office, told by the Chief Constable that there was nothing more to be done except to give a post of honour in the Police Force to Mr. William Sykes (applause, laughter).

SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: The struggle between Italy and the League continues. It is a struggle between two principles which, as Edmund Burke said, are in eternal enmity, between arbitrary power represented by Italy, and law, represented by the League of Nations (hear, hear). If the arbitrary power wins, if we make peace with Italy on the basis of a truce in Abyssinia, military aggression everywhere will be encouraged and the League of Nations will be publicly humiliated. We are here to declare that there can be no compromise with arbitrary power without killing the League (hear, hear, applause). The law must be vindicated and the authority of the League asserted. The cynics declare that it is only in adversity that a man really knows who are his real friends (hear, hear), and we see in these days that the League has had a good many false friends, who paid it no more than lip service in the past (hear, hear, applause). Already the faint hearts are joining the scoffers in condemnation of the League, and the sky is dark with the passage of those birds of uncertain plumage—the weather-cocks (hear, hear, applause). There are too many weather-cocks in power, in public life, to-day (hear, hear, applause).

Only a few weeks ago many of them were crowing as fiercely as Lord Cecil or Mr. Attlee or I, for more intense sanctions. Now, they are migrating in gaggles from Geneva to Rome (hear, hear, applause). Then they wanted to arrest the gangster who was defying the law of Nations. Now that the gangster has shown his teeth and frightened them they want to come to terms with the gangster, and send the League of Nations to the reformatory.

LORD LYTTON: In order to make clear to you our position I will quote a sentence used by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons the day before yesterday. . . . He reminded the House of a proverb about the difficulty of getting butter out of a dog's mouth.

Yes, if it is only butter, no one is going to risk getting his hand bitten to take it out. But if it be something more than butter, if it be something of infinite value, if it be something that you value as you value your own life, if it be your own child in the dog's mouth, why then, who is going to stop to consider what the dog will do? You have but one thought (hear, hear, applause). I don't think we shall spend much time arguing to which end of the dog we should apply sanctions: whether we should pull it by the tail or rap it over the nose; we should have but one thought—to save that which was in danger. That is the position, and what is in danger in this issue? Not merely Abyssinia; not merely the British Empire (hear, hear). Something that we have already been reminded that we won through our sufferings in the war, the only thing that was achieved by those who died for us in that war; something which on every Armistice night as the years go by we pledge ourselves to retain; something which on other occasions I have described as the life-line of our civilisation. That is what is at issue, and for that I am prepared to lay down my life (hear, hear). And I know that the members of our Union feel the same upon that issue. Now that, Ladies and Gentleman, is the test between those who think there is only butter in the dog's mouth and those who think that what is there is the greatest ideal ever presented to mankind.

Speeches by Members of the Government and ex-Ministers

(Except where otherwise stated, the extracts are from Parliamentary Debates, Official Report.)

SIR SAMUEL HOARE (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), July 11th, 1935: If the system of collective security that is gradually being built up with great care and patience were smashed, if the League became so feeble and futile as to have no real influence upon the course of events, the old system of alliances, that is, the reverse of collective security, must necessarily re-appear with all its ancient disquiets and intrigues. . . An Italo-Abyssinian war, however it ends, must have serious repercussions upon the whole League system.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, July 11th, 1935: We are coming very near to what may be a test case for the League as to whether it does mean collective security; whether it does mean anything for any one or nothing for any one. It is not to be supposed that the League can be flouted, under the eyes of Europe, that League methods can be repudiated, a policy of force and conflict engaged in, and that the League can pass all that by, because it happens to occur in Africa and not in Europe, and cannot by so doing destroy the value of the collective security not for Africa only but for Europe.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, July 11th, 1935: Do not let us be under any misapprehension. If the League fails to settle the Abyssinian question, the very last vestige of its authority has gone.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE, League Council Meeting on September 11th, 1935: In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations, the League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression. The attitude of the British nation in the last few weeks has clearly demonstrated the fact that this is no variable and unreliable sentiment, but a principle of international conduct to which they and their Government hold with firm, enduring and universal persistence.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE, October 22nd, 1935: One point, however, emerges firm and constant from this troubled background. While events have been moving with great volume and rapidity, our policy has remained unchanged. I purposely use the phrase "our policy" rather than the phrase "the policy of His Majesty's Government," for it was made clear in both the previous Debates upon foreign affairs that the policy of loyalty to our League obligations was approved by almost everyone in the House. In neither of those Debates, while speech after speech was made in favour of that policy, was a word said against it. I think I may justly claim on that account that it is the policy,

not of one party, but of the House as a whole. Indeed, I think I may go further and, when I remember the unprecedented expressions of public support, I can claim that not only is it the policy of this House, but it is also the policy of the great majority of men and women in the country as a whole. Nor is this general support confined to these shores. Amidst all these baffling and dispiriting conditions, the one comforting fact, to those of us who were faced by them, was the unbroken solidarity of the British Empire and particularly the unanimity of the great Dominions.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE, House of Commons, October 22, 1935: Let me say definitely and frankly to the House that the representatives of Great Britain and the representatives of the British Empire can never take a secondary part in any great international discussion. The representatives of a great Empire cannot abdicate their responsibilities or disguise their views.

. . . But if action of this kind is to be effective it must, in the first place, be really collective. Member States must take their share of the risks, the inconveniences and the losses. And, in the second place, all member States must co-operate to resist an attack upon any one State for the action that it has taken to defend the Covenant. . . . It was on this account that communications passed between the French Government and ourselves. The French answer is the answer that we felt sure it would be. Their answer has been completely satisfactory, and the solidarity of the two countries is firmly established. They interpret Article 16 as we interpret it. In the event of an isolated attack, inconceivable though such madness might be, we and they and the rest of the League stand together and resist it with our full and united force. . . . We have never even proposed to the French Government the consideration of any military measures. . . .

A great experiment is being tried in the world. For the first time the system of collective action and collective security is being tested in face of a great crisis. . . . If it succeeds, an immense gain will have been achieved for the peace of the world. If it fails, a heavy disappointment will have fallen on all those who desire to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy, and a heavy responsibility upon those who have wavered in the cause.

MR. ANTHONY EDEN (Minister for League of Nations Affairs), October 23rd, 1935: . . . We have always been ready to co-operate with others to secure a peaceful settlement of this dispute. But there are two indispensable conditions, mentioned already by the Prime Minister. The first is that the three parties, Italy, Abyssinia and the League accept the settlement, and secondly that the terms shall be consistent with the Covenant. . . .

Those of us who have been concerned for a long period of time with this most unhappy dispute cannot fail to be acutely conscious of the unpleasant duties and unwelcome responsibilities which it places upon us. We can feel no enthusiasm for our task. But here is a duty which has to be done, and which must and will be done. Some hon. Members, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs among them, have suggested in the

course of this Debate that there has been in the last few days some wavering in the attitude of the Government. I can assure them that this is not so. There has been and will be no change in the policy of His Majesty's Government, in which, as a loyal member of the League, we will persevere. For what is at stake? At this hour it is surely not necessary to repeat that it is neither an African dispute, nor an incident in expansionist rivalry between two nations, nor a colonial war, but a vital test of the efficacy of the League and of the loyalty of its members to the Covenant to which they have put their names.

We have tried in these post-war years to build up a new order by means of which we hope to spare mankind in the future the scourge of war. We who are members of the League have sought collectively to create a new ideal and a new international order. If we fail, even though that failure be not final, we shall have shattered for a generation, and it may be more, the hopes which mankind has placed in this new endeavour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, October 23rd, 1935: I should like to ask a final question. . . . Is there anything in the sanctions which will prevent the continued flow of high explosives, bombs, shells, tanks and troops to crush Abyssinia? . . . You are conducting your economic sanctions under conditions which were not contemplated, with enormous gaps. You are laying siege to a city with three great roads open—Brazil, the United States and Germany. Is there anything in the sanctions which will in the least interfere with this flow of material to crush out the independence of the Abyssinian people? Economic sanctions are a serious business. . . . Economic sanctions will not come into operation to-day and the complete futility of these conditions will not be apparent for some time. Economic sanctions would have been useful if you had threatened them six months ago, because they will inflict hurt on Italy—serious hurt upon her trade. Italy would have taken that into account. If you had threatened economic sanctions against Germany in 1914 and 50 nations had said that they would refuse to trade with her, you might have stopped the war. You could not have stopped the war with a threat of economic sanctions when Germany was marching on Paris.

MR. LEES SMITH (*Keighley*, Labour): My hon. Friend here, the late Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has been putting questions about the possibility of closing the ports of sanctionist countries to Italian ships. That is one method, and there are other suggestions of the same kind. We at present impose an embargo on imports from Italy, but we, the League of Nations, the sanctionist nations, still make use of Italian cargoes and passenger ships, of what in economic and Free Trade discussions they call invisible imports. They still make use of those, and by means of those Italy is enabled to obtain cash and foreign exchange just as much as by direct exports. I find that we are exporting for the use of the Italian armies water from Aden, that cotton has gone from Egypt, camels from the Sudan, and goods from British Somaliland. I find the Press Association giving reports of how British Somaliland is becom-

ing prosperous as a consequence of the war with Italy, with picturesque accounts of how caravans full of goods are leisurely proceeding towards the Italian armies in the south of Abyssinia. No, Sir, the oil sanction is not the only one. When it is imposed, there are many other resources of an economic character still at our disposal. February 24th, 1936.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY (MR. EDEN): Moreover, democracy is on trial. Are we to fail because of an unwillingness to face new conditions? Let us not be afraid of living up to the traditions of the past. Time was when this country first gave to the world Parliamentary government. It is in this same tradition that His Majesty's Government intend to play their part at Geneva in an attempt to build up a new world order. The most pressing and the most immediate task of our country is to bring back some measure of confidence to Europe and, though I can only speak now, as the House will appreciate, in general terms, it is to that task that we are now applying ourselves in detail. If we are to succeed we shall have to bring others along with us, but we shall not be able to do that unless other nations are convinced of our sincerity, and our strength, and unless we can gain their confidence. This, in turn, we can only do if we pursue a consistent and constructive policy. I believe that such a policy can be devised and followed with persistence on the lines I have indicated. It is in that conviction that I enter upon my task. February 24th, 1936.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Foreign Office), April 9th, 1936: . . . In 1925 a number of nations negotiated what is known as the Gas Protocol at Geneva and I would like to quote a few relevant words from that protocol. It states:

"Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world. . . . To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations, the signatories declare that the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration."

. . . It is a definite declaration with no qualification whatever. It was signed and ratified by the Italian Government, and if it turns out as a result of examination that they have used this gas, then it is clear that there has been a breach of a solemn undertaking, not only against the Abyssinian Government, but against all the other signatories to the Protocol. We have heard a great deal in this war of atrocities of various descriptions. . . .

In one respect I think that this question of gas is different from others, because this is a definite breach of a Protocol which was signed, as I understand, by Signor Mussolini's own Government, and it must be a matter of

concern, not only to the Abyssinians, who are suffering most from it, but to all the signatories of the document. What, after all, would be the use of any treaties, of any protocols, of any international documents of any kind, if they could be violated entirely with impunity at the convenience of any nation? . . .

THE PRIME MINISTER, at Worcester, April 18: If the allegations of the use of poison gases be true—and I have every reason to believe that they are—the peril I see to the world is this: If a great European nation, in spite of having given its signature to the Geneva protocol against the use of such gases, employs them in Africa, what guarantee have we that they may not be used in Europe? Europe, with its cities more densely populated than Abyssinia, may suffer far more, but it is not only that. I have often uttered the truism that the next war will be the end of civilisation in Europe. That would be more than ever certain if the nations of Europe went back on their word and their signature, and used poison gases in Europe. I believe that if such a thing were done, when that war came to an end the raging peoples of every country, torn with passion, suffering and horror, would wipe out every Government in Europe, and you would have a state of anarchy from end to end of it, as man's protest against wickedness in high places.

. . . . Collective security will never work unless all the nations that take part in it are prepared simultaneously to threaten with sanctions and to fight if necessary an aggressor.

MR. ANTHONY EDEN, Foreign Secretary, at the Council of the League, at Geneva, April 20, 1936: It is . . . in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, impossible not to take account of the evidence which exists . . . that poison gas has been used by the Italian Armies in their campaign against Abyssinia . . . Not only the two belligerents but nearly all the nations of the world are parties to the Gas Protocol of 1925. Is there one nation here, one nation anywhere, who is not interested in its observance? This Protocol concerns the inhabitants of every great city in the world. It is for them a charter against extermination. If a Convention such as this can be torn up, will not our peoples, whether living in the thronged cities of Western Europe or in less densely-crowded areas elsewhere, ask, and ask with reason, what is the value of any international instrument to which our representatives put their names, how can we have confidence that our own folk, despite all solemnly signed protocols, will not be burned, blinded, and done to death in agony hereafter.

MR. ANTHONY EDEN, League Council Meeting, April 20th, 1936: It is necessary to recall certain stark facts in relation to the present war in Abyssinia. Nearly seven months ago 14 members of the Council decided that the Italian Government had "resorted to war in disregard of its obligations under Article XII of the Covenant of the League of Nations." This assertion was later confirmed by the vote of some 50 nations represented in the Assembly. Why did the nations take that action? So far as His Majesty's Government

in the United Kingdom are concerned, I wish to-day to state plainly the reasons which have actuated and still actuate them in this matter.

If there is to be a lasting peace in the world, the Covenant of the League of Nations, which is the law of the nations, must be respected. Members of the League are here under a binding and unescapable obligation to observe that Covenant. If they fail to observe it, still more if a nation which violates the Covenant is enabled to do so with impunity, how can there be any confidence in international law in the future?

It was for that reason that in a speech at the Assembly last September the first delegate of the United Kingdom made it plain that, in spite of the evident difficulties under which the League must operate, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be "second to none in their intention to fulfil, within the measure of their capacity, the obligation which the Covenant laid upon them."

This undertaking His Majesty's Government have endeavoured faithfully to fulfil. It is in this spirit that they have played their part to the full, and are prepared to continue so to play, in the enforcement of financial and economic sanctions against the State which has been declared by the members of the League of Nations to have violated the Covenant.

We were and are ready to do this, though we have always been conscious of the limitations imposed upon League actions, limitations which are a consequence of the League's incomplete membership. Yet, despite the present non-universality of the League, His Majesty's Government felt, as did virtually all other members of the League, that they had an obligation to fulfil under the terms of the Covenant, and that, unless they were to go back upon their signature, they had no alternative but to take their share in any action which should be collectively decided upon. The obligation had to be fulfilled even though none could tell whether that fulfilment would be rapid enough or effective enough to determine the issue as between the aggressor and the victim.

We were also conscious from the first of a further limitation upon League action. All action taken by the League must be collective; the League can effectively take no other.

Herein lies the strength and weakness of the League. The measure and pace of any collective action must therefore to some extent represent a compromise. What may and does seem too slow to some must seem too fast to others.

While these are the conditions in which we have been acting, it is of no use to ignore the facts which now confront us. The seriousness of the consequences for the League of the events of the last seven months can scarcely be exaggerated. The confidence which members of the League of Nations will feel justified in placing in this organisation in the future must in a large measure be influenced by its success or failure in the present instance.

Yet it is true that the League has had successes in the past. Some of the most important of these have been, on account of their very nature, unseen and unrecorded. This fact, however, would weigh but little in the judgment of world opinion against failure in the present instance.

There is in the principle of collectivity the one hope of lasting peace, for only by the strong endeavour of nations sincerely joined can the rule of law be substituted for the rule of force.

At this solemn hour, when we must each of us be conscious of the gravity of our decision, Governments must be prepared to shoulder their responsibilities and clearly to state the policy which they are prepared to pursue. In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it is our manifest duty as members of the League at least to maintain those economic and financial sanctions which would have been put into force in connection with this dispute.

In order, however, that there may be no shadow of doubt about the position of His Majesty's Government, I must make it clear that, in addition to the action under Article XVI which has already been taken, His Majesty's Government, as has previously been stated, are ready and willing to consider, together with their fellow-members of the League, the imposition of any further economic and financial sanctions that may be considered necessary and effective for the fulfilment of the obligations which we all of us bear in this dispute.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE (*Dorset S.*, Parl. Under-Secretary, Foreign Office): The course of events during the last few weeks in Ethiopia, we must all admit, will have an immense influence on the future, and may mark a turning point in the policy of this country and of other countries. It may be one of the landmarks of our lives. For 16 years we have been supporting a new system of law and order—this applies to hon. Members in all parts of the House—which was to take away, or we hoped would take away, the rule of power and replace it by the rule of law and order. Like other systems of law and order, whether national or international, it had behind it, as we believed, an effective sanction of force. That is the inevitable background of all sanctions. For the first time that sanction has been put into force to protect the weak against the strong, which is the object of all systems of law and order, and it has failed to achieve its object. No one wishes to conceal or minimise the fact that it has failed. The Italian advance has continued and Ethiopia has been eaten up by the aggressor, who appears to have succeeded in his aggression. May 6th, 1936.

DR. HUGH DALTON (*Bishop Auckland*, Labour): We charge the Government with the responsibility for a war which they could have prevented had they acted differently. We charge them with having failed to carry out their obligations under the Covenant of the League, and notably under Article 16. We charge them with having encouraged the Abyssinians to resist, in the belief that the League would help them; and we charge them with having left the Abyssinians to their fate, having given them no effective help of any kind, but, on the contrary, having helped Signor Mussolini to destroy them by supplying him with indispensable elements in the war which has lately been moving so rapidly in his favour. We charge the Government with having joined with others in supplying, or permitting the supply of, oil to the Italian forces, oil which was indispensable to the use which they made of poison gas in the later phases of the campaign; and we charge the Government

more particularly with having made money out of these abominations by reason of the Government's own holding in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the dividends on which have shown an upward tendency and are brought into the Chancellor's balance-sheet as part of the public revenue. May 6th, 1936.

SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR (*Caithness and Sutherland*, Liberal): Let us make no mistake about it. Italy has now won, for the time being at any rate, a commanding position in the Near East. If we are told that she intends to enlist Abyssinians in her armies, who will set bounds to the ambitions of the Italian dictator in East Africa, in the Red Sea and in the basins of the Nile? He has defied 50 nations, flouted Great Britain and is in a fair way to proving that aggression can be made to pay. The greater part of our Fleet and a large part of our Air Force is tied to the Mediterranean, while dangers threaten nearer home. To quote the striking words of the hon. Member who opened the Debate, German rearmament is proceeding rapidly, remorselessly, menacingly. In the Far East the Japanese military party is steadily increasing its control over Japanese policy. What measure of rearmament should we require if we were effectively to guard against all these dangers in isolation? That is a situation which cannot continue.


We must no longer try to get the best of both worlds, but we must make a definite choice, even if it be unpopular with some part of the electorate or with some portions of the Government supporters. We must make a choice between oblivion of the past and cordial friendship in the future between Italy and this country, implying financial help to Italy in restoring her economy and developing a new policy, or the policy of compelling Italy, by the maintenance and intensification of sanctions, to submit to a peace dictated by the League. The adoption of the first policy would mean a frank recognition that the League policy on which the Government appealed to the Nation at the last Election lies in ruins. It would be strenuously opposed by all on this side of the House, and I should regard it as an outrage upon the conscience of the country; but do not let us have any more half measures with Signor Mussolini. If the Government in their wisdom and on their responsibility decide to abandon the League policy, let them brush our opposition aside and appeal boldly to the country in support of their new policy, which would be the old policy of power politics, and we will meet them in the country openly on that issue.

. . . On the issues raised by the Italian aggression the verdict of world opinion has been passed. Woe betide the Government if in feebleness and irresolution they now allow that verdict to be set aside at the bidding of the aggressor. The immediate issue now is whether the League is to survive. Abyssinia may be conquered, but conquest cannot deprive Abyssinia of her rights as a member of the League. The Government's duty is to declare unequivocally that they will insist that sanctions should be maintained against Italy and intensified until the Italian Government will agree to terms imposed by the League, and such terms should clearly show that the rule of law is a reality and that aggression is a crime which in the modern world will not be allowed to pay. May 6th, 1936.

MR. LEES-SMITH (*Keighley*, Labour): I hope that the Foreign Secretary will not at this stage make up his mind that in the Abyssinian dispute we have yet played our last card. The Italian position is not necessarily as strong as it appears at the present time, particularly her economic position. It is well known that she has lost half her exports in the last year and almost half her imports, and that her gold supply has been exhausted in the last six months. That process is accelerating. The position is not lost until the last moment, and for that reason nothing strikes one more about the position of Europe now than that it is like a kaleidoscope. It can change in a night. I can imagine sudden changes in the European situation. Changes in Austria may take place in a night which would make Italy very glad to liquidate this Abyssinian adventure on any terms that she could get. . . . We are entitled to ask the Foreign Secretary to reply definitely to this question: Will this House have an opportunity of expressing its opinion before the sanctions policy is abandoned? We have the right to express our opinion, because the sanctions policy of the Government is unlike any other policy upon which they have ever embarked. That policy was a partnership. When the Government adopted that policy, after the speech of September and the General Election, they asked for the support of the nation and they claimed the support of this side of the House. They have not, therefore, a free hand to do what they like, and they have no right, having asked the nation to support them, and having induced us, at great electoral disadvantage, to take part in that support, to imagine that this matter can be settled only by the wishes of their own supporters. May 6th, 1936.

MR. L. C. AMERY (*Sparkbrook*, Conservative): Let us admit it: we have betrayed Abyssinia. The wretched Abyssinians would have done better if they had never heard of Geneva, or had never listened to the brave speeches of my right hon. Friend. May 6th, 1936.


MR. CHURCHILL (*Epping*, Conservative): This is a mournful occasion. We have encountered a great disaster. Let no one minimise the effect of this disaster to every one of our interests in every part of the world. May 6th, 1936.



EXPERT ADVICE.

SHADE OF ABD-UL-HAMID. "I DEFIED THE CIVILIZED WORLD AND DID MY BEST TO EXTERMINATE THE ARMENIANS—AND YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO ME."

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of "Punch."



SOUTHWARD HO!

"AFTER DIFFICULT NAVIGATION, WE ARE IN VIEW OF THE HARBOUR. WE WILL REACH IT WITH SAILS SPREAD. WE SHALL CARRY WITH US, AS ALWAYS, THE FORCE, THE JUSTICE AND THE CIVILISATION OF ROME."—*Signor Mussolini.*

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of "Punch."



THE DAWN OF PROGRESS.

BUT HOW AM I TO SEE IT? THEY'VE BLINDED ME.

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of "Punch."



AT THE ACADEMY OF NATIONS.

THE LEAGUE. "AND TO THINK THAT I ONCE POSED FOR THAT!"

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of "Punch."



The weird sisters, hand in hand,
 Posters of the sea and land,
 Thus do go about, about:
 Thrice to thine and thrice to mine
 And thrice again to make up nine.
 Peace! The charm's wound up.

BAD FAIRIES.

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of the "Evening Standard."



IN THE MELTING POT AGAIN.

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of the "Evening Standard."



WORTHY DESCENDANT OF THE BORGIAS.

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of the "Evening Standard."



MISSED THE BUS.

With acknowledgements to the proprietors of the "Evening Standard."

