

"Britannia," December 10, 1915.

FOR KING · FOR COUNTRY · FOR FREEDOM

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## SIR EDWARD GREY PLAYS THE GERMAN GAME!

Sir Edward Grey and his accomplices in the British Government now want to withdraw all our forces from the Balkans.

If they are allowed to do that it means the final desertion of Serbia.

It means the extermination of the Serbian army and people.

It means that Asquith's latest pledge to Serbia to make her restoration an essential object of the Allies is broken, for Germany does not mean that there shall be any Serbia to restore.

It means that the Germans gain mastery of the Balkans and a free road to Constantinople and beyond.

It means that the Greek ports—the gates to the Mediterranean—come into use by Germany to our terrible detriment.

It means that Germany can force a million and a half Greek and Roumanian soldiers into the field against us, while we lose the Serbian Army, which for its size is the grandest fighting force in the world.

The withdrawal of our forces from the Balkans also means that the Germans can develop their newly acquired resources and train their newly mastered men and in this and other ways prepare to be as successful in Asia Minor and beyond as we have allowed them to be in the Balkans!

In short the withdrawal from Salonica means the betrayal of Serbia and also the betrayal of Britain.

But How Can We Be Surprised at This Treachery  
When We Know that Sir Edward Grey Said Months  
Ago that Serbia Ought to be Annexed by Austria!

NOW WE UNDERSTAND WHY HE DID NOT WANT TO SEND BRITISH TROOPS TO SERBIA!! It was in order that the Austro-German plan of the annexation of Serbia might be realised!

The fact is that Sir Edward Grey is the best friend and ally of the Austro-Germans.

excluding Cyprus, & ...  
And even while Serbia's future Adriatic Sea coast was still problematical, because



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Why all the implacable attacks upon Then came the exciting affair of Scutari.

## EDITORIAL COMMENT on the HOWEL MEMORANDUM WHICH APPEARS ON OPPOSITE PAGE.

Is it, or is it not, a breach of Army discipline, for an Officer on active service to send out to journalists and other civilians a memorandum on military or political policy, in time of war?

Is not this indeed a punishable offence?

Above all is it consistent with either discipline, duty or the honour of an officer and a gentleman to recommend in such a letter the desertion on the field of battle of a nation allied to his own, in this case, Serbia!

And on the same principles of discipline, duty and honour, is it permissible to refer to the position of an Ally in the terms in which a Great Power Allied with us is referred to in Brigadier-General Howel's letter?

### POINTS IN THE HOWEL MEMORANDUM.

Notice in section (1) the admission that the writer believes that "through Serbia lies the line of least resistance" for Germany, and that "the German offensive south-eastward is therefore likely to become from the German point of view of primary importance and to be maintained."

Since this is the writer's opinion, why does he then go on to say that "it does not necessarily follow that all her enemies should do the same"? Is not this an invitation to give Germany a free path south-eastward? And on what military ground is such advice given, seeing that the Allies are superior to the Germans in men as well as in other respects and may therefore reasonably expect and desire an essay to be stronger than Germany in any and every direction in which she should seek to advance?

"Consolation for German failure elsewhere, will be sought for in a new Empire in the Middle East," we are told. Judging by the policy advised by General Howel and pursued by Sir Edward Grey, that is precisely what Sir Edward Grey desires to give to Germany, namely, a new Empire in the Middle East, possession of which will lay the foundations of Germany's domination of the world.

Notice in section (2) these words, "Our chances of creating friction are therefore good." This would seem to be an attempt at Germanised policy without the force with which Germany backs up such policy.

Notice in section (3) the statement that our policy is now to promote discord between Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria.

Now with all respect to Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey and their friend Howel, the way to break up the Germanic Alliance is by being stronger in a military sense and not, as recommended in the Howel letter, by means of mere intrigue.

Notice in section (4), that with a view to creating discord Serbia is to be sacrificed and given up as a "target" for Bulgaria, who, when this target has disappeared, will not, it is suggested be so easily managed and controlled by Germany!

This offering up of Serbia to destruction, this throwing of Serbia to the Bulgarian wolves is a project truly German in its inspiration and tone and at the same time it does not even benefit the British nation, in whose pretended interests it is put forth.

The policy of letting the Bulgarians destroy Serbia, a policy which Sir Edward Grey has already carried terribly far, does not mean success in detaching Bulgaria from Germany, but it means the destruction of Britain's honour, it means the abandonment to massacre of an outnumbered Serbian Army and of the defenceless Serbian people; it means that Germany gets her free pass to Constantinople; it means that Bulgaria is even more strongly attached than before to Germany, to whom Sir Edward Grey is making a present of Balkan victory. And it means treachery not only to Serbia but to our other Allies: it means the very depths of infamy and ruin.

Notice in section (5) shady and discreditable references to opinion in France, Italy, Russia and Britain. Notice also the significant and decidedly "fishy" statement, "We and not France should have most to say in deciding our policy in the East."

Notice the involved "calculations" having all the foggiest and mistiest with which Germany herself knows how to invest an argument meant to deceive and to muddle the mind of an opponent while this Howel argument is devised to muddle and befog British minds.

Notice in section (7), these treacherous words, "A withdrawal from the Dardanelles and failure to assist the Serbs would mean temporary loss of prestige and especially in Oriental countries, but we must not overrate this bogey."

Notice too the strange words about "black races," "Indian troops," "extensive mutiny," "letting the frontier rip" and so on and so forth.

Notice in section (8), the advice to withdraw British troops from the Dardanelles but not to send them to Salonica to save Serbia and cut short the German advance. Oh, dear no! these troops are to be removed to some distant spot where they are not for months to come to enter into the fray, so that they will not help in the Balkans and are not even to be holding up Turkish troops by remaining at Gallipoli, this "holding up" of Turkish troops" being the excuse that has been given for keeping the British troops

there all this time, instead of sending them to Salonica.

Notice in section (9) the references to "large operations," "ability to manoeuvre," "vast territory," etc. etc. etc. and the assertion that we should, given time to prepare, be able to defeat decisively the Turks or whatever forces the Germans may be able to organise against us.

The sad truth is that however superior we may be to the Germans in resources of men, materials or money, this superiority will avail us nothing if we are to be misled and betrayed as we have been in the Balkan affair.

Notice the summing up at the end of the circular. We are "to maintain an offensive-defensive in the West, where Germans and not mere substitutes for Germans are being killed." Why did this argument against killing mere substitutes for Germans not prevail when it was a question of going to the Dardanelles?

In the Balkans it is a question of fighting against Germans and also against Bulgarians who have shown themselves nearly as bad.

"Encourage the French to confine all their activities to this quarter." Yes, so that the Haldanes, Greys, and Howels can freely mismanage affairs as they have already done in the Balkans by refusing and delaying and trying to withdraw help for Serbia to the injury of all those in Alliance with us.

"Elsewhere economise, recuperate, reorganise and train." Yes, be inactive at this crucial moment, in that vital region the Balkans, so that the Germans can be making hay and getting ahead of us in the Balkans, Constantinople and beyond! They will trust to some other scheme for nullifying the future effort we may make in Egypt and elsewhere "and help Russia to develop our vast resources of material and men." Yes, while Germany is advancing and securing enormous and solid advantages and also making all her preparations to outwit and outfight us, later on aided by the mismanagement and worse of the Haldanes, Greys and Howels.

"Avoid new, etc. enterprises on the land." In other words leave Serbia and the Serbian Army to their fate, enable Germany to consolidate her rule in the Balkans, and aided by the Bulgarians and the Greeks and the Roumanians, whom she will force in, be ready for us later on!

"Build up in Egypt, etc. etc." Yes, oblige the Kaiser thus instead of defending Egypt, now and where it ought to be defended—namely in the Balkans.

Our readers will observe the noticeably un-military character of the memorandum and therefore will know how to estimate the bluff about military opinion being opposed to the Balkan campaign at its true value!

## A SCANDALOUS LETTER!

This circular letter or memorandum, which appears below, headed "Notes on the Balkans," and dated October 12, 1915, was sent out to various civilians (journalists and others) by Brigadier-General Howel, a Staff officer and a friend and confidant of General Robertson who presides over the British General Staff in France.

The letter, circulated with the evident complicity of the Government, makes some strange references to a member of the Quadruple Entente, and recommends the desertion and betrayal of Serbia!

This amazing and disgraceful letter has turned out to be an only too accurate representation of the Grey-Asquith-Haldane policy! Editorial comment on points in the letter appears opposite on page 100.

(1) Germany cannot afford to sit still, cannot maintain the offensive in more than one direction at a time. Serbia is the weakest of the Allies; through Serbia lies the line of least resistance. The German offensive south-eastwards is, therefore, like to become from the German point of view, of primary importance and to be maintained. Consolation for German failure elsewhere will be sought for in a new Empire in the Middle East.

Because Germany concentrates upon the East it does not necessarily follow that all her enemies should do the same. Before Germany can definitely begin to gain power in the East, she must expend power from the North (Russia) or from the West (France).

(2) A German Eastern Empire can only be gained in the beginning with the aid of the Bulgars and the Turks, and in the end at the expense of the Bulgars and the Turks.

Germany dreams of a greater Germany; Bulgaria dreams of a greater Bulgaria; Turkey dreams of an independent and renovated Turkey. All these dreams are conflicting; they cannot all come true together and at once; fundamentally the interests of all three Allies clash. Our chances of creating friction are therefore good.

(3) German, Bulgarian and Turkish ambitions clash, not only with each other, but also with those of the two remaining neutrals, Roumania and Greece. The more freely Germany bribes Bulgaria and Turkey, the more surely she alienates the sympathies of Roumania and Greece.

Generally speaking, political friction is inherent in the Balkan States. Our policy has, hitherto during the war, been the more difficult one—to promote concord; Germany's the easy one—to prevent it. Our respective rôles are now reversed.

(4) Germany's best hope of preventing or deferring friction lies in providing each of her vassal Allies with a simple straightforward objective upon which they may concentrate their ignorant energy and hate.

Serbia provides, in the first instance, a target for Bulgaria; the Dardanelles a target for Turkey. Should these two targets disappear and no others immediately take their place, Germany's political difficulties in dealing with her Allies would considerably increase.

Victorious Turks or Bulgars; or Turks or Bulgars not directly threatened by any dangerous foe, might claim their prizes prematurely—i.e., before Germany could, with their assistance, claim and establish her own.

(5) Imperial ambitions eastwards on the part of Germany tend to increase the pressure upon Britain and Russia, whose interests are, on the surface at any rate, more closely involved; and to relax pressure upon France and Italy, whose interests are, or appear to be, more remote. We may therefore expect public opinion in Russia and

Britain to become more staunch, in France and Italy less staunch, if the German aggression tends towards Constantinople and Bagdad, and Germany undoubtedly looks for friction here.

French and Italians who fight keenly to protect or regain their own homes, would fight less keenly for less obvious purposes abroad. Germany will therefore redouble her efforts to buy these two opponents off, and unpopular enterprises far afield might clear the way for German bribes.

In any case, since the interests of Great Britain and Russia are the more nearly involved, and since we are the two Powers who will more probably be called upon to see the matter through, we, and not France, should have most to say in deciding our policy in the East.

(6) A decisive war in the East means a long war. A long war favours those Powers who still have most resources in reserve. If we assume that an inactive, and therefore temporarily unsuccessful, policy in the Balkans means that the undeveloped resources of Bulgaria and Turkey would be wholly at Germany's disposal, even then, the total attainable strength of these undeveloped warlike resources are not equal to the total resources of Britain and Russia. Moreover, the rate at which we, Great Britain and Russia, should be able to develop our own resources, given breathing space and time, should be comparatively faster than the rate at which Germany can develop resources which she has first to master before she can handle.

For instance, the Bulgarian Army is already at its best and is more likely to deteriorate during the winter than to improve. Turkish levies can be organised and trained by German officers, but not so fast nor so fully as British and Russian levies can be trained by leaders of their own kith and kin. The more Germany attempts to drive the Turks, the more likely are the latter passively to resist or even to revolt.

(7) A withdrawal from the Dardanelles and failure to assist the Serbs would mean temporary loss of prestige, especially in Oriental countries. But we must not overrate this bogey. The black races cannot combine upon a common hostile purpose. They may become disorderly but they cannot effectively fight us unless they are organised and armed. If we limit inter-communication, enforce strict censorship, and above all, effectively control our native troops, our danger is more imaginary than real.

If all Indian troops are removed from India and all Egyptian troops from Egypt, and if their ammunition and means of transport are restricted there can be no organised uprising.

An extensive mutiny might be fatal, but extensive rioting can do little more than annoy us and harm themselves.

The N.W. Frontier of India is the only quarter where armed forces exist not under our immediate control. Rather than maintain near there black troops who might make common cause with the Afghans and the Tribes, it would be better temporarily to let the Frontier rip. If Afghans and Tribes attempted to invade the plains, our Territorials and Hindu troops could, at the worst, check them on the Indus line.

(8) The object of the Dardanelles expedition was to open the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. With both Turkey and Bulgaria against us, that object cannot be achieved. It therefore becomes an expedition without an object and therefore a waste of war power. A withdrawal means the loss of a certain number of material and men. Whatever that loss may amount to, it is a definite loss; as soon as the withdrawal is completed we know exactly how we stand. Against that definite loss, whatever it may prove to be we must set (a) the eventual total wastage if we fail to withdraw an unknown quantity, and (b) the number withdrawn and actually saved.

Whatever is saved becomes a fighting force and the nucleus of a larger fighting force. Removed to some spot where it can reorganise, manoeuvre, train and recover its morale, it regains at least its power of menace which at present it has lost. Left in Gallipoli, it remains a costly collection of armed men, never really formed into an army and deteriorating from bad to worse.

(9) The large operations which must, sooner or later, if the war is ever to be won, take place in the Near or Middle East will be operations demanding ability to manoeuvre. The territory being so vast as compared with the armies it is possible to raise and employ there, warfare in this area is unlikely to develop into mere digging and holding trenches. Mobility will be essential and it is in mobility that we should, given time to prepare, be able to defeat decisively the Turks or whatever forces the Germans may be able to organise against us.

(10) If there is any logic in the paragraph above, our best policy now would be:

(a) Maintain an active offensive-defensive in the West where Germans and not mere substitutes for Germans are being killed. Encourage the French to confine all their activities to this quarter.

(b) Elsewhere, economise, recuperate, reorganise and train. Develop and help Russia to develop our vast resources of material and men.

(c) Blockade the coasts of Turkey and Bulgaria but avoid any new minor, hastily thought out and inconclusive enterprises on the land; withdraw from the Dardanelles.

(d) Build up in Egypt a striking force which will by next spring be fit, prepared and able to initiate and carry through operations on a sufficiently large basis effectively to turn the scale in Turkey or the Balkans or wherever most required.

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And even while Serbia's future Adriatic Sea coast was still problematical, because



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DECEMBER 10, 1915

BRITANNIA

PAGE 100

## WHAT ASQUITH SAID!

"I have to say this—and I say it on behalf of the Government and the people of the United Kingdom—we here in this United Kingdom cannot allow Serbia to become the prey of this sinister and nefarious German-Austrian-Bulgarian combination."

## WHAT ASQUITH WANTS TO DO!

Now, one month later, he and Sir Edward Grey want to withdraw the British naval and military forces (whom he has so far allowed to do little or nothing to help Serbia) and thus leave Serbia and her Army a prey to the sinister and nefarious German-Austrian-Bulgarian combination.

This criminal treachery must be prevented.

## Review of the Week.

## Grey's Treachery—He Thinks Serbia Ought to be Annexed by Austria!

When first we wrote of Sir Edward Grey having betrayed Serbia, we wrote even more truly than we knew. For it has now come to our knowledge that months ago he expressed the opinion that SERBIA OUGHT TO BE ANNEXED BY AUSTRIA.

Serbia, whose past and present history is a continuous struggle for liberty, is doomed by Sir Edward Grey to be annexed by the Austro-Germans!

## The Clue to the Mystery of Grey's Opposition to Helping Serbia.

We now have the clue to a mystery, the reason of Sir Edward Grey's treatment of Serbia, his cloaking of Bulgaria's hostile preparations and his further betrayal of Serbia by opposing the sending of British troops to aid her against the triple attack upon her.

THIS BETRAYAL SIR EDWARD GREY IS NOW TRYING TO CONSUMMATE. IN OTHER WORDS HE WANTS TO DELIVER UP THE SERBIAN ARMY AND PEOPLE TO FINAL DESTRUCTION BY WITHDRAWING OUR FORCES FROM SALONICA.

## The Excuse for Betrayal.

The excuse for withdrawing our forces from Salonica is that we must make ready to defend Egypt. But with what heart can we defend Egypt with Serbia betrayed by us? Besides the place to defend Egypt, (and our honour too,) is in the Balkans. The plan of deserting Serbia in order to "prepare to defend Egypt" is a response to German suggestion and intrigue.

## Germany Is Vulnerable in the Balkans!

The Germanic Alliance is vulnerable in the Balkans as nowhere else. One proof of that is that the Germans were prepared to offer such good conditions to Serbia for allowing them to pass through Serbian territory, un-

opposed. Serbia, prizing her own honour and relying upon ours, rejected these conditions with contempt. As a result she is brought to the verge of destruction. And now, by a final infamy, Grey wants to withdraw the last vestige of support and leave Serbia and her army and people to die!

This "defending Egypt" excuse means that Sir Edward Grey regards the Alliance as being run on the principle of "Each for himself and the devil take the hindmost."

## Grey Does Not Want Portugal to Help Serbia and the Allies.

The case against Sir Edward Grey gets blacker every day. For example, Portugal was and is anxious to send an Army of about 150,000 men to help the Allies but Grey has hitherto declined to accept this help. The facts are stated by M. Jean Finnot in *la Revue*, are commented upon with astonishment by the *Gazette de Lonsanne* and are publicly confirmed by the Portuguese Consulate in Paris. We refer our readers to page 104 for fuller details.

## Grey Does Not Want to Save the Balkan Situation.

The Portuguese Army could have saved the situation in Serbia—but Grey does not want it saved as is proved (1) by his concealment of Bulgaria's hostile intentions (2) by his resistance to sending British troops to Serbia (3) by the inaction of the British troops who were at last sent there (4) by his refusal to accept the co-operation of the Portuguese Army (5) by his desire to abandon the Balkan campaign and leave Serbia to be wiped out (6) by his clearly expressed opinion that free and freedom loving Serbia ought to be annexed to Austria!

## Another Strange Fact!—The Case of Italy!

A well informed reader sends us the following statement:

With a view to resisting the German-Austrian-Bulgarian attack upon Serbia, Italy offered to send two or three hundred thousand men to Salonica. Sir Edward Grey did not accept this offer. Greece, it appears, raised an objection to the landing of Italian troops at Salonica, but seeing that Greece was not then prepared to carry out the terms of her treaty with Serbia, it was Sir Edward Grey's duty to assent to the co-operation of Italian troops since this co-operation would save Serbia. But as a matter of fact nothing serious was done by Grey to secure the landing of troops and his conduct in the matter was tantamount to a refusal of Italian help for Serbia. Such refusal was of course in close accord with his policy of refusing British military assistance to Serbia.

## What It Means.

What will the withdrawal from Salonica mean supposing that shameful and serious defeat (for defeat it will be in every sense of the word) should be inflicted upon us? It will mean

- (1) The loss of at least 250,000 Serbian troops.
- (2) The loss of 1,500,000 Greek and Roumanian troops who would be with us were we ourselves strong enough in the Balkans to attract them to our side.

That means a loss of 1½ millions or perhaps 2,000,000 men.

## Britain Betrayed.

In fact it means more, for almost certainly the Greeks and Roumanians will if we leave the Balkans be ultimately forced by Germany into the fight against us. The Greek and Roumanian Armies amounting together to about 1½ million men will if they are turned against instead of for us count double. It will represent a loss to us of 3 million men.

Now perhaps the people of this country can understand that the betrayal of Serbia and abandonment of the Balkans means the betrayal of Britain and the British people.

Those who in face of all that, still wish to keep Grey and Asquith in office share their guilt.

## A Moral and Material Defeat.

The withdrawal from Salonica will mean more—it will mean that Russia cannot accomplish her Balkan intervention with effect; it means that Italian aid is prevented from being serviceable. Such withdrawal will put new heart into the Germans. It will be a moral and material defeat for us and a corresponding moral and material victory for Germany.

The final abandonment of Serbia will mean the permanent dishonouring of Britain and it will lead to the ruin of the British Empire. In these matters punishment follows crime only too surely.

## A CALL TO ACTION.

We appeal to our readers to protest with all their power against the surrender of the Balkans to Germany and to demand that for the sake of our Ally and for the safety of the British Empire the fight against Germany, the attack on German communications shall continue in the Balkans. If the fight in the Balkans is not continued, we shall have to pay a heavy, heavy price for it and we shall very bitterly repent such treacherous and suicidal folly.

## A Scandalous Letter.

Believing that the clean fresh air and the clear light of day are the only cure for the present evils born and growing in secrecy and darkness, we publish on page 101 a circular letter or memorandum sent out to civilians by a British Staff Officer, Brigadier General Howel. The disgraceful terms of this letter are but the counterpart of the disgraceful and suicidal Balkan policy that is being pursued in Britain's name.

There is reason to believe that General Howel's memorandum resembles in spirit and in substance the memorandum of the so-called General Staff which was suddenly reconstituted about the beginning of October, and then proceeded to advise the desertion of our Ally, Serbia! The fact is that the Howel letter and we believe the "General Staff" memorandum is not really a serious military opinion at all, but more a hotch-potch of intrigue.

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THE SERBIAN RELIEF FUND,  
5, Cromwell Road, S.W.

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