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POOLED SECURITY :
WHAT DOES IT MEAN ?

By
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Pamphlet

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POOLED SECURITY : WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

(A reply to some critics of "New
Wars for Old")

BY
H. M. SWANWICK, C.H., M.A.

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PREFACE

IF any excuse is needed for a third pamphlet dealing with proposals arising out of the deadlock in disarmament negotiations, it is this: that the people making these proposals seem to be Rip van Winkles, who have slept all through the years since the victory of 1918 and who have failed to learn the lessons which might have been drawn from all that has happened during these years, in connection with the problems of disarmament and security. In her first pamphlet, *New Wars for Old* (price 6d.), the writer endeavoured to show, from experience, not from abstract theory, that the project for a League Force would not work. In the second, *Frankenstein and his Monster* (price 4d.), she suggested how the peace movement could be united and a great step made in co-operation and security by the abandonment of naval and military, and the internationalisation of civil, aviation. In this third pamphlet, a few critics of the first, and in particular that distinguished peace-philosopher, Sir Norman Angell, have been answered.

It is a sign of the deep disillusionment of pacifists that so many have taken up, in despair, it would seem, these schemes for a League force; schemes which were discussed during and immediately after the war and, for good reasons, abandoned.

Readers who find some of the allusions in this pamphlet obscure are referred to the other two.

May, 1934.

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POOLED SECURITY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

*Could great men thunder
As Jove himself does, Jove would ne'er be quiet,
For every pelting petty officer
Would use his heaven for thunder; nothing but thunder.*
Isabella, in "Measure for Measure."

IT is high time that those who are conducting active propaganda for what they call "Pooled Security," "Legalised as opposed to Anarchic Force," "International Police," were pressed to declare more precisely what they intend. There are various schemes put forward by various persons or organisations, and we find some speakers rather oddly blessing them all, in spite of their variety; indeed, their contradictions. They have one virtue, it seems, in common: they involve the use of compulsive or punitive force.

THE COVENANT NOT ENOUGH.

Another odd circumstance, which requires explanation, is that many of these speakers—and among them some who have been accustomed to expound the merits of the League Covenant and its provisions for the abandonment of war and for joint action against an aggressor—are now talking as if we were starting from scratch, and must really begin to do

something to make provision for dealing with treaty-breakers and aggressors. The fact being that there is provision in plenty, but that it has not been used. Besides the Covenant—by which, in the most solemn way, all members renounced war, accepted some form of arbitral settlement, guaranteed each other's frontiers, and undertook to use political, financial, and military sanctions against an aggressor—we have the "General Act," greatly extending and developing the range of arbitral settlement; the Treaty of Locarno (among other things, binding France, Germany, and Great Britain to a common defence of the Franco-German frontier); the Kellogg Pact, by which nearly all the States in the world, whether League-members or no, renounced war as an instrument of national policy; and a large number of separate agreements and alliances for joint action in case of aggression.

All this seems to some people not enough. The League Covenant has been repeatedly broken by its own members, in Europe, in Asia, and in South America, but the rest of the States members have looked the other way and have not made use of the provisions for "pooled security" to which they solemnly subscribed when they became members. Certain people have at last discovered that these breaches of the Covenant have been due to one cause: that the League possesses no armed force with which to threaten, restrain, or punish an aggressor. "The League" without arms is

at a disadvantage, it would seem, as against individual States with arms, and we are invited to believe that "The League" would, if only it were armed, suppress aggression.

But what is this League? You may either consider it as an abstraction, an organisation, a frame, into which members fit, in which case it is nonsense to talk of arming it; or you may regard it as the sum of all its members, which, all being armed, do not lack force. What they lack is the true, honourable, international direction of force. Will the making of a special League-force give such a direction? What has there been in the past history of the League to induce us to think so?

SOLIDARITY FOR PEACE.

The issue between those who think that an international force would produce security, and consequently peace, and those who do not is being confused, probably with no sinister intent, by dubbing the anti-force argument as "isolationist," "negative," even sometimes as "anti-League." It is, of course, true that there is a noisy section of the Press which is, and is proud to be, all those things. But many of us who oppose war sanctions stood for international solidarity long before some of those who now throw at us the accusation "isolationist." We uphold the solidarity of people, but not for evil; for peace, not for war. Before we will join any band of marchers we must know not only their goal but their route.

A sentimental appeal was recently made to us to sink differences and all agree on war sanctions; an appeal which recalled the talk of a lady who said that she and her husband had had a difference as to the expenditure of an unexpected surplus; he wanted a wireless, and she wanted a Hoover. "So," she concluded, "we compromised, and bought a Hoover."

This is too grave a matter for compromise. We must beware of impatience; of being led, by false analogies, and by the heart-breaking failures of the Powers to carry out their undertakings, down a path that is described as leading to law and order, but turns into a far worse slough than that in which we are floundering. There is, I fear, a very pressing danger of this. People appear still to be more attracted by the notion of making fresh promises than of keeping those they have made. Like an unthrifty housewife, they continue incurring new debts as a means of paying the old.

We are not isolationist; we believe there are many ways in which peace can be collectively organised. We are not negative; we oppose war sanctions because we are actively peace-makers. The accusation that we are anti-League sounds like a silly joke, for we made propaganda for a League even during the war and during those miserable first six months of 1919, when we had to watch formidable obstacles being piled up in the League's path.

Ever since then we have done our best to interest our fellow countrymen in the possibili-

ties of the League and to induce them to choose Governments with an international mind, who would use its machinery "to promote" (in the words of the Covenant) "international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security."

Alas, Isabella was right! How men do love thunder! If they can't have the good old war for glory, for conquest, because it is the greatest game in the world, they will have war to end war, war to prevent war, a pacifist's war! And they will call their war "sanctions"; and their armies will be "police"; and quite a number of people, women as well as men, will be persuaded that, regrettable as this array of force may be, it is the only means of attaining law and order, security and peace.

INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A pamphlet was published by the Women's International League last January* pointing out the chief reasons why the League of Nations had not yet won the confidence of the world, or even of its own members, and how, until this confidence had been won, nobody could believe in the impartiality of any system of sanctions, whether those in the Covenant, or a completely new set, put into motion by a new international tribunal, commanding an international force. This being so, sanctions would be only old wars

* *New Wars for Old.*

under a new name; not so very new either, for we have long been familiar with "punitive expeditions." This pamphlet received some criticism, and I have also had sundry inquiries, to all of which I should like to reply as clearly as I am able.

It is no answer to my argument to describe me, as one of my critics did, as "a sympathetic interpreter of what might be called the normal attitude of Germans to the League of Nations system." Certainly, although they are very far from my own, I have thought it important to understand not only the attitude of France, but of the Powers defeated in the world-war, as well as of Russia and of the United States. A great many of our mistakes have been due to a lack of such understanding. If the League of Nations is to work, we must all acquire an international outlook.

DEFENCE ABOVE PEACE.

Sir Norman Angell (in a letter to *Time and Tide*, February 24th) met my argument with his accustomed candour and courtesy. I was not able to compress my reply into a third of the space he had had at his disposal (which was all I was offered), and I will therefore endeavour here to summarise his argument and answer it to the best of my ability, since no one is likely to make a better case than he.

He once more declared his conviction that "national non-resistance would be the best,

safest, shortest, most certain road to peace"; but since people have shown that they will not take this road and will insist on using force, the next best policy would be to put force into a "collective system" rather than to continue using it anarchically. If I believed that this "next best" path would lead into the broad road of peace I would take it. I do not.

He began his case by expressing the belief that "Mrs. Swanwick would certainly agree that the outstanding fact in the conduct of States and the psychology of peoples, which concerns us more than any other whatsoever in this connection, is this: States and peoples do not put peace as their first objective; they put national defence as their first objective, placing defence above peace." From this premise he argued that "defence" would be secured by pooling forces, and that we should thus arrive, indirectly, at our common goal of peace. *His whole argument was based on the supposed necessity of accepting the fact that States and people put national defence as their first objective.* It is worth while, therefore, to examine this statement carefully, and I find myself by no means ready to accept his premise without qualification. His argument is ingenious, but it depends for its plausibility on an ambiguous use of the term "defence."

I am aware that official orators and pressmen habitually say that their first objective is defence—security. This has been dinned into our ears more than ever since the war to end

war. "Defence! Your country is in danger!" has always been the cry wherewith to whip up the people to submissive participation in war and preparation for war. Governments, by their policy, themselves create the danger against which they clamour for "defence." Before I could "certainly agree" with Sir Norman that people legitimately desire national defence, I should have to ask the meaning of the word "defence." Defence of what?

It has sometimes occurred that a ruler has plunged his country into war in defence of its (or his) supposed honour; to cover up some of his own crimes and follies. Rulers have found no surer way of making the people submissive than that of persuading them to fear a foreign foe, and the people have not yet learned to say "Why are we always in danger? How badly you manage our affairs!" Defence has meant, and still means for many minds, the manipulation of the balance of power in our favour, and "preventive wars" have been waged in the name of defence, and might be again.

Satiated States desire to hold the supposed advantages which they have won by force, or fortune, or diplomacy, and they call "defence" (or "security") preparations to hold these. Defeated States desire to be no longer dictated to; they desire to recover what they have lost and to win something more, so as to even-up successes, and preparations for this "just recovery and reparation" they call "defence." States in economic or political difficulties hope

to better their position by the provision of coercive force, and this also is "defence." All States wish to avoid being dominated, and many States wish to have a share in the domination of others. This, too, is "defence." If, in the popular mind, this complex of "effective desires" is held consistent with defence pure and simple this is only because most people are muddle-headed enough to think they can satisfy desires incompatible with the desires of others, and yet believe they are only nourishing the harmless desire for security. If all they desired was the defence of their frontiers, they would simply have to take St. Joan's (and Mr. Roosevelt's) advice and stay within them. No force, national or international, would be required for that. The defence of which we hear so much is, in fact, *defence of what they have or desire to have.*

By leaving the word "defence" ambiguous, Sir Norman, who has, by many years of stringent and unpalatable truth-telling, remained in a minority, can now happily help in leading the majority; they and he saying the same thing, but meaning something quite different by it. He condemns the "alliances and understandings," which are still as powerful as ever they were; but he suggests that if all the various States, involved as they are in such alliances and understandings, with their opposed desires, and their profound distrust of each other, would pool their forces, retaining no national force, they would have made a great step

towards the reign of international law and order.

FUNCTIONS OF THE POOLED FORCE.

It is not clear to me, from any of his writings, how far Sir Norman would go in this pooling of forces. Some advocates of what is called "pooled security" would like to see all forces by sea, land, and air controlled by an international authority; others go no further than internationalising air forces, while yet a third group would apparently be satisfied with a force of "interceptor planes" which would never carry or use destructive bombs, but confine themselves to what may be legitimately called police functions, in discovering breaches of international air-agreements and perhaps even fighting illegal airplanes. Under cover of this vagueness, many people will agree to "pooled security" without distinctly realising what form it would take. I may say at once that, if military aviation were totally abolished and civil aviation internationalised, an international corps of trained aviators might be useful, as true police. Their business would not be to exercise reprisals on the civilian population of an aggressor State, a process which is grossly mis-called policing; it would be the discovery of illegal practices and the bringing to judgment of those guilty of them.

Sir Norman, however, seems to go a great deal further than this, for he admits (*Time and Tide*, March 10th) that "any use of armed

force, including international armed force, is bound to inflict unspeakable misery." We may take it, therefore, that he envisages something like a League war; a contingency already provided for under Article 16 of the Covenant, but never arrived at, even in the clearest cases.

It is as if he said to a public which he has found to be still incapable of understanding the basis of peace: "Very well then. I take you at your word. You say you desire defence; the defence of your frontiers; security. And you will not consent to obtaining it by the simple and obvious method of staying within your frontiers: of agreeing to the Kellogg Pact and *keeping that agreement*. Now, therefore, since you will not keep that agreement *not* to use war as an instrument of *national* policy, I invite you to make a new and much more difficult agreement; to *use* war as an instrument of *international* policy."

It may be that Sir Norman thinks that men are so much in love with force that they will be more likely to keep an engagement to go to war than one to refrain from going to war; but I hardly think it. He seems, in the face of the history of the League, to have persuaded himself that an International Force would be used in an international spirit, although the sanctions provided for in the League Covenant never have been so used. To me, on the other hand, it seems amply clear, after fourteen years of experience of the ways in which the Powers have used the League, added to the bitter

experience of the Peace Treaties, that any force, in name international, would be used, in fact, as the instrument of the "alliances and understandings" which he assumes would die out, but which would still survive, as they have survived the foundation of an ostensibly universal League.

THE LESSON OF THE EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLY.

Alliances and understandings and diplomatic log-rolling have been active in many cases of intervention or non-intervention of the League when far less terrific issues than a League war were at stake. If a League war were possible, the Powers would desire, more than ever, to secure a balance favourable to themselves and their Allies on the League Council. It was this desire which underlay the unseemly scramble for Permanent Seats at the Extraordinary Assembly of 1926; the desire to "redress the balance" against the dreaded new member. How short memories are! How few people, even at the time, grasped the lesson of that ugly episode in the history of the League, in spite of the warning articles of the late J. G. Hamilton in the *Manchester Guardian*. He was clear enough in his conviction that this scramble for seats on the part of certain Powers was dictated by the firm determination to use the League for their selfish national purposes, and the eight years that have elapsed have proved him amply right. Yet I—who at the time also said and

wrote these things—am alluded to (not by Sir Norman, who knows better, but by a jaunty newcomer) as if my objections were not founded on experience, but on some sentimental abstraction. If Powers who were engaged in that Extraordinary Assembly do consent to some such plan as that put forward by Lord Davies, it will be in the firm belief that they will be able to wangle a majority which will enable them to make, in the odour of sanctity, a war which they want to make for national purposes; and if, as in the case of Manchuria, a League war does not suit their book, they may even, with the cynicism we saw then, leave the aggressor to enjoy his spoils without so much as an apology to the injured party for treating their undertakings as "a scrap of paper."

The truth is that when the League was founded, in a war atmosphere, the Powers were not yet ready to use loyally the coercive forces provided by the Covenant. These were not used, or even threatened, when Poland illegally raided Vilna, when Italy illegally bombarded Corfu, when France illegally invaded the Ruhr. They were threatened in a Balkan squabble because neither of the parties had powerful Allies. Who can doubt that, if the balance of power, still so heavily tipped on one side, were imperilled by a war, or even by a formidable political move, ways and means would speedily be found by the predominant Powers to invoke Article 16? The endeavour to organise the punitive forces of the world, or of Europe,

before the moral forces have been greatly developed is merely to back fortuitous combinations of selfish interests (in essence, just the old "alliances") with coercive force, and call the result by the august name of Law and Order.

I see vistas of unsavoury intrigues and bargains; log-rolling of the kind which induced Spain to support Great Britain over Mosul in the expectation, naïvely admitted, that Great Britain would reward her by voting her a Permanent Seat; an expectation which evaporated in the *débâcle* of 1926, and led to Spain's temporary resignation. During the whole of those discreditable manoeuvres, there was only one member of the Council, that brave and honest Swede, M. Uden, who withstood them, and upheld the honour of the League; a circumstance which has been partly responsible for the clamour against the Unanimity Rules. How tiresome are these honest Scandinavians! If only great issues could be settled by a bare majority! To put it bluntly—the Powers are not yet civilised enough to be entrusted with the use of armed forces, which they would certainly misuse for the attainment of selfish ends, while making propaganda for the righteousness of their cause.*

* The rumour current now (May, 1934) that the U.S.S.R. is contemplating applying for membership of the League (with, of course, a permanent seat on the Council) is accompanied by the rumour that, unless Poland also received a permanent seat, she would oppose the admission of Russia. Not much progress since 1926!

MAKING AND BREAKING ENGAGEMENTS.

One of my critics wrote me a friendly letter containing the following passage:—

"I believe in original sin; most strongly do I believe in it; it seems to me, therefore, that we must take precautions against its workings and that the League of Nations is crumbling before our eyes because it has omitted to take such precautions and has assumed not original sin but original virtue. . . . I agree with Henry de Jouvenel that when the nations have accepted a common code of law and are likewise assured of its application they will be at peace. Not before."

But I, too, believe in this sinful condition of the States of the world, and therefore, precisely, I would refrain from arming them further with powers for evil, but offer them, patiently and persistently, opportunities for good. And I think that the League Powers are only too ready to "accept" all sorts of fine codes with not the faintest intention of abiding by them. Some people thought that the Kellogg Pact, accepted almost universally by all Powers both within and without the League, was inaugurating the era of perfect peace. In my view international co-operation is weakened by every agreement willingly made and wilfully broken.

CORRUPT JUDGMENTS.

It is necessary to guard oneself from seeming to say that one objects to an International Force because it would act on the decisions of a human and therefore fallible body, whether

the League Council or some other, and that these decisions would inevitably be subject to human errors. Sir Norman has candidly admitted this, and it is perfectly true. It is no valid objection to arbitration that it cannot be perfect. Nor is that a valid objection to backing arbitration with force. The valid objection is that, whereas voluntary arbitration, without sanctions, might be freely resorted to, and might approximate justice, and would gradually become popular among the masses who do not want war; arbitration, backed by sanctions, would be much less freely used, and when it was used, the verdict would inevitably be greatly affected by the possibility that it might have to be backed with force.

Here the analogy between a national court of justice with national police and an international court of arbitration with an international army is completely misleading. For the judge in a national court of justice has nothing to do with the consequences of his judgment, and if political or financial considerations affect him, we at once recognise that he is corrupt and his judgment tainted; whereas a State sitting in judgment on another is bound to be affected by political and economic considerations. In short, sanctions would be used by the League when it suited the national interests of the majority to use them; they would not be used when it did not. And the fact that they might be expected to follow a judgment would often prevent any

judgment being made, or corruptly affect the nature of that judgment. It is likely that it was the fear of the consequences of a judgment which caused the League Council to delay giving any in the Manchurian case until they were faced by a *fait accompli*.

A NEW HOLY ALLIANCE.

Sir Norman legitimately challenges me to say whether I do, then, prefer the existence of national armies to any of the schemes for an international coercive force. It is hard to say one "prefers" one thing to others, when one loathes them all; but, bad and stupid as is the existence of national forces in the modern world, they are at least honestly national and not camouflaged; their wars would, of course, like all wars, be represented as Holy Wars, but not quite so plausibly as would a League war; they are not likely to be such a formidable engine of tyranny in Europe as this new version of a Holy Alliance; they do not positively hinder recourse to civilised methods of settling differences, or even their own gradual elimination.

Sir Norman defends the use of the term "International Police," to which I take exception because it dishonestly wins support for an organisation differing fundamentally from municipal police. In my pamphlet *New Wars for Old* I gave several points of fundamental

difference, and I have been surprised by the number of people who have said that they had never before realised these differences so clearly, and that they made "all the difference."

Municipal police do not employ lethal weapons on an extensive scale for reprisal on non-combatant populations, and the effect on the public mind of making war a function of an international body would be to give war a fresh glory, and enable men to go on idealising coercive force above reason; this would be greatly furthered by giving the name "police" to those among whose functions might be the mass murder of populations. It is not therefore a light matter that advocates should go on using a term which minimises the evils of their proposals, and prevents all but the more critical minds from challenging their harmlessness.

I do not know whether Sir Norman has anywhere made clear whether he supports the whole of Lord Davies's scheme, which is that of *The New Commonwealth*. This involves the setting up of a new International Authority, at first purely European, not composed of the representatives of Governments but of unrepresentative experts, and acting by majority vote. This new Authority is to control the so-called International Police Force, and is eventually to have sole possession of aeroplanes, submarines, tanks, poison gas, &c. Its functions include:—

- (1) the enforcing of its decisions, and
- (2) the "reinforcing" of the national forces of the "victim of aggression."

The Authority is definitely to be empowered to make laws and to wage wars, in which, being theoretically in sole possession of bombing planes and poison gas, &c., it is presumed to be victorious.

A TRUE POLICE FORCE.

This ambitious scheme is that which I attacked in *New Wars for Old*. The kind of force which Mr. Noel Baker had in mind, when making his eloquent speech at the Brussels "Conference in Defence of Peace" last February, is in quite a different category, and might justly be described as a police force. Mr. Noel Baker advocated (1) the abolition of military and naval air forces, and (2) the effective international control of civil aviation, as I do,* and (3) the creation of an "international air police under the auspices of the League of Nations." In the functions of this police, as sketched by him, there was little which could make one fairly object to the term "police."

When the first two great reforms are being organised, it is desirable that everyone should feel that they are likely to be loyally carried out by everyone, and an efficient inspecting and detective force might be a useful part of the machinery. The force itself, like the Authority which controlled it, would have to be international, and I agree with Mr. Noel Baker that

* See *Frankenstein and His Monster*, Women's International League, price 4d.

it would not be a difficult matter to find a body of young aviators of all nations who would give their first loyalty to the League. The force he proposed was an air force only. The machines were not to be bombers, but what he called "interceptor planes," with far greater powers of climbing, manœuvring, and speed than any permitted to national civil aircraft.

Mr. Noel Baker made it clear that his police force was not to be used for "the ordinary purposes of punitive sanctions," but he would apparently allow them some latitude in fighting law-breaking planes belonging to "the aggressor." This proviso, and the suggestion that a beginning might be made in Europe alone, are the only features about which I feel some doubts. He seemed to believe—against all evidence, as I think—that it would be quite easy at once to determine "the aggressor," and he did not explain how a nation like Great Britain could come into a scheme for the total abandonment of military and naval planes, unless Japan also did; nor how Japan could do so, unless the United States did. Perhaps he thinks that British military and naval planes could be retained in Singapore and Australia; but I should not suppose so.

In any case, how different would be Mr. Noel Baker's "police force" from that evidently contemplated by Sir Norman Angell, which "is bound to inflict unspeakable misery!" How modest and practicable, compared to the pro-

posal for a new international legislative body with power to enforce its legislation by majority vote, and having in its sole possession "all new and super-weapons invented or employed during the last twenty-five years!"

AT ALL COSTS.

In a letter to the *Manchester Guardian*, dated April 10th, Mr. G. G. Armstrong wrote as follows:—"The policeman with his truncheon 'restrains'; the point is that behind him and his weapon are all the forces and all the arms of the State which can and will be used on adequate occasion. . . . An army directed from Geneva would, like the policeman, try not to injure innocent people, but it and he will restore order *at all costs.*" (Italics mine.) Just so. An army makes a desert and calls it peace! It may "try not to injure innocent people," but it inevitably must "inflict unspeakable misery." It is not true, either, that for the apprehension of a common domestic criminal it would be wise for the police to requisition armed forces to any extent "at all costs." When in "the siege of Sydney Street" Mr. Churchill, as Home Secretary, requisitioned machine-guns to apprehend a handful of ordinary criminals, it was not held a statesmanlike action. When it became clear in Ireland that the unregulated policy of reprisals by the Auxiliaries and Black-and-Tans, although nominally policing, was, in fact, a particularly loathsome type of war, it was decided

that we must either frankly make war or make peace. Such "police" action is generally recognised by our people, experienced as the English are in the art of government, as not morally permissible or politically prudent. Mr. Armstrong certainly feels this in national affairs; why not in international? "Force to the utmost," "Order at all costs," "Leaving them nothing but their eyes to weep with" is not honestly called policing.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

It has been suggested by some of my critics that the Economic Sanctions contemplated in the Covenant, and accepted by me as possible* in the last resort, are unworkable, and that they were, in fact, completely laid out at Brussels by M. Francis Delaisi. I have the greatest admiration for that brilliant exposé of shams, and I was disconcerted, until I read his speech. Since then I am completely reassured, for he said nothing to which I could not heartily subscribe. He showed that these sanctions would be difficult of application; I never thought they would be easy. He showed that they would be costly, that they would be weapons of war if imposed by blockade, and that they would be ineffectual unless universal, or nearly so, and very strictly enforced. All this is, of course, perfectly true, and is a complete answer to those who think—as I do not—that a boycott by

* See *New Wars for Old*, pp. 39-41.

isolated Powers is a valuable "gesture." To threaten or apply ineffectual penalties will be merely an emotional indulgence and far worse than useless. Unless co-operation in a boycott, and certainty in its application, could be assured, the Powers would be well advised to confine themselves to other methods.

OBSTRUCTIVE PROPAGANDA.

One of my critics wrote to tell me I was "flogging a dead horse," because the Powers could never be got to agree on the establishment of an International Force subject to an International Authority. I agree that it is highly improbable that such a force as Lord Davies contemplates could ever be established, and in my first pamphlet I suggested as much. Nevertheless, the propaganda for it is exceedingly injurious, because it postpones practicable measures of disarmament and turns men's minds from thoughts of co-operation to dreams—nightmares indeed—of coercion. It puts another difficulty in the way of the developments of schemes upon which we could all agree: the abolition of military and naval and the internationalisation of civil aviation. These need all our ingenuity and drive.

WHAT DO THEY MEAN?

We, who believe that, if the League of Nations were destroyed, we should immediately have to set to work to remake it; that

there is no absolutely sure way of defending frontiers other than the simple way of keeping all armed forces within them; that all disputes are capable of solution by methods of arbitration and conciliation; that "isolation" is an outworn doctrine—we are entitled to ask the protagonists of an armed International Force what they mean by it. It is not fair to take plebiscites and pass resolutions binding people to support co-operation "in defence of peace"—to which all of us would subscribe—and then to claim the result as support for a League Army or a League War.

