

Papers of Hugh Dalton:
Original Manuscript Diary

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DIARY16. 2. 40.

(He joined the Communists in Prague
after the war.)

Fierlinger to tea. The Russians invited him to stay on in Moscow as a private citizen when they dis-recognised C.S. This they did, under German pressure, at the beginning of the war against Finland. On the first day of that war the Russian policeman, who hitherto had been always on guard outside the Czech Legation, disappeared. Journalists cannot find out anything in Moscow. It is like living in a city of mutes. Gedye, who came out with high hopes, is very much disappointed. There would be immense difficulties in upsetting the regime. Communications between conspirators are almost impossible, and Party members and OGPU men are in all key positions, including every large block of workers' flats. The war with Finland is regarded as a local North-West frontier incident and arouses little attention in Moscow. There is much Byzantinism round Stalin. Young "radicals" are now in power in most departments. They have never travelled, and have read little besides Marx and Lenin. Alexandrov, the chief of the Central European Department in the Soviet Foreign Office, can speak and read no non-Russian language and has never been abroad. He was, two years ago, a foreman in an engineering Works in the Urals, and has been promoted as a good loyal Party member. Litvinov was put out partly because he discouraged such promotions, holding, what some thought to be a bourgeois view, that officials in the Foreign Office should have some knowledge of foreign countries and languages. Potemkin, who has recently been got rid of, was about the last of the officials who had these qualifications. Yet even he was quite astonished when F. said to him last summer that the British Labour Party were sincere in wanting a peace pact with S.U.

Zhdanov has his eyes always to the north. He says that the Murmansk Railway must be defended against attacks through Finland. He has organised the feeding of Leningrad with wheat grown in Siberia.

Russia does not want to be at war with England, but would resist, F. thinks, if we entered the Black Sea to help Rumania against Germany

The French Government is much less satisfactory than the British towards C.S. "The French hate to see the corpses of their victims", he says. When Benes was in Paris, Daladier refused even to see him. Bonnet and de Monzie are also enemies of C.S.

DIARY21. 2. 40.

Fly to Paris with Attlee, Phil, Barbara Gould and Gillies to meet French Socialist Executive. Fuller notes follow, but on 21st I saw Comert, Mantoux and Vaucher; on 22nd full day's meeting with French C.A.P. at Cité Malesherbes, very good lunch at Auberge du Clou, where Barbara, being called on to respond, makes a short speech in halting French, ending with "mais si je parle mal, je mange bien"; take tea with British Ambassador, and dine with Sandford at Aux Coconaux, close to the Hotel Bedford, 14, Rue de l'Arcade, where we stay. On the 23rd see Léger and Mowrer and pick up tail end of Anglo-French T.U. Committee, afterwards gate-crashing at French Ministry of Labour where a reception is being given, with a good deal of champagne, to Trade Union leaders of both countries. On the 24th, picked up by Blum at Hotel Bedford at 7.45 and motor with him and his two detectives, one of whom drives the car, to Brussels via Laon, which is a most beautiful town set upon a hill, unfrequented by British tourists, with a very old cathedral and a superb panoramic view. Afternoon sitting of L.S.I. On the 25th, L.S.I. all day with lunch with Madame Vandervelde and tragic little partie carrée in the evening with Barbara and two Poles upstairs at Concordia Nord near our hotel.

On the 26th try to return by aeroplane, Barbara, Gillies and I, Gen. Malcolm Boothby, Schmidt, a Dutch associate of the latter, and a number of Belgian business men. The plane arrives over Lypne but fails to land owing to fog and, so the pilot says afterwards, twice nearly hits a hill, and has to return to Brussels. The wireless can't be used for fear Hitler should hear, and therefore the aerodrome could only send up rockets and Very lights which were not seen by our plane. A Dutch plane also tried to land and nearly ran into us in the air. It was said by some that it did land, having sneaked through a hole in the clouds, but others said that, like us, it had to return to its base. I said to Boothby, in the presence of Barbara, "You and I are Old Etonians, but I think there is a Harrovian song which says 'My heart will thrill at the thought of the Hill'. If we had hit the bloody thing there would have been two by-elections in one plane, and you, my dear Barbara, would not even have been able to claim the reversion of my constituency."

27th. To aerodrome again (Boothby missing to-day) and wait about till after 2, only to hear that British authorities will not authorise flight owing to sea fog in the Channel. This is becoming rather intolerable, but we find there is no sure and quicker way of getting home, either by boat from Belgian ports or via Paris.

28th. Again to the aerodrome, where everyone is looking

of course the H.Ws and M.Ns. and Brockets would back it.

With Hfax. I leave a copy of our Declaration (as we left "Labour and the Nation" years ago). I say I think he will agree with much of it. This leads him, at the end, to raise the question of joint political meetings. I say we had better not reopen that till after Whitsun, when we shall put the thermometer into the water to feel the temperature of the Labour Party. In any case, I say, the P.M. is the greatest obstacle; we are much more disinclined to co-operate with him and some of his colleagues than with certain others, of whom Hfax. is one. H. says "Isn't it a bit easier now?" and adds that the P.M. was "touched" by H.M.'s tone last week in the House in the Economic Co-ordination Debate. I say that I should not advise the P.M. to read too much into that (in fact, H.M. is as violent against Ch. as any of us.)

Earlier in the conversation I opened on R. and said I hoped H. had found it useful to see him. I knew that R. was very pleased. H. said yes, he was much interested in R's story; of course, they got lots of stories from Germany and they were very conflicting. They had to put them all into the pot. I told him, not mentioning names, except X., what I had heard from the Professor. He said that this too was interesting and he would keep it at the back of his mind. X they had heard a lot of about the time of Munich. He thought that mid-November was a real case; he doubted the other two. Another version was that the Gs said to Hitler "Alright, we obey your orders, but we shall lead our troops in person, and you will take the consequences". In other words, they would have been killed and, if the offensive had failed, as they anticipated, Hitler would be unseated. Directly questioned by me, Hfax. denies all peace feelers officially. I mention P.M., H.W. and M.N. He says, of course, that he cannot speak for the City. I say that there will be an explosion if anything of this kind turns out to be true. I refer to N.H's remarks in public trying to distinguish Hitler from Goering. He says he has not it before him (I think he will look it up when I go). I press him not to believe that we should not speak against the Nazis publicly. He says he is inclined to attack the Nazis but not Hitler personally, so as not to rally Germans round him. As to saying that he would never even make peace with any of them, he says that some of his colleagues, such as Winston, say this sort of thing outright. He himself prefers not to incur charges of hubris, but his conditions of peace would be such that Hitler would not be able to accept them.

As to Austria, I speak against the Hapsburg agitation. He says that the French put Austria into their Declaration on Peace Aims last time and we did not. Lebrun himself put it in at the last moment. He says that the French think Benes has played his cards badly and they won't be firm on C.S. H.M.G., therefore, he says, speak of the "Czech people". I say that in the Labour Party we are still "Czechoslovaks". Especially since Hungary has got all the Plain, Slovakia cannot be independent, and the Separatist Movement there is simply due to German bribes and clerical obscurantism. I have been there and I know something about the country. Personally, I want a Polish-Czechoslovak union and have tried to push Sikorski and Benes together. This, I think, would be better than a Danubian Compound.

DIARY

13. 2. 40.

Dine, at Nathan's invitation, with Greenwood, Morrison and a few others, to meet Sir W. Seeds, still nominally British Ambassador in Moscow. He tells me that the Embassy there is in charge of de Rougetel, a man from Rossall to whom I gave a very black mark when I was at the F.O., because, though he had been in Vienna for two years, he had ~~not~~ met no Socialist leaders and seemed to know no way of meeting them. Seeds is not impressive. His case is all rather ex post facto. He says the Russians always work on rigid plans prepared for the politburo by various so-called experts. Once accepted by the P., these plans cannot be varied. Hence there was never any "negotiation" in the ordinary sense with Molotov, and it would have been useless, he thinks, for Halifax to have visited Moscow. He would have had to sign on the dotted line or go away empty handed. (This seems to me to be nonsense, particularly if H. had gone out at a fairly early stage of the talks.) I ask whether at the end it was not a formula defining "indirect aggression" which was the stumbling block. I understood that the F.O., or rather Strang, prepared four alternatives, of which one M. would certainly reject, one certainly accept, and two were doubtful. Seeds says that formulas did not matter at all. We knew quite well what the Russians wanted, and to that we could not agree. (I do not believe this; it does not square with what we were told from both sides at the time.)

I say that it was to me a shocking muddle that Poles and Russians were never confronted by British or French representatives to discuss ways and means of co-operation. He says that "It would have been no good". (Damned fool!)

Footnote
on Home
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in 1935

He also says that it was the Labour Party in the House of Commons who continually roused the suspicions of the Russians against Chamberlain. I say that since it was I who regularly put one or two questions a week to him on the progress of the negotiations I suppose he regards me as especially responsible for the breakdown of the talks. He says, with a smile, that he is afraid he does. I say that I do not think it needed my questions to infuse distrust of our Prime Minister into Stalin and Molotov. He says that Molotov frequently used to show him, when they met, translations of statements by Labour leaders on Chamberlain, and ask "How can you expect me to believe that that man is sincere?"

He says that of all the Russian leaders, he disliked only Zhdanov. He is a really bad man and a gangster, he thinks.

I doubt whether this ppor mut could do any good by returning to Moscow.

DIARYMiddle of February, 1940.

I have had a number of interesting talks during the last ten days, several with a Professor, whom I introduced to H.M. (on the 5th) and C.R.A. (on the 6th); also one with Van on the 6th and with Hfax. on the 8th. I have also got through, at last, "Labour, the War and the Peace". Finally, only C.R.A. and Pritt would not vote for it, and only Pritt voted against it. J.M. Griffiths would have made trouble and wrote stupid letters, but was away ill. C.R.A. "doesn't like the balance of it". He thinks there is too much about France and Germany! In the classic entitled "The Rabbit's Peace Aims", the only reference to France is near the end, when it is stated that his Vague New World would be equally acceptable to the Chinaman, the Frenchman, the Dane, the Belgian and the Javanese. I broadcast on the following Wednesday and get a large fan mail, with some hearty abuse.

The Professor has an optimistic story. The Gs have three times stopped H's offensives, in mid-November, just before Christmas, and in mid-January. The Gs are now all solid against H. except K. B. is very strong against H., and R. has recently been converted to the same view. Plans are laid to upset the regime and form a National Council, with X as President and Trade Unionists and Socialists in, among the latter, Harnack, son of the old professor. They want an assurance of no attack for two or three weeks while they are clearing up. They will go to great lengths to meet French demands and will restore P. and C.S., but they will want food and supplies quickly, and the P. thinks that our T.U. and Labour Movement could send friendly observers and distributors into G. Hitler tells the Gs that he has peace feelers from this country, and ~~pretends~~ pretends to show letters. He mentions Chamberlain, Horace Wilson, Montagu Norman, Londonderry, etc. (But this is all rumour, and both H.M. and I say bluntly that we disbelieve it.) He urges us to go on attacking the regime. H. now says "Next time I shall attack in a straight line: Calais - London. I shall be in London on April 20th."

V., who is in touch with the P., thinks him good at heart but very optimistic. They have heard a good deal of X in the F.O. Lately his reports have been much discounted; V. thinks perhaps too much. He does not believe that peace feelers are being made now. There would be too much row if this were discovered. He himself would help to make it. But if a Peace Offensive starts,

cheerful and saying that there is a high wind to-day, so that there will be no fog though it may be rather bumpy upstairs. We are quite used to each other's faces by now, and take off punctually. I ask the attendant whether it is a head or a following wind. He says a head wind. The flight should take an hour and twenty minutes; with a head wind, a little more. After an hour it is signalled we are going down (Belgian planes have glazed windows in war time, so we can't see out). We seem to have done the crossing in very good time. We all emerge smiling, only to find that it is Ostend. Five minutes later, in the squalid little buvette at this very second-class aerodrome, a Belgian business man says to me rather grimly, "Did I hear you speaking of these bloody neutrals?" I invite him to have a drink..... The pilot says that soon after we started, a message came from London to Brussels that we should not have started, and this was wirelessed from Brussels to the plane. We could not spend the night at Ostend and should have to go back to Brussels unless we could get authority before sunset to cross the Channel. It was a beautiful fine day, he said, and from upstairs he could see Dungeness quite clearly. The only explanation he could offer was that the British must be expecting a German raid. Two days before, when I had asked him why, if there was fog over Lympne, he could not fly on and land at some inland airfield, e.g., Heston, he said that he understood that many British A.A. Batteries had not yet fired a round in the war and were always on the look out for something to pop off at, and the shape and colour of these Belgian planes might be unfamiliar to them.

I tried to send a telegram to Kingsley Wood, demanding instant action by the Air Ministry, but was told that this would take four hours to get across. I therefore rang up the British Embassy in Brussels, slightly embarrassed by the fact that, though I had been five days in that city, I had not called on the rather dull, and less romantic than he sounds, Sir Lancelot Oliphant. Some young man assures me that they will try to communicate quickly with the A.M. Anyhow, about 3 p.m. we are told that the plane will start in five minutes, and over we go.

We have missed an important meeting of the National Executive of the Labour Party and have failed to prevent the re-admission of that most displeasing rich black Jew, George Strauss.

DIARY

21. 2. 40. Paris.

See Comert, who now deals with German émigrés (his office is at 35, Rue des petites Ecuries). Hilferding was there when I called. C. was removed from the Quai d'Orsay in Bonnet's time and ~~is~~ now, so to speak, got half way back. He was, I think, glad to be called on and taken notice of. He is very sceptical about any hopeful movement in Germany before a military defeat. The German people, he says, are very tired and exhausted. When they are defeated they will be a mass without a will and with no known man to lead them. They will say Here is Mr Schmidt, but no-one will have heard of him nor have any view of his value. C. has great doubts about the G.s. They don't want Germany broken up, and that's about all. They have probably advised against, rather than refused to carry out, certain orders. R. is an ex-Nazi and an ex-official. For the first reason he is not much liked or trusted by many in France; for the second, he is inclined to accept all suggestions made to him and to try to please. (I told C. how I had outlined pretty stiff Peace Terms, and he had accepted them all, including complete evacuation of P. and C.S.. complete freedom for Austria to choose, and payment for damage to Warsaw, etc.) But R. has no difficulty in getting to England, and the French authorities have never put any obstacles in his way. A week ago he came and asked C. for his visa, which was granted at once. The time may come when the Germans will say yes to everything we propose, and we, British and French, shall have practically to run the country for years, since they will be utterly disorganised. He likes our Declaration very much. He is sure it would be a great mistake to get into a state of war with Russia, but, on the other hand, there is great military need for finding a new front somewhere.

*General
Krauschning*

The French censorship has been much criticised in Parliament. Undoubtedly it is most stupidly administered, by retired military officers and such like, with no proper direction from above. The Parliamentary discussions will certainly lead to an improvement. He admires our tolerance of Communists, etc.

From him I go to Mantoux and Vaucher at the Hotel Continental. They are doing liaison with our Ministry of Information. I find them both very sensible and satisfactory, though we don't go very deeply into anything. Bonnet, M. says, is now without influence. De Monzie, who was also Mûnichois, is more active, able and dangerous. Only Maurras has publicly and persistently demanded the breakup of Germany. Mantoux agrees with me that public discussion on this subject now is inadvisable.

DIARY22. 2. 40.

Joint session with whole French C.A.P. very successful. Many of these French had never seen a British Socialist before and, I think, are reassured by the experience. In the morning session they told us about French opinion; in the afternoon session we told them about ours.

In the morning Paul Faure explains at length, and very cogently, the reasons why, by a substantial majority, the Socialist Parliamentary Group decided to press Daladier, who, they say, was very reluctant to take strong and speedy action, to suspend from their functions all Communist Deputies who refused to repudiate the Stalinite thesis that this was a war of French and British Imperialist aggression. Blum and a minority, though equally disapproving of the Communists, were in favour of going more slowly. P.F. says that in all there were 65 Communist Deputies, and in the Seine, the heart of France, 33 Communists out of 60 Deputies. Of the 65, 13 repudiated Moscow and have now formed a new group, called the Workers and Peasants Group, in the Chamber. (but even these, though not suspended, have the good sense to keep away from meetings of the Commissions). The rest refused, and of these 12 are in flight and several, including Thorez, are deserters from the Army. T. is thought to be in Holland, waiting for a German boat to take him to Russia. The Communists, said P.F., are nothing but agents of a foreign Power. It would be intolerable that they should be present at meetings of the Commissions of the Chamber, where confidential information is given to members of all Parties on Defence - Army, Navy, Air and Munitions - Foreign Affairs, Finance, Food Supply, etc. These are not men without a fatherland, but men whose fatherland is Russia. Their minds are hermetically sealed against all thoughts which are characteristically French. They have no sense of France, no knowledge of her history, nor of that of the modern world, nor of the national and social life of France which is flowing around them. They are in the Chamber on false pretenses. At the last election they outdid all Parties in their chauvinism and taught the Socialists to sing again the Marseillaise, an old tune which they had almost forgotten. They demanded arms without limit, and an unconditional stand against Nazi aggression. Their slogan was "Pour une France libre, forte et heureuse". Thorez broadcast the most flamboyant nationalist speeches which delighted old officers of the Reserve, some of whom, not having caught his name, thought that the speaker belonged to the most patriotic section of the extreme Right. At the second ballot they got votes, under the compact of the Front Populaire, from Socialists and Radicals. If an election were held to-day, the Communists would be wiped out. German aircraft have dropped leaflets over France consisting only of reprints, without comment, of Communist declarations.

Blum, following P.F., said that it is the French democratic and republican tradition that when France is in danger "le salut publique et la defense nationale" take precedence of individual liberty. After all, he said, this is a question of life and death. "Nous sommes en guerre". If you, he continued, in the British House of Commons had not just one single Communist whom no-one heeds, but a party of 65 declaring day by day, in Parliament and in their press, that your country was in the wrong, or if, instead of Mosley being, as we know he is, a mere infantile joke, he were the leader of a Parliamentary group some 60 strong, daily defending Germany, you would have had to act not less strongly than we have done.

We gathered that Trade Union membership had shrunk since the war, particularly because many Communists had left the Unions or been turned out, but it must be remembered that in 1926 an immense new membership came in quickly and was never firmly organised. The C.G.T. had passed for a while under Communist control and had declared the fatuous general strike of a year ago which had proved a complete and disastrous fiasco. Great numbers of workers had refused to come out, and Daladier, almost without meeting a protest, had taken strong and decisive action against the instigators. Jouhaux had now re-established his position, and the Communists had been cleared out of his Executive. I gathered, however, that Belin, who is still influential, is inclined to be anti-British and in favour of peace talks with Hitler.

P.F. asked us to compare the fate of French Communists ~~who would not renounce Stalin and Hitler with that of non-Communists in Russia and non-Nazis in Germany.~~ who would not renounce Stalin and Hitler with that of non-Communists in Russia and non-Nazis in Germany. (Later, we heard terrible stories of the hunt of all Polish Socialists - P.P.S. and Bund alike - by the Ogpu in Soviet-occupied Poland.

Dormoy tells me privately that he hears that Rauschnig has been having pour parlers with British bankers. He says he has this from the French Surete. He seemed very suspicious of R. I said I knew nothing of such talks.

Sandford, previously of the D.H., is now Press Attache in the British Embassy and in liaison with the British Ministry of Information. He had heard no suggestions of anything really moving behind the Western wall. He hears that Germany is already short of oil, iron, coffee and fats. He is organising contacts between French miners, farmers, etc., and British troops. The first such joint beano is to be at Lens in a fortnight's time. (A fortnight later I heard this over the wireless. French miners, bands and processions along with a band of the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, and speeches in French by French miners' leader, by Gen. Brooke commanding our second Corps, and by a Welsh Lance Corporal who spoke better French than the General.)

DIARY23. 2. 40.

With Léger for over an hour. Stiff at first but thawed later. Van had written him a letter saying that I had always been "a firm and unwavering Francophil, even in difficult times". I asked L. whether he was now satisfied with the British effort and with the degree of understanding between our Governments. He said yes, now, though he could not have said this earlier in the war. At first it was felt in France that we thought that the mere removal of the Nazis would guarantee a reasonable and lasting peace. Now, as a result of an exchange of views between the two Governments, it was understood in France that we regarded the removal of the Nazis as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of peace. In addition, there must be material and military guarantees, which had not yet been clearly defined. He did not press for their close definition at present, only that the two Governments should remain in close and friendly touch. In reply to a question by me, he said he was not at all optimistic about the possibility of early changes for the better in Germany. We had been told this sort of thing so often before: before Munich, before German mobilisation last summer, immediately before the attack on Poland, and again now. He named Thyssen, Rauschning and Goerdler as three Germans of different types who were always telling hopeful stories, but nothing ever came of them. With some of these gentlemen it would be necessary to be very careful, even if they became the Government. I explained our recent Declaration and left him a copy. He said that he had read a full report of it and approved its main lines. Blum, he thought, was very good and wise about the war; Paul Faure less good.

Russia, he felt sure, would not stop at the conquest of Finland. She would go on to swallow up a large part both of Sweden and Norway. We had been very slow to help Finland, but things were better now. The Germans would like to stop the Russo-Finnish war, since it was using up Russian resources. There might be some important consequences of Russian lack of military success, e.g., in the Caucasus, where the population had never been reconciled to Russian rule.

There was some danger in early peace proposals. All neutrals would prefer, if they were faced with so hard a choice, a German peace to a continuance of the war. In Holland, in particular, there were strong defeatist currents. The visit of Summer Welles to Europe might be misunderstood in neutral countries.

He was very mistrustful of Italy. Daladier, he said, when he succeeded Bonnet at the Quai d'Orsay, at once sent for the Italian Ambassador and told him that Mussolini should be under no illusions. France would not tolerate any more indirect aggression

by Italy, nor was she prepared to make any concessions, even the smallest, to threats and clamour. Mussolini, said L., wanted a German victory, or, failing this, at least to save Germany from defeat. If we were in difficulties, he would not hesitate to attack us. He is still in control, even though others at Rome take a different view. He wants all North Africa and much else besides. No small concessions will even begin to satisfy him. We have been easy with him as regards the blockade because we do not want to give him any popular grievance which he could exploit in order to excite the Italian people, who are now most definitely non-belligerent, into a warlike mood. (I gather that L. was not quite satisfied with this easy policy, but that it had been recommended by François Poncet and Loraine and accepted by the two Governments.) The Italians are undoubtedly making money out of the war and passing a good deal through to Germany, though they are very active at present in re-arming themselves. At the end of the war, when we are all tired, Italy, with her fresh and unused forces, may try to play a deciding part.

This is a very able and clear-headed man. He cultivates several special streaks of suspicion, as well as a general Gallic scepticism, but, in general, I think his judgment is sound.

Yesterday Attlee and I and Phil went to tea with Campbell, our not very impressive Ambassador. He said little that was fresh or interesting, except that he expected Mussolini soon to mobilise several million men "to try to make our flesh creep".

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DIARY

23. 2. 40.

Lunch with Mowrer, just back from U.S.A. Attractive, stimulating, right-minded, but judgment not always good. Every Finnish success, he says, makes his heart sink. It ties the Russians up more and more with Germany. G. can at any time land divisions in South Finland. Russia is becoming more and more dependent on Germany. Hitler is putting Stalin on a chain. He will propose the reorganisation of Russian railways and oilfields, and the Russians won't feel able to refuse.

The war, he thinks, won't really start till 1941, unless Germany or Russia thinks that it will pay them to start sooner. The Allied air superiority is not enough. Pamphlets over Germany are useless until we have been able to inflict on them a military defeat. We should name 20 German towns over the wireless and say that we shall bomb some of these within 24 hours, so that the women and children should clear out. This would create demoralisation in Germany and make them all listen in to our wireless each night. He does not think there is any real shortage in G. of oils, metals, etc. He thinks that Bruning, Rauschning, etc. still want a peace with the Nazis and don't want the U.S. in the war. Bruning in the U.S. has been discouraging them from selling us arms. Mowrer himself thinks that the U.S. should give us limited assistance short of entering into the war. They should copy other models of "non-intervention". At the beginning of the war Americans pulled the bedclothes over their heads. Now they are beginning to peep out again, and if they can be assured that, even though they send arms, supplies and even volunteers, in large numbers, they won't get drawn into the war, they might ~~perhaps~~ go a long way. He does not like Sumner Welles, who is on the make. But we should not mis-handle him. We should tell him that we are panting for peace but that the Germans won't pay. Kennedy, he says, is anti-British, but is soon leaving London and will be replaced for a time by Bullitt. M. thinks that an attack on Petsamo would be very fool-hardy. He gives Poncet the credit of the present easy policy with Italy. He thinks it is a great mistake. We should be much stiffer. A British air officer said to him "This war should never have happened. Civilisation will be destroyed anyhow at the end....There will be no more shooting and yachting.." He asked whether I thought this was a common view. I said only in a narrow social circle.

DIARY

24. 2. 40.

Motor with Blum from Paris to Brussels across the battle-field of the Marne. He points out to me where Gallieni's taxi army disembarked and went into action, and also the furthest spot the Germans reached, quite close to the main road. He has an article in to-day's "Populaire" recalling memories of February 22nd, 1916 (our joint meeting with their C.A.P. was on February 22nd). In 1916 he was Secretary to Sembat and came across in attendance on Briand and others to London for an inter-allied talk. De Margerie and he were joint secretaries to the French delegation. That night they dined with the British Government and the party was split up among a number of small tables, at each of which one British Minister presided. He was at Kitchener's table. Later in the evening, after dinner, Asquith, with his distinguished and noble appearance, came up to Briand and handed him a telegram, looking very grave. This was the news: that the German attack at Verdun had begun. Briand turned pale and drew back as though he had received a blow. Then he recovered himself and said "They will never get through". Just as 24 years ago this great attack started quite suddenly, so now, Blum thinks, a German attack may start at any time. He thinks it most likely that they will attack all along the Front against Holland, Belgium, the Maginot Line and Switzerland simultaneously, with massed air attacks on England at the same time.

In reply to questions by me, he is not hopeful about the German Gs. Rauschnig, he hears, is mixed up with the German industrialists. These people, he says, won't make a new Germany, and there is no evidence that they can deliver the goods now.

~~Continuation of the
the 20th~~

Blum very rash at Brussels.
Help Finns not all work, else if
it leads to war with Russia.
I say he lacks the mandate
to go so far.

DIARY

25. 2. 40.

Barbara Gould and I with two Poles, a man and a woman. He has scars on his face from the Gestapo. She is the sister of Alter, of the Bund, who, I hear later, has been shot by the OGPU. She does most of the talking. They were both in Warsaw when it was bombarded. The elan of those days was tremendous. They felt they were really defending something, on behalf of all Europe. They thought that the Socialist International would come to their assistance. Then came a terrible disillusionment. She slept in passages and cellars during the bombardment. He shows me a photograph of twelve Polish hostages demanded by the Germans when they entered Warsaw. These were photographed in a group. They included Starzinski, the Mayor (who, it is said, was afterwards sent to a Concentration Camp or, according to another report, was shot), Prince Lubomirski, a Conservative professor from the University, two Socialists of the P.P.S. and two of the Bund.

She says that three million Poles, including Jews, are now nomads. How can these ever be restored after the war? What can ever give back to the Poles their enthusiasm again? She went from Warsaw to the West of Poland and there saw in Poznan and other towns people being turned out, whole streets at a time, old people and children included, at a quarter of an hour's notice, generally in the middle of the night, being allowed to take with them only ten zlotys (ie., a few shillings), food for two days, and small hand luggage. They were then marched off to the railway station and packed tight into trucks. They were dumped down, after a journey of 5, 6, 7 or 10 days, during a large part of which the trucks were shunted into sidings, with no sanitary arrangements, no heating, and no additional food. After being dumped down, they were told to disappear within a quarter of an hour or they would be shot. Vast numbers of these destitute people have now crowded into Warsaw, Cracow and other Polish cities. They have to be supported somehow by charitable funds raised by the Poles themselves. German authorities contribute nothing. In the homes from which these people are expelled, the Germans take over everything, including furniture, linen, food, etc., and either carry these things off to the Reich, or hand them over to German tenants. Thus, German dentists, barbers, etc., from the Baltic States, or from inside the Reich, are given possession of the homes, offices, shops, etc., of Polish dentists, barbers and so on.

In one Polish town she saw 50 people rounded up into the square and shot for no reason at all. The Germans then stripped their corpses naked and said that their relatives could fetch them away, as no doubt they would be able to distinguish them even in this condition.

-2-

The man said that one day in Warsaw a Polish policeman - these are compelled to go round in pairs with German policemen - was shot while walking in the street from a high window in a block of workers' flats. Nothing happened till next day, when the Germans came at midday and searched this block from top to bottom, dragging out 53 men who happened to be inside at the time, though some of them did not live there. All these 53 were then shot down in the street, on the ground that they did not help the police to catch the murderer the previous day. Their bodies were left lying in the street for days, the Germans forbidding their removal.

Heavy fines were imposed all over Poland, on the slightest pretexts, on towns and villages.

AIR MINISTRY5. 3. 40.

Saw Kingsley Wood for one and a half hours. After discussing a number of smaller matters, I took him on to questions of (1) liaison and (2) production.

As to (1), he denied that there was friction or disagreement between A.M. and Admiralty. He and Winston and their chief advisers meet every Monday, alternatively in A.M. and A. and alternately take the Chair. No serious ~~difficult~~ difference has arisen between them. Some naval men, e.g., Keyes, want to put all Coastal Command under the Navy. Winston and his Admirals have never asked for this. Incidentally, the Fleet Air Arm has not yet been used at all in this war. The A.M.'s principal objection to transferring the C.C. is that the A.M. should be able to dispose of its total forces in the most effective way at a crisis, and many of the machines of the C.C. might be switched over to B.C. or F.C.

I took up with him the case of the "Domala", bombed only eight miles from Plymouth, and of A.M. failure to bomb the sitting target presented by German capital ships recently stuck in the ice in the H.B. I told him that I had heard that, on this last failure, Winston was after his blood. He said that the bombing of the D. could only have been prevented if she herself had been effectively armed. It was impossible for Fighter patrols or otherwise to be sure of intercepting a single Bomber at night over the sea. We were constantly making, over German land, much more dangerous flights and getting back safely. We had lately taken, in flights over Berlin, to coming down to two or three hundred feet and dropping flares in the main streets and leaflets merely carrying in German the greeting "Here we are again".

As to the ships in the ice, our patrols reconnoitred them for several days in succession, as, indeed, they reconnoitred every night the enemy bases of Sylt, etc. The reason why we could not bomb them effectively was owing to low cloud. Bombs on battle-ships, to have maximum effect, should fall from a considerable height. The A. had not criticised this failure.

As to liaison between various elements in the Air Force, as to which I told him I had unsatisfactory and, indeed, disturbing reports, he admitted that the G. in C. of each Command naturally thought his own job the most important, and was, therefore, unwilling to detach part of his force to other Commands, or to assume part of what he thought were their proper duties. In fact, it was arranged that C.C. should have an automatic call on a proportion of Bombers from B.C. He denied the story of slowness in transmission

of orders and information. He admits that there is a feeling in some parts of the R.A.F. that younger men should hold the high commands. It may be that in three or four months he may make some changes, though it is hard to weigh experience against energy.

As to the Army, Barratt's appointment was working satisfactorily. He was to co-operate to the full with Gamelin and Gort, but, if asked by the Armies for what he judged to be too high a proportion, in any given situation, of his total force, he was to refer back to the War Cabinet.

(2) I said that there was much concern as to our production, both absolutely and relatively to Germany. It was also said that we were now getting back to the old vice, which at the beginning of his period at the A.M. he had largely cured, of multiplicity of types and too many mock-ups. He said he wanted, in the Estimates Debate on Thursday, if his officials did not too strongly object, to give the following particulars. (chief objection to making such statements was that they might excite the Germans into having a go now.) In last six months our output of best Bombers is 50% up on previous six months; for best Fighters (Spitfires and Hurricanes) 100%; output each month greater than the month before; present output of British plus French, at conservative estimate, equal in numbers to present output of Germany, and superior in quality. Pressed on last point, he admits that "British" includes Canadian plus U.S., but that both of these are very small at present, though with great possibilities of growth. As to new types, we shall concentrate in Bombers on three distinct types, probably to be reduced to two after experiments; in case of Fighters, two new improved types are coming along, including Bofighters which will be produced in great quantities, at latest by the beginning of 1941. Pressed by me on spare parts, he is making special enquiries regarding Reading. Before his time, firms delivered practically no spare parts, though these were specified in their contracts. He has for some time past insisted on at least 15%, and in two recent cases, on 20%, of spare parts being delivered with planes, or these will not be paid for. Firms much prefer to deliver complete planes without spare parts, and his recent insistence has meant that output, in terms of completed planes, is less than it would otherwise be. If he had been aiming simply at maximum numbers, he could have gone on turning the handle and producing enormous quantities of "Battles" and "Gladiators", but this would have been quite wrong.

AIR MINISTRY

5. 3. 40.

K.W. said that, as to plans for counter-attack, we have not bombed the Ruhr, etc., yet because it might antagonise U.S. and because the French don't want it, thinking German reprisals would probably be against them and not us. But all plans are minutely worked out, pilots allotted, and each with his special objectives, which he has studied so closely from photographs that he should know them as well as his own village. There would be no limitation in the Ruhr to air fields as targets. Industrial plant, railway stations, viaducts (these very important in the Ruhr), etc., would be included. The attack, to be effective, would need to be repeated by day and night for several days in succession. Our losses might be heavy, running up to even 20 or 25%. It is the knowledge of this, and corresponding knowledge on the German side, which has hitherto discouraged mass air offensives. It still remains to be proved how far such offensives in any case can be decisive in war. He feels that the air weapon is, after all, one which might break in one's hands and be finally discredited by one or two spectacular failures. So far, the Germans have made tremendous gains merely by threats and bluff.

I ask whether he has considered the possibility of giving warning in advance, e.g., over the wireless, to the German civilian population, that we intend to bomb some of a long list, e.g., some 30 or 40 German towns. This would both mollify U.S. and other humane opinion and disconcert German civilian population. In the result, we might bomb only three or four out of 30 or 40 towns named, but there would have been stampedes in all the 30 or 40. These warnings might be repeated, varying part but not all of the list, from day to day. He says that these tactics have been considered, and I do not gather from his manner that they are rejected. He says that the German police forces would probably try to prevent the civilians leaving. I reply that, in this case, the German authorities would share responsibility for damage to civilians and that good feeling between civilians and the authorities would not be promoted.

He says finally that he still cannot understand why the Germans did not go for us heads down at the start. He can only think it was because they did not quite trust the efficacy of their much-vaunted air arm.

DIARY - Air Ministry7. 3. 40.

E.H.Keeling, who is at the A.M. in uniform, draws me aside and tells me that the Germans have 1,750 heavy bombers, and we only 270. Of these totals, 1,250 and 160 may be regarded as immediately available at any given time. Of good Fighters, Spitfires and Hurricanes, we have only 750. This, he says, is a catastrophic situation. He is not including our Bombers in France, which are medium or light. He says that a number of people at the A.M. should be sacked, and also Ludlow Hewitt, C.in C., Bomber Command, who is most unenterprising. He thinks that K.W. is not on top of the job and never has been. Keeling would like a three-Party secret meeting upstairs, where K.W. could be cross-examined. He says that he has long wondered whether it was consistent with his duty to speak to me about these matters, and has finally decided that it is. I undertake to keep in touch with him.

14. 3. 40

K.W. comes, by invitation, to our Supply Committee, where there is a good attendance. He speaks chiefly about liaison in various forms and production, following the main points raised by me in the Estimates Debate. He makes a good general impression on the Committee, and there are no tremendous revelations, nor man hunts, as Garro Jones had hinted to me there would be. G.J. himself does not put many, nor penetrating, questions. At the end I ask whether it is the case that we are heavily out-numbered in heavy Bombers. He does not deny it, but hints that, particularly for attacks by night, there is no real defence against heavy bombers, and that a few may do as much damage as many. He thinks it likely that the Germans will not use their Air Force in the west except as a last resort if things are going very wrong with them. We may well have, he says, a similar situation in the air in this war as at sea in the last. The main fleets will be fleets in being rather than fleets in action, exercising influence at a distance through their possibilities, not through their positive actions.

DIARY11. 3. 40.

Talk to Jowitt, who is Chairman of Air Sub-Committee of National Expenditure Committee. He says that what he hears, by way of casual and unpremeditated remarks by R.A.F. High-Ups, does not bear out K.W.'s statement to me that British plus French current production is now greater than German. He gathers that it is only between one-half and two-thirds of the German. It still takes two years from the drawing board to a real flow of production for a new type of plane.

Freeman commands confidence, and K.W., he thinks, is not to blame and is doing as well as anyone could. There is a serious bottleneck as regards material; for aluminium and light alloys. It takes a long time to obtain new extrusion presses for aluminium. Apparently they are only made in U.S.A.

Jowitt thinks that the training of supervisors for unskilled labour will be another bottle-neck as production programme expands. Each Works, he thinks, should have its own staff college to train supervisors chosen from its own personnel.

Garro Jones thinks that Germany has twice as many Bombers and Fighters as we and the French put together. As regards potential production, our aluminium alloy supplies are much below those of Germany. German production of these, he thinks (based, I suppose, in large part on imports from neutrals in S.E. Europe), is greater than that of Britain, France, U.S.A. and Canada combined. He has, I know, some inside sources of information but is inclined to a dramatic pessimism.

DIARY14. 3. 40.

Butler thinks that the Russians will go quietly now and that they will try to get Bessarabia peacefully. If invaded by Germany, the Hungarians, he thinks, would only fire off a few machine guns and then give in.

Exam?

[Date? Pinned after

entry for 15.3.40. i.e. Was chos
after Dalton's discussion with Maisky?]

DIARY

15. 3. 40.

Lunch with Maisky at Soviet Embassy. This little man has lately shown signs of coming to life again socially, and Strabolgi and R.A. Butler have both been to lunch with him recently. R., on the other hand, who is also invited, says she would sooner be found dead than in his Embassy, and Butler tells me that his wife took the same line. The party to-day consists of the Turkish Ambassador, the Latvian and Afghan Ministers, the Irish High Commissioner, Charles Peake, F.O. News Department, d'Egville, several women and Korj, the little OGPU press attache. Madame M., advancing upon me with rather too red lips, says she is so sorry that my wife is in the country. She adds, rather malaprop, "So many people's wives seem to be in the country just now." I say, "Yes, it is such beautiful weather, isn't it." Little Korj sidles up to me holding a glass of sherry, which he lifts as though in salutation. I say, rather coldly, and in the hearing of several, "I don't know what you ~~xxx~~ think we are celebrating to-day". I then ask him "Do you remember when we last met?" He says no. I say "It was on August 22nd. Do you remember now?" (This was the day that A.G. and I came round to demand explanation of M. of Ribb's announced flight to Moscow to sign the German-Russian Pact. On this occasion K. spoke most offensively in the anti-chamber, saying, when I asked what was the meaning of all this, "This is to teach your Government and the French a lesson".) K. then slunk away.

Sit next to Dulanty at lunch, he talking chiefly about drinks and beans with Belloc. This is one of my home grounds, and I quote to him the famous poem, nowhere printed, which begins "The end of Piccadilly is a place".

I deliberately outstay the rest to talk with M. alone in his study. I am very frank and say that he and his Government are always letting us down, first over the Pact, then over Finland, where their aggression was disgraceful and indefensible. What next? I ask. Do they intend to push on to Narvik? He says no, certainly not. They have shown evidence of their good will by not occupying more than necessary strategic points in Finland. They could, in another two months, have overrun and occupied the whole country, but have preferred to make peace. I say that we are unpleasantly reminded of Hitler's action in the Sudetenland, which was followed, only a few months after, by the conquest of all C.S. He says there is no parallel. I say "We shall watch and judge you by results". I ask whether it is not true that I did as much as anyone to try to get the A.F.S. Pact last summer, that I visited him as often as anyone else in Parliament and persistently pushed Chamberlain towards the Pact. He says Yes, this is all true. I ask "Why then am I singled out by name for

abuse and attack in your press and wireless? Do you not report back to Moscow who are your friends and who are not?" He says "It was only after the Finnish War began and the Labour Party took up such an unqualified anti-Soviet attitude that these criticisms were made." I say "This is not true. I was attacked long before the Finnish War".

Whom are you going to attack next, I ask, and when? He says they have no intention to attack anyone. They have only had regard to their own strategic needs in the Baltic. I say that my only purpose in international affairs now is to kill Hitler and his system. "That also is the view of most of my friends. We judge every other country according as they are helping or hindering us in this job or remaining strictly neutral. We had hoped last summer that Russia would help us. Now, I think we are entitled to demand that Russia should be at least honestly neutral, that is to say that she should be equally willing to trade with both sides and to sell supplies, e.g., oil, metals and timber, to us rather than to Hitler if we offer the better price." He does not directly dissent from this, and I go on to ask whether trade talks, which, as I know, were proposed by H.M.G. even after the outbreak of war in September, could now be resumed. I make it clear that I have no authority to speak for H.M.G., but should like his view. He says that just now, having regard to our attitude over Finland, there is some bad feeling towards us in Moscow, and he doubts whether talks could begin at once, but, if relations could be improved, he thinks they might come later.

I say "We don't want war with you - I repeat that our purpose is to kill Hitler - but if you force us into it, we shall not run away, and if unhappily it should come to that, I don't think the principal scene of operations would be in Finland or Scandinavia". "Moreover", I add, "I think I know the mind of the Labour Party, and don't rely too much on my colleague Pritt, who is a light weight in the Party and of little account."

He says nothing in reply about Pritt, but assures me that he and all in Russia share my view that they do not want a state of war between our two countries. And he says "There is no reason why it should come provided your Government does not make mischief in the Middle East". I ask what is meant by "making mischief" and he says "If you were to attack us or encourage others to do so."

Deliberately I leave Rumania till the end of the conversation. Then I say to him "You remember that we have guaranteed Rumania. I remember very well a talk in this room when you were very frightened that we should not guarantee Rumania, but only Poland and Greece, so that, as you said, we should be pointing out to Hitler a permitted route to the Black Sea and Odessa. It was

after you and others had urged on me the importance of an Anglo-French guarantee to Rumania that some of us brought pressure to bear on the Government and got it. You had told me the night before that the thing was impossible, because H.M.G. had got the negotiations into such a muddle." He says "Yes, that is all quite true. But at that time we were thinking of a Rumanian guarantee with another edge on it." (i.e., against Germany and not against Russia). I repeat "None the less, we have guaranteed Rumania against attack. What are your Government's intentions as regards Bessarabia?" He replies "We have never recognised Rumania's right to it". I say "Yes I know that, but it has been part of Rumania now for more than 20 years, and you can't pretend that it has any strategic value for you." He says "No, that is quite true, and we have no intention of attacking Rumania in order to regain it."

As I am going, I say "One reason why I have not called on you lately is because I thought you might feel embarrassed". He says "Not at all. I always think that it is the duty of us diplomats to talk to everybody and to explain everything."

Note. I endeavoured to strike a note of frank and friendly intimidation throughout this talk.

In the afternoon I saw Cross, who alleged that the Rumanians were not sending the Russians much oil and that we were obstructing the transport by various ingenious devices, including barges manned by disguised British seamen carrying maize up the Danube and getting stuck at various points of the stream. He said that these barges had machine guns on board, hidden under tarpaulins, in case of need. The Germans also had armed men in civilian disguise on their Danube boats.

He was chiefly concerned about the leak through Vladivostok and across the Trans-Siberian Railway to Germany. He said that quantities of copper, cotton, etc., were coming from the United States. Also that the Japanese were making large profits out of this trade. He was not quite sure how it could be stopped. As regards neutrals in Europe, the Cabinet had decided in favour of trade agreements, wherever possible, in preference to forcible rationing. On the whole, these trade agreements were working well. It was Mussolini himself who had put his pencil through a most imposing list of Italian arms - guns, aeroplanes, etc. - which they were going to sell ~~us~~ us in exchange for coal.

DIARY17. 3. 40.

Hugh Gaitskell spends some hours with me and gives a pessimistic appreciation of the conduct, or rather the non-conduct, of the war. He is now in charge of Intelligence for Enemy Countries at the M.E.W. Naturally his mind is almost wholly focused on the problems of his Department. He does not think the blockade is doing much at present. Four factors are favouring Germany now, as compared with the situation in the last war:

- (1) There is no military activity on a large scale, and therefore no using up of German war supplies; on the contrary, these are being constantly increased.
- (2) The blockade now is much less complete than in the last war, since there is a much greater entry of goods into Germany overland from and via contiguous neutrals.
- (3) The German civilian standard of life has been screwed down much lower, with consequent saving and storing of food stuffs, materials, etc., than in the last war.
- (4) The internal regime in Germany is much *stiffer* now than then.

If (1) continues, there is no way in which we can win the war. Germany can hold out indefinitely. Further, German moral may outlast that of Britain and France in a sit-down war. Neutrals don't take us seriously. Since we accepted the challenge, it is we who must win and take positive steps to this end. Recent polls of public opinion in the United States show that in the last few weeks American opinion is turning towards the view that we cannot and shall not win the war.

Events in Finland, Norway and Sweden have, of course, been very bad for our prestige, and correspondingly good for Germany and Russia. I said that I thought the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force to Finland, even if Norway and Sweden had let us through, would have been a very hazardous business from the military point of view. He thinks not. All troops and supplies would have been convoyed, and experience shows that convoys are pretty safe; the Russians could not use more than a limited number of troops on the Isthmus Front and we and the French could easily have held them up; we should also have occupied on our lines of communication the iron mines round Kiruna, which Ironside, who knows the area, says could have been held by 10,000 men; we should therefore have cut off German iron ore supplies and threatened them at other points in the north; if the Germans had attacked

Sweden, we could have given the Swedes very effective assistance and secured valuable air fields for ourselves in Sweden; and this campaign would have made the Germans use things up. It would, moreover, have had American approval, which will be more doubtfully given to other possible enterprises round the Black Sea. Most obvious of these are Rumania or the Caucasus, but for either, Turkish consent is necessary. The Turks are said to be still very firm and to be prepared to face war with Russia if it should become inevitable. He thinks they would like to absorb the Baku oil fields into Turkey. He seemed ignorant of the other alternative that Georgia might desire to regain its independence. On this I told him something of our private information regarding this country. He thinks that the Rumanians are simply playing with us, and that the return of the Iron Guard means that they have definitely moved into the German orbit. I said that if this is so, it would perhaps be time to invite Bulgaria into our orbit. He likes this idea.

German shortages, actual or potential, are:

- (1) Oil. But they are increasing their synthetic production from coal (the situation of their coal-oil plants are all known, and they are very vulnerable air targets). They are importing from Rumania all they can find transport for. This is the only limiting factor. They are importing a certain amount from Russia, both across the Black Sea and by land routes. (If the Turks would let our ships into the Black Sea, ~~and~~ we could arrest the Russian oil tankers as a peaceful blockade measure. If the Russian oil fields were either captured or put out of action, the whole Russian economic and military machine would be dislocated.)
- (2) Fats. The German position here is rather weak, but they are still getting a good deal from the Balkans. They are very short of margarine, but are trying to stimulate the production of oil seeds from the Balkans.
- (3) Textiles. The German position here is also weak. They are not getting much cotton, but they are always developing synthetic production.
- (4) The same applies to Rubber; small natural supplies, but large synthetic activity. Big Buna factories in the Ruhr and elsewhere.
- (5) Iron and steel. For iron ore they depend on Sweden. If this supply were cut off, they would be in great difficulty. They have carried collection and use of scrap to the utmost limits already.

- (6) Other metals. Copper, nickel, chrome and tin are coming in in considerable quantities via Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railway. But for this leak, serious shortages might soon develop if military operations began. I said that Cross had spoken to me about this hole in the blockade and was obviously concerned about it. Much of the supplies come from the U.S.A. across the Pacific.
- (7) Cereals. No shortage at all, in view of large stocks and low standard of consumption.

I asked how Germans were paying for their imports. He said they paid with exports which were diverted from sea routes we had stopped, principally with machinery of various kinds. This suited the Russians very well.

The other smaller neutrals were still supplying Germany to an important extent. We did not ration them properly. I said I heard from Cross that there was "a Cabinet decision in favour of grade agreements rather than forceful rationing". He said he was afraid that this was true. He said "What can we do? The Foreign Office won't let us bully any of the neutrals and the Treasury won't let us bribe them". He said that Treasury officials, notably Waley, were disastrous. They put up objections in detail at inter-departmental conferences to many positive proposals of M.E.W. The F.O. attitude was illustrated by the sale, without conditions, to Rumania of a quantity of light ~~alloys~~ for the manufacture of aircraft. This had horrified him. Within the Department Cross was amiable and able, but too much inclined to speak optimistically in public, notably his speech in the House and his broadcast at the end of January. He was also too ~~much~~ much impressed by Leith Ross, who undoubtedly had great ability but who, H.G. thought, was three-quarters pacifist. When one said to him that the blockade was not working well, he seemed to think that the only conclusion was that we must make peace. Mounsey was useless and had obviously been handed over to M.E.W. by the F.O. because the latter knew this. Morton and Hall were both very good and tough. So was the Intelligence Department of the Ministry as a whole, as distinct from the Political Relations Department, which was very weak, compliant and reflecting F.O. Ingram and Stirling, both from the F.O., were weak as water.

H.G. thinks that what is needed now in public speeches in Parliament and outside is a cold analysis of the situation, without personal attacks on Chamberland and Co., but rather a courageous and reasoned pessimism which will convert public opinion to the view that these old gentlemen, with their optimistic twaddle, cannot win the war, and that a Coalition Government is necessary. He says that the speeches of Paul Reynaud in France are just the kind of thing he has in mind.

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I observe that he is so concentrated on his immediate job that he is not quite alive to some of the political difficulties, e.g., encouraging the still very small, but just noticeable, minority in our Party who want to "pack up the war".

He says that he finds a few officials who take this view, but no evidence that it is held by any member of the War Cabinet.

DIARY

4. 4. 40.

Maillot thinks it is about even chances whether Reynaud will survive next week. At the last meeting of the Supreme Council in London, which R. attended but Daladier did not, plans were agreed for a number of offensives by sea and air against German iron ore bargoes, German Baltic ports where these are unloaded, and certain other important military objectives within Germany. When R. got back to Paris, D. made difficulties. Partly this is green-eye, partly a fixation on D's part in favour of an expedition to Scandinavia, partly fear of German retaliation on French towns and other targets. Anyhow, everything is held up. Churchill wanted to go out to Paris, interview all leading French politicians in succession, and indicate to them their duty. Fortunately, he has been dissuaded, for he might have done much more harm than good. Bonnet is leading the intrigue against R. and pretending to be doing so on D's behalf. I asked why Louis Marin, whom I had met at Nancy and judged to be a patriotic, though Right-wing, Frenchman, was opposing the Government. Why should not he and his group - even if not the traitors like Flandin, Bonnet, etc. - collaborate? M. replied that Marin, though patriotic, was exceedingly stupid and could not believe that a French Government containing Socialists was really French.

Later in the evening at the French Embassy, where I was invited to meet a number of French journalists, one of their diplomats said that the French Chamber was quite out of touch with French public opinion. I said that I thought this was odd, as I understood from French Deputies that they spend much more time among their electors than we did.

It is not a very good situation.

Sargent, at this French Embassy dinner, denies that (1) the F.O. have been obstructing the M.E.W. and (2) that the F.O. unloaded on to the M.E.W. all their unwanted staff. I showed scepticism on both points. He says the real trouble of getting the Turks or the other Balkans to move is that they think they have not enough arms; they are always asking us for more, and we have to say that we have not enough yet for ourselves. On the other hand, the Germans still sell arms to some of them. The Turks, he says, before signing the agreement with us, sucked us absolutely dry of all available arms. The result was that for a time we were most dangerously short, e.g., of anti-tank guns. Some think that the Turks will feel ready to move in about August. S. thinks that the Russians have ~~just~~ lately become a little frightened of us and the French; hence Maisky's hints about trade

talks. But he doubts whether the Russians have any real intention to change their attitude (Maillot told me that he thought the British Govt. were inclined to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt at present, but the French were convinced that they means much more mischief and were firmly tied up with Hitler). I asked S. whether we intended to send back Seeds, or some better diplomat, to Moscow? He said there were pros and cons. He thought we should act with the French, and they at present were unwilling to send their Ambassador back. It was no use having an Ambassador in Moscow who was simply boycotted and humiliated, as had been the case immediately before Seeds came away. Meanwhile, Le Rougetel was being very active and sending back a lot of information. In present conditions in Moscow, a diplomat could really be no more than a journalist, picking up scraps of information here and there. Most Russians who could talk were completely terrified of saying anything to, or being seen in the company of, the foreign diplomats.

S. thought that it was a good move to bring back all our representatives in Turkey and the Balkans for consultation, particularly as this would keep the Russians guessing. I said that I thought we had too many diplomat~~c~~ deadheads in the Balkans and should like to see them replaced by younger and tougher representatives. In particular I could not imagine that either Palairt or Hoare were any use at all just now.

DIARY4th and 5th May, 1940.

Conference in London with Blum, Zyromski and Roucaayrol. Held at Victoria Hotel, Northumberland Avenue. Quite a convenient meeting place. We have a fair-sized-representation of National Executive members. Dallas presides.

4. 5. 40.

We begin with exchange of information on Norway. Blum says that French public opinion was shocked by the very rapid change, within twenty-four hours, in the Norwegian situation as revealed by Official British communiques. On the evening of April 25/26 news reached Paris from Rome that Ciano had sent for Poncet and told him that the British had suffered a serious reverse north of Oslo; his personal feelings, he said, were well known, but, if Britain and France were to be defeated in Norway, the decision of the Duce to enter the war on the German side might be precipitated. Blum thinks that Ciano, speaking thus, was "exercising a slight diplomatic blackmail". But the same night alarming rumours reached Paris from London. The question was raised of evacuating all the Trondheim zone and only holding Narvik. There were French troops, as well as British, at Narvik. On Saturday morning, the 27th, Reynaud went to London, determined to press hard against evacuation and in favour of sending strong reinforcements to the Trondheim zone. R. himself told Blum this.

R. returned to Paris the same night - Gamelin having gone to London before him and stayed after him, and Daladier and Darlan having accompanied Reynaud. R.'s view was now changed, in the light of the talks in London. He was prepared to evacuate south of T., where our troops were in a very dangerous situation, but still thought that we could and should hold Namsos. R. then fell ill and was in bed for three days. B. has not seen him since his return but has information indirectly.

In London R. was told that the British Admiralty said that the wear and tear of the fleet in the total of their operations, including convoys, was heavy. It was a case, not of losses, as to which the full number was always admitted, but of damage, more or less serious. On an average, one warship a day was having to be withdrawn from service for repairs. Sometimes these could be executed in a few days, but in other cases, weeks or even months would be required.

Jules Moch, who was serving on a French cruiser with the British fleet, had said that the strain on the ships' crews of six or seven air attacks in one night was severe. The Admiralty held the

held the view that the present strain on the Navy could not be prolonged beyond what was necessary. It appeared that they had certainly under-estimated the effectiveness of air attacks upon the fleet. It had been assumed that, although a surprise attack from the air in misty weather, or upon ships lying at anchor, might be serious, yet a fleet at sea, in movement and in appropriate formation, and with plenty of room for manoeuvring, would be comparatively immune. This view had also been held by Darlan. In Norway, however, aircraft had been much worse than submarines.

One of the chief troubles in Norway had been that we had no air fields nor bases from which Fighters, with comparatively short range, could operate. The experiment on the frozen lake had been a fiasco. The work of British bombers from bases in this country, and of the fleet air arm from aircraft carriers, had been admirable, but there was a great inequality in the conditions of combat for the Air Force, and it had been very difficult effectively to protect the fleet from German air attack.

The Germans had already been installed for several days in Trondheim and Bergen, and held all the good port and disembarkation facilities, when the Allies first moved against the Norwegian coast. Moreover, German crossings from Denmark to Oslo had not been stopped either by our surface ships or submarines. Very substantial reinforcements by sea and by air had streamed across. A proportion of transports had been sunk, but not enough to make any material difference.

There was evidence of lack of preparation and of co-ordination between the French and British Governments.

It had been agreed, when operations in Finland were under discussion, that all these, including the land operations, should be under British command. This agreement, together with details of the forces to be supplied by France and Britain, were embodied in a Protocol. Since the command was to be British, Gamelin, when criticisms were raised in Paris, said that he could not intervene. The French did all the British asked, though not, perhaps, "with zeal", since they held that all force withdrawn from the Western Front might be wasted on subsidiary expeditions.

Blum thinks that the plans made in February and March for Finland were still applied in April in Norway. (I don't think much of this argument.) Jules Moch was at Scapa Flow on April 7th when the first news came that the German fleet were out. The British fleet went out within a few hours, hoping to meet the Germans in the North Sea and bring them to battle. In accordance with a pre-arranged plan, the British ships scattered over a wide circle in the North Sea and then converged upon a rendez-vous. It

was hoped that they would thus drive the Germans in front of them and catch them, as it were, in a net. But no German ships were caught, and the British and French only met themselves at the rendez-vous. While they were thus sweeping the North Sea, the German transports and warships were in the Norwegian fjords, from Oslo up to Narvik.

A second error was not to foresee that our mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters would lead to an immediate German reaction. B. thinks that the British Government was most to blame here. The French had long pressed for these mines to be laid (the Daladier Government and, not less insistently, the Reynaud Government), but the British Government had been reluctant. (As to this, see note of my talk with A.V.A.) Darlan had urged that immediate military action should be prepared to follow the mine-laying.

After this exposé by Blum, Greenwood gave our French colleagues the following account.

Much remains to be explained. Why was the Force, said to consist of 100,000 men, for Finland dispersed? It appears that the British Government did not know of the German plans for Denmark and Norway and were not prepared for the speedy success of these, as a consequence of Norwegian treachery and weakness. The French, he understood, came to the Supreme War Council quite opposed to the idea of withdrawing from the Trondheim zone. The original British plan was for a frontal attack on T., as being the strategic point of the campaign. This was accepted by the War Cabinet but was later modified on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff. (A.G. is not clear, when questioned by me at this point, as to whether the C.O.S. were ~~willing~~ unanimous or only two to one, the Admiralty dissenting.) Churchill, who had wanted the big bang, was driven to "acquiesce" - this was his own chosen word - in the decision of the War Cabinet. A fortnight ago he was in a most indignant state of mind, but was now prepared to take his share of Cabinet responsibility.

At the Supreme War Council the French pressed the argument against evacuation. But the British said that the German forces were so strong and were advancing so fast, that effective defence was impossible. The French, having put their case very strongly, in the end agreed with the British view. A.G. understood that this included agreement by the French that there was no point in holding Mamsos if a big attack on T. was no longer practicable. The French, however, insisted that we should on at Narvik. A.G. understands

that yesterday, May 3rd, a landing was made by us at a point between Mamsos and Narvik; also that our attack on Narvik was to be speeded up. The Germans will, however, probably destroy the railway to the Scandinavian frontier. He doubts whether Blum's estimate of the loss of one British warship a day is ~~excessive~~ not excessive. On the other hand, it has been stated that 20,000 German troops were drowned in the crossings to Norway.

The P.M. had told him that the Germans might have anything up to 100,000 men now in Norway. The advance guards of these, running into thousands, had been landed, over a period of weeks, if not months, at various Norwegian ports from German ships, mostly the ore ships returning "empty" to Narvik. These men, disguised as German merchant seamen, stayed in sailors' doss houses at the ports. All this pointed to a grave failure of British Intelligence Service in Norway (or to neglect or stupid discounting by those at home of Intelligence reports). If we can take and hold Narvik, together with the strip of Norwegian coast lying to the south of this, and if we can secure a good air base for our Fighters, this will transform the situation in Norway. So, at least, the P.M. had told A.G.!

5. 5. 40.

Blum gives us to-day the following account.

The French Socialist Party had been very definitely in opposition to the Daladier Government. Not only was there no participation, but there were no contacts, such as we had. He thinks that perhaps we have all the advantages, both tactical and moral, of influence and information without responsibility. He does not know how long we shall be able to continue in this state of beatitude! In France the situation was quite different. They had no influence or contact as regards either the conduct of the war or domestic policy. There was great discontent in Parliament against the Government -

- (1) owing to the personal character of Daladier, who was solitaire and farouche.
- (2) because D. had too many jobs: he was P.M., Foreign Secretary, Minister of War, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Minister of National Economy, and also in charge of the Service of Information and Propaganda!
- (3) D. was always adjourning his decision - not surprisingly in view of (2).
- (4) D. last September said that he would create a separate Ministry of Information. When he fell from power he had not yet done this; this was typical.

- (5) As regards Finland, he incurred very grave criticism. On this occasion all the critics and the discontented combined against him. At the Tribune he gave figures and details regarding the aid to Finland which were later proved, in one of the Committees, to have been seriously incorrect. He had made very energetic declarations in favour of an armed entry into Finland, but he did not persuade the Chamber or the Senate that his preparations had been complete. In the votes which followed his statements, there were large numbers of abstentions. People said "It's the same thing again: promises made; nothing done."

The new Government under Reynaud was then formed. A majority of the French Socialist Party was in favour of going in. The chief argument used on the other side was: "We refused in October to go into D.'s Government, he being the leader of the Radicals. If now we go into Reynaud's Government, he being a very moderate Republican, this will upset the basis, electoral and political, of co-operation between Parties of the Left. There has for many years been an understanding, even if unspoken, between Socialists and Radicals as against the forces of the Centre and the Right." But most took the other view. B. had been six weeks without any contact at all with Daladier, even by telephone, and this illustrated the state of personal relationships. B. said that he himself would not enter Reynaud's Government. His presence would increase the violence of the attacks of the Right and Centre against Socialist participation. His name symbolises, for such critics, the Government of 1936. He thought he could best help the new Government, both in the Chamber and in the press, from outside.

Georges Monnet had entered the War Cabinet, and Serrol and Riviere, both well liked in the Parliamentary Group, were to be Ministers of Justice and Pensions. Under-Secretaries were Fevrier at Information, Albertin at Public Works and Blanchet, who was a Trade Unionist and a metal worker, at Munitions under Dautry.

How would was the new Government? The Socialists were its only really solid support! They had already saved the Government from defeat on the first day. Laval, Flandin and Marin were all violently opposed. Reynaud and Flandin had hated each other for years. Reynaud and Daladier are, to put it mildly, not very intimate. The Radicals as a whole are jealous and doubtful. Daladier would like to be P.M. again. There is no obvious third choice. There has been some reaction in France from the events in Norway, since the first impression given was that the Germans had been caught in a trap!

Roucaayrol added that when Daladier was in power things didn't go well but a majority of the Chamber wanted to cover him. With Reynaud in power, a majority wanted to destroy him. The Radicals think they have a right to hold the key positions in every French Cabinet. From them there is likely to be a permanent and jealous hostility.

Special Note

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the original**

Lunch to G. Monnet on 5. 4. 40 at Claridge's attended by swarms of ex-Ambassadors (Lindsay, Rumbold, etc.) and officials.

R. says they want to tighten up, but Italian press being awkward; no doubt large supplies into Italy since last Sept.

L. says he tells them what you may say to a foreign Govt.; I said I hoped not what but how. He denies diplomats act as breaks on blockade.

P. Morand, next me, says French tradition is to give nothing to Italy. This a mistake. French think we can make Turks do whatever we want; British not. He thought Georgia was half Stalinite; I thought less. He says M's last speech very clever.

Monnet very young, brown-eyed and Blumite, asked to be kept in touch with us. British Prize Law very out of date, requiring proof that destination of given cargo was Germany. French somewhat more elastic.

Morand says we should make all neutrals give us statistics of their trade. Only German and Russians

Dalton I 22

(40)

have learned to fake statistics
systematically

DIARY9. 4. 40.

Parliamentary Executive meets from 6 to 7.30 p.m. to exchange views on the question of entering the Government. A fairly sensible discussion, as a result of which no-one, not even A.V.A., proposes that we should at this stage enter a Government under Chamberlain. On the other hand, most think that we should keep an open mind, as events develop, and that if Chamberlain disappeared, as a result either of rapid physical decay or of a bad turn in the war, we should again seriously look at the question. Several feel strongly that we should be a very substantial part of the Government in the last phase of the war, with a view to influencing the settlement and ~~fighting~~ a khaki-coupon election. A.G. suggests, tentatively, that we might ask the Annual Conference at Whitsuntide to give general power to the Executive to go in, if circumstances seem to them to justify it, without the authority of a special conference. Others, including myself, are strongly against this procedure, which would provoke maximum of controversy and suspicion and might be rejected by Conference, thus leaving us in a much worse position. On the other hand, I argue that it would be very easy to collect a special conference in 48 hours by telegraphing to delegates at ^{the} previous conferences. A further alternative would be to take our decision, and then to summon a special conference to approve it. It should not be lost sight of that we are rendering a really valuable service in keeping the official Opposition constructively behind the war effort. If we went in, there would be a very queer collection of freaks in opposition, and these might then gain more publicity and influence than they can possibly get now. If the British Parliamentary system is to go on at all, it requires a responsible Opposition as well as a responsible Government.

previously

E.N. A.M.W.

DIARY10. 4. 40.

Denmark and Norway invaded. Hear Halifax speak at one of Nathan's lunches at the Dorchester. He is pretty good, and a civilised man, though, even to-day, he thought it necessary to drag in his religion and talk of man's "immortal soul" and "responsibility before his maker".

I warn that rabbit Frankenstein, who is at my table, against Hapsburg propaganda. He querulously complains that Otto (pudding face) had a great reception in U.S.A. but that none of this was reported in our press.

From this lunch I go straight to Maisky, who has been very pressing for an interview. His chief point is that he wants Trade Talks to be started at once and thinks that he could begin them in London with a representative of H.M.G. Any proposals put by us could be reported by him to Moscow (he clearly has no definite and detailed instructions at present) and then, if things went well, someone could go from here to Moscow to complete an agreement. I said that I should welcome such talks if they were likely to lead anywhere, but the big question was did the Russians intend to help or hinder us in killing Hitler? Everything else was subordinate to that, including the question of the arrest by us of ships making for Russian ports in the Pacific, of which he had complained. He said that they did not want Germany to win the war but that he doubted whether we could win it. I said that we intended to do so and that I should like to know whether they would sell their oil to us rather than to Germany. He said that this could be discussed; also the sale of timber, which he thought we needed. He had the usual complaints about having seen Halifax on the 27th of last month and made representations about the ships and then having been told that they had been handed over to the French Prize Court at Saigon, which he said he thought was "a mockery". He added that the French, he knew, were most anxious to make war on them but that H.M.G. was inclined to be more cautious. I repeated, a number of times, what we should judge them by their acts and by the evidence of their intentions.

H.G. to dine. Waley said to him "Dalton is going about blaming the Treasury for obstructing economic warfare". This was rather marked, and H. thinks that he is suspected of telling me things. It will be well therefore that I should make a parade of hearing my stuff from Einzig, the City, etc.

He was shocked to see Cross so subservient to Simon. The English Corporation for the Balkans has been hanging about since before Christmas (Cross told me about it then) and there is a Control Committee which may hang everything up.

DIARY11. 4. 40.

After Winston's statement on the naval fighting along the Norwegian coast, ending with a declaration in favour of "vigour", X. tells me in the Corridor that the Air Force is furious because (1) they are still forbidden to bomb any targets on land, including aerodromes in Norway which are "lousy with German machines"; (2) C.A.S. has just succeeded, after much difficulty, in getting C.O.S. Committee to agree to our bombing German coal-oil plant; these are superb targets, much better than Sylt or ships, and 15 out of 24 are within 150 miles of the Western frontier; this proposal is now bogged in the War Cabinet, and the excuse is put ~~down~~ that the French are against it; the French are a little reluctant, for fear of reprisals, but even more so are some of our old women.

X wonders whether I could not do something about this. I suppose that publicity would do more harm than good; he agrees. He thinks I might see Winston.

Later this evening, at 10.15 p.m., I see Sendall, Winston's P.S. - the latter being, quite naturally, up to the neck. I tell S. that this is only the second time I have sought Winston out since the war began, the previous time being when I wanted him, in the first week, to urge ~~for~~ action to help the Poles. This is rather the same case, and now W. is also Chairman of the Defence Committee and has more responsibility. He is, I say, our one white hope in that black flock. I say that many of us are most restive at failure to fight war with both fists. If W. will push his colleagues that way, he can count on much support. If not, we must reserve the right to make a row in whatever seems the most effective way. S. hints, pretty broadly, that both he and W. quite agree with my point of view, and undertakes to transmit my message. He adds "and most of those targets are not defended".

Later, it is reported that German ~~aircraft~~ ^{airfield} at Stavanger has been bombed and machine-gunned by our planes. ^{step}

DIARY12. 4. 40.

Mrs P. has a Labour Party-Turk lunch at the Carlton. Attlee, Greenwood, Alexander, Ben Snell and I with an equal number of Turks, including the Naval Attache, for whom Mrs P. specially asked, to put next to A.V.A. I sit between Aras and his Counsellor. A. is very firm and allied. He says "When we sign a pact, we mean it, and we mean it most of all when things are difficult, as they are now." He emphasises that the Turks must have more arms, especially tanks and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. He hints that by September they might be fully equipped and feel able to take the offensive in any direction. He says the Bulgars have been immensely armed by the Germans, but the Turks are not afraid of them. The Roumanians, he says, say that if they have to choose between German and Russian domination, they choose German. "That", he said, with a slightly contemptuous shrug, "is Roumanian mentality. We must make them understand that there is a third choice too." I speak of the army of the Near East. He said that it was a very small affair compared with the Turkish Army, though they were glad to have this reinforcement. I asked what he thought Mussolini was thinking. He said that since the Brenner meeting, M. had been more pro-German and anti-ally than ever, but that he would not enter into war on Hitler's side unless things went really badly for us. C.R.A., on the other side of him, spoke of the Dardanelles, where he served. I said that to me it was a great joy to think that Turks and Anzacs, who had fought each other like heroes in 1915, would now fight on the same side. A. said "the Australian soldiers are much respected in Turkey".

DIARY

14. 4. 40.

P. to see me. Crump, he says, is colourless; his wife is still employed at M.E.W. but not in any important post. His article in the "Sunday Times" is full of gaps, both of fact and logic. The German scoop of oil in Denmark includes much lubricating oil, of which Germany is very short. Moreover, Crump seems to argue that one function of the M.E.W. is to enable the Germans, by seizure of neutral supplies, to replace the supplies expended in overrunning neutral countries! Further, the Danes had got already much oil cake from Roumania and Bulgaria before they were invaded. The Roumanian products passed through Russian-occupied Polish Galicia.

Several Americans have recently returned from Scandinavia and are talking all over London both about the Danish supplies and about the much larger supplies, running up to half a million tons, of oil which we have allowed into Sweden. These stocks are largely concentrated at South Swedish ports and their presence is undoubtedly an additional inducement for Hitler to attack Sweden. I said that I thought we should not allow neutrals to have any stocks at all, but require them to live from hand to mouth. Incidentally, it seemed that this would make their position vis a vis Germany slightly safer.

The Roumanians have a trade delegation here, but they are not being at all accommodating. We did threaten to stop Roumanian imports from British and British Empire sources, but this is not much of a threat, since most of their imports, of copper, tin, rubber and cotton, come from U.S.A. and non-Empire countries. If we threatened to stop all these, on the ground that they won't treat us as well as they treat the Germans, it might have some effect. They refused to make a payments agreement with us, though they have one with the Germans, the third of a series of three. The essential point in a payments agreement is to fix the rate of exchange. At present, the official rate is 800 lei to the pound. The rate on the Black Bourse is 2,500 to the pound. We are now paying the Roumanians three times the world price for all we buy. The Germans, on the other hand, are only paying them 30% above the world price. We should use our contraband control to secure at least equal treatment from Roumania. No politicians there matter, only King Carol.

Italy had no stocks at all at the outbreak of the war. No oil nor raw materials. Her campaign in Spain and her sales to Germany had completely dried her up. She would have been at our mercy if, in the first week of war, we had demanded a clear statement of her intentions. Now, she is much better supplied,

though her reserves of many important articles are not imposing. Undoubtedly there is considerable leakage through Italy to Germany, and much bribery of officials.

As to the lawyers, I may say that my legal friends tell me - and also my French friends - that Prize Law as now interpreted by British judges is responsible for some of the worst gaps in the blockade. Until the beginning of March, it was held that statistical evidence had no weight in deciding whether or not a given cargo should be condemned. In the last war, Sir Samuel Evans, one of Lloyd George's Welshmen, was President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court. He used to spend his weekends down at Brighton thinking out new "constructive interpretations" of the Law which would enable him to help, rather than to hinder, the British blockade. Now we have Boyd-Merriman as President. He is one of Baldwin's political hacks. He knows no international law and has terrified the Procurator General by some of his decisions, which are most destructive to the blockade.

Lord Finlay, who has been heard to say that he thinks many of Evans's decisions in the last war were bad law and went too far in enforcing the blockade against Germany, presides over the Contraband Committee, which detains cargoes for submission to the Prize Court and puts them up to the P.G. if it thinks there is a good enough case against them. This Committee also is very weak.

Within the M.E.W. there is a Prize Department which administers the technical side of Contraband Control, issues instructions to the C.C.centres and either passes, or refuses to pass, the manifests of ships.

The P.G., on the basis of certain decisions already given by B.M., refusing to condemn, is releasing cargoes right and left, even though a good case against them has been submitted to him by the Contraband Committee, rather than risk putting them to the High Court.

Finlay, correspondingly discouraged and in any case lacking zeal, is therefore ceasing to submit cases to the Procurator General.

In March the Intelligence Department of the M.E.W. made a great row and got from the Attorney General (Somervell) a statement that in certain cases statistical evidence will throw the onus of proof on a ship owner, i.e., he must prove that the cargo is not destined for Germany. In any case, this means little,

not
for a cargo might be destined/for Germany but to fill up gaps in
neutral supplies due to previous exports to Germany,

Then, M.E.W. asked for forcible rationing of neutrals,
and this has been accepted in principle and embodied in certain
trade agreements, - Greece and Hungary.

By exercising pressure on imports into a given country,
we can influence both the re-exports and the home exports from
that country.

It is utterly pedantic to talk of "law" till Hitler's
neck has been broken.

DIARY14. 4. 40.

I decided yesterday that the time had come to read the Riot Act over ~~to~~ Bastianini. Rumours had reached me from many quarters that Mussolini had once more been bemused by Hitler on the Brenner, persuaded that a German victory was imminent and that he must fling in Italy soon; also that he was feeding furiously on old anti-British grievances and notably on memories of Eden; also that Italy had now been allowed by our economic non-warfare to pile up large stocks. It was also reported that the Italian press was twisting all news from Norway and being violently pro-German and anti-British. Having, therefore, an empty Sunday, I fixed to call on the Ambassador just after noon.

I spent an hour and a quarter with him and I think it was worth while. I began by reminding him that I had been for many years a friend of his country and that two of my proudest memories were of my right to wear above my heart an Italian Medaglio al Valore won on the Carso, and of my most interesting conversation with Mussolini in Rome in December 1932. I had called to see him because I had noticed with great surprise the apparent lack of information in these last days in the Italian press, usually so well-informed, realistic and clear-eyed. It did not seem to be known in Italy that we had now sunk nearly all Hitler's fleet, and that this was a fact of the first order of importance for the future of the war, since an even greater part of our great naval power would now be available for use elsewhere as might be needed, and since the naval action off the Norwegian coast, and in particular the ridiculously small losses suffered by the British fleet, showed what poor sailors these Germans were and how they were no match for ours.

adams B. said that, if the news in the Italian press might seem pro-German and incomplete, this was because the Germans gave out so much more news than we (I thought to myself, this is a silly lie, because they are not printing our news). He had expected, for instance, that Churchill last Thursday would have made a much fuller statement. He then, of his own accord, widened the discussion, and spoke at length, having first thanked me for having given ~~him~~ this opportunity to talk frankly. There was no ground, he said, for the ~~rumours~~ which he had heard in London in the last few days regarding Italy's attitude. It was not true that at the Brenner M. had given any pledge to H. to enter the war on his side within a week, or within a month, or at any time at all. But Italy had her interests which she must constantly watch. He had read, he said, a report of my speech at Edmonton yesterday in which I had demanded that we should ration all

neutrals strictly according to their own requirements. "That is quite impossible for Italy", he said. "Much ill feeling has already been aroused by the operation of the British blockade in the Mediterranean". He then told a long story of an Italian ship with 60 or 70 Italian passengers on board and a small cargo of Egyptian cotton bound for Venice being stopped by a British warship and the Italian Captain very rudely spoken to by the British Commander, and, just because he could not find at a moment's notice some document, being ordered to turn his ship round, when only six miles from the Italian coast, and take her to Malta for examination, thereby losing three days and gravely inconveniencing his passengers, who raised "a minor mutiny" on board. B. also complained that the Italian liner "Conte di Savoia" (one of their crack liners of which they are very proud) with Sumner Welles on board, had been stopped by British naval authorities at Gibraltar and searched for fourteen hours. "They even searched the lavatories and all the private cabins of the passengers". I can imagine that this display of British sea power was particularly irritating when performed under the nose of Roosevelt's returning reporter. I said that, of course, little difficulties like this were apt to occur in wartime, but I was sure that he in London and Loraine in Rome would be able to smooth out such little troubles. I said that he had already had some very great successes since his arrival here as Ambassador, notably in his negotiations with Halifax over the Italian coal cargoes from Germany. He seemed pleased at this and said that it was always a pleasure to meet Hfax. who was so courteous and fair-minded. He did not like to take too much of Hfax's time, knowing that he had so much to think about just now.

On the blockade generally, I said that our intention was to starve Hitler of all war supplies, and I was urging the strongest possible action to this end. There was no desire to starve Italy of her own requirements, but certainly I could not agree to permitting the transit of war supplies to Germany through Italy. He said that no supplies went through (that, thought I, is a whopper!) since Italy was a debtor country and was not in a position to buy from America (that, thought I, is just economic nonsense). The only war supplies, he said, which Italy was sending to Germany was a little of her own mercury, of which she was sending twice as much to France and some to us in addition. I asked, What about oil from Russia going to Germany through Italian ports? He said none was going through. For the last seven or eight months Italy had imported no oil from Russia at all.

He then spoke of Germany, where he had been en poste. The Reich of Stresemann, he said, in 1934 was no different from the Reich of Hitler except that Hitler had an army and Stresemann had not. He remembered a controversy he had had with Loebe at a

meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. L. had been explaining that the Weimar Republic was quite different from Kaiser Germany, and B. had replied that this was not true, adding to L. "I know history from the trenches. You only know history from books".

B. warned me that it was impossible to try to divide the Italian people from M; just as impossible as to divide the German people from H. M., he said, could in two days, by a strong speech, turn the whole mind of the Italian people in a new direction. I said "It may need some hard blows to divide the German people from H., but we shall do it. On the other hand, I recognise, of course, the great influence of M. over the Italian people".

B. then - and no Anglo-Italian conversation can ever be complete without this element - began to abuse the French. He said that French leaders were saying that after the war "the democracies" would re-organise Europe. Such statements were displeasing to the Italian people. He also asked what was Weygand's army doing in Syria? Its presence there was not understood nor liked by Italy. I said that it was a very good army, containing some Anzac and other first-class British troops. For my part I was very glad that it was there, alongside the Turks. We could not foresee all possible contingencies, but I would suggest to him, for example, the possibility of action, in which this army might have to take part, to prevent the supply of Russian oil to Germany. Now that the German fleet was practically destroyed, it might well be that some of our naval forces thus liberated from the North Sea, might have to enter the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and arrest Russian oil ships. He said "That would mean you would treat Turkey as the Germans have treated Norway". I said "Not at all. I should hope that any such operation would take place in full co-operation with the Turks. Even apart from this, there would, of course, be the possibility of air operations against the oil fields of the Caucasus, and I hear stories of discontent in Georgia which might have political consequences". He said "You and the French have an agreement with Turkey which we in Italy do not like". I said "I have been a strong critic of our Government's foreign policy, but I have told them that I regard the Turkish alliance as their one diplomatic success since the beginning of the war. There is no reason why Italy should feel any concern about this alliance, which should, indeed, be a stabilising factor in the Mediterranean." I added "Surely the Duce would not wish to support Russia in the circumstances which I have hinted at". I then recalled to B. a remark which he had made to me at our first meeting at d'Egville's dinner party at the House of Commons some months ago, when I had said that it was to me symbolic that British and Italian airmen should

be flying together as allies in Finland, and B. had replied "We must go together and bomb Leningrad". He was, I thought, a little non-plussed by this reminder, and began to speak in general terms of Italian interests in the Balkans, "the sphere of our life" from which, he said, they drew the greater part of their supplies (another piece of economic misinformation). Germany, he said, got much more oil from Roumania than from Russia, and Italy got oil from Roumania too. If we entered the Black Sea, we should have to face a German army in Roumania, and Italy could not be expected to remain passive if, through our action, the war spread to the Balkans. I said we could not exclude the possibility of fighting in Roumania, and that I ~~accepted~~ Churchill's statement the other day that our quarrel was with Hitler and we did not desire to quarrel with anyone else, but that we must be prepared to follow the war wherever it might lead us. I said that, as regards Italy's oil supplies, if the friendship of our two countries was secure and firm, we could, I thought, easily arrange alternative sources of supply for Italy, e.g., from Iran or Iraq, whence pipe lines run to the East Mediterranean coast.

Reverting to my statement that our intention was to ~~divide~~ ^{defeat} Germany, he ~~laid~~ his hand upon my arm and said "Ah, here is a bon bouche for you. If you win the war - and I will concede that you will win it (his English is not yet very strong, and I am not sure whether he meant "I will assume for the sake of argument", or "I do, in fact, assume") - you will have to make peace either against Germany or by discussion with Germany. In the first case you will soon be back where we are now, for you will have a resentful Germany which will soon give birth to another Hitler, or two or three more Hitlers. So what will be the use of that? If, on the other hand, you are prepared to make peace by discussion with Germany, you ~~can~~ have that discussion with her now and make peace now". I recognise this as the formal Italian thesis which has been put about by their spokesmen, desirous of being seen as peace-makers, for many months. I replied "I rule out absolutely discussion with Hitler and his gang. One cannot trust a word they say, and their signatures are worthless. But I will answer your question. We will make peace with Germany and we will discuss with Germany, but only when we have pulled her teeth out". He seemed to have no answer ready for this.

Bringing our talk to a close, I said that I often recalled Salandra's phrase "Sacro egoismo". There was to-day a sacro egoismo of Italy and also a sacro egoismo of England. We must find practical means of adjustment between them. He said, I thought rather weakly, "Yes, I have not come to London to make

any trouble". I said that I hoped in days to come we could rebuild the Stresa Front. He said, with great vehemence, "Ah, that accursed Eden spoilt all that. Had it not been for sanctions, we should not be in these difficulties to-day". I said that we must work on to a new phase, and we parted, I recalling my many happy memories of Italy, of persons and places, of beauty and of battlefields, and he saying "I hope that some day I may be able to accompany you as a friend and a visitor in my country."

DIARY15. 4. 40.

A Mrs P. lunch to meet Scandinavian journalists. Easier to find things to say to a Norwegian who is fighting than to a Dane who has allowed himself to be squashed or to a Swede who is waiting and wondering. I am eagerly itching for news that we have landed troops in Norway.

Walk away from lunch with A.V.A., to whom I report my call at the Admiralty on Thursday last. He attaches some importance to the French objection to opening up the air war in the west, but warmly agrees that any prohibition on our bombing German air fields in Norway would be outrageous. Evidently, as repeated raids on Stavanger show, this prohibition is at least partially off.

He says that he is quite satisfied with, and very confident of the success of, our naval plans. The Admty. are going steadily on, refusing either to halt or to hurry, and are going to mop up all German elements in Norwegian waters from the north southwards. They have begun at Narvik and will go steadily *along the coast.*

Winston, he says, has been very furious for a long time at Scandinavian neutrality. He wanted to mine Norwegian waters and stop the iron ore in the second week of the war, and has unsuccessfully been pressing the War Cabinet ever since. At the beginning of February King Haakon made a special appeal to our King to use his personal influence to prevent this infliction of Norwegian neutrality. "Serve him right", I said, "if the Germans are hunting him now with bombers!" I told A.V.A. that I was going to spend much time and effort now in continuing to barge up the blockade. A Finnish journalist said to me at lunch that, in the rush of events, it had almost passed unnoticed and uncommented that Germany had herself been violating Norwegian territorial waters by transporting through them armed forces hidden in iron-ore ships.

At this moment we see a poster "B.E.F. in Norway; official". I buy a paper with a song in my heart. I am half inclined to ring up Bastianini and ask him to let the Italian press get the news!

DIARY19. 4. 40.

At his own request I visit Hoare. This is my first call at the A.M. since K.Wood went. H. is most anxious that we should maintain the liaison arrangement. We discuss (a) present operations, and (b) problems of production, repair, etc. As to (a) he assures me that Norway is not regarded as a side show. On the contrary, they think it very important and perhaps the decisive battles of this summer will be fought there. They are putting in all they can. It is awkward, he says, that G.H.Q. for this campaign has to be in London. (I have a horrid picture of prolonged and too numerous committee meetings of tired Ministers with rival experts.)

They are handicapped, he says, by very bad weather, by melting snow and tremendous winds. It is amazing what the R.A.F. and the ships have done in these adverse conditions. At Narvik a few German guns are still causing trouble, and small scattered German detachments in strong positions, but he hopes that all this will be finished soon. Trondheim is really the important point since it has high sentimental value as the old capital, since rail and road communications radiate from it, and since it has an aerodrome. This last is most important, and our chief handicap in Norway at present is the absence of an aerodrome from which our Fighters can operate. There are only four aerodromes in the whole of Norway; Oslo, Kristiansund, Stavanger and ~~one~~ ^{ships} near T. We cannot work Fighters effectively either from ~~sea or ships~~ or from the very uneven ice surfaces of Norwegian lakes. We have everything ready, with the landing parties, to tidy up and extend the aerodrome at T.

The damage to the aerodrome at S. by naval guns was less than was hoped. The air bombardment has been more effective. Our crews have had some amazing returns. One squadron of Whitleys, after performing navigational miracles, returned in ones to aerodromes all over ~~the~~ England, from Scotland to the south coast. They found quantities of M.110s patrolling above S. when they arrived. I urged that we should go for any targets that would help, without too long a prohibited list. He told me, in deep confidence (but since I am dictating this on 23. 4. 40 I need no longer hush it up), that we were going to bomb Allborg in North Denmark which has been an indispensable aerodrome for German action in Norway. He recognised that this might provoke some German retaliation. As usual, he tried to put blame for limited air objectives on the French, partly because they were nervous of air retaliation on their aircraft factories, the production of which was slowly increasing but still very inadequate, and partly owing to the conservative spirit of the French Army Command, which did

not understand the possibilities of air action outside the immediate battle zone. H. added that the great mass of German bombers were still, as since the beginning of the war, in aerodromes in North Germany.

On our own production, he admitted that we had been going through a bad and disappointing phase. He was making changes in personnel and trying to infuse new blood, new energy and new ideas. As to repairs, I said that we were much concerned with tales of inadequacy, especially lack of spare parts (I particularly mentioned Reading and told him that K.W. had never taken up this particular point). He said that he was studying this question closely and suspending judgment for the moment. Some said that Nuffield was not the man he was, and Boden's death had been a great loss. On the other hand, it was argued that the adaptation of Nuffield's garage organisation to repair of aircraft was now beginning to bear fruit.

He was, in his just-out-of-a-band-box manner, cordial and fairly communicative. He has more the hang of this department than K.W. ever had. His Secretary ran after me all down the street to impress upon me that what had been said about prospective targets was most secret!

DIARY22. 4. 40.

Mrs P. lunch with Rumanians - Tilea, Mateescu and Dimitrescu, with Attlee, Greenwood, Alexander, Phil and I. The Rs are, for the moment, a little reassured by our success in Scandinavia and our intended trade talks with Russia, which, they seem to think, will postpone any attack on Bessarabia.

I ask T. whether it is not very dangerous to bring back the Iron Guard who have been, and probably still are, in Hitler's pay. Can the Rs be sure that they will not act as traitors, like Sundlo and Quisling in Norway? T., not very happy, says that he is on the black list of the I.G. and due to be murdered. Therefore, he can say frankly that he thinks it was wise to liberate them from gaol, so as to increase the sense of national unity in R.

We soon work round to the old tale that R. must have arms. I ask what sort. He says anti-tank guns, A.A.guns and aircraft. We discuss whether they might not get something from U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. Prospects apparently not rosy. I then ask, quite casually, "Are you getting any arms from Germany now?" He says "Oh yes, some anti-tank guns and some Messerschmidts. They are also offering us some of the arms they captured from the Poles." "Anything from the Italians?", I ask. "I understand that they have some Capronis on offer." "We aren't getting any Capronis", he answers, "but we are getting some Marchetti-Savoias". This is a frank and injudicious admission of a somewhat confused situation! For my part, I would prefer to put what spare arms we have in Turkish rather than Roumanian hands.

M. E. W.

23. 4. 40.

Had H.A. Smith to dine at H. of C. He is adviser to Procurator General, and much dissatisfied with slow and weak operation of blockade.

German exports were expected, both by Germans and neutrals, to be stopped by us at the start of the war. We were fully entitled to do this, without relying on the rather dubious doctrine of reprisals, in November. He knows that the Germans had made their plans on assumption that we should act at once.

Italy, at the start of the war almost bare, is now bulging with oil and well supplied with many other things. There is also leakage of German goods, valuable in proportion to their bulk, e.g., Zeiss cameras, diamonds, dyes, etc., which are all falsely certified as being of Italian origin. We have agreed to accept, without question, the Italians' word in all such cases. The French are very anxious to institute an air blockade, but we are sticky.

Our Prize Court has not yet given any important decisions, but Boyd-Merriman is gaga and the P.G. is afraid of what he might do. I then asked "What, if anything, can Parliament do about Prize Law?" Smith said that all other countries issued, through the Government, instructions to their Prize Courts. The French, for example, had issued Naval Regulations. Our lawyers held that this was not a legitimate procedure. Smith was satisfied that this view was mistaken. Lord Stowell in the Napoleonic Wars had declared the Law on the basis of Orders in Council issued by the British Government. In 1916, in the Zamora case, Lord Parker had to an important extent reversed these decisions. F.E. Smith, who put the case for the Crown on that occasion, knew no International Law, and his personal relations with Parker were bad. Sir W. Houldsworth had written in the "Law Quarterly Review" in 1916 or 1917 arguing that Parker's decision was wrong and that Stowell had been right.

DIARY1. 5. 40.

Norway looks bad. Yesterday evening there seemed a tide in the H. of C. against the P.M. "He must go now", many were saying, including some of his own. C.R.A. tells me he thinks we shall have to face up to it. Clearly he is in favour of going in, on certain conditions. I say one must be that Ch. packs up. C.R.A. says that a member of the Government has been urging him that we should come in. "We want your tough guys in", he says. I mention to C.R.A. C.S.'s proposal that Hfax. should be P.M. and C.R.A. lead the Commons.

To-day the tide has ebbed. H. Belisha is visibly active, in Lobbies and corridors, but this does not help! He says that we landed guns in one fjord, gunners in another; that a ship load of Bofors were sunk; that there are precedents for a Select Committee of the House (Dardanelles and Mesopotamia in last war).

C.R.A. tells me that P.M. told him that "In the last few days I have realised the importance of air power!"

Lunch to-day with Jean Monnet, at his flat (51, South Street, Park Lane), and Rajchmann. M. is clear and compact; a strong partisan of Anglo-France after the war, and believes that, unless we build it now, we can't later. I say "Begin with simple things: You want British coal now. Promise to go on taking it in equal quantities after the war. France is not always too popular with our miners. That is a way to bind them to your heart." He says he is familiar with this problem and thinks that it should be easily solved. The British worker, he says, is not yet at war, whereas the French is. Our output is still low, e.g., in coal, and our hours are short. He says that in France workers are already being admitted to hospitals through nervous breakdown owing to long hours. I say that this is silly. Last time we proved statistically, as well as in the light of common sense, that hours in many munition factories were much too long for optimum results and maximum output maintained over a period. None the less, I agree that here, in England, we are still only half-conscious of the war. "Yes", he says, "you have not, as we have, the memory of having been invaded." In 1941, he says, we should have, as a result of our own efforts and of American supplies, a preponderance in the air and in other materials. Meanwhile, the French would like murse their production, and therefore they are

against taking an initiative in opening out the air war. This is in reply to my remark that I am told that the opposition to the R.A.F. bombing the Ruhr is mainly French. "Your air production", he says, "is now going on very well, according to figures I have seen." He thinks, however, that Hitler is now going all out in the West and, if he can bring Italy in, in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. This will mean that Hitler will open out the air war to the maximum. Hitler knows that he must either win the war this year, or lose it next year. M. thinks that Italy will come in. If Mussolini decides, everything else can be squared. The little King might object to signing a declaration of war against France and Britain; the leaders in the Army, Navy and Air Force and industry might also hesitate. But if first Germany enters Hungary to attack Roumania or Yugoslavia, Mussolini will say that, to protect her vital interests, Italy must occupy Dalmatia. He will not attack Britain and France, and there will be no papers for the little King to refuse to sign. (I recall that in the last war they called him "Vittoruccio".) If necessary, it would be easy to invent a story about British or French aircraft dropping bombs in Italy. The most awkward weapon the Italians have, says Monnet, is their 100 submarines, but their entry would simplify blockade policy. I hope, I say, that if the Germans go for Roumania, we shall destroy the Roumanian oil wells. M. thinks that this is planned. I almost despair of anything being planned by the High Direction in this war.

DIARY1. 5. 40.

See Hoare at 5.45 p.m. after lunch with Monnet. I have had some difficulty in getting in, and the atmosphere is less friendly than with K.W. I begin by saying "The situation has degenerated badly since our last talk". He is fidgety and defensive. I remind him that twelve days ago he told me Trondheim was the key. In view of this, I said I was surprised and disappointed that we had not made a big attack with land, sea and air forces. He said it had been long considered, and one could debate the pros and cons for a long while. He wished to assure me that the politicians had not overridden the chiefs of staff. If we had lost two battleships at Trondheim, Mussolini might have come in against us in the Mediterranean. (I thought this the most astonishing and deplorable remark.) I said "But now he may come in against us if we evacuate the Trondheim area without trying to take it". He had no answer to this. I asked "Have we and the French plans ready for instant action if Italy attacks Dalmatia?" He said, rather haughtily and uneasily, "Oh yes". Even if we had to evacuate up to Namsos, we should not give up Norway. It will be like the Peninsular War. I said "But we haven't even taken Narvik yet! We have nothing at all to show on land." He said "The trouble at Narvik is that there is a continual snow storm. You can't see your hand more than a few inches in front of your face." I nearly said, but didn't, "The snow flakes fall alike on the just and the unjust". I actually said "I hope, whatever the weather, we shan't be much longer before we take it". He said "I can assure you that we fully realise its importance." He added that he had experts in Norway now looking for suitable aerodromes between Namsos and Narvik. He was hopeful that we might find some. The aerodrome on the frozen lake, which we had used for our Gladiators, had been bombed to pieces. These Fighters did very well when they were up, and shot down many German bombers. But when they came down, most of them were smashed up by German air attacks. It was impossible to mount adequate anti-aircraft defences. German air strength had been the deciding factor. But the Germans had lost many machines through our anti-aircraft guns and Fighters and through crashes. Now, in Norway, it must be largely a war of attrition against Germany in the air. We must make them lose more heavily than we did. I asked "Were you surprised at the strength and effectiveness of the German Air Force in Norway?" He did not seem to like this question and began to blame the Norwegians who, he said, had been left to hold the eastern valleys and had failed, thereby permitting an unexpectedly rapid German advance. This, he said, had been an unpleasant surprise. The Norwegians would neither blow up themselves, nor permit us to blow up, rails, roads, bridges and tunnels. We sent men with dynamite, but the Norwegians would not permit them

to use it. We sank ten per cent of German transport and supply ships in the Kattegat, but that did not deter Hitler from continuing to push ships across. This also, it seemed, had been a surprise to Hoare. I asked why our Air Force had not been able to assist the ground troops in the Oesterdal and Gudbrandsdal. He said first these valleys were out of range (this sounded odd, in view of long flights over Central Europe, but perhaps it is true if you allow for heavy bombloads and hence less petrol). Further, he said, one of the chief lessons of the air war so far is the complete difference between night and day operations. At night aircraft can effectively bomb relatively large targets, such as enemy aerodromes, without fear of really heavy losses, but it is impossible at night to pick out very small targets. In the day time, on the other hand, very small targets, e.g., a bridge over a stream in a narrow valley, can be picked out, but in the daylight Bombers are very vulnerable to enemy Fighters and also to A.A.guns, except in conditions of poor visibility.

I refer again to production and repairs, and he said that he had given Craven a fortnight to look round, at the end of which he was to report to him on necessary changes. I asked whether his terms of reference included the repairs, and Hoare said yes. He added that the French were passing through another bad period as regards aircraft production. They did not seem able to manage mass production, but we were giving them all advice and help possible.

Not a very satisfactory impression, either of the man or of the situation.

Black comes to see me at the House. He talks at length but has not much to say. The most picturesque thing he says is that the French withdrawal from the Saar after the collapse of Poland was a considerable undertaking. The spirit of the young Nazis, they say, is terrific. They all want to die in battle, with "Heil Hitler" on their lips. And then they believe they will go straight to Valhalla. On the other hand, no German over 30 wants to die at all.

DIARY

2. 5. 40.

P.M. announces that Aandalsnes has been evacuated. This is received with reserve, and a debate promised for next week. The chief feeling in many of our minds is one of relief that the evacuation was carried out without a massacre by German air attack or a mass surrender.

Talk at length later in the afternoon with A.V.A. who gives me an account of his conversations at the Admiralty. Churchill seems very subdued. Some even say "Winston has lost his nerve". There is great conflict of evidence as to who wanted to do what. Churchill said last week "I can only speak for the Admiralty"; on another occasion, "I had some very unhappy experiences in the last war when my naval advisers, after the event, said they had differed from me all along". Someone has said that, remembering the Dardanelles, Winston in this war is like a singed cat. But A.V.A. had said to him some days ago, "I thought you were not only First Lord of the Admiralty now, but Chairman of the Fighting Services Committee". And now, A.V.A. understands, Winston has attained the right to take the Chair at meetings of the Chiefs of Staff.

Now follows A.V.A.'s narrative to me.

Our Force for Finland was dispersed because ships were scarce and wanted elsewhere. Our Intelligence Service failed to discover in advance the prospect of Norwegian treachery; nor did they detect the use of the Norwegian "Covered Way" for the transport of armed Germans under hatches in iron ore ships returning, nominally, empty. This, A.V.A. thinks, is our first bull point for criticism.

Winston wanted to mine the Covered Way last November. At that time there was some opposition from Dominions, who, feeling far away, feared effects on their public opinion of violations of International Law. Winston, therefore, was overruled. In January he tried again, more insistently. The Dominions were now reconciled, but Attlee and Greenwood, when consulted, are reported in Government circles to have advised against mining, though Sinclair was in favour. And King Haakon wrote a personal letter to King George, who, acting quite correctly, passed it on to his Ministers, strongly against mining. So Winston for the second time was overruled, and, if we say too much, we may be confronted with A. and G., though they said what they did to Ministers without consulting colleagues. Winston tried a third time at the end of March, and this time he won, but it was very late.

Norwegian treachery resulted in the initial capture, without a shot being fired in their defence, of Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger, and, with only a few shots fired, of Oslo. After this bad start, British naval actions were successful, as far as they went. The first intention of the Admiralty was to start at Narvik and proceed steadily southwards, mopping up all German forces as they went. Then came heavy pressure on the Government, both by public opinion here, by the French and by the Norwegians, to land troops quickly. Trondheim was recognised to be the key. There is at this point of the story some conflict of evidence as to who said what. The Admiralty said that they could take Trondheim Harbour, by naval action alone, without very great losses, relatively to the total strength of the fleet, but that the possibility of some losses, including capital ships, must be faced. They were prepared to face it if the Government said go on, and they had no doubt of the immediate result. But, according to the Admiralty version, the Army and the Air Force held them back, and the C.O.S. Committee, by a majority of 2 to 1, advised the Cabinet against the attempt. Their view apparently was that, against heavy German air attacks, it would be impossible to take and hold Trondheim on land, even though the Navy might sink the German warships inside and clear the fjord. In particular, the aerodrome at Trondheim "would have been soused" by German aircraft and would really have been no use to us. It would have been "in flames all day and all night". (This, I said, would be an argument against any action in Norway at all, and against the possibility of establishing any aerodromes for our Fighters on Norwegian soil. It is a quite different tale from that which Hoare told me at our first talk.) The politicians accepted the majority report of the C.O.S. Committee against naval action (compare Hoare's remark about Mussolini and the loss of two battleships). But then, and here again the evidence seems to conflict a little, it was decided to attempt to take Trondheim from the land. Hence the two landings north and south. (If this was worth undertaking at all, it would surely have been a great reinforcement for the fleet to attack by sea simultaneously.) Light detachments of our troops were pushed rapidly down the valleys to support the Norwegians. If demolitions had been effectively carried out, the German advance up the valleys would have been impossible. But the Norwegians would not agree to this, and therefore we and they were pushed back. We had been unable to get any effective air fields in Norway. A.V.A.'s story of the Gladiators and the frozen lake agreed with Hoare's account. "In the air", he said, "the airmen were magnificently brave. But down on the ice, lying on their bellies, they were filled with terror and a sense of impotence. They had no cover; no anti-aircraft guns; the detonations of German bombs on the ice were terrific, and most of the Gladiators were destroyed. I said that Hoare had told me that a quantity of our anti-aircraft guns had been sunk in the sea

approaches to the landing places. A.V.A. was surprised at this, saying that we had lost only one supply ship. I said that this must have been loaded with A.A.guns. He said that the little Skuas had done very well. We spoke for a moment of alternative P.M.s I said I was inclined to favour Hfax., and mentioned to him the suggestion of C.S. Leadership in the Commons, I said, would give us a status otherwise not easily to be arranged. But he and I both shrugged our shoulders comprehendingly at C.R.A. in that role. None the less, I do not dismiss this possibility. A.V.A., I think, would rather like Winston to be P.M.

Maillot says that there has been no unity of command in Norway. Each battalion or brigade has been on its own (I think this must be an exaggeration), apart from orders conveyed from the W.O. in London or the G.Q.G. in France. He says a French troopship on the way to Norway called at Glasgow on a Sunday afternoon. She wanted coal and stores, but the docks were empty. The workers were either asleep or in church, and the French soldiers had to do their own loading of the ship. This, he said, does not make for better Anglo-French feeling. He also said that quantities of French troops were waiting at Brest, ready to go to Norway, but there were no ships to carry them. The French military, he thought, were very much averse to the evacuation, even of the A.area.

DIARY8. 5. 40.

This is the second day of our House of Commons debate on the conduct of the war. Yesterday Chamberlain was unimpressive and Oliver Stanley mild and feeble. The most striking speech was that of Keyes on the failure to go in and take Trondheim in the first 24 hours after Hitler moved. H.G., who came to breakfast with me this morning, says that he has it from a Foreign Office source that Halifax threatened to resign unless an attack were made against Trondheim; that Sargent and Collier of the F.O. are both leaking very freely and saying that Cork and Orreday, the Admiral at sea, asked for permission to go right into Trondheim and that this was refused by the Admirals in Whitehall. E. and O. said afterwards "In the first 24 hours I could have taken Trondheim with my bare hands". H.G. also reports that the attack on T. was ordered and counter-ordered three or four times. As to Narvik, he says that people in the M.E.W. are saying that we shall be "out in a fortnight, or in a month at the most". He wonders whether we have any preparations of any kind in the event of Hitler going for Holland and Belgium. He thinks that, unless we really pull ourselves together, we shall literally lose the war.

At 10.30 this morning Parliamentary Executive meets and we discuss whether or not to take a vote tonight on the adjournment. A better discussion than usual. A majority, including H.M. and Lees-Smith, is for taking a vote; a minority - Williams, Pethwick, Benn and I - against. My view is that there are strong arguments on both sides, but that a vote at this stage is likely to consolidate the Government majority and that Chamberlain and Margesson would like us to have one. At the Party meeting later in the morning the Executive recommendation to have a vote is accepted, though with some doubts and dissentients. Later events prove that this was quite the right decision, and that my judgment was wrong.

To-day's debate is very dramatic. H.M. opens very well, though somewhere in the middle of his speech he lost grip for a while, but he has lots of detail and is very definite. He again names Chamberlain, Simon and Hoare as men who must go. He ends up by saying that we shall vote. Thereupon, ~~im~~ when he sits down, up jumps the Old Man, showing his teeth like a rat in a corner, and says "I accept the challenge". (R. says next morning, "What else could the silly old fool do if we said we were going to have a vote?") "No Government can continue unless it has the support of Parliament and the public. I ask my friends - and I still have some friends in this House - to support

the Government tonight in the Lobby". He then sat down and Hoare began to speak about the Air. The Old Man's intervention was gawky in its appeal to his "friends", as L.G. and others rubbed in later on. I had thought for a moment that he was going to announce a General Election, a course which had been hinted at in the Evening Standard of the night before, in the event of our insisting on a vote, and which had been put to me by Frank Owen in the Lobby when I had asked his opinion. Though I had not mentioned this to colleagues, and had thought it a very remote possibility, I had kept this idea at the back of my mind and it had influenced my view in the Parliamentary Executive this morning. I had judged that in a General Election campaign the Old Man would win hands down and we should be wiped further out than in 1931.

L.G. made a violent attack, but, as always now, without much constructive in it, but with one superb retort to Winston: "I hope he is not going to allow himself to be used by the others as an air-raid shelter". L.G. ended by recalling the P.M.'s appeal for "sacrifice". He added "I say solemnly that the Prime Minister should give an example of sacrifice, because there is nothing which can contribute more to victory in this war than that he should sacrifice the Seals of Office". The debate continues to run very badly for the Government, only a few third-raters defending them, while Duff Cooper and Commander Bower, ostentatiously in uniform, denounce them, and the former states that he will vote against them. (Keyes, who is to-day in mufti, appeared yesterday in uniform with his breast covered with ribbons, and said in the opening sentences of his speech, that he had put on uniform in order to show that he spoke for a large number of naval officers who were deeply critical of the Government's handling of the naval side of the war.) After L.G. had spoken, Winston was heard to say to Kingsley Wood on leaving the Chamber, "This is all making it damned difficult for me tonight." It is also reported that he was heard to say to Elliott of L.G.'s attack on the P.M. "absolutely devastating". A good deal of riot, some of it rather stupid, developed towards the close of Winston's final speech, and then we voted. When I went into our Lobby it seemed to be full of young Conservatives in uniform. Earlier in the day I had not thought that, at the outside, we should get more than a dozen to 15 Government supporters in with us, although many would no doubt abstain. In fact, we had between 40 and 50.

Handwritten notes:
 L.G. is
 cool
 when
 I speak
 my own
 mind
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 for
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 tomorrow
 will
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 tomorrow
 will
 vote
 for
 them
 tomorrow

Terrific buzz in Lobby afterwards. People asked "What is the next step?" I say "The Old Man must go along to B.P. and hand them in".

Earlier in the evening I had seen Butler and said to him that I was not authorised to speak on behalf of my colleagues, but that in my view, provided Chamberlain, Simon and Hoare disappeared from the Government altogether, we should be prepared to discuss the

question of entering the Government. I said that there were difficulties connected with this, but that, subject to the condition I had mentioned, they could be hopefully explored. I added that, if I was asked who should succeed Chamberlain as Prime Minister, my own view, which I thought was shared by a number of others, was that it should be Hfax. In time of war I was not concerned with the fact that he was in the Lords. Indeed, this had some advantages in relieving the strain upon him. Some might think of Winston as P.M., but in my view he would be better occupied in winning the war. If one passed beyond these two one arrived in the outer circles of Andersons, etc., and no-one there seemed to stand out. I told Butler that I did not wish him to keep what I had said entirely to himself, but should be glad if he would pass it on to Hfax. He said that he was much interested, and thanked me for speaking, as on other occasions, so frankly. He asked whether we would not consider the possibility of Chamberlain continuing as P.M. if certain other changes were made. There was, he said, a great loyalty to Chamberlain in the Conservative Party. I said there could be no question of this. In our view Chamberlain and Simon had failed so often, both in peace and war, and had such long crime sheets, that they must go. I did not myself put Hoare in the same class, but most of my colleagues, I thought, would insist on his going too.

I had said much the same, the night before, to Assheton, Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, with whom I had found myself alone in the Newspaper Room after the House had risen. So they can't say that they are getting no guidance from us! On the other hand, it would be a mistake to say this kind of thing publicly, particularly as one is on the eve of the Bournemouth Conference, which is perfectly synchronised with this crisis.

9. 5. 40.

10.30 a.m. Ivor Thomas tells me on the phone that posters ~~now~~ announce "Premier sees the King".

DIARY

9. 5. 40.

F. L. L. & W. G. M.
Put

best of
Joseph
Secret
a new
from

House in a buzz. Boothby says most of the 43 of last night met to-day and decided not to join or support any Government which did not contain members of the Labour and Liberal Parties; also to serve under any Premier who could create such a Government. He asked would it help us to publish this? I said yes, certainly; no member of our Party would serve under Chamberlain, nor, I thought, with Simon or Hoare. With these three out, on the other hand, we should be prepared to discuss, and to accept our full share of responsibility on proper terms. Later, I saw him surrounded by the press. The Old Man was telephoning personally from 8 a.m. onwards, trying to conciliate opponents of yesterday. He seems determined himself to stick on - like a dirty old piece of chewing gum on the leg of a chair, as someone said - but is offering to get rid of Simon, Hoare, and, if need be, Kingsley Wood, if this would propitiate critics. It will not. Last night's division, and especially the large number of young men in uniform in our Lobby, has shattered him. Wise said to me to-day "I have come straight back from Namsos to vote against the Government. I voted on behalf of my men. We were bombed by German aeroplanes and had nothing with which to reply, not even a machine gun. When I went back last night to the Mess, everyone, from the Major General downwards, said Well done!" That, I believe, is the spirit of the fighting services. L.G. has seen Attlee and said that Ch. should resign and ~~then~~ might then advise the King to send for Attlee. What should he do then? I told Attlee that I thought he could not possibly be P.M. in this situation. He quite agreed. The P.M. must be a Ministerialist. He agrees with my preference for Halifax over Churchill, but we both think that either would be tolerable.

Wise
Parliament
Churchill
Attlee
Halifax
Churchill

We go ^{now} tonight to Bournemouth, and the timetable is unpredictable. There may even be a new offensive by Hitler. Opinion in our Party is, I think, steadily hardening along the lines which I have held for some time. They will go in with both feet if necessary personal demolitions are effected. Trade Union common sense will insist on this.

DIARY10. 5. 40.

(FRI)

This morning Hitler violated Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg. Should Parliament meet? A.V.A. telephones from Manchester suggesting it should. I hold strongly that it should not, for this would give the cheer-leaders and crisis-exploiters a chance to rehabilitate the Old Man. All N.E. members due to leave for Bournemouth by 11.34 a.m. train. I go round to H. of C. at 10 and see C.R.A. who arrives about 10.30. A.G. also comes in later. We all agree that we should not ask for Parliament and should go to Bournemouth. A. and G. had seen the O.M. last night, when he had once more begged them to enter a Government under his Premiership. They had told him bluntly that this was impossible and that the mood of the country required a new premiership. ~~They said they could give no answer to this before consulting colleagues. He asked for an early and definite~~ He then asked would we serve under a new Premier? They said they could give no answer to this before consulting colleagues. He asked for an early and definite answer to this last question and also to the first which he had put, namely, would we serve under him. He had also asked whether, pending an answer to these two questions, we would not send a message saying that the Labour Party supported the Government at this grave crisis of the war. This old man is incorrigibly limpet and always trying new tricks to keep himself firm upon the rock.

This morning, therefore, I drafted a message which A. and G. accepted and issued over their two names (reported in the press of Saturday, the 11th): "The Labour Party, in view of the latest series of abominable aggressions by Hitler (C.R.A. in the first draft had said 'In view of the present critical war position'; I said this lacked punch; he agreed!), while firmly convinced that a drastic reconstruction of the Government is vital and urgent in order to win the war, re-affirms its determination to do its utmost to achieve victory. It calls on all its members to devote all their energies to this end."

And so to Bournemouth. I share a taxi alone with C.R.A. from the H. of C. to Waterloo Station. In the course of this drive I say to him "For myself I am not rushing or scrambling for any job. I should not be interested now in any job which had not got a very close relation to the waging of the war. Nor would I wash bottles for anyone. I am through with that phase. I should prefer the Ministry of Economic Warfare. That is on the border line of economics and foreign policy. Those are the two fields I know best. That is all I am going to say about myself." He said "Of course it would be quite out of the question to suggest that you should play second fiddle to anyone in any Department."

You are entitled to a Department of your own. A member of the Government said to me the other day 'We shall want all your tough guys'; and", said the little man, with rather an engaging smile, "you are one of those." At the station Herbert Morrison came to see us off. He said that he felt at this moment his job was in London in case things began to happen. It would look bad if he was down at Bournemouth when the first bombs fell. (In fact, he came down later, though he left early.)

~~After the meeting of the N.E.~~

Arrived at Bournemouth, the N.E. met and, without too long discussion, even though many were more talkative than usual, being in a state of excitement, decided unanimously that we were prepared "to take our share of responsibility in a new Government which, under a new Prime Minister, would command the confidence of the nation". We also decided that A. and G. should go forthwith to London to carry on any negotiations necessary to implement this decision, and that it was a decision and not merely a recommendation to the Conference on the following Monday, it now being Friday. This, we said, is a time when we must act swiftly and show leadership. As A. and G. were about to leave, the P.M.'s Secretary rang through to enquire whether we yet could answer his questions. It was now about 5 p.m. C.R.A. communicated our resolution on the telephone. Then they left. When they reached London, Chamberlain had already resigned, and A. and G. were asked to go to the Admiralty to see Churchill. It is thus clear that the last blow which dislodged the old limpet was struck by us at Bournemouth this afternoon.

~~He is going to Bournemouth~~

~~He is going to Bournemouth~~

~~He is going to Bournemouth~~

11. 5. 40.

(SWK)

~~He is going to Bournemouth~~

17. 5. 40
Chamberlain
M662-4

It soon became clear that the big Unions would stand up well to the crisis. The Miners, with 100 delegates, decided by 98 to 2 to support our decision; others followed suit. All through this day I am doing liaison on the telephone between the N.E. and A. and G. in London. They report the progress of their talks with Churchill and I ask various questions for elucidation. At about 5.30 p.m. they ask for N.E. authority to accept

Chamberlain
in 45 mins
at least half
Gardner 666
(Jan 28/40)

- (a) Two seats out of five in a new War Cabinet; these to be filled by themselves.
- (b) One out of three of the Defence Ministries.
- (c) A reasonable number of other offices, including several positions, for members of our Party, ~~but details to be reported~~ Key
- (d) Chamberlain to be a member of the War Cabinet but to have no Department (it had previously been proposed that he should return to the Treasury) and not to be Leader of the House of Commons (this was being pressed for by his supporters and had been hinted at in the D.T. and other papers.)

A. and G. strongly urged acceptance of these terms. To get Chamberlain out altogether was impossible. Moreover, it would create such embitterment among his friends as to make the life of the new Government "brutish and short". Simon was to go to the Woolsock. There, said A. "He will be quite innocuous". Hoare was to have nothing.

The N.E. boggled a bit at some of this, and H.M. was rather awkward, saying that this didn't sound like a Government that would stand up any better than the last one, and that it would not impress the public. He was inclined to think that he would stay outside. (I had told him on the platform at Waterloo the day before that I thought he ought to take hold of Supply. He had not been very pleased at this, and obviously would have preferred to be in the War Cabinet without a Department. Later this evening at Bournemouth I and several others urge him to go right in and take this job if offered it. I think he will.) Several of our N.E. members are apprehensive as to whether the Liberals and the Tory Rebels are working closely with us. One or two, moreover, are very solicitous that L.G. should be in the new show! I have a further conversation on the telephone with London and bring back the news that the Liberals are in and satisfied, Sinclair having one of the Defence Departments; that the Tory Rebels, whose number has been growing - now that the tide is visibly flowing in their favour, a cynic would say - have been in the closest touch with A. and G., have been very firm, and are also to get a number of their men in key positions. After some more chit-chat, I am authorised by the N.E. to go back to the telephone and tell A. and G. that they can accept so that Winston can publish the five in the War Cabinet plus the three Defence Ministers to-night. A. says to me "We are getting several more very important offices and you are well in the picture."

~~Private~~ ~~Subj. Matter~~

Later that evening, after the N.E. decision, the N.C.I. meets. There is a little, but not much, difficulty in getting their agreement, when I have given a chronological statement of events. Citrine, who did not get back from France till Friday night, when our first decision had already been taken, gives us his warm support. I gather that he definitely does not wish to be in the Government, though, if he did, no doubt this could be arranged. He thinks he can be most serviceable remaining in his present post. Lately, relations between him and Bevin have been bad, and as Bevin is to be in, there may be some malicious forethought in Citrine's staying out. One of the points which I was instructed to put to A. and G. on the telephone to-day and yesterday was our desire that "some industrial leaders outside Parliament" should be in the Government. A. tells me that they have this much in mind and that Winston wants it. At our N.C.I. to-night it was decided to call a meeting of the Three Executives for tomorrow, so that there should be as much consultation (after the

-4-

event!) as possible.

12. 5. 40

Sum 1

Further meetings of various kinds, but nothing vital. The sun and the sea are more than usually beautiful - tragic, tense, ironic beauty. We hold two demonstrations in the evening, at one of which, in the Pavilion, a first-class hall with splendid accoustics, I speak. I tell the story of the happenings last week in the House, and of the young Tories in our Lobby. I read out the two declarations of Friday, the first by A. and G. and the second by our N.E. I say "I am completely confident that tomorrow our Conference, the supreme democratic authority of our Movement, will endorse the unanimous decision of the N.E. by an overwhelming majority. In leisurely times of peace we should have had further consultations before we took our decision, but these are not leisurely days. In these days History goes past at the gallop. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse - War, and Pestilence, and Disease, and Death - are riding again across the plains of Europe. We are in the midst of the most tremendous struggle that the world has known for many centuries. We must be mentally prepared for everything except one thing, and that would be to lose the war. It is unthinkable that the world, under the impact of these Nazi hordes, should crash down into slavery and black darkness."

That night A. and G. arrive from London. They give a long account of their doings to the N.E., which endorses them. The case for keeping Chamberlain somewhere in the Government is overwhelming. This is generally recognised. H.J.L. says to me, with characteristic malice, afterwards "Not very impressive. I felt as though the cook and the kitchen maid were telling us how they had sacked the butler." H.J.L. also tells A. that there is increasing concern because so far I have not been appointed to anything. A. comes across and whispers in my ear that "It is all right. I have told the new P.M. that you ought to be at M.E.W. and he is quite in favour. It is as good as settled." He repeated the same thing to me next morning, but I replied "If it is as good as settled, why the devil isn't it announced?"

13. 5. 40.

Mon

spoke early church 11.45
Wood 1.45
speaks

A. has to leave at 10.30 a.m. in order to reach London in time for the meeting of Parliament. He must know before the House meets how we have decided. Therefore, the vote must be taken at 1 o'clock. The debate is a ragged affair with a lot of freaks talking pathetic rubbish. The only big speaker from the floor is

-5-

Will Lawther for the Miners, the biggest card vote in the Conference and always, in a crisis, our storm troops. He speaks forcibly and to the point in favour of going in. Greenwood winds up, and a majority for the Executive is 2,450,000 to 170,000. To say we won by 25 to 2 would flatter the minority.

14. 5. 40.

Still no news, and I am becoming very irritated in having to parry friendly questioners. Just before lunch John Wilmot tells me that journalists who were in London last night and have returned to-day after yesterday's sitting of the House report that "a great battle is going on over Dalton's body." It is said that Montagu Norman is trying to veto my appointment, but that A. and G. are sticking to their guns. This creates some sensation among my colleagues, who contemplate various forms of emergency action, e.g., a special meeting of the N.E. or a special telephone message by a few of them to A. But none of this is either done or necessary, for I receive a message at 4 o'clock that a personal call will come through for me between 5 and 6.

At six the P.M.'s Secretary rings me up and Winston himself comes to the 'phone. The following dialogue ensues:

- W.C. "Is that Dalton? I want you to help us."
 H.D. "Why, of course."
 W.C. "I want you to take a post in my Government."
 H.D. "I should be very proud to accept if you offered me a job which I was confident I could do well" (I had previously told A. that of the jobs now left I would only take M.E.W. Failing this, I would stay outside.)
 W.C. "Your friends tell me that you have been making a considerable study of economic warfare. Will you take that Ministry?"
 H.D. "I should be very glad. I think I could do that."
 W.C. "Well, if you will excuse ceremony, I will have that announced to-night. Time is pressing and it is a life and death struggle."
 H.D. "Very good."
 W.C. "All right. That is agreed. You will take the oath tomorrow. The Privy Council Office will tell you when."
 H.D. "All right. Good luck, and I am very proud to serve under you." (this last word with great emphasis.)
 W.C. "Thank you very much". Rings off.

Slain
what she had
 I return by train, having telephoned the news to R. and told her to order H.G. to attend in my flat before midnight, where I discuss with him the question of his becoming my Principal Private Secretary.

that is correct

DIARY15. 5. 40.

I arrive at my office in Berkeley House just after 10 a.m. I attend my first Cabinet, on a small matter relating to the Iberian Peninsula, at 11.30. Duff-Cooper, coming out of the Cabinet Room as I come in, shakes my hand and says "Congratulations, but you have indeed joined us in a dark hour!" As I come in and sit down, Winston greets me with a cheerful smile, saying "Here is the Minister of Economic Warfare. I am very glad to see you." Halifax smiles benevolently and bows in my direction; A. and G. grin slightly sheepishly; Chamberlain turns his head the other way; Inskip looks infinitely pompous and puckered; Sinclair squeezes my hand, and Eden smiles very benevolently. King Albert had just left.

Things go fast even this first day. What I call the Patrizi proposals. Conference at F.O. with number of officials. Agreed to offer to discuss but not to concede.

16. 5. 40.

*Duncan H. G. in cabinet
- Chief of cabinet
in addition.*

Amusing discussions about Private Secretaries. Offer H.G. the job and he accepts. A conversation, which a less thick-skinned person might have found difficult, with the D.G., who fears that he may be pushed into the background and not consulted about anything. I say "If H.G. spoke as you said, he was running a bit ahead of the cart. You and I agreed last night that our relations were to be quite frank on both sides, and, if at any time you feel yourself to be improperly short-circuited, you must tell me so." He then says "If you feel that I am not the right person to work with you here, you must tell me and I shall ask the Treasury to give me something else to do." I say "Now you are running ahead of the cart. I have never had the pleasure of working closely with you. I have, of course, heard from many others of your great abilities. I did think in 1929 that you were partly responsible for encouraging Snowden to make a fool of himself in the Hague Conference when he nearly prevented Arthur Henderson from pulling off the agreement with the French. But, apart from that, I have nothing critical to say to you at all." He says "Of course, Snowden took his own line on these matters and I had only to give him the facts. I tried to prevent Winston from agreeing at all to the Young Plan in 1933." I then tell him that my view is that I have come to this Department in order to do everything possible to bring the war to the quickest and cheapest end. If he has the same general approach, there need be no difficulty. "It is not my job, as I see it, to put a break on the

Foreign Office, but rather to act as a spur. Or, in other words, it is not my duty to walk about with a watering-can, but rather to light the fires and let the F.O. extinguish them if they must." The only question I need ask you is 'Are you a war-monger or a pacifist?'" He then gives a long explanation, prefaced by "Since we are now discussing these very general questions", to the effect that he agrees with me that we should have stopped Hitler long ago; also that we should have introduced conscription much earlier and developed arms production earlier. But, he adds, he still has a respect for law and thinks it most inadvisable that we should push the exercise of our belligerent rights to such a point as will antagonise neutral opinion, especially that of U.S.A. I say I quite appreciate this last point, but in general my view is that when we are at war, there is no law, and I have so spoken to the lawyers, including Lord Finlay yesterday. I told him that, in my view, the British Prize Court would do well to shut up for the duration of the war and let the French take all the ships. They seem to deal with these matters in a more common-sense manner than we do. Finally, I say to D.G. that he will know from what I have said and written that I have held the view that British foreign policy for the last nine years has been in a mess and that in the last stages much of the blame for this was due to politicians having listened to the advice of Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Nevile Henderson. "I think", I say, "that you can truthfully say that you are not a Horace Wilsonite?" He says "I always thought that Wilson was very good on industrial questions." "Yes", I say, "that may well be, but he knew less than nothing about international affairs, and no politician should ever have listened to him on such subjects." He did not disagree.

I ask him to draft the official Treasury letter which I should send to K.W. regarding the reorganisation of my and his secretariat in the office. I say that it seems to me ignoble that he and I should take part shares in a Private Secretary. This is not what happens in other State Departments. I wanted a Principal Private Secretary (Gaitskell) plus an Assistant, who I thought should be a civil servant and preferably a bright young man from the Foreign Office. I proposed to speak to Jebb, who had been a perfect P.S. to me at the F.O. and was now with Cadogan and who I knew had worked with the D.G. This was a good card to play, for the D.G. at once began to praise Jebb and approve my plan. He said that he would like to keep for himself the man whom he had shared with my predecessor. I raised no objection.

We then parted on reasonably, though provisionally, good terms.

On the other hand, I have to give consent, in view of strong joint pressure by F.O. and Admiralty, to let the "Rex" come through Gibraltar on her return voyage without even sending out the small boat which usually operates our contraband control. Several of my officials put up, quite properly, the argument that this was most destructive of economic war, might be twisted into a most dangerous precedent by the Italians, and might have other repercussions in all directions. This is quite true, but in this present situation, I said, this is not ground on which I feel I can fight. None the less, the case is noted and used ~~and used~~ and referred to by me in letter to P.M. on the 19th (attached). The idea is not to give Musso a flaming pretext for coming in to-day or to-morrow. It is held that every day's delay is worth a lot. "I would buy time at a high price", said Mfax. to me. F.O. and Admt. then push on further, when I have gone home, and extend free passage to Conte di Savoia coming the other way. This leads me, at instigation of my officials, to protest against decisions being taken too speedily and without effective consultation with us, and, in fact, the C.d.S. does call voluntarily at Gib.

News to-day that we have done the biggest air-raid of the war and, for the first time, have bombed, with great effect, German coal-oil plants in Western Germany. One of our aircraft at 10,000 feet was flung upwards by the explosion. British losses in the air have been heavy in the battle zone but very slight indeed on long-distance raids. We are, however, getting at least three of theirs to one of ours, and the disparity in Germany's favour is being reduced. This afternoon there has been some panic in Paris because of yesterday's break in the line. The armoured divisions which have broken through were more effectively armed than had been expected and were using flame-throwers which they threw 300 ~~feet~~^{yards} in front of them, the stuff not igniting for the first hundred ~~feet~~^{yards}.

yards.

DIARY16. 5. 40.

Dine, at Spears's invitation, with Blum, W. Benn (rather sour at not having got anything) and H. Macmillan. This afternoon news had been very bad, but Blum now, having just come from French Embassy, is more reassured. The drive, he thinks, is being checked. At 3 p.m. to-day L.R. had come into my room with long face to say that he had drafted telegram for me to see to G. Monnet, urging speed in lifting oil from Constanza, but, he added, "I don't think it's much sending it. I doubt if anything will get through to Paris now. They think the Germans will be there by to-night". Now, at least, it does not look like to-night!

Macmillan very interesting on events leading up to change of Government. I told him of our part and reminded him of vain efforts by him and me to begin to do this sort of thing after Munich, now nearly two years ago. He says that Amery was grand. Chamberlain's last effort, at instigation of Sir H. Quisling, who was passionately anxious to prevent Labour Party coming into Government, was to send for Amery and offer him free choice of any office, other than Premiership itself, if he would bring his rebels in. This was refused. I quote remark of a friend of mine about the Old Man being like a bit of dirty chewing gum sticking to the leg of a chair, and M. said that Bracken had put it another way. He had said "It's as hard getting rid of him as getting a leech off a corpse." Sir H.Q. used to have a room of his own next to the Cabinet Room in No. 10. The day Winston took over, Sir H.Q. came to this room as usual, but found that "the parachute troops were already in possession". Bracken and Randolph Churchill, the latter in uniform, were sitting on the sofa. No words were exchanged. These two stared fixedly at Sir H.Q., who silently withdrew, never to return. Now his room is to be occupied by Morton, the live wire whom P.M. had stolen from my Ministry. But he will be a useful contact, especially through H.G. Macmillan says that the reason why young Tories in uniform voted with us against the Government was because in the Army their loyalty to the King overcame their loyalty to the Old Man and Margesson. When they saw the mess in Norway, some at first hand, they made up their minds. It is, he says, like 1915 when old Asquith told Parliament that there were plenty of shells and soldier M.P.s came back from the Front and said "that's a bloody lie. We only had three shells a day at Festubert".

To-day I have started at least to demonstrate that I want to hot up the economic war by writing a Minute in favour of blockading Hungary, whose Foreign Minister, Csaki, has told O'Malley that H. would offer no resistance if Hitler wanted to come through.

DIARY17. 5. 40.

2/ Hfax. wants to send Cripps to Moscow. I throw some doubts on his suitability. Hfax. thinks he might seem new and persona grata to them. I say that I have had an uncomfortable experience ~~with~~ him, and that it fell to me, when the Labour Party finally despaired of training him to the House, to put him outside. Hfax. asks what my relations are with him now. I say "Rather sketchy." It is agreed between us that, if he goes, he must have a policeman from my Ministry and must have very close instructions and no power to make a settlement on his own.

Lunch with Gladwyn. He says he feels a little "groggy at the knees". He supposes that, if Hitler won the war, he would be crowned Emperor of Europe with the iron crown of Charlemagne, and that no doubt the present Archbishop of Canterbury, always *willing* ~~prepared~~ to oblige those in authority, would gladly agree to crown him King of England in Westminster Abbey. Sir H.Q., he supposes, would come back again in order to negotiate our surrender. He thinks that at our Ministry there has been no policy developed and no unity.

Call from Swinton in the afternoon. His pre-emption plans are still held up by the Treasury.

Winston flew to Paris yesterday. He found Daladier and Gamelin in a poor shape, but Reynaud holding up very well. He rallied them, saying "Is France defeated because 120 armoured vehicles have broken through your lines? Do you think that these will be able to go on and on for ever? Why, the men inside will have to stop to get a drink or to relieve nature. Pull yourselves together!" (Within two days R. has taken over National Defence; D. gone back to the Quai d'Orsay, and G. been sacked.) The P.M. dug them all out for a conference at 1 a.m. in Paris, caught a plane back at 6 o'clock, got to London at 7.30, and was presiding, very fresh, over a meeting of Ministers soon after 9. This afternoon he has gone to sleep. A grand man!

We have to send the French some more Fighter squadrons which, in other circumstances, we should not have been eager to do. G. told me at lunch that last night the Quai d'Orsay were burning their papers.

After my first visit to the Cabinet, W.C. said, with that half grim, half whimsical smile of his, "I expect all these buildings will look a bit different in two or three weeks' time." A good mot also by Hfax., the English aristocrat at his very best, "Invasion? That would be a great bore."

18. 5. 40.

My secretarial arrangements at the Ministry completed after slight resistance. H.G. well in charge. D.Foot unexpectedly arrives to be my Parliamentary Secretary. Calls me "Sir" uninterruptedly all day! I turn him on to focus all the legal stuff.

J.Monnet comes to see me. He says "So long as the French Army exists, France is not defeated". Even if they have to abandon Paris. He speaks of need for cutting through inter-departmental red tape and also, more particularly, about coal.

11 a.m. Conference of officials, but this has to be cut short as I have to be in Cabinet at noon. I greet officials, telling them to be mentally prepared for everything short of losing the war, saying that I have been a critic of the half-hearted way, as it seems to me, in which the E.W. has hitherto been waged, but I can well believe that responsibility for this lies not in this Ministry, but outside it. If we can stabilise the Front in France it will be a great moment for a violent counter-offensive on the economic front against an enemy which will have consumed great quantities of oil, weapons, etc. Then some brief talk on Russian negotiations.

At Cabinet agreed to send Cripps to Russia, from which, in the end, I did not dissent, having given warnings. I say now "We will try and make it go, but if it goes wrong, don't blame me". P.M. says, with his grin, "You're on velvet".

They say that the R.A.F. has done magnificent work over the Bulge and our long-distance raids, on oil stores, etc., are continuing with great effect. Also middle-distance raids on railway and road junctions, lines of communication, etc. Eden says he can't understand why the French don't counter-attack against the Bulge.

Talk at lunch with C.R.A., who is in good form. I may be a prejudiced witness, but I think he has made his selections and omissions for Government posts very well. He says that he had absolutely no difficulty about me. Winston was quite keen from the first. This does not, of course, dispose of the rumour that M.Norman wanted someone else; it only shows he made no progress with Winston. A. says that he left out Pethick because too old, Lees-Smith because too slow, W.Benn because too recent, and Phil because too unbalanced in his judgments, increasingly so these last few months. Also a balance had to be maintained between bourgeois and working-class M.P.s. He has got quite a lot of our people in. Winston was very keen on Ellen; so was he. Shinwell was offered Under-Secretary for Food, with his Chief in the Lords, but turned up his nose and rejected it without even consulting A. Hudson asked for Tom Williams. Winston is fine to work with. ~~Chamberlain~~ ~~the night before~~ Macmillan told me the night before that Winston

had been saying "My Government is the most broad-based that Britain has ever known. It extends from Lord Lloyd of Dolobran to Miss Ellen Wilkinson."

Someone said that Chamberlain reminded them of the undertaker who said "The corpse is upstairs". This mot, when next repeated by me, moved my hearers to great mirth.

Decide in conference at F.O. to send Master of Rolls to Italy by plane on Monday, 20th, with power to settle if Italians will. Tuesday, the 21st, is the latest blackmailing date. We are to offer to wash out all examination of ships in the Mediterranean and to release goods held up in warehouses in Italy. In substitution, a plan to be devised for more navicerts and examination at ports of origin. This to counter Musso's pose of claustrophobia. I insist that any arrangement must be such that we can revoke it. It must therefore be of an experimental nature.

Talk to Van afterwards. He thinks Anderson is slow and not vigorous enough against Fifth Columnists. I promise to tell Attlee, who is on Committee of Three with Anderson. Van says the question is, Can we make Germans run out of oil before we run out of aeroplanes?

19. 5. 40. (Sunday)

Relatively quiet in the office. Talk about oil. Decide to send Postan as policeman with Cripps. Eccles reports dangerous situation in Spain and Portugal. German tourists, etc. Salazar would like some troops. South Africans? I send message to F.O. that I strongly support line they are taking in response to E.'s reports.

Rodd, whom I address as Signor Rodd, tells his version of negotiations with Italians. They were out, he says, to break the Axis. They were shooting elephants, not parrots. It all failed because the Treasury were stupid in pressing for the whole thing to be taken as one whole, and the Italians didn't want to sell one particular type of gun. I doubt all this; It sounds as though he had been humbugged in Rome. Now there is an offer to sell Capronis.

Listen to-night to Winston on the air. Very brave and moving.

20. 5. 40.

7 a.m. News. Gamelin sacked!

DIARY20. 5. 40.

My new Private Secretary No.2 arrives, Hancock, of Winchester, Trinity, Cambridge (Double 1st in History), F.O., who has just returned in a hurry in a destroyer from the Hague. I ask him if his morale is good, and he says yes. I think he will fit in all right. He is Gladwyn's nominee.

Lunch with Mrs Phillimore to meet Norwegians. Meet also, for the first time since we got separated, a number of colleagues. A.G. and A.V.A. both very tough and standing up well. A.V.A. says French are being perfectly useless. Their First Army is no good. General Billotte has been sacked (this turns out not to be true); we had as good as lost the Channel Ports; we don't intend to let our Army in France become a mere bomb trap. They will, if necessary, have to cut their way through whatever lies between them and defensible positions; they are already moving back towards bases further west.

A.G. says that Weygand is "full of blood".

Also, at the lunch are Lees-Smith and Wedgewood Benn, neither of whom have been asked to join the Government. The former, as it turns out later, is to play a most important role as acting Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party. The latter is rejoining the Forces in some appropriate capacity. L.S. says that Gamelin has always been "cautious", preferring to organise his campaigns behind defensive lines. No good at open war-fare.

Winston, A.G. says, has been grand. His visit to Paris pulled the French together. He has also sent a message to F.D.R. saying that his Government will fight to the end; that they will never accept any shameful peace nor any surrender to Germany; if, however, in the stress of war they should later be replaced by another Government which should make such a peace with Hitler, then let the U.S.A. look out for their own skins. And let them therefore now do all they can to help this British Government. A.G. said that he thought he still saw the finger of Sir H. Quisling in some things. I said I hoped that this would soon completely cease. A.G. said that the Ruhr was now a mass of ruins. The Germans were hiding from their public the effects of our air bombing. Only those knew who lived near the targets, though some of these were so spectacular that light and sound travelled great distances around them.

21. 5. 40.

The news is bad to-day. Amiens and Arras have been taken and, it is said, Abbeville too. When will the French counter-attack? Reynaud has made a panicky speech, speaking of "incredible mistakes", and hinting at treachery, etc.

John Wilmot settles in at the Ministry. He, H.G. and Hancock have my Secretaries' Room to themselves. Reilly and Miss Cracknell, for Leith Ross, have been put down the passage. I had been told, the first day, that there would be difficulty in finding another room. I had replied that I had been all through this kind of petty obstruction at the F.O. ten years ago. I added to R. "Understand that, if there is one thing I dislike more than another, it is delay in carrying out decisions which have been taken. And what's more, I won't have it!" He was rather taken aback and indignant and said something about considering the susceptibilities of the higher staff. He had also been telling me that there would be difficulty in getting a telephone communication between Leith Ross's room and the room now proposed for him and Miss Cracknell. I said that this was ridiculous nonsense and they had better ring up the Office of Works about it. Next day the thing was all done.

Talk late to-night with H.G. and exchange some fundamental thoughts on our present prospects. I say that the great division now is between the stone-colds and the hysterics. I believe that he and I are, and will remain, in the first class. If we lose the war, and have Hitler as Emperor of Europe and King of England, would it be bearable to go on living, especially with Himmler and all that? Anyhow, we have had our lives; much of it has been fun and some has not, and it must end sometime and somehow. But we are an immense distance from such large catastrophes as yet.

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H. of C. this afternoon presents a funny sight. Herbert Morrison is in the corner seat where Ernest Brown used to be. I go and sit next to him. Then on my left, Margesson, then the Old Man of Munich, then Winston, then Attlee and Greenwood, then some more, including David Grenfell, George Hall, and Bob Boothby, who has taken on the job Shinwell refused as "a bloody insult", namely Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Food, with Woolton in the Lords. (George Hicks speaks of our esteemed colleague as 'Shinbad the Tailor'.) I have to answer Parliamentary Question No.1, on the Vladivostok leak. I have had to spend some time on getting the answer right, the official who made the first draft here not having the ghost of a notion of how to set about it. He also turned up at 10.40, I having sent for him at 10. I therefore rebuked him and told him that I expected officials to be here not later than 10 a.m.

in wartime. This is Baxter of the F.O. I am given quite a friendly greeting from my old friends across the floor, and also from some other parts of the House. I am said in the press to be confident and audible.

Then follows a silly wrangle with the Speaker as to whether there is still an Opposition, if so, who is entitled to receive the Opposition Leader's salary of £2,000 a year, who is to sit upon the Front Opposition Bench, and who is allowed to put Business Questions. A very discreditable exhibition of petty egoisms. It has been decided, quite rightly, that the Opposition Leader's salary is at present to remain in abeyance, since there is no Opposition in the sense of a body of persons able and willing to become an alternative Government. I.L.P., Gallacher, disgruntled Tories, prominent among whom is Herbert Williams, and some of our crowd exhibit themselves. I whisper to Margesson "The dishonours are about equal. Why don't you shut up this bloody monkey-house, or at any rate only open it one day a week?" I remark to someone else that a bomb, not near enough to hurt them but just near enough to scare them, would help to bring them to their senses. Winston murmurs "This comic relief is quite a rest after what we have to do elsewhere".

At 2 o'clock, before the House meets, Parliamentary Executive. Shinbad, in a state of nervous and egocentric volubility, even worse than usual. We decide, he alone dissenting, to recommend to the Party next day that there should be, in place of the Executive, an Administrative Council consisting of (1) those members of the Executive who are not Ministers, and (2) those members of the Front Bench Second Eleven who are not Ministers. This will make a convenient number, just over a dozen. In addition, though it is not expected that any of them would be able to attend regularly, members of the Executive who are now Ministers should be ex-officio members of the new A.C. Further, we shall suggest to the Party, though it is of course for them to take the decision, that Lees-Smith shall be the Acting Chairman, though Attlee will remain the Leader. This will mean that L.S. will occupy A.'s old seat and will - a most important point this - put the Business Questions. When this is decided, Shinbad leaps from his seat and rushes from the room in a towering rage. Our remaining business is more speedily concluded without him. He afterwards rushes about among the Party intriguing and making complaint. It seems that he regards himself as the only possible leader in these days.

5 p.m. Meeting in A.'s room of Labour Ministers. First ten minutes taken up with listening to grievances of Paling and Whitely, who have been appointed to paid offices, the former as one of the Whips, and the latter as Whip and Comptroller of the Royal Household (he is a well-built fellow and will fill the part) without having been invited or consulted. This is obviously a slight slip, but

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after all, we are at war and the Government had to be formed in a hurry and A. had proposed their names to W.C. Their little dignities, however, are deeply offended and they are doubtful, or say they are, whether they will accept. This momentous problem having been postponed for further consideration, we all briefly report how we are getting on, all briefly except E.B., who speaks at immense length and has to be cut short from the Chair. But he is talking good sense.

Sir M. Peterson comes to see me. He is being dismissed from the Madrid Embassy because stories have reached the F.O., both from British and Spanish sources, that he is not persona grata with the present Spanish Government. He was very indignant, and showed me a very cold and critical letter signed by Cadogan. He understood that Sir S. Hoare was to replace him and he had been asked to vacate the Embassy at short notice but to leave behind all his personal plate and other belongings for the use of the Embassy. He did not know if there was any other post which at the moment he could hope to fill.

I also received the Yugoslav Minister, and it appears that I am to be, for some British and Foreign diplomats, a sort of unofficial Foreign Office. This is quite amusing, but it will be important not to cause jealousy in the official institution.

22. 5. 40.

A busy day. From 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. John looks over my shoulder while I read the Daily Gloom. Ironside has been over in France and apparently doing well. "A stupid soldier", some say, but a stone-colder. (R. says she heard a cockney say to-day "What we wants is warm feet and cool 'eads".) Ironside found Gen. Billotte "in a state of indecision". He reported this to Weygand, who "sharply reprimanded B. upon the telephone". W. is thought to be getting things together, and the German units who have pushed forward into all the towns beginning with A. are very small, the equivalent of old-time cavalry raids, and should be easily nipped off and dealt with.

10.15. Report by my officials on their conference yesterday with Cripps. They seem to have got on quite well when they got down to detail. H.G. says that he hopes I shall not say much to Cripps this afternoon. He is afraid that I may make him bristle. The officials have got him into a good mood. I said "I expect that yesterday when he was talking all that rubbish about general principles he was really trying to show off in front of me and Halifax."

11.30. Parliamentary Party meeting. Another monkey-house.

C.R.A. takes the Chair at the start and makes a brief statement on the extreme gravity of the situation and on the proposals of the P.E.C. He then has to go back to the War Cabinet and suggests that L.S. take the Chair. Hardly has he safely deposited his posterior than Shinbad is on his feet excitedly waving his arms and demanding to move an amendment to the Executive recommendations. I then rise (I have been specially asked to sit through this show this morning to see that it does not get out of hand) and say, very quietly but firmly, "At this time we should all keep cool and show courage and comradeship. I think that before anybody begins moving amendments the whole Party will like to hear from L.S., who has been carrying through some very important and difficult discussions, the story which he told to the members of the P.E.C. yesterday." This is generally accepted and the right atmosphere is created in favour of L.S. and against Shinbad. L.S. then gives a long account of his talks with the Speaker and with Tory Privy Councillors on Front Bench, etc. He has pushed the S.a long way. It is now agreed that we shall keep the right for all our members not Ministers who sat on the Front Bench before, to sit there still. L.S. has also secured agreement of Tory ex-Ministers to his sitting opposite the box, following Ministers, and putting the Business Questions. In return, he has told Winterton and others that he thinks there will be not difficulty in some of them sitting on the Front Bench reasonably near the Centre. They were apprehensive lest they should not be "treated with courtesy" or lest they should be pushed away to the extreme ends of the Bench by the formation of a phalanx of our people in the centre. This question of "bum precedence", as John Jagger calls it, has now been settled. H.M. rallies the Party by a good speech, drawing their attention to realities, and Shinbad does himself no good by a long argumentative speech designed to recreate an Opposition with its own Whips, etc.

2.30. Conference on dye stuffs. 4 o'clock, National Executive, Walker in the Chair. Ministers to be members of sub-Committees but not expected to attend. Small Emergency Executive to have large powers. 5.15, Cripps to see me. Quite friendly. Then take him to F.O. to talk a trois with Butler.

Late in the office with H.G. and Lucas preparing document on dye-stuffs for Cabinet sub-Committee next day.

DIARY23. 5. 40

News a little better this morning but worse again to-night. Abbeville again occupied. Heavy fighting in and around Boulogne. German armed forces in rear of allied forces are trying to derange our communications. (Winston announced this in brief statement in H. of C.) General Billotte has been hurt in a motor accident and now replaced. These French Generals are doing very badly!

2 p.m. Shinbad niggling and quibbling about not taking Government Ships. In a minority of one on our A.C. I leave the room before the end, saying tartly that I have more important work to do than to listen to S.'s tripe.

2.45 p.m. Ramsay's arrest announced by the Speaker. It is ironical that the first M.P. to be called should be a Tory. This follows Van's line through me to C.R.A., and H.G.'s verbal message from me to the latter. Anderson has been binged up. Later announced that Moseley, Beckett and others also in jug. This is some compensation for the loss of Boulogne! R. says "We had to lose Norway to get rid of Chamberlain, and to lose Boulogne to get rid of Moseley."

Cabinet Committee on dyestuffs. Hankey in the Chair. Amery, Duncan, Butler and many officials attend. Duncan is surprised that there has not been consultation of M.E.W. before export licenses from Germany granted. He will put this right.

It is only a fortnight tomorrow since Germany went into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. The B.E.F. are in danger of being encircled, though news some days later proves that Germans, as usual, have told lies about their achievements in this direction. The gap between Arras and the Somme is too wide to be nice and is being spoken of now in the communique as though it were a permanent feature of the landscape!

24. 5. 40.

Yesterday C. telegraphed imperatively to R. There is a Plan, but it is not being fully worked. Strong German elements are through the gap. My personal judgment is that, unless the French attack soon and in force, we shall have to withdraw the B.E.F. to this country through such Channel ports as we shall still command. It is obvious, even to laymen, that their supply position, both for food and arms, is becoming seriously difficult.

C. was in Paris for the second time on the 22nd; his first flight was on the 16th. We could have no better Premier now.

Hall is a live wire. I take to him. He has been considering certain pessimistic hypotheses. What do then? It has long been foreseen, by those with knowledge, that Germany would reach her maximum strength in May 1940. But even this great strength is brittle. H. hopes that by April, 1941, she should be down to one million tons of oil. This was her dying-out figure in the last war. It is important to observe that there are no really large coal-oil plants anywhere else in Europe outside the present German occupied territory. Roumania raises various queries.

If, say I speculatively, Hitler ruled all Europe west of the Soviet frontiers, British sea power would come into its own again. We should operate a continental blockade and stop all cargoes headed for Europe. It is essential, of course, that the U.S. should play on this. It is also to be remembered that the Germans will need mobile garrisons in all conquered territories, and that mobility means stores and use of oil.

Later to-day Admiral Taylor calls. He is our liaison with the Admiralty. A good type of sailor. He says "Do you remember Max Pemberton's story of the Iron Pirate? She succeeded in stealing everything she wanted, but came to a bad end because she ran short of lubricating oil". He also says, after we have briefly touched on certain pessimistic hypotheses, "It was much worse in 1780. We had the whole world against us then, including the U.S." I like sailors in wartime.

The Bulgarian Minister, Moucheloff, calls. I say "I am a good friend of your country. I have heard much about you from the Buxtons, who are very old friends of mine, but, if you will allow me to speak frankly, I hope your country will not, for the second time, come into the war on the wrong side". He says that they will certainly not come in on the German side. I say that I am well acquainted with Bulgarian ideas regarding frontier revision, and that, if Bulgaria does not commit the mistake I have already mentioned, I feel sure that all these can be amicably settled later on, and that my friends and I would use, at the right time, our good offices between the various disputants. He says that all this now must wait. The question now is Who will survive?

Sir W. Greene reports successful talks in Rome on contraband control. Cripps leaves for Moscow with Postan and G. Wilson. They are to be met in Moscow by Lascelles, now in the north of Norway.

25. 5. 40.

Pay an official visit to the French Mission in Lansdowne House. I am shown round, accompanied by Foot and H.G., by Paul Morand, who says that he has spoken this morning to Corbin who reports that Reynaud and Weygand are both calm. Making the round of the Mission and of that section - chiefly Statistics - of my Ministry which is lodged in Lansdowne House is rather like electioneering. Much shaking of hands and the repetition, with only minor variations, of the same sentiments of courtesy, personal interest and good will. Among others presented to me are a large number of French sailors, both officers and ratings. Beneath the surface there is a sense of gravity, and the French know, though no-one even hints at it, that we are wondering when their big counter-offensive in France is going to begin.

Call from Dov Hos and Locker. They make certain proposals in the sphere of intelligence with reference to the Balkans and Near East. I hand them over to Hall.

Maisky calls, at his own request, and stays for an hour and forty minutes. H.G. says afterwards "He stayed so long that we thought you and he had fixed up a complete new Anglo-Soviet agreement." I give him a good deal of background on recent political events and tell him one or two funny stories with deliberate intention that they shall be reported to the Kremlin. My purpose is to persuade him that this is a really new Government and that everything has changed for the better, including the attitude towards his country. (I have made a note of the conversation on a separate sheet.) Referring to Cripps's mission, I give M. foreknowledge of our attitude about the two Russian ships detained at Saigon.

26. 5. 40.

Sunday. All Ministers are invited to attend a service at Westminster Abbey with the K. and Q., Q. Wilhelmina, etc., in order to pray for victory. As Foot is pious, though with a Free Church accent, I feel that we are sufficiently represented. I therefore put on a grey suit and a soft collar (since becoming a Minister I have generally worn stiff collars!) and spend the day, more usefully I think, in the office. Master Hancock is alone in charge and I take him to lunch at the Isola Bella, since one may not be able much longer to visit Italian restaurants if Mussolini plays the fool. He is a pleasant and intelligent young man, but very innocent politically.

Albarda to tea with R. in my flat, and I leave the office for three-quarters of an hour to see him. The poor man is constantly on the verge of tears. He had to go away in a hurry with other Dutch

Ministers and left behind his wife in the Hague and his daughter and grandchild in Rotterdam, which was bombed and set on fire over a large area. He says that 10,000 parachute troops came down in a few hours on the morning of Friday, May 10th, around the Hague. They were got up in every kind of way, as Dutch soldiers, priests, nuns, peasants, postmen. The men in charge of the parachute-dropping aeroplane simply turns a handle and they all fall out, 20 at a time. They carry guns, etc., and some of them motor-bikes folded up. The famous bridge into the Hague was occupied by parachutists dressed as Dutch soldiers. They waved their arms in cheerful greeting to genuine Dutch soldiers, who greeted them and then found the Bridge occupied and themselves being shot down. He thinks we should realise, more clearly than some do, this new technique. He has told his story to Eden.

There is a blanket over the Front. Fifteen French Generals have been sacked. This is in the best French tradition, except that in the great revolutionary wars they shot them as well. I regret to hear that there is some backchat between the principals as to who is and who is not carrying out the Plan.

Spend the evening reading more than usually important papers.

DIARY27. 5. 40.

A vivid day! After having studied the most important and secret papers, I am told at the Ministry that I am not wanted at the Cabinet this morning as only War Cabinet members will be there. Thereupon I write to C.R.A. and send H.G. down to deliver a note direct to No.10, saying that M.E.W. is involved and that I wish to say that, having checked the facts cited in the secret papers, I consider them sound. I enclose certain figures given to me on oil showing that, on assumptions very favourable to Germany, she will begin to feel the oil squeeze badly in the autumn, and will not be much above the dying-out figure of 1918 next April. This is a date at the end of a string, which can be drawn nearer by air bombing on synthetic plants and stocks and by other measures, of many kinds, designed to reduce imports. I ask C.R.A. to put the point to the Cabinet.

Some streaks of defeatism were visible in some of the private papers, not, I thought, due to politicians, and Reynaud, who was here yesterday, will welcome all encouragement.

After a quick lunch I see C.R.A. at 2.30. He read my note to the Cabinet and gave my figures to the P.M. I therefore give him new copies. He says I need have no fear. There is no shake among the politicians here. Germany's difficulties are very serious. Ministers and high officials will all get a directive from the P.M. not to talk or look defeatist. The short point is that, no matter who comes in or who goes out of the war, we shall fight it out and are confident that, with the resources behind us, we shall win. C.R.A. is in very good form. Would like some more detail on oil consumption and on the destructions. I tell him of my Balkan pre-emption troubles. He says we shall soon suppress all this Treasury interference with detail. I say that I want to reorganise my Ministry and make an Economic War Council. Need I send it up higher? He says "No, do it yourself".

On my proposal, I see K.W. a deux on Balkan pre-emption, before any officials come in. There has long been a certain roguish intimacy between us two. When Cross went, thinking it was to be a deux, to see Simon, he was confronted with six Treasury officials. H.G. says that he used to call Simon 'Sir'. K.W. is where he is in part because we did not black list him as we did his predecessor. He, therefore, like the P.M., should have, and no doubt has, some feeling of appreciation for the Labour Party. He tells me an amazing Fifth Column tale from Boulogne. Persons purporting to be British Admirals and Generals marched into our

Headquarters and demanded in authoritative voices and perfect English accents, "What is going on here? What are your dispositions? Where are the Guards? Where is General X?" When this had happened once or twice, we began arresting these people and sent half a dozen of them over to England in a destroyer. When the Guards arrived at Boulogne they had to force their way to defensive positions through seething and utterly disordered crowds of refugees, French soldiers, Belgian soldiers, Dutch soldiers. One of their officers said he had never seen such a sight in his life. Some who have come back say that you get quite used to bombing after a time. At first it is demoralising, partly because it is so noisy, but, as in the old days of two-dimensional war when thousand of shells were fired and most of them did no damage, so it often is with bombs. Somebody else tells me that the worst of ~~the~~ ^{being} bombed is that you get rather tired.

Just before the officials join K.W. and me, Sir H. Quisling looks round the door. I stare at him and he withdraws in silence. This is becoming a regular routine.

K.W. at our conference is reasonably good. I denounce the Treasury in front of Bewley, his man, and say that in this affair they have expended all their ingenuity in delaying, side-tracking, and, in the last resort, minimising these most essential operations. Swinton, Leith Ross and Hall weigh in. We shall get something at last out of this.

K.W. tells me that when the Beaver took over aircraft production, he sent for Nuffield, who, on a Friday, was in the country and said that he would not be back till Tuesday. Whereupon the Beaver sent a message "Do you want me to send the Prime Minister's car with a police escort to fetch you?" This brought Nuffield along, but, when he met the Beaver, "You know, when I got to London I had to ring up from a telephone box to find out who it was I had to see. I had forgotten that it was you."

Master of the Rolls reports on his visit to Rome. All very satisfactory and a good negotiation. (But see later!)

The Russians have replied to our offer of Cripps that they want a proper Ambassador. They are very touchy and troublesome. This affair runs on for several days and I tell Butler that I am quite prepared for Cripps to be given any title or status that they like and that, now that this experiment is launched, it might well be worth while considering whether we should not leave him in Moscow as a permanent Ambassador. (This would have certain advantages from another angle.)

Dine with Hankey and Geoffrey Lloyd. H. gives the impression now of an old man, but he still has ideas and information. Talk on

oil, home defence, etc. The F.O. is very hesitant towards some kinds of bold action, and our human instruments are not always too good. Two the other day were found ~~drinking~~ in a Danubian brothel. Some of our sailors at the United Services Club where we are dining tell amazing stories of their adventures. A wonderful spirit! Such men cannot be beaten.

Will the Belgians make a separate peace? The Belgian Premier has doubts about the King (soon to be justified). The French are very bad at destroying their stocks.

Lloyd and I have different estimates from our advisers, his being the more optimistic. But on policy we are all agreed. Oil everywhere should be a primary target. In night raids we lose very few planes and there is reason to think that the effect of our raids on German moral has already been very severe, particularly because they have all been hushed up in the German press and therefore rumour has run far ahead of fact and circulated widely.

28. 5. 40.

8.30 a.m. Hear Reynaud on the air announce that the King of the Belgians has told his troops to surrender. Reynaud phrases it very well.

In the afternoon all Ministers are asked to meet the P.M. He is quite magnificent. The man, and the only man. we have, for this hour. He gives a full, frank and completely calm account of events in France. When the Germans broke through on the Meuse, French moral for the moment collapsed. Therefore, he flew to France and saw R. and Gamelin. The latter said "We have been defeated by German superiority in numbers, in material and in methods" C. said "What then are you going to do?" G. merely shrugged his shoulders. C. said "Will you please leave the room", and then, alone with Reynaud, they went into everything, including the High Command. The French, before this war, had given up all ideas of the offensive. They were hypnotised by the Maginot Line. General Billotte commanding the forces north of the Somme, including our own, had given no important or significant order for four days! Since then he had been killed in a motorcar accident and succeeded by Blanchard. The French had failed to make a push northwards from the Somme. They had had too few Divisions between the sea and Amiens and their communications had been badly bombed. Therefore, though we had done our best from the north, it had been impossible to close the gap, and we were in grave danger of being surrounded. Now, therefore, it was necessary to fight our way through to the Channel Ports and get away all we could. The act

of the King of the Belgians had opened our flank, but this was not so grave as might have been supposed, owing to the inundations on the Iser, which were perhaps a better defence than the Belgian Army. How many would get away we could not tell. We should certainly be able to get 50,000 away. If we could get 100,000 away, that would be a magnificent performance. Only Dunkirk was left to us. Calais had been defended by a British force which had refused to surrender, and it was said that there were no survivors. We could only use the beaches east and west of Dunkirk in addition to the port itself. Bunkirk was under a great pall of black smoke, to which our ships were adding artificial smoke so as to screen our embarkations from the air. The Air Force were maintaining the most powerful possible fighter patrols over this scene, and the Germans were suffering immense losses in the air, as on the ground, in their attempts to interfere with the embarkation. The superiority of our Fighters was once again being manifested, and on two occasions great flights of German bombers had turned away and declined battle when they saw our Fighter patrols. (Sinclair told me, two days later, that it was even more dramatic than this. A large number of German bombers, escorted by German Fighters, were approaching from inland. When they saw our Fighters, the German Fighters turned and fled, leaving the German bombers unprotected. We attacked the German bombers and knocked down 22 of them, with no loss to ourselves.) The P.M. went on to say that our clawing-down rate was greatly rising, taking an average of one day with another, to 3:1, to 4:1, and lately to 5:1. It was clear that we had killed off most of the best Nazi pilots, unless, which seemed unlikely, they had been holding some of their best in reserve. ("Dagles" with)

gradually

mean. on mine say.

He was determined to prepare public opinion for bad tidings, and it would of course be said, and ~~that~~ with some truth, that what was now happening in Northern France would be the greatest British military defeat for many centuries. We must now be prepared for the sudden turning of the war against this island, and prepared also for other events of great gravity in Europe. No countenance should be given publicly to the view that France might soon collapse, but we must not allow ourselves to be taken by surprise by any events. It might indeed be said that it would be easier to defend this island alone than to defend this island plus France, and if it was seen throughout the world that it was the former, there would be an immense wave of feeling, not least in the U.S.A. which, having done nothing much to help us so far, might even enter the war. But all this was speculative. Attempts to invade us would no doubt be made, but they would be beset with immense difficulty. We should mine all round our coast; our Navy was immensely strong; our air defences were much more easily organised from this island than across the Channel; our supplies of food, oil, etc., were ample; we had good troops in this island, others were on the way by sea, both British army units coming from remote garrisons and excellent Dominion troops; and, as to aircraft, we were now more than making good our current losses.

5- This long is law story of our is to end the war. Let it end only when we can win by the King

more than making good our current losses, and the Germans were not.

It was idle to think that, if we tried to make peace now, we should get better terms from Germany than if we went on and fought it out. The Germans would demand our fleet - that would be called "disarmament" - our naval bases, and much else. We should become a slave state, though a British Government which would be Hitler's puppet would be set up - "under Mosley or some such person". And where should we be at the end of all that? On the other side, we had immense reserves and advantages. Therefore, he said "We shall go on and we shall fight it out, here or elsewhere, and if at last the long story is to end, it were better it should end, not through surrender, but only when we are rolling senseless on the ground". There was a murmur of approval round the table, in which, I think, Amery, Lord Lloyd and I were loudest. Not much more was said. No-one expressed even the faintest flicker of dissent. Herbert Morrison asked about evacuation of the Government, and hoped that it would not be hurried. The P.M. said Certainly not, he was all against evacuation unless things really became utterly impossible in London, "but mere bombing will not make us go". It is quite clear that whereas the Old Umbrella - neither he nor other members of the War Cabinet were at this meeting - wanted to run very early, Winston's bias is all the other way. When we separate, several go up and speak to him, and I, patting him on the shoulder from my physically greater height, say "You ought to get that Cartoon of Low showing us all rolling up our sleeves, and frame it and stick it up in front of you here". He says, with a broad grin, "Yes, that was a good one, wasn't it". He is a darling!

(and finally to the King's or.)

29. 5. 40

I examine the organisation for the armed defence of my Ministry. We have a number of old soldiers here, and a man named Wyngate, ex I.C.S., is taking charge. They are to have some ~~rifles~~ rifles and a number of others will bring shot guns and ammunition. There will be an armoury in a suitable place and, when the thing gets going, armed guards day and night in all key points.

Mounsey offers me his resignation on the grounds of health and age. He is evidently anxious to get out and, after a friendly conversation, I say I would like to make immediate arrangements to replace him. I carefully do not ask his views on his successor. My first thought is to make Hall his successor. Then, talking to L.R., decide to make Drogheda and Hall joint secretaries immediately under L.R. There may be some F.O. chagrin over this.

P.O.G. Committee meets. Swarms of officials. A lot of fidget about the statistics. P. Nicholls, who has become a first-class middle-aged obstructionist, is there for the F.O. I say that before I came to my Ministry I took the view that oil targets should long ago have been bombarded. I knew that political reasons in the contrary sense were advanced. Those had gone now. I am not much interested in the exact statistics. They do not alter policy. There are also other possibilities of useful action in S.E. Europe. I thus give a lead to any person who may be discontented and one little man pipes up from the corner and says "We have often put up proposals but they have always been turned down". I say "Put them up again to me and if they are turned down I will take them up with the responsible Ministers". Hankey from the Chair says, "father helplessly, "We have done that before". I say, rising to leave for another Committee, "We have now got a largely new Government and I hope it will have a largely new policy". We must get a move on here.

Attend the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet with Greenwood in the Chair and swarms of Ministers and officials, including Stamp. Somebody says the French are back in 1870.

30. 5. 40

Not letting grass grow, I send for D. and H. and ask them separately whether they will take on joint secretaryship. Both seem pleased and say yes. I send L.R. to the Treasury to fix their salaries. This is arranged. I discuss with L.R. who will be disappointed. He asks whether he may go and speak to Cadogan and Van about some F.O. left-outs. I say yes, on the understanding that I have made my decision. I am not prepared to discuss this with anyone at the F.O. If Sir O. Sargent fell down a lift at the F.O. and broke his neck, Halifax would not consult me before appointing his successor, and I will have parity. Later, L.R. says that he has seen Cadogan, who is making no difficulties but would like another 24 hours to consider whether either Mounsey or Ingram can be employed at the F.O.

Lunch with Foreign Press Association. Duff Cooper the principal speaker, also Van Kleffens, the Dutch Foreign Minister. I have sent a message ^{through} ~~from~~ Bowes Lyon, my attractive and intelligent press officer, who is a relative of the Queen, that if I go I shall say a few words. In fact it is thought that I make much the best speech of the occasion and somewhat put Duff Cooper in the shade. I am much congratulated, but perhaps it is not much above the level of loud-voiced and truculent mob oratory. None the less, they like it.

Better news to-day of numbers being evacuated from Dunkirk.

DIARY31. 5. 40.

Send paper to P.M. for Cabinet on Narvik and M.E.W. case against evacuation. (At first it seems this came too late and I was not consulted; *Make it less so/and, but not revised.*)

Invite Italian Ambassador to see me. Very amusing (see separate note). He is either a very good actor or has been kept quite in the dark.

Visit from Van. He still sees no-one in the F.O., and no papers, and is consulted about nothing! How much longer will he find this tolerable? All the life, he says, has gone out of the office since he was put on one side. This has shown the rest that vigour and initiative by civil servants is not appreciated. He said this when I complained of P. Nichols, who, I said, had grown from an attractive and bright young man ten years ago into a solemn middle-aged obstructionist. "Palsied Pansies of the F.O." I said to someone. R. says I should not repeat this! Anderson, Van says, is a menace, being so slow, timid and unaware of everything. V. tells a terrible tale of high officers at the H.O., lost files, etc. He has spoken to A. and G., they being in the War Cabinet. I welcome this and urge him to go on. It is a waste of my time always to have to act as go-between. He thinks either George Lloyd or Amery would be much better at H.O. V. is a little egocentric in these days. There should be a curfew for everyone, and not just enemy aliens, and all roads near the coast should be blocked at night. The French, he fears, are very wobbly. Corbin has been grossly exaggerating the number of French Divisions in the Northern Group. This is a bad sign.

I am summoned to Buckingham Palace and spend thirty minutes with the King. Very easy. No stammering. He asks about M.E.W. and his brother-in-law, David Bowes Lyon. I say that he is my Press Officer in liaison with the Ministry of Information and is doing very well. He speaks of the really remarkable evacuation of the B.E.F. Hitler, he says, "wants to come here". I said that he had fixed the date a little while ago at April 20th. The King says he understands it has now been fixed for August 1st. He wants, the King goes on, to exterminate us and to plant Germans in this island. What will he do next? He will stop at nothing, neither raining gas from the sky nor poisoning our water. That would be the last degradation. But, I say, we have, I hope, effective preventive measures. Scientists, at any rate, have been working on these problems for some time. The King says he has had to remind Winston that he is only P.M. in England and not in France as well!

Talk with Campbell Stuart. As roguish and helpful as ever. He is under Duff Cooper now and finds it works fairly well.

See Leith Ross. He will announce the changes I am making at the top to-morrow, i.e., Drogheda and Hall as joint Directors on Mounsey's resignation.

Oil targets and P.O.G. The Air want to go for the oil targets. P. Nichol's obstructs: "We must help the French". Alternatively, Italy can make good any deficiencies we create in Germany from her own stocks; thirdly, if we knock German oil targets about badly, Germany will go the quicker into Roumania and take their oil. This last snag is really the invention of Geoffrey Lloyd. I say it is a ludicrous deduction from these facts that we should not go for the German oil fields. The right deduction is that we should also do something in and to Roumania. This P.O.G. makes me tired! I shall have to do something about it.

The P.M. told us this week that Gamelin had no mass of manoeuvre!

The French were as bad as the Poles! The Germans bombed their aerodromes at the beginning of the offensive. These were not satellited. Therefore, most French Fighters were smashed up on the ground. In fact, only 80 Fighters survived. This is why we have had to carry the French completely on our backs in the air.

1. 6. 40.

Van has spoken to A.G. but not yet to C.R.A., who is in France with P.M. Arrange that I will speak to-day to Amery and he to Lloyd regarding H.O.

Amery thinks it very unlikely that things are quite as bad as Van says. Van, he observes, is rather French, and inclined to dramatise situations. Amery thinks Anderson is pretty good in a slow, prudent way. Bengal and Ireland have been good training grounds. He was rather concerned to hear Lloyd and B. Bracken talking the other night as though Anderson must be got rid of. (The appointment of Swinton to deal with Fifth Column is, I suppose a compromise between all or nothing.)

Much has happened, says Amery, in recent years, and months, which can only be rationally explained as treachery. And yet we know it is really stupidity and muddle. He cites the offer from India of one Division early in September last. This offer was messed about from committee to committee until February, and Belisha could not be got to answer letters about it. Finally, it was accepted in March, Simon, however, making a reservation as to the apportionment between us and India of the cost! Not till late in March was final agreement given.

Likewise the story of the tanks. It was only decided to send an Expeditionary Force to France well after Munich. Before that, the only tanks designed were light tanks to operate on desert sands. Then, the decision on the B.E.F. having been taken, in a very leisurely way a study of heavy and medium tanks began. After a long delay plans and designs were made for a heavy one. Then the Ministry of Supply was set up and two R.A.⁹.C. officers were moved from the War Office, with whose doings they completely lost touch, but gave themselves a step up in military rank. Orders were placed, unawares, with the same firm to manufacture both heavy and medium tanks. Then it was found that the medium tanks were no good anyhow. The first effective flow of supply will begin in April, 1941. (Belisha and Burgin should both be hung for this.) I spoke tartly of the obstruction of officials and of inter-departmental delays. Amery said, rather brightly, that an attitude of mind had grown up in the Civil Service such that, if anyone made a proposal and then two people raised objections, the proposal was held to be defeated by two to one.

9) I am pressing on with re-organisation in my Ministry. An announcement is to be made in tonight's evening papers, and I agree to putting out within the Ministry a rough sketch of new sections on which L.R., M., D., H. and Watkin and Ingram, whom I shall make Advisers, economic and diplomatic, have agreed. I. is not present and is stated to have a slightly sore head, but it has been soothed. The D. plan is being concocted. C. Stuart very agreeable (he obviously wants to succeed Ogilvie at the B.B.C). G's marriage permit comes through. It has been obstructed by a policeman who has had his head washed by C. Stuart.

Foot is active about Swiss gold, some of which is in the mountains. It is a question of getting a ship.

DIARY2. 6. 40

Sunday, but a busy day. See Albert at the Admty. at 10 a.m. He was overruled on Narvik and thinks that I should certainly have been consulted. I speak to him about the Itn. ships, and say that I shall go all the way, up to the edge of resignation if necessary, to get them stopped. He is sympathetic but not quite as fierce as I should have liked on this.

Thence to Ministry, where I tell P.H., with a grin, that we are going to get a drive on to-day and get things done. Bennett (Wing-Commander) comes to see me at Hall's suggestion. I tell him that I have always been, and still am, strongly pro-Air. He says the Air Force have not enough "power over the port"; old Admirals and Generals hobnob off stage with Cabinet Ministers who were at school with them, and things get fixed up. The Air Force is a young service and the C.A.S. was not at school with anybody that matters. I say I will try to remedy this weakness. He talks very intelligently about various classes of targets. I send him a copy of my speech of March 1938 on "The Government's Air Middle Exposed". Hall says afterwards that he came out from me with his tail waving in the air.

Then try to get in touch with colleagues. C.R.A. is in the country and wasn't coming up till 5 or 6 p.m. I get him up earlier, on the ground that this is urgent, and see him at 3. He says that I must certainly come to to-night's Cabinet and he speaks to the Cabinet Secretariat in this sense. I get A.G. along to my Ministry at 4.30, where he meets several of my advisers. Butler, whom by courtesy I endeavour to contact, is, very fortunately, out of London all day, and Hfax. is not due back till 5.30. I arrange on the telephone to see him at 6.30, just before the Cabinet. H.M. who, as Minister of Supply, would have had a positive interest in the cargoes I want diverted, is also out of London, but I have got enough to be going on with.

See Hfax. alone at F.O. No officials to muddle his mind! He is moved by my argument, which I support by a quotation in the Evening Standard from the Relazioni Internazionali which says that "the hour for which Italy has been waiting for fifty years has now arrived The Italians will fight their French and British enemies with grim determination until victory is won..." This, I say, is Ciano's spout and cannot be neglected. It will give us a pretext for reversing "the present intention" to go on, as though nothing had happened, with the attenuated contraband control now running. Hfax. says he thinks we ought to consult the French, so as not to give them any excuse for saying that we had brought Italy into the war. I do not disagree with this.

Cabinet gives a rather easy passage to my proposal. Hfax. opens generally and then I state the facts, citing a number of the most provocative cargoes. I ask just that these ships shall be stopped, and make no reference to any question of law. The P.M. backs me up and says to Hfax. "Don't argue with the French. Just tell them what we are going to do". He adds that he thinks that this is likely to do more good than harm by showing Musso that we are not afraid of him. It will appropriately back up another communication which Loraine has been instructed to make to Ciano as to the consequences of Italian entry into the war against us. Together, says the P.M., these two acts of ours may prevent him from coming in. So it goes through, and Caldecote, sitting beside me, writes on a slip of paper, "The Dominions will all be behind you in this."

And Admiral Tom Phillips I am sure had been made some

Talk to Gladwyn just before going into the Cabinet and find that he, like many others, is much dissatisfied with Hankey, *Smith* who is too old now.

3. 6. 40.

Rang up late last night by the Admty. on the Itn. ships; they ask for a list: unfortunately, owing to loose screws in my Ministry, this is not ready. I, therefore, am at the Ministry at 9 a.m. There is nothing ready; very slow; I blow them all up! Finally, I send Hall to the F.O. and Admty. with the list. At the F.O., I hear, P.N. has tried to unpersuade Hfax., but in vain (this time, but I am told later that this is the regular practice, that Hfax., without his officials, agrees to what is proposed, and that then his officials work successfully upon him to reverse). I hear also that at the Admty. Hall is loudly cheered!

Christopher Mayhew, looking very charming and very fit, calls upon me in battledress as a simple gunner. I take him round as my orderly to No. 10, which pleases him. He is now to train for a commission over here and, after that, is probably going into Military Intelligence. I say that, when this stage has been reached, I can, without impropriety, ask for him to be liaison with my Ministry.

The P.M. has a squash of Ministers. Things are very much better than last week. We have got out more than 300,000 men. He ~~thought~~ had thought of nothing but dead, wounded, and long dreary processions making their way to prison camps and starvation in Germany. The French? They will ask us for help, and we must give them more than we can spare, which will still be not all that they ask. We must not denude this island. "We've got the men away but we've lost the luggage". This will take some time to make up from our aircraft and ~~manation~~ manation factories. The French insisted on the post of honour at

the end, and so "after a seemly wrangle we brought the Cameron Highlanders away. Otherwise they were to have stayed and died at the end."

P.M. is much more confident against invasion than he was a week ago. After all, we have the B.E.F. in this country now, hardened veterans. Also, says G.Lloyd, the Germans are very bad at night flying. In any case, many defence measures are now being taken here.

Eire. Not much to be frightened of. "They have got something through, but it would be much harder for them to operate against us from there than from France. In any case, let them begin it in Eire. Then the Irish will start to fight among themselves, and some at least will be on our side! Indeed, if the Germans begin it, the great majority of Irish will resist, and we can then come in and help them".

The Beaver gives some very good and encouraging figures on aircraft production. The claw-down rate is steadily at 4 to 1; initially things stood at, perhaps, 2½ to 1; we are more than making good our losses, but they are not. Outside of this are the French and the sources of supply from over the ocean.

What will Europe be like after six months? Famine, starvation and revolt, most of all in the slave lands which Germany has overrun.

The P.M. wants to be able to say to the House tomorrow, "If I wavered for a moment, all my colleagues in the Government would turn and rend me." No-one raises any objection to this. E.B. wants to stop "all this labour floatin' about". To help this he has pushed agricultural labourers' wages up to 48 bob a week. This will revolutionise the countryside. The railwaymen are to get a few bob more, and then all wage rates are to be stabilised for at least four months. As for Fifth Columnism, he says "It isn't in the workshop; it's all the upper middle class". One or two of my colleagues looked down their noses.

P.O.G. redraft Hankey's rather flat report and put some pep into it.

4. 6. 40

Real row with the F.O. over the Italian ships. This ends by my writing a letter of protest to the P.M. with a formal copy to Hfax. ("Dear Foreign Secretary, I enclose a copy of a letter which I have to-night addressed to the Prime Minister and to which I shall make reference at to-morrow's Cabinet.") I only got Hfax.round last

Sunday because I caught him without any of his officials. To-day P. Nichol and Malkin attended him at an "informal conference" with Alexander and Cross. At this gathering, to which I was not invited, having, however, my views before them on a Minute which I had addressed to Butler, they rejected my view, i.e., in favour of straightforward interception of the ships, and decided to fall back on contraband control. Without consulting either me or any of my advisers, they communicated on these lines with the French.

P.O.G. Hankey, Geoffrey Lloyd and I, with Captain Nicholl, settle the terms of our report. I get nearly all my own way, making only a few minor concessions.

Winston made a grand speech in the House on the evacuation from Dunkirk, on the victory of our airmen over the Germans, and on our determination to fight to the end and to win. It was very well received, on the whole, by the House. Very grim and determined. "We shall never surrender". It was evidently designed, and well designed, to pull ostrich heads out of the sand both here and in U.S.A. (The Germans said at the beginning of the war to the French, your "poitrine" and the British "machine". Now we say to the Americans, "Our poitrine but your machine".) Patrick Hancock is away ill and H.G. has a heavy cold. These young men don't stand up well to the rigours of the war!

DIARY5. 6. 40.

Reading yesterday's Cab.Minutes, I find that Hfax. raised again the question of Itn.ships. He argued that the contraband control method was better, and quoted the Master of the Rolls as being of the opinion that our latest decision to stop the ships was unwise! The Lord President said, however, that we should on no account allow such valuable cargoes to reach Italy.

These proceedings, behind my back, are a new provocation. The P.M. writes to me that H.M. has been graciously pleased to make me a P.C. Is this the P.M.'s answer to my letter of yesterday? It would be fun to think so!

I get Fitzmaurice's opinion on the Itn.ships, which is pretty good. To stop them would not be "an act of war" as Hfax. has been advised by his old women, but a reasonable "measure of restraint falling short of war", on which, it seems, there is quite a lot of talk in the International Law books.

Hfax.invites me to go and see him just before the Cab., to which to-day I am duly summoned. I go. I say coldly in his P.S.'s room "I have come at the invitation of the F.S." Entering his room, I say, still coldly, "Good morning, F.S." He says that he has read my letter to the P.M. and cannot complain of it and wishes to offer me an apology for not having brought me in to the consultation. Everything, he says, has been so rushed, and it was A.V.A. who suggested the meeting, he himself not having really wanted it. I say that I have not come seeking for a formula of apology. But, I say, at this meeting, to which I was not summoned, though I was readily accessible, and could easily have been found at the H.of C., my view, recorded in a Minute to Butler, was before the meeting. But it was rejected by him in my absence. Then the discussion flows on, not very agreeably. In the midst, Butler enters looking, I thought, slightly sheepish. Finally, Hfax.says, rather nettled, "Can't we get back to the question of how to beat the Germans?" I say "That is what I want to do, but there seem to be obstructions, not least in this office". I refer also to yesterday's Cabinet Minutes, and to Hfax.'s citation of the M. of R. The latter might at least have spoken to me, I say, as well as to Hfax., since he was sent by us jointly. It appears that ~~the~~ lawyers have been trying to play football with Cabinet decisions. I also, I tell him, have my legal and other advisers, and they hold different views. Nor, I think, will the views of Fitzmaurice be lightly pushed aside here (in F.O.) since he was F.O.adviser before he was transferred to me. At this stage, Butler says "I tried to put everything right by ringing you up and telling you what had happened". I said "Yes, you told me the whole black story, and gave me the material for my protest to the P.M. I am much obliged

to you". Hfax. then mentions Turkey (Nichols had obviously put this into his head). If Italy said that we had begun the war against her, the Turks might run out. I said that this seemed to me, once more, to be confusing a pretext with a root cause. Either the Turks were firm or not. If yes, they would be still firmer, if we showed, as the P.M. had said, that we weren't afraid of Musso. If no, they would run out anyhow and would easily find some other pretext. And so, not very cheerfully, though superficially polite, we go on to the Cab.

To Butler, having him alone for a moment, I say that I think that the "Butler Committee" should be wound up. On Italy, from now on, I will communicate direct with Hfax., or, if he is too busy, I should be quite content to communicate with Butler. There is no need for any other machinery any more, nor for my officials to come and sit under his Chairmanship with the Master of the Rolls at the F.O. He says he thinks he agrees.

I tell Drogheda that, if the Butler Committee is summoned again, he is to come to me for instructions and to say that he understood from me that the thing was finished. To Butler I say that I think the Master of the Rolls is taking too much upon himself, and I also tell him that I do not think much of P. Nichols.

Cab. I have got into the habit of sitting on the right hand of whatever Admiral is in attendance. To-day it is Phillips. Hfax. on ships. I can take no objection to his general line. I say "I am interested in what is done; not in what is said. I fear I failed in lucidity on Sunday". P.M. says, with a smile, "No, you put up a most powerful case". I continue, "I neither had in mind, nor mentioned, contraband control. That relates to goods reaching Germany. I was concerned, ~~not~~ not that some cargoes might reach G., but that they would reach I." Evidence against I., Loraine's telegrams, Relazioni, etc. "I regret that I was not at the meeting yesterday evening, nor were my officers. They could have put up arguments against those of Hfax.'s officers. I regret that I was not summoned to the Cab. yesterday. But I thank the Lord President for putting so strongly the case which I should have put had I been here, as I should have been. But we have now lost three days. To-day is Wednesday. I hope we shall act to-day. I have here a further list of ships. I want them all stopped. I don't care on what legal fiction". I then quote FitzM.'s opinion, which I have brought in my hand. Lord President says "That sounds very good sense, whether or not it is good law". I say that I want all the tankers stopped too. If there is any hesitation, I will argue the case; if not, I have no more to say. The P.M. says "We are all agreed. There is no need for you to push an open door". I say that I want it now all quite clear cut. Will

orders now be sent to stop the ships? He says "Yes". The Admiral leaves the room to send the order. He comes back and assumes his seat beside me and pushed a note to me saying "I wish you had been Minister of E.W. from the beginning of the war". I write "These chaps have all been led up the garden by Mussolini". I then withdraw.

Bridges, as I go out, says he didn't know this question was going to be raised yesterday. It was not his fault that I was not summoned. I say "I can only judge from my own experience. This sort of thing has happened much too frequently since I have been Minister for E.W. I have written to the Prime Minister about it".

Lord Finlay comes to me and asks for my "instructions" on the Itn. ships. I say "Stop the lot". And I add that I am quite sure that he can find ~~an excellent~~ ^{a well-fitting} legal garment in which to clothe this act.

Have a drink with C. Stuart, who is all for G.J. taking over some important work in which we are both interested.

Go on to dine with G.J., who would like to do it, but must first speak to Cadogan who, I say, I neither like nor dislike, but only non-like. I am still a Vanite. G.J. says that of course Cadogan is very borne, but much better than many people think. G.J. thinks that we have been very weak about Italy since the war began, though at an earlier stage we should certainly have tried much harder to make a friend of her.

*He says that Van has become hysterical. He should have resigned
6. 6. 40. I hope into politics. He is all sorrow & grief. I hope I could
follow it up. There can't be two heads in the Office.*

Hfax. and I agree, in Cab. to extend my short list of Itn. ships to a much longer list.

My P.C. is announced in the press. There are seven of us in this batch: Bracken, Citrine, Cross, myself, Edwards, Harris and Van. Labour has three out of seven! Rehearse in Privy Council Office. Kneeling, holding up New Testament, kissing hands, backing away from Royal Presence, and never uttering.

Lunch with Japs. All very agreeable and full of professions of friendship. So is the Bulgarian Minister who happens to be there. But more and more I sense that, in these days, most foreign emissaries abroad signify almost nothing. So it is with Maisky and Bastianini, and, I think, these Japs.

7. 6. 40

To B.P. to become a P.C. The ritual is gone through without any crashing errors, though Bracken, who, being first in alphabetical order, has to lead us up in Indian file, tries to shake hands with the wrong people after kissing hands. I drive Charlie Edwards to Paddington in my official car, which much pleases him. He is afraid, to-day as always in the past, that he may miss his train from Paddington home. I land him there in good time. He is 73 but walks very sprightly. He likes being what and where he is and says that only Shinwell is a nuisance.

12.30. To Caxton Hall for ceremony. My presence is really unnecessary since two admirable lady witnesses are already there. I am cutting it rather fine, as I am due at Cab. at 1, and therefore enter Registrar's Office and apply a slight hustle, telling him who I am and that I must leave there soon for the Cab. This perhaps was slightly injudicious, but probably made no difference.

Later in the day the press got wind of my presence and the Mirror and the Mail in particular seemed to want information as to whether the Minister of E.W. was present to-day at the wedding of "a German". H.G., who knows nothing of my movements, says that he thinks it is almost impossible that the Minister, who has a very crowded timetable, can have found time to attend any wedding. Later, I put on Bowes-Lyon to keep the whole thing out of the press, and he does this admirably - he is a very able and agreeable young man, this young brother of the Queen - having rung up a large number of editors and told them that it was a matter of national importance that the name of this German, who was being of great value to this country, should not be mentioned.

old P.O.G. report before the Cabinet. "Rather a conservative report", says P.M., thinking chiefly, I think, of some statistics, but on the whole well received. Hankey speaks strongly but very long-winded. I sense that he is not the power he was. The F.O., however, have moved fractionally away from their ~~own~~ gentlemanly attitude. We get authority to make practical proposals.

Lunch with the Chinese Embassy. Also very friendly and perhaps more represents his Government here than most diplomats. He likes the idea of our concerting with French, Belgian and Dutch, and, if they will, with U.S.A., in economic field.

I hold Press Conference of six chief London morning papers. I talk well off the record.

I am told that the French Navy have now given the wrong order about the Itn.ships. I refuse to take any notice or any action. I say "Our ships have their orders. They are carrying

them out. We never asked the French to help. We only asked their Government to agree. It did. We have not been notified that it has reversed its agreement. I don't think it would matter to us if it did. Anyhow, let the F.O. make the first step towards me. I ~~turn~~ turn a Nelson blind eye to this last telegram". Leith Ross seems to think my attitude odd. But there it is.

P.O.G. again this afternoon. Hankey says he wants to waste no time. He has lots of plans.

8. 6. 40.

Lord Finlay again asks instructions for Contraband Control Committee (Itn. ships). Statistics, he says, will carry us some way, but not all the way. We have already picked up the Barberigo, the second worst case of all. She has been taken into Gib and her cargo is being "rummaged", to use the P.M.'s admirable word. I have agreed to a De Minimis schedule prepared by Jack Nicholls which will clear a lot of other ships. Finlay proposes that we should seek the A.G.'s opinion on the status of pre-belligerency. If we get a good opinion, everything will be simple. We can ~~see~~ see without reference to contraband to Germany. If we get a less good opinion, it will be open to me to go back to the Cabinet. I agree, on condition that all evidence, including private telegrams, are put before the A.G.

Cab. Hankey again very long-winded on matters relating to the River. He bores the Cab. It is 1.15. Winston looks hungrily at the clock. A.V.A. passes a note to me: "What a deployment of detail! M.H. is getting very wordy." I ask that at long last something may be done to cut the jugular vein of oil. Left to F.S., Ld. Pres., Hankey, me and Lloyd to meet and settle. P.M. says all Ministers should go away for part of the weekend. They may not have another chance for a long time. Cadogan says to me, going out, that G.J. has spoken to him and he would be willing to release him, good though he is, if H.M.G. should wish it.

Lunch with C.R.A. He is a very good G.S.O.I. He is doing a lot of push on home front, e.g., for communal feeding, rational restriction of imports, etc. He is interested in what I tell him about M.E.W., and possible extensions. He thinks Hfax is going down hill. People are getting rather fed up with him. He is ~~rather~~ a weak and indecisive nobleman.

C.R.A. would like to find a job for Shinwell to keep him quiet. S. has been to him and practically admitted that he made a damned fool of himself in refusing the job he was offered when the Government was being formed.

The 51st Highland Division was spread out over 20 miles at the mouth of the Somme! It has been knocked about badly. There seem to have been no French reserves in the neighbourhood. It was necessary to call up British L. of C. units to hold the front line!

I broadcast at 9 p.m. (script attached.)

DIARY9. 6. 40

At P.M.'s orders all Ministers who can take to-day off. I visit W.L. in my official car, though making proper private payment. Miss the road at Newbury, but arrive at 12.15, having started just after 9. Stamps seem very happy and trees are growing well (also long grass and weeds). Sun-bathe in the copse and then take a rather violent walk, through Postman's Gate, up the Marlborough road, down Stock Lane, up round by Constantine's and back along the road past Gentry's. This in just over an hour. Leave by car at 6.30 and get back to flat at 8.40, just two and a quarter hours.

Meet Gladwyn and talk about the lack of coherence in a certain important sphere of war work. Finally left that, as a first step, he should be given an instruction to investigate everything and question everyone in this field, and to report. This should pave the way for his taking charge under whatever political direction shall be decided upon.

DIARY10. 6. 40

Attorney General gives an important opinion, at Finlay's and Fitzmaurice's instigation, on pre³belligerency. This is a moderately "constructive" development of International Law. The essence is that, if H.M.G. will express the view that Italy is likely to enter the war, ships carrying contraband to Italy may be treated as though Italy was already at war.

I take this opinion with me to a conference at the F.O. - on other matters - presided over by the Lord President with Hfax., Hankey, Butler, Geoffrey Lloyd and some officials. In the Private Secretary's room I tell Butler that I have come, unsupported by officials, and so has Lloyd, and I did not anticipate that "all these people" whom I see around me would be attending. Butler says "they always try to come in". I ask him to limit the number. Otherwise, I say, Lloyd and I will both have to send for our officials, and then it will become a public meeting. With great tact Butler prevents P.Nichols from following in.

In the discussion which follows the Reluctant Nobleman is gradually pushed by some of us to where we think he should be. He is, I gather, much less reluctant than some weeks ago. He wants, however, "to tell our friend" before anything happens. But we dissuade him from this view.

This meeting over, about 4 p.m., I show Hfax. the A.G.'s opinion, and ask him whether he feels that he can conscientiously certify that the entrance of Italy into the war against us is "likely". He says he thinks he can, and will send it to me to-night. At 4.30 and 4.45 this afternoon, as we learn later, Ciano has told Poncet and Loraine that Italy will be at war with us from midnight.

Cadogan seems friendly, and I learn indirectly, from ^{J.J.} through C.S., that he is in fact friendly to me. This surprises me a little.

At 6.30 we receive officially in my Ministry the "Duplicity" message. This is the pre-arranged signal that Italy has come in against us. H.G. wants me to issue a message to the press on Italy's vulnerability to economic war. This, after a slight hesitation, I do in a few sentences. It gets excellent publicity both in the press and on the air, even up to the morning's B.B.C. new bulletins next day.

To-day it is announced that Narvik has been evacuated and that we have lost "Glorious" and two destroyers. We seem to be winning the war backwards!

11. 6. 40

I have a discussion on the 'phone with Hfax., through the medium of Butler, on the date to be inserted in the proclamation stopping Italian exports. When corresponding action was taken on German exports last November, a week's warning was given! Now it is thought by the F.O. that perhaps we can date it from to-day. I propose instead to date it back a month, so as to catch all Italian exports in neutral ships - Italian ships themselves can be seized anyhow - which are on the seas. It could also be said that this would correspond with the date of Hitler's violation of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, which Italy applauded. After some debate I agree to compromise on dating it back one week, and undertaking that consignments to Japan shall, in particular cases, be looked at tenderly.

At 7.30 I am summoned to a Privy Council at B.P. attended also by Chamberlain, Simon and Halifax (what company I keep these days!). This is to get the King's approval to the Italian export order. We stand and make polite and faintly relevant conversation. Coming out, Hfax. says to me "Isn't it wonderful how cheerful he is when he must feel that all his Empire may be crashing about his ears"! I say that it is indeed wonderful.

I give a little Ministerial dinner party at the House of Commons, admirably organised by John Wilmot, to my principal assistants at the Ministry - Foot, Leith Ross, Mounsey, Drogheda, Hall, J.W., H.G. and P.H. It all goes very well indeed. J.W. says afterwards "They all enjoyed themselves as much as kids at a Sunday School Treat". We give them little to eat and much to drink.

The P.M. is in France.

12. 6. 40

P.M. still in France. Paris is being evacuated. The oil at Rouen has "gone up". We have had to help with this. Plans for removing machine tools and raw materials from the Seine factories are being carried out.

Lunch with Lord Kemsley, a number of his Editors and his two rather unimpressive sons. I am very frank with this lot.

Letters continue to come in on my broadcast. Most are favourable.

Dine at the Regis with Lannon, Yugoslav and Bulgarian commercial representatives, Jagger (representing Ministry of Supply), Dobbie, Marchbank, Remnant and a man named Collins, who leads the grievance chorus regarding pre-emption. It is a long story and most of it is true no doubt. But nearly all of it was before my time. I tell them in broad terms that I am trying to buck things up.

H.G. thinks that I shall soon have too little to do in the Ministry and wants me to take over part of A.G.'s "Economic and General Staff" work.

13. 6. 40

My trip to meet Georges Monnet is cancelled, as the French Government has moved from Paris and everything, no doubt, is in flux and some confusion.

A most dramatic account of the last meeting of the Supreme War Council; also of our efforts to bomb suitable targets in Northern Italy. It is clear that the bombs dropped on Geneva were from a British plane. To gain height and get over the Alps she had to release some of her bombs, and these fell through a thick mist and struck the outskirts of Calvin City where the late League of Nations used to reside. It would have been ironically best if the bombs had hit, not some harmless civilians on the outskirts of the city, but the great tomb of an idea at the Palais des Nations.

Van and I have a talk. He was hurt by an answer to a P.Q. yesterday saying that he was still Diplomatic Adviser to H.M.G. He says this implies that he is sometimes consulted and may have some responsibility for H.M.G.'s foreign policy. But this is not so. He is consulted no more under this regime than under the previous one. He thinks the H.O. is still most dangerously slow.

Reynaud's two appeals to Roosevelt are published to-day.

DIARY13. 6. 40

British air attack on North Italy, which had been agreed with French Government, is seriously obstructed by the French authorities. British bombers due to operate from an airfield in Southern France found French lorries driven on to the airfield in order to prevent them from taking off. A larger number of British bombers, operating from this country, refuelled at the Channel Islands and many had to come down in France on their way, principally owing to bad weather, but also, some think, to having taken on bad oil at C.I. Some think there may have been sabotage here. General V. had vehemently demanded that the operation should be cancelled, but our Air Marshal B., having been again in contact with London, said that, as it had been agreed between the two Governments, it must proceed. Owing to bad weather it was only moderately successful.

The French also called off some naval attacks on Italian coast targets which had been planned, and it is said that French and Italian troops are fraternising at some Alpine posts. The official French reason for going slow is always that they fear reprisals, but there seems evidence here of very mixed counsels.

It is also said that the French let down our troops very badly in the Havre peninsula, not allowing them to retreat on Rouen along their line of communication, but causing them to be trapped close to the coast. The French Corps Commander then told them to cease fire, but they refused and fought on till French troops began surrendering on both sides of them. Then they surrendered too.

The last meeting of the Supreme War Council seems to have been a very melancholy affair. It seemed clear that the French were near to the end of their organised resistance; they were nearly gone. They had been outwitted and outmatched and outmanned and outgunned and outplanned at every point. Pétain was defeatist - as he was in April and May 1918! He held that France must now make peace with Germany. Weygand also had been proposing an armistice and declared that he could no longer take responsibility for the High Command. He added, however, - "being a good staff officer rather than a commander-in-chief", as someone has said of him, - that he would loyally serve under any other commander-in-chief who might be appointed to carry on the war.

14. 6. 40

Spend an hour with the Contraband Control Committee. All very quiet and competent under Finlay's Chairmanship.

At lunch meet Sobanski. He says that the Poles are starving, morally and physically humiliated, but wildly optimistic.

5 p.m. Winston has one of his Ministers' squashes. Gives an account of his last visit to France and a very vivid appreciation.

French organised resistance is at an end. The Government and the High Command still give orders, but they are not effectively transmitted nor obeyed. You meet men who can talk to you, but have no telephone. General Georges supported Weygand's advice to R. that he should ask for an armistice. R. refused.

R. had asked W.C. "most solemnly and formally" to relieve France from her promise not to make a separate peace. W.C. had refused. This, he thinks, was the answer R. wanted from him. R. had put this question after a long meeting of the Cabinet.

The French Army has lost the battle. They have no reserves left. Their Divisions have been reduced to the strength of two battalions. In some parts soldiers are wandering in the woods, taking food from passers by. They state that if they had had twelve more Divisions, they could have won. That may be true, but that sort of thing is true of almost every battle.

Hitler will soon make the French a Peace Offer. It will be made to sound very generous. ~~The~~ French Government may be found to accept it. The French fleet raises a number of problems and there may be great temptation. There should be a France across the Water. Reynaud and Mandel would be for this.

Only too much recrimination is possible on both sides, French and British. But what good would it do? Very few British Divisions have fought in France. At the end, very few indeed, French losses have been out of all proportion to ours, in every sphere.

We here must strike a still more defiant note. We shall defend this island. Weygand said to him "You have a very good anti-tank trap in the Channel". We must intensify the blockade and show great activity in the air. We have more troops here than we have ever had before. All forms of home defence are being vigorously pushed forward. It is a long-standing doctrine that raids may succeed but that large-scale invasion of this island is

impossible. Our Fighter Strength is now greater than before the offensive began. There have been prodigies both of production and repair of aircraft. There will now be very violent attacks made upon this island, but, if they are beaten off at first, they cannot succeed later. Nazidom will lie like a dark pall over all Europe, but, after only a few months, it may dissolve like the snow in spring.

There is no alternative before us except to fight it out; else we shall be first despoiled and then enslaved.

To-night it is announced that the Germans have been marching into Paris all day! We are back now behind 1870!

15. 6. 40

The Turks, saying that they are afraid of Russian aggression in the Caucasus, are invoking for the moment the Escape Clause in the Protocol to their Treaty. The real truth is that events in France have not unnaturally discouraged them. In any case the Treaty is tripartite, and if the French run out, they are not bound. Their attitude is symptomatic. There are wobbles in Egypt and Iraq. The Balkans are petrified. Sarajoglou said to our two Ambassadors, when they told him that nothing could produce greater moral effect in the Balkans than Turkish entry into the war on our side, "Some victories in France would have a much greater moral effect". In my view we cannot do anything much with any of these people (except the Egyptians) in this stage of the war. We can only keep them in storage for the next phase.

C.S. thinks that a France across the Water might be set up at St Pierre et Miquelon, two little French islands in the mouth of the St Lawrence. This also might appeal to the French Canadians and the U.S.A.

M. says that he is working day and night for W. He describes the scene in the garden at Tours. R. was very formal. He said "Mr Prime Minister of England: In the name of France I ask you whether you are willing to release France from her promise not to make a separate peace". W.C. replied, "Mr President of the Council of France: In the name of England, I say No." Then, breaking through formalities, he suggested to Reynaud that they two should go and talk together in the garden. Ismay was told to go with them and to take a note. M. says that the French always have their tails

down when W.C. arrives and that, as he energises and encourages them, their tails rise. Mandel is much the strongest. But he is a Jew, whose real name is said to be Rehoboam Rothschild. R. is very susceptible to Winston but he is conscious of having led no large political party and of not being entitled to speak for France. People say to him, "You can't speak for France. You are only a Boulevardier; you do not know the Provinces".

We speak also of the French fleet and of the possibilities in N.Africa.

16. 6. 40

Sunday. Sleep longer than usual.

10.30 a.m., while shaving, am summoned to the office, with a Cab. soon after 11.

Conference at Ministry on French Colonies; Spain and naval attitude thereto; U.S.A. and stoppage of materials at source.

News from France not good. French Army disintegrated; also French Government. General Brooke to act on his own and disregard French orders if necessary. News at night a little better. A formula and declaration of Franco-British unity is offered, largely inspired by Van and Jean Monnet, but probably this is all too late to strengthen the French will.

Egypt. Lampson is not being very good; he is getting rather excited and nervy. He has been told that he may now bring back the ~~Ward~~, who are all for fighting Italy - at any rate if this will bring them back to office.

G.J. says that Russians and Germans have done a deal; the Russians to take Lithuania and to threaten the Turks against coming in on our side at present. (Later evidence suggests that this was not so, that the Russians took Lithuania as a measure of defence against Germany, and that the Turks made an untruthful excuse about Russian pressure against fulfilment of their Treaty with us.)

I have done a War Cab. paper on the French Colonies "in a certain eventuality". I propose inducements to local Governors - guaranteeing their salaries, banking accounts and imports of comforts such as spare parts for cars, lubricating oil, and wines!

It is put to me that Winston is surrounded by stimulants - his "Brains Trust", Morton, "the Prof" (Lindemann), Brendan Bracken,

↑
Harrod.

etc. What he really needs, some think, are sedatives. He is always getting new ideas and collecting what is almost a Cab. at short notice, and taking sudden decisions of great importance. Most of these are probably very good, but the Chiefs of Staff live in a constant state of terror of what he may do, or decide, without consulting them. The other day, when I came into the Cab., he was wiggling the C. of S. like anything, particularly old Pound, who is rather deaf. "I have been concerned with this problem on and off for the past thirty years and I have never heard it said before that What has become of Sea Power?..... Who is responsible for this paper.....?" Then excuses, and then P.M. again, "Then it should all be taken back and reconsidered and brought up again in proper form by those responsible. They must be prepared to defend in the Cabinet the statements they put in their papers....."

Someone said that, when Bastianini was told to return to Italy because she was now at war with us, "il Ambasciatore piangeva come un bambino".

Old Petain, who is quite gaga, wanted to make peace weeks ago. He wanted to make peace in March, 1918, and he is now 22 years more senile. Weygand is only a staff officer. He will take no real responsibility.

17. 6. 40

I take the Chair at my Inter-Allied Conference (French, Belgians, Dutch and other departments of H.M.G.) and then we have a Government Hospitality lunch, at which I preside, at Lancaster House. A lovely setting, but a very sad affair. Paul Morand much moved. He did not want to come to the lunch, in view of the news from France, but I asked him on the telephone to come, since he was also a friend of mine. I sat between the Belgian Ambassador and the Netherlands Minister, the first of whom was in a very collapsed condition, though the latter outwardly was as hard as brass. At the Conference there was only agreement on generalities. The Dutch are very much afraid of the Japs.

Petaïn broadcast at 12 noon. He is seeking an armistice. He has told the French to cease fighting. Later, this was corrected. They are to go on fighting until the armistice terms have been agreed. In the rush of these last days Reynaud was wearied out and was made to resign by the others. Lebrun, who was in tears at the time of Munich, has been little better than a senile cry-baby ever since. There is, I fear, some truth in the fears of the Dictators against the decadent and senile Democracies. We have just

got rid of our old Undertaker, but at the top in France to-day are the most miserable lot of very old men. The French Government, apparently, will not leave the country till an effort has been made to get armistice terms which are not "dishonouring". We are much preoccupied, of course, about the French fleet. The French say that they will not hand it over to the enemy. Some, however, seem to think that they will scuttle it rather than continue to keep it with us. This continues for some days to be the principal point of interest to us now left in France. Reynaud wanted the United States to declare war on Germany, and his final fall from power was due to Roosevelt's inability to do this. The dramatic offer of Franco-British union made on Sunday night, 16th, was too late, and the final visit of Churchill, with other Ministers, was abandoned when we heard that Reynaud had fallen and old Petain taken his place. These old Generals - Petain and Weygand - still think they can sit round a green table in the old way and discuss terms of peace with this new Germany. Reynaud said that for France, if she signed a dishonourable peace, it would mean centuries of servitude and her reduction to the status of Slovakia.

It is said that 135,000 people were killed in the air bombardment at Rotterdam. Also that time bombs were dropped, all timed to explode in the middle of the day when the streets were full of people. Rotterdam had no air defence at all.

18. 6. 40

H. of C. Winston again makes a grand speech - defiant, reasoned, and confident. It is noticeable that he is much more loudly cheered by the Labour Party than by the general body of Tory supporters. The relative silence of these latter is regarded by some as "sinister". John Wilmot, whom I ask to feel about and ascertain opinion, tells me that many Tories feel they are quite out of it now. They think the Labour Party has much too large a share, both in offices and the determination of Government policy, and in addition to ~~being~~ a large part of the Government, the Labour Party also continues to be, to a great extent, the Opposition, so far as status is concerned. The Tories, therefore, wonder where they ~~are~~ ~~now~~ come in. Most of the Tories in the Government are either rebels or near-rebels. So what was the use of having been loyal to the Old Man and Margesson in the now closed chapter of our history? There is some danger in this situation, and it must be watched. One very obvious conclusion is that we must not push the Old Man out of the Government, for he would then become a centre of disaffection and a rallying point for real opposition. Leave him where is, as a decaying hostage.

With Will Henderson, now attached to A.G. The latter seems very slow and unimperative. He is in danger of being run by his officials, notably Hemming. I seek to push Durbin on to A.G.'s immediate staff. H.G. is much in this intrigue.

A.V.A. and Pound are at Bordeaux to discuss the question of the French fleet.

19. 6. 40

In the absence of the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, I see Vice-Admiral Phillips. I lapse the protocol and consent to visit him at the Admiralty in his own room. Hitherto I have had a good opinion of him and it was he who passed me a little note in the War Cab. when I stopped the Italian ships. To-day I have come to make sure that the Navy have in the front of their minds the question of the fringe of islands in the Atlantic from which, if Gib went, we could continue to enforce the blockade and control the western gateway of the Mediterranean. His answer on this point is reasonably satisfactory, though he said the islands lack good harbours. Then, however, he begins a political harangue - I feel that I should have had less of this if he had been in my room, which would have been the proper "venue". He does not care anything about the Italians, who are a worthless lot, but the Spaniards are a very different story. To have Spain as an enemy would jeopardise the whole of our control, both of the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic sea routes. It is unthinkable that we should have been brought to such a point. We backed the Bolsheviks in Spain in 1936 and '37 against the only man who, in modern times, has been able to make Spain strong. The horrors committed by the Bolsheviks in Spain were seen by our sailors and are on record. This was the climax of a foreign policy which had first adopted an attitude towards Germany which made war with her inevitable; had then successively alienated Japan, Italy, and now, finally, Spain. The French had not been fighting in these last weeks. This was because they too had become Bolsheviks. Weygand had said that the only tough troops in France were the Poles, and that if he had had ten more Divisions of them, he would have won the battle.

I did not take much part in this talk, but I have been inclined to revise my view that this man should be First Sea Lord. Sailors and soldiers, when they become political, become very political. At the same time, one must sympathise with a sailor who sees his problem rendered much more difficult by a series of political acts, with an obvious naval bearing.

What he was saying about the French not fighting is based on an account by Sikorski, now in England, who said that on many parts of the Front, when the German tanks approached, the French troops took shelter in neighbouring houses.

DIARY20. 6. 40

I have to correct more weakness from Geoffrey Lloyd regarding oil targets. Now that our bombers are released from the lost battle zone, we should have many to spare for these, as for other targets having a high immediate value. Bennett, the airman, and I bring up some rather feeble recommendations drafted by G.L. In any case the Petroleum Department is taking too much upon themselves in this matter. This must be corrected.

H. of C. Secret Session on home defence and kindred matters. Rather a good show. Pressmen, to whom, of course, nothing could be said, remarked that, at the end, members came out looking very pleased with themselves, and some, chuckling.

In the afternoon an Australian soldier in uniform called to see me, saying that he had sat at the back of the hall in Sydney when the A.W.U. Conference met there early in 1938, and had heard me speak. Vic Johnson had told him to come and see me when he was in London.

DIARY21. 6. 40

Lunch with Fletcher and Morton. Much of the time engaged in diatribes against Anderson. They are now thinking of trying to frighten Margesson with threats of a revolt in the House unless he is shifted. This is the only thing that moves Margesson. Winston refuses to listen to talk against Anderson, or any other Minister. He says "I have formed this Government and I don't want to have to change it". Bracken has, indeed, been forbidden by P.M. to mention Anderson's name again. Attlee has also made a vain endeavour to get a change. P.M., says Morton, is a combination of a genius and a naughty boy. He takes a puckish delight in side-tracking the anti-Anderson campaign. When Morton, the other day, broached the subject, the P.M. turned upon him with a bland smile and, holding out a newspaper, said "Have you read this most interesting news about the price of gold in New York?"

P.M. is naturally greatly focused on home defence, and seems to have ticked off Ironside the other day. He asked the latter how many more guns he wanted, and when a certain figure was mentioned, he leant forward in his chair and said ".... (a most expressive monosyllable), General".

Morton recounts a terrible story, pieced together from versions of Spears and others who have lately been in France, of the complete moral and physical collapse of the Government. This really began, he says, as soon as they left Paris. When they got to Tours there were no telephones and no authority. When they got to Bordeaux the Ministers were found eating sardines with their fingers, and Reynaud's mistress is said to have penetrated to a Cabinet meeting and to have been found sitting on his knee, in the presence of the others, tearing up the note which he was ~~drawing~~ trying to draft and saying "Ah, but you are still a Frenchman. You are not an Englishman. You can't write like that". One returned Englishman said "This is not France any more; it is Haiti". All this may well be coloured up, but it is not quite fiction. Lebrun, they say, is "the best guarded thing in France". Therefore an attempt to bring him away to safety did not succeed.

G.J. came to see me. He has been offered a job of some importance under Morton in connection with press censorship. He and Cadogan are trying to think out a plan for better control of problems of common interest to me and others. It is now suggested that Eden and I might have a joint responsibility, with a good soldier jointly responsible to both of us, and, under him, the organisation bifurcating into military and civilian branches. The

F.O. would fade out of this picture, except that it might be useful to have a relatively junior person from the F.O. as liaison with the new organisation. I said that I would be quite willing to work such a scheme, if others agreed.

22. 6. 40

Maisky first telephones, and then calls, about the Norbryn. There has been the most incredible delay at the Dominions Office. With the aid of Salter, I have the thing put right.

U.K.C.C. Kingsley Wood writes that, over and above the quarter of a million pounds already authorised, we may have another million for pre-emptive purchases. We are getting on!

For the first time since I became Minister I spent a night out of London, motoring down to Davenport's house at Hinton Waldrist with the Wilmots.

23. 6. 40

It has been a pleasant break, although rain nearly all the time. Motor back after addressing a body of E.D.V. in Davenport's back yard. They are amused by my quoting the saying that "we are now in the Final, and we shall have the advantage of playing on our own ground". I nearly create a local crisis earlier in the day by inadvertently ringing an outside bell in D.'s garden. The rule is that no outside bells, and notably Church bells, are to be rung any more, except if German parachutists appear. Fortunately, this bell does not seem to be heard. Hfax. told Anderson in my presence yesterday that he thought it would have a most depressing effect throughout the countryside that Church bells should be silenced. Anderson replied, first, that this was done in the last war (which Hfax. did not know), and second, that the two Archbishops had given their consent. This rather bowled out Hfax., who could only reply "The Archbishops always support the wrong side".

Terms of the German armistice to Petain are announced. It is a shocking business. The practical question now is how far Frenchmen, in addition to the valiant General de Gaulle, will make a France across the Water; how far we can rely upon the French colonies; and what arrangements can be made regarding the French fleet.

DIARY

Dillon I 22

(124)

24. 6. 40

Still waiting for definite news about the French fleet. Campbell was very desperate in his last messages from Bordeaux. He was dealing, he said, with "a crook" (Baudouin) and "an old dotard" (Petain). "French personalities", he says, linger on in Bordeaux, hoping that things will improve. He arranges shipping facilities for them, at their request, and then they do not take it up. Why don't these damned fools come away? Herriot and Jeanneney, whom one had hoped to see away, are now to stay - "to soften the blow", as they feebly say.

I tell C.R.A. that, in my view, it is high time that the Cabinet took sharp decisions to disrecognise Bordeaux and to recognise whatever else can be collected. Campbell reports that Weygand has fallen into a "mysterious disinterested mood". France, he says, has committed grave sins for which she must now suffer. This old man is a black mystic. Clemenceau once said of him that he was "knee-deep in priests".

Stanczyk comes to see me with an attractive young interpreter called Gaszynski. He gives a shocking picture of the scenes in France - French soldiers running away and German soldiers "controlling the traffic"; French soldiers selling their arms in the streets of Bordeaux; one Polish Division fighting its way south along the coast; two others in the Maginot Line, one fighting its way into Switzerland; Mandel's office at Bordeaux surrounded by armed soldiers, entry refused to all visitors, and telephone communications with the Minister likewise cut off, his Secretary saying "The Minister is not allowed to speak to anyone".

25. 6. 40

Go to the Cabinet and get authority to blockade France! Both occupied and unoccupied territories ~~shall be effected~~ are, in effect, to be blockaded and plans to be concerted with the Admiralty for diversion of ships, etc. The French still don't arrive here. Their insularity and non-travelling habit are coming out with a rush. There is no "French National Committee" around General de Gaulle. It is, as Corbin says to Hfax., "a construction of the imagination". French resolution in the colonies seems also to be crumbling. The position regarding the French fleet is still very unsatisfactory and uncertain. We shall "spare neither patience nor resolution" says the F.M. to-day in the House. We are shadowing some of their biggest ships, but we haven't a large enough fleet to do everything we should like to do.

They are too much attached to their mistresses, & their ships, & their little properties!

"A very disagreeable message" from the Bordeaux Govt. is delivered to the F.O. by Cambon. Corbin, who won't stay much longer here as Ambassador, would not deliver it himself. It demands the recall of our Consuls, who have been admirably active and tenacious, in N.Africa, and the return of de G. to France.

John Wilmot, having read a lump of telegrams from Egypt, the Balkans, Turkey, Iraq, Japan, etc., says "When things begin to go wrong, everyone turns against you I suppose they have all had a lot to put up with from the British Empire in their time".

26. 6. 40

Another day of infuriating uncertainty. Still no Frenchmen blowing any trumpets anywhere except de G. in London, and his trumpet blasts are becoming a bit monotonous. The "National Committee" is still only a name. There are rumours of this and that notable Frenchman on his way to England, or in North Africa. Duff Cooper and Gort have gone to N.Africa trying to rally something. Still no hard news about the fleet. I have a pitiful interview with Paul Morand (see separate note). These Frenchmen have all become sawdust, or, if you prefer another metaphor, we see before our eyes nothing less than the liquification of France.

National E.C. of the Labour Party meets this morning. Long-winded, trivial and rather hysterical, but no damage done.

27. 6. 40

Bad news from N.Africa. Liquifaction continues. The French will to fight is collapsing all round the Mediterranean. How clever of the Germans and Italians to wait a few days and do nothing! Duff Cooper and Gort have not seen Nogues; they have, indeed, been refused an interview. Nor are they allowed to see the bunch of French ex-Ministers who have arrived at Rabat and are being treated practically like prisoners.

There is some move towards my taking over extended responsibilities, but this will need much handling to overcome . personal jealousies and bureaucratic obstruction and delays.

DIARY28. 6. 40

Lunch with Spears (see separate note). He says that Van is much past his best. He no longer seems able to take decisions. He has been in the Chair of a small committee dealing with Anglo-French things.

S. said that when, at Bordeaux, Madame L. and others jeered at the offer of Franco-British union, he said "It is as though England said to France, who had been for many years his beautiful mistress, "Now that the Germans have thrown vitriol in your face, I am prepared to marry you".

To-day the Russians take Bessarabia. Our opportunities in Rumania continually shrink. The Hankey Committee meets this afternoon and concludes that nothing much new can be done, though some things which have been authorised to be done may yet be done.

Talk to C.R.A. French fleet. We must soon pass "from patience to resolution".

29. 6. 40

I receive a document from Cadogan for discussion by a small committee at the F.O. It proposes to give much too much to D.M.I. I concert counter-measures and invoke the aid of C.R.A. I think it should be under him, with me doing a good deal of it.

Go to the country and only return on 30. 6. 40. It has been a rather quiet public weekend. It is clear that German air-raids are only practice for the crews. They drop no bombs anywhere that matters. There is a tale at Aldbourne that three bombs dropped "on the common" some three miles from the village.

1 get the assignment 2/11
on 16/7 (just with
3 weeks later)

2 1/2 hours from last
6/22/7
13 1/2 wa

28th June, 1940.

Lunched with Spears, who still has high fever. He says that in France he had less than three hours sleep on the average for a fortnight. Pétain and Weygand were impregnated with the fear of a Bolshevik revolution. "If we do not make peace now, the soldiers will shoot their officers". It was as though one touched France, the façade of which was so familiar and found that there was nothing solid left at all. It had been all eaten away by white ants. Georges had fallen ill, by one of those ill chances of war, just before the German offensive. His old wound of the last war had come again. Gamelin had been grand at the time of Munich. Then there had been no Siegfried line, the Germans had 50 divisions less than this Spring, the Czechs were waiting to attack on the other side. But this time Gamelin had done less well than any scoutmaster. He had no mass of manoeuvre and he had placed a bad general in command of bad troops in the key sector of the Meuse. Moreover, the German Fifth Column schools had been completely successful and France and Britain had done nothing comparable. Therefore it was as though ringing for one's coffee in the morning one had been shot at in bed by the chambermaid, setting in the — one had found a magnetic mine, speaking on the telephone one had received orders always from the enemy, and it was a nightmare life for which neither the French High Command nor most of the French soldiers nor the French civil population was prepared. The rivers of France run roughly in a parallel system. Each river in turn was crossed by German Panzer Divisions. They seized and held some bridgeheads, and the French High Command was unwilling, at each stage, to destroy the crossings because on the far side of the river great numbers of French troops, and French refugees, would have been left stranded. This happened time after time. Moreover, France had no aviation and therefore German planes could fly low and drop incendiary bombs generating immense heat close besides each pillbox, so that their occupants were not under-cooked. In the centre of the line the French fought well for ten days, out-numbered and with no approach to parity of equipment. The violence and the noise of the German offensive destroyed them. It did not occur, until the end, to any French Generals, to order the men to place cottonwool in their ears and pieces of rubber between their teeth. Had this been done, the French morale would have been sustained. The refugees included numbers of Fifth Columnists. The parapets of the bridges of the rivers were burst by this flood. From time to time a motor lorry would open down its sides and Germans with machine guns would appear who would fire upon the French soldiers guarding the bridges, and create the maximum amount of panic on the refugees flooding across them. Weygand, at 74 years of age, had lost all elasticity of mind and all sense of new thoughts. Spears urged that he should form columns of lorries on which machine guns should be mounted to go like Gallieni's taxi-cabs in 1914 to redress the rout. It was in vain.

At Bordeaux there were cowards and traitors in

Spears said to me, it is like a man

who men to many a beautiful woman

moment when they differed

equal proportions. Baudouin was always in Italian pay. He falsified all news and every conversation. He alleged falsely that Churchill had said that he assented to the French request for an armistice. (I told Spears that yesterday my friends of the Labour Party, Jusqu'au but-ists, if there are any in England, had demanded why the Prime Minister had admitted this French demand.) Georges Monnet had denounced Baudouin at the last Cabinet he had attended as a traitor. Now he is a fugitive somewhere. The French Socialists, it is said, stood up most bravely against the defeatism of the ge-ga generals and the traitors. Provoust was trying to save his skin and his private wealth and his comfortable country houses, by broadcasting lies at German orders. The French political personages, for whom Campbell had secured passages on board ship were never sure whether they wanted to go or not. He put them on the boat at midday, and at dusk they had run off again back to the British Consulate at Bordeaux to ask the latest news. Spears had even put aboard their mistresses - including Mandel's, "a fat cow" - to make sure the men would come too.

by some
knowing
in La
Paris

Reynaud was never a strong man. He was only injected with confidence by Churchill. When Churchill went away he fell down again. His mistress, Madame Laporte, was an Anglophobe. She was always in the next room to the Cabinet at Tours and at Bordeaux. When the great offer of Franco-British Union came through, Reynaud sat at the telephone, with a piece of paper slipping about on a shiny table trying with a blunt pencil to take it down, and Spears held the paper on the table to prevent it from slipping. And then, when Reynaud took it into the next room, Madame Laporte snatched it from the hands of his secretary and said: "Oh, this is only a trick to make France a British Dominion". This, too, was the view expressed by many of his Ministers.

noted above

Lebrun, who had been crying ever since Munich, was crying worse than ever in these last days. Everything was lost. France could not resist. The sufferings of the civil population had become impossible. The danger of Bolshevism was imminent. Germany, at least, would maintain order in France. Nor could any Frenchmen of note, except De Gaulle, be persuaded to leave France, because, they said, "it will be counted against us that we abandoned France". Spears tried in vain to persuade them that they would best serve the cause of France by setting up a new Government of resistance either in England or in French colonies. In these last the situation had for many days been sliding from bad to worse. All around the Mediterranean resistance had now collapsed. De Gaulle had been obstructed over here at every turn. Jean Monnet was, it seemed, a Fifth Columnist. He had constantly got Halifax out of bed in the small hours of the morning in order to get reversed some more than usually energetic Cabinet decision. Next day Halifax had apologised to the Cabinet for giving way but meanwhile De Gaulle had been obstructed. The Service Departments were also constantly obstructive. The Admiralty said: "Will not recognition of De Gaulle discourage Darlan from keeping his word about the French Fleet etc." The C.I.O.S. had said to the Prime Minister: "We don't want"

want any Frenchmen over here. I shall think my honour satisfied if I say to the French Generals 'Any man that wants to stay and fight here can do so' and then I hope they will all go back". The Prime Minister had said: "Is that your sense of honour towards our Allies and towards the Cabinet decision to invite Frenchmen to volunteer to fight with us?" Now a memorandum, dictated and corrected by the Prime Minister, himself, has been lost somewhere in the War Office! Moreover, there had been long discussion as to whether or not Frenchmen volunteering to fight with us should be paid British rates of pay!

Spears thinks that Anglophobia will now rapidly grow in France. They will be told by Hitler that we are starving them. They may soon be waging war upon us with great gusto.

I said to him: "You must make a diary of these days. This, too, is prelude to victory. I have told foreigners in these last days that I have the sensation of a man who has a dream and who knows that he has been through it all before. We have been through all this 130 years ago. Just so, then, all Europe lay prostrate under the foot of a conqueror - though a more civilised conqueror than now. Just so, then, Britain, obstinate and unconquerable won back for foreigners in Europe the freedoms which they had lost. In those days, the U.S.A., too, was against us and there were no Dominions to be on our side". I said, too, that none have done better than my favourites the Poles who have fought far more bravely than the French, as bravely as the English, and no Pole has been prepared to make a puppet Government for Hitler. In the day of Resurrection the Polish angel shall fly in front of all the others.

Spears said, speaking of the French; "politicians and their mistresses; "Not thus can one defeat the Germans!"

Alas! for that French mansion, for those beautiful French palaces, that the white ants have eaten!