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THE LEAGUE IN THE EAST

BY

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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for Study Circles

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The League in The East.

I.—ORIENTAL AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION.

It is a commonplace that the League of Nations must be all-embracing; that if it remains a sectional organization, confined to one group of nations, however large and important, it will not have achieved the object for which it has been created. And this being granted, it follows that the success or failure of the League idea and the League organization among the Oriental nations will be a test case, upon the results of which the general success or failure of the League may largely depend. To be successful it must become universal, but its foundations have been laid in a particular part of the world: among the peoples of Christendom, who have the special traditions and outlook which we describe as "Western civilization." Can the League spread beyond the confines of the West to other regions and other civilizations? Can it offer an ideal which West and East can share and a society in which they can co-operate for the realization of such an ideal? Little progress has been made hitherto in getting rid of the division between them, and this division has led to perpetual misunderstandings and conflicts fatal to the peace and happiness of the world. Europe has been tormented for centuries by her "Eastern Question," and if we talk to Orientals about the relationship (or rather lack of a proper relationship) between our two civilizations, they tell us that for them the "Western Question"—the growing ascendancy of the West over the East—is the most urgent and disquieting of their contemporary problems.

Can the League bring East and West together in a larger society? Certainly it must endeavour to do so, but we cannot estimate its prospects of success or discuss the line of action it ought to pursue, till we have looked more closely at the Oriental world.

What do we mean by the East? We are apt to mean by it all civilized peoples in Asia and Africa whose civilization is not European, but these peoples really constitute not one but several groups. There is (i) the "Far East," consisting of China, Japan, Indo-China and the Malay countries, and

there is (ii) the "Middle East," embracing all the predominantly Mohammedan (Moslem) countries of Asia and Africa (roughly, the region between Europe and India). These two Oriental civilizations differ from each other perhaps more than each of them differs from Europe. In fact, the Middle East has points in common with Europe (*e.g.* the common origin of our alphabets and our religions) in spheres where it has nothing in common with the Far East. But between the Middle East and the Far East lies (iii) India, a region where the two former types of Oriental civilization have met, and, while not appearing to mingle, have somehow produced by their contact a third, or Indian, type of civilization with a character of its own.

The chief bond between these three Oriental groups—the Far East, the Middle East, and India—is that the "Western Question" is pressing upon all of them with the same urgency and in much the same form. For the sake of simplicity and brevity, therefore, we will concentrate mainly upon the Middle East, because the status of this region has been altered by the War more profoundly than that of the others, and also because the League of Nations has already been called in—in the very articles of the Covenant—to cope with the problems which the effects of the War in the Middle East have produced.

If we are to understand the Middle East (and this applies equally to India and China) we must get rid of the notion that the East is "unchanging." This notion, though prevalent in the West, is based on insufficient data and is very misleading. For instance, Westerners familiar with the life of the Hebrew patriarchs in the North Arabian steppes as described in the Old Testament learn from their countrymen who travel there that the Bedawin lead the same life on the same steppes to-day. They are struck by the absence of change in this locality, and contrast it with the transformation of conditions and outlook that has occurred during the same number of centuries in the agricultural and industrial parts of Europe in which the majority of us live. They seldom realise that this steppe-life with its rigid conditions fixed by a rigid environment—the seasonal migration from pasture to pasture and from well to well with the peculiar social organization this entails—is no more characteristic of the general life of the East than, for example, the unchanging life of the herdsmen and their cattle on the high Alpine pastures is characteristic of the general life of society in Europe. Suppose an Oriental who had studied what we know from archæology of the life

of the prehistoric inhabitants of Switzerland were to take a Cook's tour round some of the more frequented Swiss valleys without stopping at the great centres of European civilization on his way to and fro, he too would be impressed by the extraordinary absence of change through the ages in the small part of Europe he had visited, and might be led into the same error of judgment about the history of Europe as a whole as Westerners habitually commit in judging the East. For of course the great movements and events that have moulded and are moulding Eastern civilization do not occur in the steppes and deserts where the tents and flocks of bin Saud and bin Rashid are as the tents and flocks of Abraham. The cultivation of wheat and palm, the invention of irrigation, the discovery of the arch and the dome, the religious experience of the Jewish prophets or Zarathrustra or Muhammad were not fruits of the desert, but of the settled countries and oases in which the majority of the inhabitants of the Middle East have always lived. These things happened at Memphis and Babylon, at Jerusalem and Mecca and Balkh, at Damascus and Baghdad, and when we study the course of Eastern history at these characteristic centres, we find not unchangingness, but successive rises and declines of civilization. The movement may be slower, more interrupted, more violent and more unhappy than our development in the West, but one can recognize the essential kinship between the two. The truth is that civilization is a rare and peculiar phase of human life. The human race has existed for hundreds of thousands of years, but we have no evidence for the existence of civilized human societies longer than five or six thousand years ago. And the great majority of the tribes of men have stagnated or become extinct without ever attaining to civilization. All the civilized societies of to-day go back to a few small communities who raised themselves to an exceptional level through exceptional opportunities or natural endowments and were then enabled, by the civilization they had acquired, to be fruitful, multiply and replenish the earth. Civilization is in itself a bond between all peoples that possess it, however different the types of their civilization may be.

Comparing the course of Middle Eastern history with ours, we can at once see certain broad resemblances. Islam, as a social institution, is an Oriental equivalent of Christianity. Like Christianity it superseded a host of local cults that had formerly divided the cities and oases and tribes, by introducing a worship of one god open to all mankind; and this universal

religion was closely connected, as in our history, with the temporary establishment of a universal Empire. The Arab Caliphate of Damascus and Baghdad performed the same function as the Roman Empire at Rome and Constantinople; and when the Caliphate was overwhelmed, in the 11th and following centuries of our era, by barbarian invasions, Islam survived and preserved the continuity of Eastern civilization through the Dark Age, just as the Christian Church held society together in the 5th and following centuries when the Roman Empire collapsed in Europe. Of course, in contradiction to these broad resemblances; there are differences of detail and degree which, in the respective fortunes of our two civilizations, have made the difference between success and failure. The invaders who ruined Middle Eastern civilization were nomads from the central Asiatic steppes, and the destruction they did was far harder to repair than the mischief made by the Teutonic invaders of the Roman Empire. Even when, in the 15th and 16th centuries of our era, the East began to recover and comparatively stable Moslem states arose again in Turkey and Persia and Hindustan, the nomadic taint was in them and condemned them to sterility. If one reads the accounts given by the first English merchants and ambassadors who visited the Moghul court in India, one gets the impression not of a government administering a country, but of a horde of nomads exploiting it. The Moghul court was a vast camp moving over the face of the land and devouring the produce of one province after another like a swarm of locusts. Such predatory and parasitic empires could not last, and they have mostly given place to direct or indirect forms of European administration before the Middle Eastern World, exhausted by the Dark Age and its sequel, has had the chance of making a second experiment in reconstructing itself by its own efforts and in its own way.

II.—THE PENETRATION OF THE EAST BY EUROPE.

The penetration of the East by the nations of modern Europe began at the end of the 15th century of our era, at the moment when the Middle Eastern peoples were beginning to emerge from their Dark Age and were making their first native attempt at social and political revival. But these two new forces operating in the East, one internally and the other externally, did not balance or supplement each other. The internal movement would probably have failed even if

the external influence had not appeared on the scene. Certainly, Oriental reconstruction had no chance against Western penetration, and if one looks back over the last four centuries of Middle Eastern history, one sees how the native organizations have been replaced by or subordinated to the more powerful forms of organization imposed by Europeans. As we approach our own times, we find the tendency gathering momentum and extending its range. Till the close of the 18th century its operation was practically confined to India, and India might have been regarded as an exceptional region. The Moghul Monarchy was more exotic than the contemporary Monarchies of Persia and Turkey, and the task of reconstruction from within was made difficult by the mingling of different Oriental civilizations in India and by the numbers and density of the population. But the replacement of Moslem and Hindu governments in India by Portuguese, French and ultimately entirely by British ascendancy, though it is still by far the most striking example of the domination of the East by Europe, is now seen to be only the earliest and largest manifestation of a general process. For the century between the close of the Napoleonic Wars and the close of the recent European War (1815-1920) has witnessed not only the consolidation of the British Empire in India, but the establishment of French ascendancy (in various degrees) over Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, of Italian ascendancy over Tripoli, of British ascendancy over Egypt and the Sudan, of Russian ascendancy over the Caucasus and Central Asia, of Russo-British and latterly exclusively British ascendancy over Persia, while the Ottoman Empire—the last representative of the neo-Islamic monarchies that arose after the Middle Eastern Dark Age—has been cast into the melting-pot in consequence of its intervention in the European War. It is no exaggeration to say that the external action of Europe has been the most potent positive force in the Middle East during the last four centuries; that its influence over the destinies of the East has been increasing in something like geometrical progression; and that the only fresh native movements in the East that appear to have any future have either been inspired by contact with Europe or are re-actions against European penetration.

In proportion as this Western ascendancy has grown stronger, the Oriental peoples have become increasingly conscious of being in the grip of an irresistible and at the same time alien power and increasingly disturbed at their situation, while we, on the contrary, have taken our position in the East and our

relation to Orientals more and more for granted. And yet if one studies previous periods of Western ascendancy over the East, or even the general history of the ascendancy of races and civilizations over one another, one begins to feel that our own acceptance of the present position has less justification than the Orientals' uneasiness at it, because one realizes that the relation of the nations of modern Europe to their Oriental dependencies is abnormal or at least unprecedented.

Compare our present ascendancy with those earlier ascendancies of European over Oriental peoples that were established during the Ancient and the Mediæval phases of Western history. The Græco-Roman ascendancy over Western Asia, which lasted nearly a thousand years, from the conquests of Alexander to the fall of the Roman Empire, may serve as one illustration, the Crusader Principalities and Levantine dominions of the mediæval Italian republics as another. The first point we notice is that the European and Oriental countries, which in these cases were temporarily joined together under European administration, also adjoined one another geographically or at any rate were situated in the same climatic zone—a zone inhabited by a more or less homogeneous human stock. The difference of type between Western and Oriental civilization did indeed constitute a barrier, as it does now, but this was not heightened, as it is in our case, by barriers of distance, climate, and colour. When a modern European travels to one of the Oriental countries attached politically to his own, he leaves his home by sea and after a long voyage arrives at a country in a different latitude, with a different flora, fauna, and race of men. All the circumstances of the journey, great and small, combine to widen, instead of bridging, the gulf between the two civilizations. But when an ancient Greek or Roman travelled, say, from European Athens or Rome to Oriental Antioch and Alexandria, or when a mediæval English Crusader or Venetian merchant travelled (by land or coastwise) to Jerusalem and Cyprus and Krete, there was no point on their journey at which they would be conscious of a transition from one civilization to another, or at which, in other words, a break between East and West would suggest itself to their minds. There would neither be a sudden change in the appearance of country and people nor even an overwhelming difference between the extreme types at one end of the journey and the other. And, more important still, every century that these older Western ascendancies lasted, the differences did really diminish, for the same absence

of barriers which reassured the individual traveller led also to large permanent movements of population. The first thing Alexander did in each Oriental country he conquered was to found self-governing municipalities of Greek colonists, who incorporated, intermarried with, and assimilated the surrounding native population. Readers of the Books of Maccabees will remember how, within a century and a half of the first Greek conquest, even such stubborn Orientals as the Palestinian Jews were within an ace of succumbing to the charm of Greek institutions, and where the Jews barely resisted the more pliable Syrians and Anatolians were Graecised wholesale. On the other side the population of Greece and on a far larger scale, after the Roman conquests, that of Italy was crossed with an Oriental strain by the forced immigration of masses of Orientals as agricultural and industrial slaves—immigrants whose descendants rose in the world and recruited the Italian lower middle-class. During the last centuries of the Roman Empire the fusion had gone so far and so deep that the Western and Oriental peoples, linked together by this originally Western organization, produced a universal religion—Christianity—in which Western and Oriental elements are so mingled that it can only be regarded as the common expression of both civilizations. The emotional and intellectual rapprochement implied by the creation of Christianity is a contrast indeed to the mental barrier which still divides Englishmen and Indians, after four centuries of contact, almost as deeply as it did when first they encountered each other. The contrast between our position and that of the Crusaders and Venetians is less extreme, for these Mediæval Western empire-builders were already divided from their Eastern subjects by religion. But undoubtedly there was more intermixture of race, more assimilation in manner of life and thought, in the Latin Principalities in Syria (1097-1291, A.D.) or in the Venetian colony of Krete (1206-1669, A.D.) than there has been so far in French North Africa or British India. The true modern parallels to the ancient and mediæval cases just cited are Turkey (an Oriental ascendancy over Westerners) and the Russian Empire (a Western ascendancy over Orientals)—empires which are both situated on the land-bridge between Europe and Asia and whose Christian and Moslem subjects live next door to each other, do not differ too markedly in physique, and in some sense form a single society. In the Russian Empire of 1914 there were Tatar peasants, workmen, tradesmen and professionals domiciled in the heart of the Russian

provinces and there were Russian municipalities planted among the Oriental populations of Turkestan and as firmly rooted there (to all appearances even now) as were the ancient Greek colonies of Alexander the Great. But neither Russia nor Turkey were typical of the relations between modern Europe and the East. They were backward and reactionary, and as empires uniting Western and Oriental elements they have broken up as a result of the war. The problem of East and West will not be solved on this soil, but, if anywhere, in the trans-marine dependencies of Western powers such as the British Empire in India. And when we compare the roots of our dominion in India, or of the British and other European dominions in the various countries of the Middle East, with the roots of the ancient Greek and Roman dominion which lasted for a millennium in Western Asia, or with the roots of the modern Russian Empire in the Caucasus and Central Asia, we realize with a shock how external the character of our ascendancy is, how little assimilation there has been between us and our Oriental fellow-citizens. In the typical modern mixed empires the fusion of races (not to speak of religions) has hitherto been negligible. In Algeria French colonization has been a failure, in spite of the European climate and the white skins of the native population. In India the extreme difference of climate and colour has prevented any British colonization at all. Of course there are Eurasian half-breeds, but they are separated from the Europeans by almost as great a gulf as are the natives, and the Europeans themselves are only sojourners in the country. The Englishmen who have built up the material organization of modern India, and without whose intervention that organization would still break down, are not born or bred in India, do not bring up their children in India, and do not stay in India when they retire from work. Similarly, the native Indians who come to Europe come, for the most part, only as young men for a year or two's study. They, too, are sojourners, rarely able to enter intimately into the life of European society or to profit fully by their European experiences for their own life in India afterwards, and their acquaintance with European ideas and institutions inevitably remains superficial. In fact, in these European Empires in the East the two civilizations have so far remained completely external to each other, and there has been no physical or mental assimilation to lessen the division between the dominated and the dominating community.

III.—THE REACTION OF THE EAST TO EUROPE.

Nearly all the social and political movements that can be observed in the East to-day have in one sense or other been caused by the European penetration of the East discussed in the preceding section. To an Oriental this may seem a hard saying, and such generalizations are never more than approximately true, yet the "Western question" will in fact be found to be at the bottom of almost any modern Oriental movement we examine.

Take the Pan-Islamic movement as an extreme example. It is thoroughly un-European in outlook. It makes its followers tolerant where Westerners are intolerant, ignoring differences of colour, language and nationality so long as there is uniformity of religion; and it preaches intolerance where Westerners have learnt toleration long ago, for it stresses the division between one religion and another and regards hostility between their respective adherents as inevitable. Europeans who come into direct contact with Pan-Islamism—administrators and soldiers, for instance, in India or Africa—are apt to regard it as an aggressive manifestation of everything that is un-European in Oriental society. Un-European it certainly is, but it is so because it is anti-European, because it is a conscious negation of and revolt against the domination of the East by an alien civilization from outside. Pan-Islamism may take aggressive forms, but the essence of it is a defensive impulse. Its appeal is to fear, and if the fear of the West could be lifted from off the minds of the Oriental peoples, its main-spring would be gone.

Pan-Islamism, in fact, is a case of the herd-instinct which makes animals and human beings crowd together for mutual protection in face of a common danger and which also makes individual members of the herd sacrifice themselves that the herd may survive. It is the raw material of the social faculty, a rather primitive phase in which the bond of society is not internal cohesion but pressure from without, a kind of negative fraternity which only exists by virtue of a more powerful antipathy shared in common. There is an element of this in most group-feelings and loyalties; there is a very large element of it in the patriotism of the various nationalities of Europe; but to find any close parallel in our own history to Pan-Islamism, in which the sympathy and antipathy are determined not by nationality but by religious allegiance,

we have to go back to the early Middle Ages, when the relative positions of Islam and Christendom were reversed and Western civilization feared the ascendancy of the East as the East fears Western ascendancy now. If one studies European society in the 8th and 9th centuries of our era, one discovers Christian equivalents of modern Pan-Islamic tendencies. For example, Pan-Islamists, exasperated at their military and political impotence to resist Western power, look back regretfully to the days of the Caliphate, when the Middle East was united and strong. It is no consolation to them that the successors to the Caliph's title (the Osmanli Sultans of Turkey) should preserve a "spiritual" authority. They insist on their having temporal power and maintain that, in law and in fact, sufficient military and political power to protect the interests of Islam against all comers is the essence of the Caliphial office. Just in the same way the peoples of Christendom at bay against a host of Moslem and pagan enemies in the 8th century longed for the restoration of the invincible Roman Empire, and the Pope himself, whose "spiritual" authority in Western Europe was then almost unquestioned, actually brought about the reinauguration of a "Holy Roman Empire" (Christmas Day, 800 A.D.) in order that the Papacy and Christendom with it might be protected again, by the strong arm of a Cæsar, against their external assailants. Christendom came through her ordeal, and, as soon as she had space to breathe, the Pope and then one Christian community after another proceeded to repudiate the central authority which they had set over themselves in their hour of need. Similarly, if Islam began to breathe freely, the Pan-Islamic idea would doubtless lose its hold. But the break-up of Turkey, in consequence of her intervention in the War, has brought the "Western Question" to a head. The Sultan of Turkey is recognised by a majority of the Moslem world (though the dissenting minority is considerable) as the legitimate successor of the Caliphs or Commanders of the Faithful, that is, of the Arab sovereigns who succeeded to the headship of the community founded by Muhammad at Medina in the 7th century A.D., and who during the 7th, 8th and 9th centuries of our era were in fact the effective temporal and spiritual chiefs of the then Moslem world. In addition to this, Turkey was, at the outbreak of war, the only remaining Moslem state which kept up the semblance of being a "Great Power" and of playing an independent part in international politics, and the political

prestige of Turkey appealed even to those Moslems who did not recognize the Sultan's title to the Caliphate. The prospect, therefore, that Turkey, too, may fall under the control of the Western nations has caused profound disturbance among non-Turkish Moslems—except those who, like the Arabs, have been subject nationalities of the Turkish Empire and have fought before and during the War for their liberty, or those who, like the Egyptians, desire not the supremacy of a Caliph but national self-government. Such Moslems, however, are probably in a minority, and their attitude appeals to the educated few rather than to the ignorant masses of their co-religionists. As popular catchwords, "The Caliphate is being weakened" or "The last Moslem Power is being partitioned" are effective. This Pan-Islamic movement on behalf of Turkey has been most vigorous in India, and though it is never possible to estimate how far the programme of a political campaign represents the general feelings of a community, smoke means fire, and there is no doubt that the Pan-Islamic sentiment is widespread and genuine. It is a sentiment that naturally springs from the international situation, and one might almost have inferred its existence *a priori*, even if it had not been given voice by a party among the Moslems themselves.

This sentiment for the Turkish Caliphate and Empire is not based on reason. The title to the Caliphate is doubtful and contested; the Empire ceased to be a "Great Power" in 1774, when the Russian Government obtained by treaty a protectorate over Ottoman Christians, and since that date the Ottoman Empire has fallen successively under the control of one or another Western Power and has only prevented that control from being complete by playing off the Powers against one another. Again, the Ottoman Government has brought hardly less misery on its Moslem than on its Christian subjects. The Arab provinces of Turkey welcomed and assisted the Allied armies during the War, and the Turks themselves—at any rate the bulk of the nation constituted by the peasantry of Anatolia—have paid the heaviest price of all for the Ottoman Imperial tradition. They have died as conscripts in every rebellion of the non-Turkish provinces and in every foreign war, and they have recently been resisting by force the attempts of the Turkish Nationalist organization in the interior to call them to the colours again. But such arguments, though reasonable, do not appeal to the Pan-Islamic frame of mind. Pan-Islamism is too emotional, too defensive, too much

compacted of fear and hostility to take a reasonable view, and even if its leaders were convinced that the Turkish Empire was detrimental to its Moslem subjects, they would probably argue that the minority must be sacrificed for the good of the whole. When the herd is hard pressed it tramples on individuals, and the Khilafat Delegation, which came from India to lay the Pan-Islamic point of view about Turkey before the Peace Conference, did, in fact, put the restoration of the Turkish Sultan's authority over the Arab Moslems who had revolted against him in the forefront of their demands. Pan-Islamism cannot be met by argument, but only by altering the international situation which produces the Pan-Islamic spirit. When the mainsprings of fear and hate have been removed, the minds liberated from them will be open to reason. And clearly it is a world-interest of the highest importance that this should be brought about. For however much we may understand this state of mind, however inevitable in present circumstances we may recognize it to be, it is none the less true that fear and hostility are barren and destructive emotions, and that a sectional fraternity based on these emotions, however wide and genuine it may be, only leads to deeper cleavages and more disastrous conflicts between the great divisions of the human race.

IV.—THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEAGUE.

If Pan-Islamism were the only response to European penetration among the Middle Eastern peoples, the prospects of the League in the East would be bad, but happily this negative and reactionary movement is not the only one in the field. The "Western Question" has also stimulated Orientals to hold their own against the West in a more positive way, by borrowing from it the institutions from which its ascendancy is derived. Where narrower minds and more backward populations have taken refuge in aversion, the more advanced and more capable have sought knowledge and have entered on the path which has been followed with such remarkable results by Japan. The mention of Japan reminds us of the pitfalls. It is easy to mistake mere material technique or military organization for the underlying causes of the greatness of Western civilization, and even Orientals who look deeper and who realize that those causes are to be found in political, social, and ultimately in moral lines of development, do not always copy the best points in their models. The Parliamentary form of national self-government

has been tried in Turkey (unsuccessfully) in the middle of the nineteenth century, in Egypt (abortively) in the third quarter of the century, in Persia in 1906, in Turkey for the second time in 1908, and a first experiment in it is just being started in the provincial governments of India. Taken all in all, these attempts have hitherto been disappointing. There has been more nationalism than self-government, more parliamentarism than democracy. The party organization has remained almost entirely in the hands of the official and propertied classes, and it is significant that, especially in Persia, the ulema or Moslem clergy (a class not noted for liberalism) have taken a leading part. The mass of the people have had no share in the new self-government, and no doubt many of them are too backward politically to take one, but there is also a distinct tendency among the privileged classes to shut them out. In Egypt, for example, the upper class Nationalist Party apparently contemplates a restriction of the franchise, under the prospective constitutional government, to literates, who constitute no more than 15 per cent. of the population and certainly do not include all Egyptians capable of exercising the vote. It must be remembered that in countries employing the difficult Arabic script, literacy implies a higher standard of intellectual attainment than it does with us. Again, in adopting the European principle of national self-government Orientals have succumbed to the European vice of national chauvinism, and have carried it to lengths unapproached in Europe even since the war. The Turks, who have had the greatest opportunities for this inasmuch as they have been freer agents than their neighbours, have gone to the greatest lengths of all, and indulged in an orgy of "Turcification" as soon as the break-up of the Concert of Europe in 1914 gave them a completely free hand. Arabic, Persian and other alien elements were banished from the Turkish language; firms were ordered to keep their books in Turkish instead of French or the other customary languages of international commerce; foreign post-offices and schools were closed without regard to the advantage derived from them by private Ottoman citizens; and finally an organized attempt was made by the Central Government to exterminate the non-Turkish nationalities—Armenians and Greeks—in the northern half of the Empire. The history of this appalling crime need not be entered into here. We need only take note of two facts about it: first, that even in the predominantly Turkish provinces the artisan, shopkeeping and professional

classes were mainly Armenian and Greek, so that the destruction of these nationalities has ruined the Turkish provinces economically, and has largely destroyed the material foundations for a Turkish national state; and, secondly, that nationalism was the direct motive of the crime, on the supposition that a policy of eliminating all non-Turkish elements would make the Turkish nation and state stronger.

Thus the history of the nationality movement in the East, recent though it is, is full of failures and aberrations. But allowance must be made for the adverse circumstances against which the movement has had to contend. It has had to wrestle at home with legacies of corruption and bankruptcy, and has been crushed under the pressure of the "Western Question" during the inevitable stage of weakness and disorder which all revolutions entail. The Egyptian movement was arrested by the British occupation in 1882, the Persian by the armed intervention of Russia; after the Turkish Revolution of 1908, Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and then all the Balkan States together seized the opportunity to take toll from their neighbour. Turkey found herself almost continuously at war, and the deterioration of Young Turk policy, its passage from liberalism to chauvinism, was largely due to the disillusioning experiences of these foreign relations. By 1914 the transformation was complete; and it explains (though of course it does not excuse) the Turkish Government's intervention in the war and subsequent atrocities. Bad, then, though it is, the record of nationalism in the East should not make us despair of its future, and there are two facts about it which give ground for hope: it is strongest among the most vigorous and progressive Oriental peoples, and in certain cases it has already shown itself capable of overcoming the barriers of religion. Both points may be illustrated by a contrast between two of the Arab countries which have detached themselves from Turkey during the War. In the Arabian Peninsula there is no sign of an Arab national spirit; the immemorial tribal loyalties and feuds are in full vigour, and this though in language, way of life, and religion the population is homogeneous. But, as has been explained above in Section I, it is impossible to judge Middle Eastern civilization by the Arabian steppes, and if we turn to the nearest settled Arab country, Syria—a country divided internally by mountains, differences of economic life, and profound and numerous differences of religion—we find a genuine movement in favour of unity and self-government, in which highlanders and lowlanders, peasants

and townsmen, Moslems, Druses, Orthodox and even the Catholics are co-operating with one another. In Egypt, again, Moslems and Copts (the native Monophysite Christians) have a common political programme for which they are working together; and in India, since the beginning of the War, there has been something like a political entente between Moslems and Hindus. Now if men of different races and religions show themselves able to unite inside a country for the purpose of self-government, there is a strong presumption that this country, when its internal unity and liberty have been fully secured, will be capable of uniting freely with other countries in a League of Nations. The establishment of genuine national self-government in the East and the inclusion of the Oriental peoples in the League of Nations are closely connected.

Thus, the success of the movement for national self-government in the East is very important for the League, but past experience shows that the movement cannot succeed without assistance. Their own evil legacy from the past, the enhanced pressure of Western penetration during the stage of transition, and the lack of material and technical efficiency according to Western standards, make it virtually impossible for any Oriental people to reconstruct their life unaided. Japan's success is no argument to the contrary, for her large, homogeneous and comparatively advanced population and her remote island situation gave her exceptional opportunities. Nor is it true that Western technique can be dispensed with, for although material efficiency is not necessarily a criterion of civilization, it is an essential part of the equipment of an Oriental nation aspiring to become a fully qualified member of a world society in which, for good or evil, the main lines of international trade and finance are already organized on Western lines. If the East does not master Western technique, the West will go on exploiting the East economically, and from that, as we know, political exploitation inevitably follows. In fitting themselves, therefore, for full membership in the League of Nations, the Oriental peoples will need Western assistance, and the practical problem before the League is to discover satisfactory means by which this assistance can be provided. Two conditions have to be secured. This Western assistance must not give any opening for further political penetration, or in other words imperialism, on the part of the Western Powers; and secondly, the guarantees against this danger must be so strong and so obvious that Orientals will believe in them. Good-will on the part of the

assisted people is the most important condition of all if the assistance is to be profitable. But the consciousness of Western ascendancy, reinforced by the unjust advantage of it which the Western Powers have taken, has produced in the East a reactionary anti-European movement (that discussed in the preceding section). If the League of Nations were to offer assistance to those Oriental peoples that are aiming at national self-government in so suspicious a form as to incline them towards Pan-Islamism, its efforts would be worse than useless.

These considerations provide us with a test for judging the provision made for "mandates" in Oriental countries under Article XXII of the Covenant, the relevant paragraphs of which are the following:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be the principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

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In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be

exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council in all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

This concept of a "mandate" certainly marks a notable advance on the previous conceptions of the proper relationship between Western and Oriental peoples as expressed in legal terms. The most usual method of Western ascendancy has been annexation, the incorporation of an Oriental people body and soul in a Western State. During the latter part of the 19th century Western Empires invented the protectorate, under which the non-Western party remained a distinct and nominally even sovereign community bound to the protecting power by treaty alone. But the disparity of power between the two parties was so great that, in the absence of any third party or umpire, the interpretation rested wholly with the protecting power and the protectorate became little more than a hypocritical name for annexation outright. The mandate relationship does provide a safeguard against this by instituting a contract between three parties—not only the mandatory and mandated nations, but also the League—yet this safeguard, as provided for in the terms of Article XXII, is obviously insufficient. The annual reports which the mandatories are bound to render to the Council of the League through its Mandatory Commission are not enough to give the League effective control. For that, the Mandatory Commission will have to be in direct touch with the mandated countries through inspectors independent of the Mandatory, responsible to the Mandatory Commission alone, and possessing the widest powers of investigation into the affairs of the mandated territory. Since this is not provided for expressly in Article XXII, it ought to be insisted upon when, in accordance with the second paragraph from the end of the Article, "the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory" is "explicitly defined in each case by the Council."

The creation of a trained and public-spirited international inspectorate under the League is perfectly possible. The training might be connected with the projected international university, and young men of all nations—Indians, Egyptians, Syrians, Algerians as well as Frenchmen, Italians, Englishmen,

Americans, Dutchmen, Swiss and the other nationalities of West and East—who chose this career, would surely acquire by a common training and a common life-work the same *esprit de corps* that distinguishes the great national civil services of the various civilized countries.

But this proposal, arising out of the inadequacy of Article XXII of the Covenant, suggests another. If the League builds up an international inspectorate for mandated countries, why should it not ultimately dispense with mandates altogether, and employ its trained personnel for rendering direct assistance—whether advisory or administrative—to the countries that require it? Such direct assistance by the League without mandates, supposing the League had once acquired the means of rendering it effectively, would certainly be preferable in every respect to the mandate system at present provided for. The mandate system (an advance though it is) has one dangerous point in common with protectorates and annexations. Under it, as under these older relationships, Oriental countries will still be subjected to penetration by single Western Powers. The penetration may be temporary, limited in scope, controlled by the League, but the Oriental world—disillusioned, sensitive, and on the defensive—will find it difficult to distinguish between one form of Western ascendancy and another. Already, in the Arab countries just detached from Turkey, there is a feeling that frontiers are being traced and mandates assigned, not according to the wishes and interests of the inhabitants themselves, but to suit the economic and political requirements or to compromise between the rivalries of Great Britain and France. The feeling is not without justification, and even if there were no justification, the international situation would call such feelings into existence. This is the weak point in the mandatory system, and the situation would be greatly eased if that system were definitely declared provisional, and if Orientals could look forward to direct assistance by the League. Neither the League nor its staff will be exclusively Western or Oriental. Their members will be recruited from both civilizations, and for this reason, action by the League can do more to overcome the division between West and East than any other remedy. Here again, as so often, we come back to the League for the solution of a problem which cannot be solved otherwise and which constitutes, unsolved, a danger to the world.

Questionnaire on the League in the East.

SECTION I.—ORIENTAL AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION.

1. Why will the success or failure of the League among Eastern peoples be a test case of the League's power to influence international relations?
2. What is the fundamental difficulty which the League will have to face in applying its ideas and organization to the East?
3. What is meant by "the East"? What are the principal groups of Eastern peoples?
4. What is "the Western Question"?
5. Why is the idea that the East is "unchanging" wrong?
6. What are the broad resemblances between the course of history in the Middle East under Muhammadanism and the course of history in the West under Christianity?

SECTION II.—THE EUROPEAN PENETRATION OF THE EAST.

1. When did the penetration of the East by Europe begin and what has been its general course?
2. How does this process of penetration and European ascendancy over Eastern peoples compare with previous periods of such ascendancy in ancient and mediæval history?
3. What are the peculiar characteristics of the present relations of East and West which make the problem of bringing them together—which the League must face—particularly difficult?

SECTION III.—THE REACTION OF THE EAST TO EUROPE.

1. What in recent years has been the effect of Western penetration and ascendancy upon Eastern political, social, and national feeling?
2. What is the connection between the Pan-Islamic movement and Western penetration?
3. What is the connection between the Pan-Islamic movement and the Caliphate question?
4. How are the Pan-Islamic movement and Caliphate question a direct result of the pre-war system of international relations?
5. How do they complicate the difficulties of a peaceful international settlement of the Middle East?

SECTION IV.—THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEAGUE.

1. What other effects has the penetration of Europe had on the Middle East which make the prospects of applying the League idea to the East more hopeful?
2. What have been the strength and the weakness of the movements for applying Western institutions in Eastern countries?
3. How did the pre-war international system stand in the way of movements for national self-government in the East?
4. What is the assistance which the East requires in order to adapt itself to Western civilization?
5. How can the League, through its Mandate system, render the required assistance and make a peaceful and progressive settlement of the East possible?
6. How does the Mandate system proposed for the Middle East differ from the pre-war international system of relations between the East and Europe?
7. What are the chief points in which this Mandate system will require strengthening and development?

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