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The Coming Struggle for South Africa


SANDOR

THREE SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE

"SANDOR" is a South African who has to remain
anonymous owing to the provisions of the South African
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June, 1963.

I. Whose Victory?

BRTAIN'S policy towards South Africa is now wholly untenable. It is hypocritical and illogical for Mr. Patrick Wall, M.P., British delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Committee, to describe apartheid as 'morally abominable, intellectually grotesque and spiritually indefensible',¹ and to proceed from there to affirm the right to sell arms to the perpetrators of apartheid. But the issue is not limited to the sale of arms. Fundamental to the casuistry behind Mr. Wall's statement, is the British Government's paralysed indecisiveness as to where Britain's true interests really lie. On the one hand, South Africa is today a profitable trading partner and can apparently be relied upon to stay in the Western camp. On the other hand one can hardly supplement Mr. Wall's list of derogatory epithets by the words 'and a good and profitable friend of the West'. The classic Marxist would say, of course, that the addition of these words aptly sums up Britain's relations with South Africa. If this were really so, there would be less ambivalence shown by Britain's policy-makers.

Britain has considerable interests as well as responsibilities throughout Southern Africa. Nearly £1,000 million of British capital is invested in South Africa alone. Britain supplies nearly half of South Africa's imports (valued at nearly £150 millions annually), and is herself South Africa's best customer. Britain's lease of the Simonstown naval base arises from the belief that the Cape sea-route, and hence South Africa, are of vital strategic importance to the West. Clearly this would not be true in the event of nuclear war, but some believe that Simonstown might be important in a 'limited war'.

Britain has clear responsibilities, which she has hopelessly neglected in the past, for the three High Commission Territories—Swaziland, Basutoland and Bechuanaland—whose future depends considerably on what happens in South Africa. All of them are vulnerable, in different degrees, to economic and other pressures from South Africa, and indeed today are little more than economic appendages. As they advance to self-government and assume policies and economies of their own they are coming to be regarded by the Verwoerd government as potential threats, and by the South African resistance movements as likely bases for subversion against the Republic. Britain is already too deeply involved in these territories to be able simply to abandon them in the near future. Thus her dilemma in this area will increase and not diminish. Moreover Britain cannot hide her policy decisions: they will be watched closely and critically by the entire Afro-Asian world. Nor should one ignore the very real risk that the Commonwealth may face another crisis over South Africa.

The real issue before Britain hinges on a distinction between long and short-term interests, and between the static and the dynamic view. In the long run a country in the throes of revolution is neither a reliable trading partner nor a secure guardian of capital invested. In the long run Dr. Verwoerd's government, if it lasts long enough, might conceivably ensure an ultimate Communist victory; not because the Soviet bloc will step in and take over, but because indigenous communism, equipped with all the

¹ November, 1962.

techniques for underground revolution, will flourish and expand in the absence of any effective alternative.

Thus to have no coherent policy on one of the most inflammable international issues of the day cannot conceivably be regarded as acting in the national interest. The British government has been consistent only in its refusal to consider taking part in a programme of sanctions against South Africa. It has offered no alternative policy. Meanwhile the situation is not standing still. Inside South Africa a revolutionary resistance is building up. It views with growing despair and hostility the vacillations of the Western powers—and of Britain in particular as the source of the bulk of the government's imported arms, and the most outspoken opponent of international pressures. The independent African states are increasingly coming to the conclusion that Britain will act only when the alternative of inaction is worse—that is, when her trading interests are already so severely damaged that she has little more to lose.

Pressure for Sanctions

International pressures for sanctions against the government of South Africa are growing rapidly. Far from diminishing the pressure is likely to increase as the search goes on for ways of making sanctions more effective. There is no other subject upon which the nations of Africa and Asia are so completely united; and fully backing them are the countries of the Soviet bloc. For the Afro-Asians, the South African regime embodies the two cardinal wrongs of racial discrimination and alien rule. They are as bitterly opposed to apartheid as are the doctrinaire cold war warriors of East and West towards each other's regimes. But the opponents of apartheid have an important advantage: South Africa's white regime has no powerful ally willing to support it openly against its attackers. History is against those who uphold white rule in South Africa; even those nations which benefit from trading with the Republic do not support its internal policies. After the Sharpeville shooting in 1960, an Afrikaner nationalist paper, *Die Burger*, warned of the danger of South Africa becoming 'the pole-cat' of the world community. The warning has become the reality.

International feeling against South Africa has passed the point where it is considered enough to denounce apartheid. In November, 1962, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa, for the first time with a two thirds majority. This resolution asked member states to take the following measures against South Africa: to break off diplomatic relations; to close their ports to her ships; to prevent their own ships from entering her ports; to refrain from trading with her, including refusing to sell her arms and ammunition; and to refuse landing and passage facilities to her aircraft. The resolution also asked the Security Council to take appropriate action, including sanctions, to secure South Africa's compliance with Assembly resolutions; and to consider, if necessary, her expulsion from the United Nations. A Special Committee was established to keep South Africa's racial policies under review and to report back from time to time.

The resolution was adopted by 67 votes to 16, with 23 abstentions. Every independent African and Asian state voted in favour, with the exception of

the Central African Republic and Gabon, who were absent. Countries which abstained were Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Italy, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay and Venezuela. Britain voted against, along with the United States, France, Portugal, Spain, the 'white' Commonwealth, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey and, of course, South Africa herself. The United States justified its vote on the grounds that the resolution could not be carried out, and that to pass it as an ineffectual measure would only help to bring the U.N. into disrepute. The British delegate contented himself with a condemnation of South Africa's policies, adding in effect that sanctions were not the right way of dealing with the problem.

The resolution was admittedly not a sensible one. As it stands it cannot be effective. International sanctions cannot be undertaken in an uncoordinated fashion by individual nations acting separately. They must be directed to a specific political end, controlled to achieve it, and ended once the objective has been reached. The resolution ignores the realities of international power, and it makes no provision for the machinery needed to implement a programme of sanctions. Unless it has the support of all the major powers, the measures listed cannot be enforced, since a General Assembly resolution is not regarded as binding by countries which have not voted for it. The only international political authority which is in a position to enforce a United Nations decision and direct its implementation is the Security Council. Its action requires agreement between the major powers themselves.

Nevertheless, the U.N.'s special Apartheid Committee has held several meetings, the first of which was attended by the Secretary-General, U Thant. It has written to member governments asking what they intend to do about the measures envisaged in the resolution. The British government's reply, it is safe to predict, will almost certainly be entirely negative, not only as to intention but also as to attitude.

The Communist countries, on the other hand, are wholly committed on the South African question. Their interests happen to be served by identifying themselves openly with the revolutionary forces. There is nothing to inhibit them, as there was in the case of Algeria where Soviet concern to avoid an open rupture with France caused the Communists to equivocate throughout the F.L.N. revolt. Of all the African states, South Africa is the one to which the Marxist analysis and communist methods of struggle apply most closely, and the one most likely to develop the political forces which will accept them. It is also by far the richest prize on the African continent. The Communists have publicly committed themselves to international sanctions and privately offered money and arms for the conduct of revolution.

Race War Cannot be Isolated

But even though the 1962 U.N. resolution will not produce a programme of effective sanctions, the South African conflict will remain a burning international issue. As the frontiers of independent Africa approach the borders of South Africa, the weight of African solidarity will make itself felt by providing bases for revolution and channels for assistance. A race war in

South Africa cannot fail to involve the rest of the continent. And since the Communists are already committed it is bound to involve the rest of the world as well. The static objection that intervention in South Africa should logically entail intervention in other parts of the world—for example in Tibet, Kashmir, Mississippi or Hungary—will fall before the political *fact* that, unlike any of these, South Africa has no friend among the major powers which would dare support it against the combined hostility of the non-aligned world. Because the West is unable to act in the case of Tibet or Hungary is no reason for it to believe it can avoid commitment on the South African question.

A policy based on the hope that things will gradually 'sort themselves out' in South Africa is hopelessly unrealistic. There is no possibility of an alternative, less extremist, white government replacing Dr. Verwoerd's; and there is no hope of Dr. Verwoerd's policies succeeding in winning African co-operation. Thus the situation can only get worse. For Britain—and indeed for everybody else—there can be no escaping the challenge. Unless Britain formulates a consistent and clear-cut policy, she will simply be dragged into action or, what is even more to be feared, she will be pushed into the humiliation of providing one of the props underpinning the Verwoerd regime.

The resistance movements have already to some extent shaken the confidence of the white population in its ability to maintain the *status quo*; but without outside help they cannot hope to defeat the South African armed forces. Alone they can inflict terrible damage to life and property, but without allies they cannot win in an open fight. There is no doubt that they will get help from other African states and the Communist powers, and that they will win, partly as a result of physical struggle, partly through international political pressure. How soon they win, and what is left by the time they do, will depend to a considerable extent on how the international forces line up on the South African question, and how purposeful they are in supporting one side or the other.

What will be the price of victory in terms of crippled and embittered human beings, in terms of death and fear and atrocity, and which of the external forces will act most decisively to shorten the struggle and diminish its tragic consequences.

However, we do not know.

2. The Clash of Nationalisms

TWO South African political movements were born in the year 1912: the African National Congress and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party. The dynamic of twentieth century Africa was to ensure the head-on collision of the nationalisms carried in these two movements, both of them formed two years after the birth of the Union of South Africa itself. African nationalism was to become the most powerful continental political force. Unique to South Africa was the peculiar isolationism of Afrikaner

nationalism, which gave the South African struggle a dimension and a resonance unknown even in other settler areas of Africa. The story of South Africa since then is the struggle between nationalisms, rather than the familiar conflict between African nationalism and imperialist hegemony.

Today Afrikaner nationalism has the confidence and aggressiveness of the victor in the struggle, at the very moment that African nationalism elsewhere on the continent has transformed the relationship between Africa and the Colonial Powers. But the seeds of Afrikaner ascendancy in South Africa were planted by the terms of the settlement of Union and independence in 1910. Political power was then held by the minority white population. Though Coloureds (people of mixed blood) and some Asians and Africans had the vote in certain areas, they were of little political consequence. By granting independence to a minority in the belief that representative government would follow in due course, Britain ignored an axiom of politics: no minority voluntarily renounces a privileged position. So it has proved. Any political party which has proposed an extension of the franchise and a sharing of political power has forfeited all hope of political office in South Africa.

This was easily predictable. It is not a peculiarity of white South Africa that the electorate is essentially short-sighted, preferring privileges it can see to a theoretical long-term stability under a mixed or African government it can scarcely even conceive. All the promises of 1910 that the franchise would gradually be extended were destined, from the moment of independence, to be broken. The electorate has moved steadily to the right in an inexorable process set in train in 1910. Equally inevitably African demands have become more insistent, more militant, more frightening to the European minority, which in turn has strengthened its determination to preserve its threatened position. Increasingly, right-wing governments have been compelled, in the face of growing African opposition and European fear, to adopt more authoritarian methods.

A Police State

Today the Nationalist government has arbitrary power over individuals and organisations, their activities and their public utterances, which makes it a police state. If some sections of society do not feel the weight of these powers that is because they are not at present a threat to the status quo of white supremacy. But the African Congresses and the Communist Party having been banned, the Liberal Party is now in danger, and active members of the Progressive Party feel themselves threatened to the extent that they are able to make any real impact for radical change in the sources of political power.¹ The General Laws Amendment Act of April, 1963, gives the Minister of Justice powers to detain people convicted of certain political offences for indefinite periods; and the right to detain people 'for interrogation' for renewable periods of ninety days, until such time as they have, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Police, replied satisfactorily to all questions.

The victory of the Afrikaner people within the white oligarchy was ensured

¹ Both the Liberal and Progressive Parties stand for a non-racial voters' roll; but whereas the Progressives propose a qualified franchise, the Liberals stand for universal adult suffrage.

partly by the vigour of their nationalism and partly by their superior birth-rate, which gave them a majority over English-speaking whites by the mid-1940s. Today the Afrikaners make up just over 60 per cent of the white population.

Who Are the Afrikaners?

The Afrikaner nation is the only white nation to have evolved in Africa. It came into existence in South Africa, and has no roots anywhere else. Its character was formed by the circumstances of its birth in the small, defensive communities of trekkers, embattled to survive the isolation and danger of the unexplored African hinterland and its hostile peoples. Wars against the African were conducted from the 'laager'—a circle of ox-wagons enclosing the women, children and cattle and guarded by the men. The hated British could not be defeated; they could only be evaded by trekking further north into greater isolation and into deepening suspicion of everything but the trusted familiarity of the 'volk' itself. The nation was weaned on the glorification of heroic self-reliance pitted against the cultural and political persistence of the British and the numerical superiority of the Africans. The 'volk's' most important duty was self-preservation for the sake of the survival of Light and Civilisation and Christianity in a Dark, Barbaric and Pagan continent. The man who left the 'volk' was a traitor, for he left his place unguarded, a chink in the laager. The man who questioned the fundamentalist tenets of the Dutch Reformed Churches blasphemed and placed in jeopardy Divine favour for the whole nation.

All these ideas and feelings were incorporated into the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, which is more accurately described as the embodiment of the heritage of the people than as a political party. The Church, the party and the system of education became inseparable. Each was seen as an essential part in a destiny of struggle. The objective of the party as the instrument of the nation was the establishment of the Pure Afrikaner Republic, finally dissociated from the hated British imperialisms and undiluted either by what are called 'foreign, liberalistic ideologies' or by the 'paganism and barbarism of the African'.

In March 1963 an Afrikaans Church Journal, *Die Kerkblad*, published a list of 'enemies' against which, it said, the Afrikaner nation had to fight: 'Communism; Islam; the fraud of Roman Catholicism; the sickly sentimentalism and sensationalism of Methodism; the Liberalism which is like a cancerous growth in the Western world; materialism; education without dogma; Modernism and the false unifying of Churches at the expense of truth'.

In a speech made in April 1962 the Rev. H. L. C. Snijders, Moderator of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, expressed the Afrikaner's passionate sense of besieged isolation. Immigration was all very well, he said, 'but our loftiest ideal ought to remain . . . that the Afrikaans spirit should live in the future'. Although English was an official language which Afrikaners should know, the Afrikaans culture and tradition should always remain the most powerful force in South Africa. He 'heartily endorsed' the government's defence preparations, since 'we will have to protect ourselves. The sacrifices demanded of us will be great because we are a small nation . . . We have

only one homeland . . . and we dare not capitulate. Therefore we shall have to fight with our backs to the wall and, if need be, die for the country and the folk that is dear to us'. Praising the government's policy of mobilising manpower, he said: 'We are no aggressors, but the Boer nation has in the past given proof that it can become aggressive and can wage a life and death struggle with relentless, tough perseverance. We know no capitulation' (Cape Argus, 2.5.62.)

The sense of struggle becomes a sense of doom in a passionate outburst by the Administrator of the Cape, Mr. Nico Malan, on February 22 1963. Praising Dr. Verwoerd as 'one of outstanding statesmen of today', he said it was only a pity he had not been a citizen of one of the great nations of the world. 'The tragedy is that he is the citizen of a small nation of which it is doubtful whether its own children and its children's children will be able to exist in this beautiful country of ours'.

From this psychological background, Nationalist Party policy follows naturally. The political struggle against the local English was won in 1948 through the ballot box; and in 1960 by the declaration of the Republic. The cultural struggle is being waged through the education system—with its emphasis on separate languages and 'Christian National' education—and through censorship. Already parents have lost the right to send their children to the school of their choice, and the Provinces are losing their autonomy in educational matters. The Publications and Entertainments Bill provides a virtually unlimited formulation of what is an 'undesirable publication'. Though certain opposition newspapers continue to appear, it is because the government does not choose to act against them yet. Now that Afrikaner hegemony is in sight—on the statute book at any rate—the Prime Minister appealed to the English-speaking section of the white community to close ranks with the Afrikaner to preserve the existence of the Afrikaner Republic against his other traditional threat—the African.

The Theory of Apartheid

But the African, unlike the English South African, cannot be politically contained, because of his vast numerical superiority. So the theory of apartheid was devised. The alternative, political integration with the African, is a contradiction of the whole history and psychology of the 'volk'. But the Afrikaner understands the force of Nationalism. He knows the African will not be content to remain subject to the white man for all time. The only answer, as far as the Afrikaner is concerned, is the division of the country into 'black' and 'white' areas. The government-supporting Cape daily paper, *Die Burger*, wrote in a leading article on April 26, 1963: 'The Bantu's urge to freedom and self-government is a natural and just urge which can be guided but not destroyed. That it should degenerate into an urge to *baasskap* (domination) over the other nations in South Africa is a bitter fruit of the denial of the principle of a separate territorial freedom'.

But for electoral reasons South Africa cannot be divided in any just proportion between the country's different racial groups. Dr. Verwoerd's electoral support derives from his promise to preserve the privileged position of the Europeans; and they would not support him in a policy depriving them of three-quarters of 'their' country and much of the basis of their

standard of living. On the other hand, apartheid makes economic nonsense unless the country is divided in accordance with population ratios. The 'white areas'—87 per cent of the country—cannot preserve their present productiveness deprived of 80 per cent of their labour force; while the 'black areas' cannot support three-quarters of the country's population, deprived of the mineral, industrial and capital resources of the rest of the country. This is the dilemma of apartheid. Moral and humanitarian issues aside, it cannot succeed.

African Nationalism

African nationalism in South Africa, like Afrikaner nationalism, is the product of the interaction of different races. Africans in the Republic have achieved a much higher stake in the European's economic and cultural way of life than they have in any other part of the continent. Today only one-third live as rural peasants in the Reserves; the other two-thirds provide the labour force for the mines, industries and farms. Because South Africa is incomparably the richest African country, Africans there have a higher average standard of living than elsewhere. And since, South Africa is the greatest industrial complex in Africa, its workers—largely the Africans, Asians and Coloureds—have suffered all the diseases of a voiceless proletariat: overcrowding, unemployment, malnutrition, squalor. They have been able to taste the fruits of a materially rich society; they have had access to education; they have absorbed the standards of a bourgeois capitalist society. But those who live in the large urban locations are in daily contact with the worst aspects of 'Western civilisation'—sophisticated crime, individual greed, loss of community life, social disintegration and, above all, a vast disparity between the incomes of rich and poor. These are the classic ills of an industrial revolution in a capitalist society, but here aggravated by racial discrimination.

The result—or one of them—is a far more sophisticated attitude to politics than in other parts of Africa. The classic African nationalism and Pan-Africanism of the West Coast strikes a chord in the heart of every black South African. Yet for them that is only the most important part of a complicated story. In South Africa the struggle is not simply between Africans and an alien imperialist power: it is a civil war between the victims of a local oligarchy and the perpetrators of an indigenous tyranny. It is not the struggle of an African nation against a European power whose interests are no longer associated with political hegemony: it is the struggle of a politically voiceless people against their compatriots who dare not consider capitulation.

The result of these complexities in the African situation has been a lack of clarity and unity in the liberation movements. The simple charismatic 'Africanist' leadership of the west coast has not provided the answer in South Africa. Such a simple formula could not unite the diverse economic and political elements in the African population, even if its leader were allowed liberty of movement and action for any length of time, which is unlikely. Secondly the nature of South African society and the restrictive legislation make the task of organisation infinitely more complex and difficult than anywhere else on the continent: rousing calls to 'positive action' are

simply an invitation to police action. Thirdly the role of non-Africans in the struggle raises, in their most acute form, some difficult issues: can non-Africans participate effectively in an African nationalist movement; and what should be their relations with its leadership? Fourthly the Africans of South Africa have far more to lose by conflict with the authorities and until recently, far more to gain by keeping in with them, than Africans anywhere else. Finally, the degree of formal education and industrial experience have produced a sophisticated leadership, open to ideological differences of analysis and opinion.

Divisions in the Congresses

Both Communism and anti-Communism have, for example, taken deep root in South Africa. It is certainly the only country in Africa in which the Communist Party has a respectable number of educated convinced African members, and many informed and passionate African opponents. The reasons should be clear. The industrial aspects of the African's subservience make a classic class analysis of the situation more plausible in South Africa than elsewhere on the continent. European and other non-African Communists in South Africa have for the most part committed themselves staunchly to the struggle to overthrow white supremacy, being prepared to suffer every consequence of open dedication. Their actions, no less than their teachings, have contributed to the multi-racial attitudes of many of today's leaders of the African people.

At present the African movement is deeply divided chiefly on two questions. The first is the issue of the role of non-Africans in the struggle, the second the question of non-alignment. The African Nationalist Congress (A.N.C.) is allied with four other bodies, in all of which Communists have a considerable influence—the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. In 1958, the Pan-African Congress (P.A.C.) was formed as a result of a breakaway from the A.N.C. It claimed the A.N.C. was being dominated by non-Africans in the other Congresses, all of which are much smaller in membership. It claimed also that the Communists were subjecting the movement to doctrinal and tactical considerations deriving from cold war priorities rather than from local South African needs.

The P.A.C. responded by proposing a strictly 'Africanist' programme. Reacting against the A.N.C.'s system of 'alliance' with non-African groups, it went to the other extreme to reject in principle any non-African participation in the struggle. It is true that the leadership propounded the theory that other races had a part to play *within* their own racial groups, but it is also true that the P.A.C. message was understood by the mass of its followers as fairly straightforward anti-whiteism, and that it achieved much of its support for that reason. Reacting also to the cold war theories of the Communists they rejected any co-operation whatever with individual Communists.

Recent developments in the Congresses and prospects for the future will be dealt with in Chapter 5. It is enough here to describe the influences which have been reflected in the two Congresses. At present each mirrors an

important aspect of the struggle, and neither has been able to unite the liberation forces behind it.

Opposition Parties

Caught between entrenched Afrikaner nationalism and the rising passions of African nationalism lies the rest of South Africa's splintered opposition. The programme of the United Party, the official parliamentary opposition, is readily available. Its slogan, 'white leadership with justice', associated with proposals for a unique form of 'race federation'—based not on separate territorial units but on separate political institutions—offers an alternative to apartheid aimed at ensuring continued white supremacy. The Progressive and the Liberal Parties propose to abolish all racial discrimination in political and economic rights, the chief difference between them being the Progressives' insistence on a qualified franchise, a rigid constitution and a strongly entrenched Bill of Rights.

None of these parties has any hope of office as things stand. With slightly more than half the country's votes, the government party has two-thirds of the seats. At the last elections the Progressives and Liberals surprised many people by polling between them nearly ten per cent of the votes cast; but only one Progressive was elected. Their relative success in terms of votes cast, is explained by the fact that the elections were held shortly after the launching of the first campaign to boycott South African goods; and under the threat of expulsion from the Commonwealth. This led many whites to consider seriously whether their position in relation to the rest of the world was any longer tenable.

Since then, with the relative return of economic confidence and prosperity, and the apparent inability of the rest of the world to take effective action against South Africa, the swing has been once again to the right. The Liberal, Progressive and United Parties have all lost support to the right. Dr. Verwoerd has managed to restore his image with the majority of the electorate, English-speaking as well as Afrikaners, as the strong man who can protect them from overseas attack and local uprising alike. It is clear that no internal factor, other than revolution, can remove the Nationalist government. There is no effective growing point within the parliamentary framework.

3. Legislation for Starvation

THE chances of a revolution developing in South Africa depend largely on the effect of the government's efforts to implement apartheid and the kind of resistance movement which emerges from the present efforts to organise an underground struggle.

The Pass Laws and Bantustan legislation are the cornerstones of the apartheid programme. If South Africa is to be divided into 'black' and 'white'

areas, the problem must be tackled on two fronts. One is the removal of Africans from the 'white' areas. In practice, since this cannot be achieved immediately without destroying the 'white' economy, it means denying the African any permanent stake in the 'white' areas, and making him a migrant worker until his labour is no longer needed. In the government's own words, the African must be regarded as a 'temporary sojourner' in 'white' South Africa. The attitude is well summed up in a speech made by the Hon. Mr. M. C. Botha, Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development on August 30, 1962. The crux of the speech is contained in this sentence: 'It is . . . the duty of every official entrusted with the task of Bantu Administration assiduously to apply the basic principle . . . that the Bantu stay in the white areas can be justified only by the need for his services there.'

The other leg of the apartheid policy is the development of the Reserves so that they can support an even larger African population. There is no intention of increasing the amount of land held by Africans. The existing division into 'black' and 'white' areas would be maintained. Dr. Verwoerd firmly told a questioner in the House of Assembly on March 16, 1963. In theory these two legs of the apartheid policy should march in step.

The Economy of the Reserves

The combined area of the 110 African Reserves—some of them no more than pockets of land surrounded by European farms or bordering on urban areas—constitutes 13 per cent of the area of South Africa. They contain none of the Union's known mineral resources, none of its major commercial or industrial centres, none of its ports. Originally they included some of the richest farming land in the country; but generations of over-crowding, poor farming and neglect have produced serious soil erosion and a steadily declining fertility.

According to the 1960 census only 3 per cent of all adult male Africans are engaged as peasant farmers in the Reserves, but some 30 per cent of the African population lives in the Reserves. In 1950 the government appointed a Commission, under the chairmanship of Professor F. R. Tomlinson, to produce a 'comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas . . .' The Report was presented in 1955 in 18 volumes. The Commissioners went outside their terms of reference to argue the case for the establishment of complete separation between European and Bantu areas as the only alternative to full integration. Their report points out that by the year 2,000 A.D. South Africa will contain between 5 and 6 million whites and 21 million Africans; and that unless something is done about it, 17 million Africans will be working in the 'European' areas. This, in the Commission's opinion, would be inconsistent with the survival of the European population as a separate racial entity.

But despite its convictions, the Report was not able to present a plan for complete separation. Instead it recommended certain urgent measures to reverse the present trend to integration, with the implication that this is the best that can be done. These measures would ensure that by the end of the century 15 million Africans would be accommodated in the Reserves; while

the 'white' areas would carry 6 million Europeans, 6.5 million Africans, nearly 4 million Coloureds and 1.4 million Asians. Thus in the 'white' areas the Europeans would still be outnumbered by two to one: it would still be necessary for them to face all the problems of a plural society which they are attempting to avoid through the apartheid policy.

To achieve this rather limited objective, what would have to be done? The Commission estimated that £104 million would have to be spent in the first ten years, mainly on agricultural development and establishment of industry. About half the population of the Reserves would have to be removed from the land in order to rehabilitate it and establish economically viable farming units. Alternative means of livelihood would have to be found, not only for the 2½ million people who would have to be removed, but for the other millions now working in the 'white' areas, who would be required to make their home in the Reserves. Over a hundred towns and cities would have to be established in the Bantu areas. There would have to be a crash programme of education and particularly agricultural training. These recommendations are based upon two assumptions: that the three British High Commission Territories would be included in the land made available for Bantu settlement; and that 'white' capital would be available for the development of industrial and other tertiary economic activities. The first has proved politically impossible; the second was rejected by the government on ideological grounds.

The average sum spent during the last seven years on the Reserves has been less than £4 m. a year, as opposed to over £10 m. recommended by Tomlinson. A five-year plan was announced this year to cost £57 m. But of this sum, £38 m.—two-thirds—will be spent only on housing the surplus population removed from their land in the Reserves. Irrigation, by contrast, will absorb £3.5 m.; forestry, £4.5 m.; water conservation, £2 m.; and fencing, £4 m. The South African Budget for 1963/4 makes provision for the expenditure of £9 m. on the Reserves. This is about 2 per cent of the budget; and if one subtracts the figures for pensions and schools, one per cent of the budget will be spent on economic development. This may be compared with 16 per cent budgeted for South Africa's defence.

As a substitute for European capital for industrial development in the Reserves, the government has a plan for 'Border industries'. This is a scheme to induce white industrialists to establish themselves on the borders of the Reserves to provide some local employment. As an inducement to such industry the government promises to allow a lower wage structure than in the rest of the country, to provide housing and basic services, and to give income tax concessions and tariff protection. A recent report of the permanent Committee on the Location of Industry said that 18,000 new jobs had been created in 1962, compared with 12,000 the year before. The government's target is 24,000 new jobs a year.

It is clear that the present rate of advance does not approach even the limited recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission. Housing for workers in the 'border industries' absorbs by far the largest sums of such capital as is made available for the Reserves. The 'border industries' themselves will virtually ensure that industry will not develop inside the Reserves themselves.

The vast majority of the residents of the 'rural villages' will remain dependent upon remittances sent home by migrant workers in the 'white' areas.

Bantustans 'Self-government'

That being so, perhaps one should be grateful that the 'self-government' proposed for the Bantustans is a facade rather than a reality. Were these territories indeed to be cut loose with an economic problems of insoluble proportions their future might be even blacker than it is. Six Bantustans already have territorial Authorities, the bodies which are intended to rule them. They are the Transkei, the Ciskei, the Tswana, the Lebowa, the Venda and the Mashangana, the first two in the Cape Province, the others in the Transvaal. Only the Transkei so far has a 'self-government' constitution. From this constitution we must judge the South African government's intentions for the political development of the Bantustans.

The Transkei will have a Legislative Assembly of 109 members, of which 64 will be Chiefs or Paramount Chiefs, and the other 45 elected by the votes of all Transkeian citizens, whether they live in the Transkei or not. The Cabinet is to be elected from the assembly, and there is provision for up to ten ministers. The assembly is thus to contain a majority of chiefs, whose position depends ultimately on the South African Government. The Parliament in Capetown will retain control over *inter alia*, defence, external affairs, currency, public loans and banking, the entry and control of police forces of the Republic charged with the maintenance of internal security, immigration, and the Transkeian constitution.

The Transkei Assembly is gradually to assume control of its budget; such personnel in the police as may be transferred to its service; education, welfare, agriculture, land settlement; and control of magistrates and inferior courts dealing with matters affecting Africans only. One of the most disturbing aspects of this constitution is the extent to which it concentrates power in the hands of the small oligarchy of chiefs. Even the magistrates are to be appointed by the Civil Service Commission, itself a creation of the Transkei Assembly. But perhaps the fundamental constitutional reality of the Transkei's 'independence' is that all the laws passed by the Assembly require the South African President's assent; and that for the fulfilment of every one of the functions within its jurisdiction the Transkei Assembly will be economically dependent upon the South African Treasury.

This Constitution was accepted by the Transkei Territorial Assembly in December, 1962, against strenuous opposition from Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo of the Tembu people and two lesser chiefs. It was supported by the chairman of the Assembly Chief Kaiser Matanzima, a government-designated chief. Sabata's opposition rests mainly on two principles denied in the constitution. He seeks a majority of elected members in the Assembly—a proposal defeated by only five votes when the Transkei assembly discussed the constitution. And he wants the establishment of a multi-racial society in the Transkei. Matanzima on the other hand, rigidly upholds the government's doctrine of a black racialism for the Transkei.

The South African government knows that it may have created a

Frankenstein monster. Already Chief Matanzima has demanded the incorporation of virtually the whole of Natal into the Transkei; and has given notice that he intends to abolish the Bantu Education system in the territory. But for the moment the Transkei is much too weak to make anything like an effective standing against the government. What it may well do is to make it clear that the Bantustans cannot work without force.

Means of Enforcement

For there is no sign that the opposition to the Transkei constitution is declining. Since 1960 the territory has been ruled under a State of Emergency in the form of the now infamous 'Proclamation No. 400'. Under it, the following offences are punishable by a £300 fine or three years in prison: calling, addressing or attending a 'meeting' (defined as any gathering at which 'more than ten natives are present at one time'), unless they have a permit from the government; entering or remaining in the Transkei if one is not a resident; failing to report the presence of anyone known to be or 'suspected of being' in the territory without a permit; or making any statement which is likely to have the effect of subverting 'the authority of the State, of a Native Commissioner, or any officer in the employ of the state or of any chief or headman'. Under the Proclamation any chief authorised by the Minister may order any African to remove himself and his household to any other place and may demolish his dwelling. Failure to comply with such an order carries the same penalties. In case anyone should question the validity of all this, 'no interdict or other legal process shall issue for the stay of any order, decision or direction made under the regulations'. Proclamation 400 remains in force: in answer to a question in Parliament in February this year, the Minister of Bantu Administration said there was no intention of lifting it.

These are the circumstances in which Transkei 'self-government' has been born. If the success of the Bantustan policy is the first article in the government's faith in apartheid, developments in the Transkei must break or justify that policy. If the Transkei experiment fails, apartheid lies in ruins. The government meanwhile continues to push ahead with what it calls 'the negative side' of apartheid. The instrument here is the complex web of the Pass Laws, embodied mainly in about six Acts.

'Negative' Apartheid

The Pass Laws, which had their origin in legislation passed long before the Nationalist government came to power, were designed to control the movement of Africans into the 'white' urban areas. The present government has tailored them specifically to remove from the African any *right* to be in an urban area, and to refuse him the conditions for a stable settled life in the 'white' areas. This is not a by-product of apartheid: it is its stated aim. At present this means defining in detail the conditions an African must fulfil to be allowed to live and work in a 'prescribed area'—in practice virtually all urban areas. The conditions are numerous and complex. It is worth detailing the most important; for it is these conditions which determine the lives and livelihoods of every African man, woman and child.

No African has the right to a work-seeker's permit in an urban area unless:

- (1) He has lived there continuously since birth.
- (2) He has worked there continuously for one employer for ten years, or has been there continuously and lawfully for fifteen years.
- (3) He or she is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under eighteen of an African falling into the classes mentioned above and ordinarily resides with him.
- (4) He has been granted a permit to remain there.

BUT if an African having these qualifications becomes unemployed, for any reason, whether through retrenchment, dismissal or illness, he must report *within 72 hours* to the labour bureau. If he fails to do so, he is immediately 'endorsed out' of the area, which means he has forfeited his right to seek work there. If he does report, he is given two weeks in which to find a new job after which he *may* be 'endorsed out'. After a month of such unemployment he *must* be 'endorsed out'. Twenty-six thousand Africans were 'endorsed out' of Capetown between 1955 and 1960. From Alexandra Township in Johannesburg, 43,000 out of a total population of 93,000 have been forced out in the last five years. In May the decision was announced that all family accommodation there will be 'eliminated', and residence will be 'restricted to single Africans, including women domestic servants, to be housed in 8 hostels of 2,500 beds each' (S.A. Institute of Race Relations 55/63).

Once an African takes employment however briefly elsewhere than in the town for which he 'qualifies', he loses his qualification. Thus Jack B., a family man born in Capetown, took a job over Christmas with a building firm in Paarl, because his own firm had retrenched for the holiday. When he returned he was 'endorsed out' of Capetown for having broken his record of continuous employment in Capetown.

An African wife may live with her husband in a town if he has established his 'qualifications'. But to do so she must be able to prove that she ordinarily and lawfully resides with him. Since African men are increasingly only being allowed to seek work in a town provided they take accommodation in the so-called 'batchelor' quarters, it is often impossible for their wives to establish 'ordinary' residence with them. Nor may a wife be with her husband for the period he is establishing his 'qualifications'. She may visit him for periods of up to seventy-two hours without permission, though if she is picked up in town it is up to her to prove she has not been there for longer than seventy-two hours. Special extensions of the seventy-two hours regulation may be granted for women who wish to conceive.

Direction of Labour

The present Pass Laws may come to be regarded as relatively humane, if the new Bantu Laws Amendment Bill becomes law. The Bill was announced by the Minister of Information, Mr. Waring, who described its purpose as being 'to reduce friction', and 'promote healthy race relations'. He said it was 'aimed at preventing Bantu being criminally prosecuted for offences of

an . . . administrative nature'; and that the accent was on 'resettling people, especially surplus Bantu, in the Bantu homelands'. He confessed later that he had not himself read the Bill before giving the Press conference. At the time of writing the Bill is before Parliament.

Amendments are proposed to nine existing Acts. These are some of the new provisions:

No African, *whatever his previous 'qualifications'* is automatically entitled to seek work in any 'prescribed' area. Every African will require permission to enter *and remain* in employment. That permission may be refused or revoked if:

1. The employment is of a class in respect of which the Minister has laid down that no Africans may enter contracts of service.
2. The work is to be performed in an area in which the Minister has decided that no further Africans may be employed.
3. The Minister has determined a maximum number of Africans who may be employed in any particular class of work, and the maximum has been reached.
4. The Minister has decided that the number of Africans in the area concerned exceeds the reasonable labour requirements, and if the African concerned is on a list of names of people the local authority thinks should be removed, he will be ordered to leave.
5. The African concerned comes from a labour source (i.e. an area) from which the Minister has decided no more labour is to be recruited for the prescribed areas.
6. It is deemed not to be in the interests either of the employer or the employed or the public interest that the contract of service shall continue.

The only advantage an African born in a 'prescribed' area has over others is that he will be removed only after the others who are 'surplus' have left.

Local authorities are to lose their right to allow African women to visit their husbands for longer than seventy-two hours. Workers who visit their wives in the Reserves will lose their right to return to their work in urban areas. Women have to fulfill most of the conditions which apply to men in order to be admitted to an urban area. Work-seeking permits will no longer be issued. Africans will be given the right to take up a certain class of employment with a certain employer, and permission to work there will lapse when that employment ceases. No married quarters may be provided by any employer except with express permission. The Minister's *personal* permission is required for any African to be self-employed, as a casual labourer, pedlar or hawker, or as an independent contractor.

The Bill makes provision for the establishment of 'depots' for adults and 'youth centres' for juveniles, and requires that any African not in employment may be accommodated in one of these. Africans arrested for or convicted under one of the Urban Areas Acts or Labour Regulations may be detained in a depot or youth centre instead of a prison. The Bantu Affairs Commissioners may hold courts at such depots. Appeal against any decisions lies only to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of the area concerned. The definitions of 'idleness' and 'undesirable' are considerably widened, and

provide several new grounds upon which an African may be removed from a prescribed area.

These are some of the provisions of a Bill which can only be described as a device for establishing a system of direction of labour. If it becomes law no African will take a job unless the authorities sanction it. It will remove the last vestiges of security from Africans employed in the urban areas. It will allow the government to determine the supply and distribution of labour to all parts of the country. No African's job will be safe from a Ministerial decree. African residential and employment rights will be linked entirely to the labour needs of the 'white' economy. Alternative sources of employment will not be a relevant factor. Yet the incapacity of the Bantustans to cope with 'surplus' Africans remains a glaring and incontrovertible fact.

4. The Economic Outlook

IN 1920, 40 per cent of the African adult male population of South Africa was classified as peasant farmers in the Reserves. In 1960 the figure was 3 per cent. The urban African population today is over 4 millions. The structure of the mining industry makes it wholly dependent upon African labour. Seventeen per cent of skilled work, 66 per cent of semi-skilled and nearly all the unskilled work in industry is performed by Africans, Coloureds or Asians.

To try to reverse this trend would appear to be impossible. It is nevertheless the stated aim of government policy. In addition to the direction of labour through the Pass Laws, the government has adopted three subsidiary lines of action. The establishment of 'border industries' is really a device for decentralising industry within the 'white' economy in order that the workers so employed shall not *settle* in the 'white' areas. It is not intended to give the Africans their 'own' industry. In terms of government doctrine it is a temporary expedient. The effect upon the African worker is to reduce his bargaining position by forcing him into a convenient labour pool.

Second, Africans are not allowed to operate effective trade unions. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act they are excluded from the definition of 'an employee'; and all negotiations on behalf of Africans is done by the Department of Labour. Strikes by Africans are illegal. African trade unions *per se* are not illegal, and several in fact exist. But the operation of the Pass Laws, the arbitrary powers placed in the hands of local authorities, the wide definition of an 'undesirable' African and the laws of trespass are invoked against any trade union official who performs his functions effectively. Among the casualties of African trade unionism are some of South Africa's unsung heroes.¹

The third, and perhaps the crudest measure of all, is the Job Reservation

¹ For a full analysis of trade unionism see Horrell *South African Trade Unionism*, published by S.A. Institute of Race Relations; and Doxy: *The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa*.

Act, which gives the Minister of Labour the right to determine by decree that any class of job shall be filled only by members of a certain race, or to lay down a category of work in which not more than a certain proportion of workers may belong to a particular racial group. The object is to squeeze the Africans out of the lowest grades of work, making them 'redundant' in the 'white' economy, and forcing other racial groups to take their place. For example, only whites may be employed as firemen and traffic policemen above the rank of constable in the Capetown area, as liftmen in certain types of building in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Bloemfontein, or as skilled workers in the building industry in the Transvaal and the Free State. These are three of the twelve Determinations gazetted by the end of 1962. Few gain by this law, except white workers who have found it hard to compete for 'white' jobs in the past.

Colour Bar Effect

The inhibiting effect of the industrial colour bar on the efficiency and rate of growth of the South African economy has been remarked by economists from the 1920's onwards. The truth is that periods of expansion have been marked by a *de facto* breakdown in the colour bar—Africans, Asians and Coloureds in fact being employed in skilled work which is theoretically the preserve of the white worker. What is needed now is a serious study of the recent effects of the government's newest and most determined measures to reverse this process. The state of a country's gold reserves is no criterion of the rate of expansion of the economy, particularly in a gold producing country like South Africa; nor indeed are the figures of white immigration to a country whose laws inevitably produce a chronic shortage of skilled (i.e. white) labour. The Gold Reserves have risen to nearly £250 m. from £75 m. in June 1961; and nearly 21,000 immigrants gave the country a net population gain of some 11,000 in 1962—a record under this government. Figures like these have given a wholly illusory impression of restored confidence and economic activity. It is worth looking at a number of other indices of economic activity.

In January 1963 the report of the 'Froneman Committee' on 'foreign Bantu' was presented to Parliament. It contained the startling estimate that there are 505,000 black South Africans unemployed. That is about 10 per cent of the total labour force, and about 14 per cent of the African labour force. The government has always claimed that unemployment in South Africa is negligible. The fact that the Committee published its estimate is explained by the context: it was concerned to make the case for excluding 'foreign Bantu'. Of these the Report said there were some 800,000 in South Africa, 186,000 of them women and children. If South Africa's 505,000 unemployed were to replace them, the country would need only 144,000 'foreigners'. The Committee's recommendations for the exclusion of 'foreign Bantu' though important, do not concern us here. The striking fact is the figure given for South African unemployment.

The 1962 report of the merchant bank, Union Acceptances, contained these words by its Chairman, Mr. Sidney Spiro: 'Consumption *per capita* at the end of 1961, adjusted for falling money values, was actually lower than it was in 1956; and the greatest impact was taken in the durable field

—a sector on which fixed investment depends considerably. It is hardly surprising that private investment should have stagnated when the total consumer market actually contracted'. In 1962 the economy recovered slightly to show a rise in the real *per capita* income of 1.7 per cent. But the continued rise in the liquidity of the banks gave more evidence of the sluggishness of the economy. There was a heavy decline in loans and advances, and a record volume of money lying idle in the banks. The liquid assets ratio reached 53.6 per cent. These are some of the signs of a long-term decline in the rate of growth of South Africa's economy. It is not a post-Sharpville phenomenon.

Decline of the Internal Market

At the root of the decline lies South Africa's failure to develop an internal market. Between the years 1946/7 and 1960/1, African earnings rose by 11 per cent, and European earnings by 35 per cent. This means that the average African today receives £17.5 more per year than he did in 1946; while a European gets £257 more than in 1946. The average African earnings in 1961 were £182.5. In the ten years to 1948 African earnings rose to the level of a quarter of European earnings. But by 1956 the ratio had fallen again to below what it was in 1938. In an article in the South African Journal of Economics in June 1962, Professor W. R. J. Steenkamp, Chairman of the Wage Board, said that, with a few exceptions, the real wages of Africans in the main urban centres, declined in the 1950's.

The failure of Africans to share in the rising prosperity of South Africa is the result of the industrial colour bar, the denial of trade union rights and the pass laws. The total effect is 'dire poverty among African families, underfed and therefore inefficient labour, untrained and unused skills, and an anaemic consumer market.' ("Financial Mail," November 9, 1962.) A report (No. 172) of the Council for Social and Industrial Research showed that half the African families in the main urban centres live below the poverty datum line. In Johannesburg, where the minimum required to sustain a family of five was estimated at £23 per month in 1959, the average *family* income is still less than £17 per month. In Capetown it is estimated that a third of the Coloured families and eighty per cent of the African families live below the poverty datum line.

Opening the 1963 Rand Easter Show, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer declared: 'It is only the European group in South Africa which has, as a whole, retained a reasonable standard of living.' The poverty of the African masses, he said, was the reason for the poor rate of expansion of the South African economy. It is not surprising that industrialists in South Africa are second only to the Africans themselves in demanding a rise in African wages.

Malnutrition

The level of African earnings means that the incidence of malnutrition diseases in parts of South Africa is the highest recorded in the world. The infant mortality rate in the Port Elizabeth Divisional Area in 1961 was

480 per thousand live births: nearly half the babies born there died before they were a year old. Reporting the figure, the area's M.o.H. explained that the rate had doubled in the previous year.¹ In the eight main urban centres alone—there are no statistics for the rural areas—10,000 babies die every year from the deficiency disease of kwashiorkor. So serious were the manifest signs of poverty and malnutrition that a Conference on Poverty was called in Capetown in 1962. Doctors there described the situation as 'a severe crisis in child health', which needed immediate national action. African children die at twenty-five times the rate of white children between the ages of one and four. An average of forty children are taken each day to one children's hospital in Capetown in the last stages of gastro-enteritis. At the same hospital fifty-four per cent of the attendances show signs of severe malnutrition, rickets, tuberculosis or serious weight deficiency.

Alarmed by evidence of poverty and malnutrition which came to light through isolated medical and social services, the 'Rand Daily Mail' undertook an inquiry and published the results in October 1962. Here are some of the facts it brought to light, all of them checked and confirmed with the relevant authorities before publication:

Fifty-seven per cent of Africans die before they reach five years; the equivalent figure for whites is five per cent. In a Port Elizabeth hospital an average of fifty children died each month from kwashiorkor. Fifty-four per cent of Capetown's Coloured children are underweight as a result of malnutrition. Tuberculosis is spreading at the rate of 160 new cases every day. A National Nutrition Research Institute survey showed that 22 per cent of all child patients suffered from malnutrition diseases. A University of Natal survey found signs of malnutrition in every one of 240 African workers they visited; they were earning £10 a month. A foundry reported a forty per cent rise in production within four months of starting a scheme to provide meals for its workers; a bus company gave out free soup and found absenteeism dropped by half.

The 'Rand Daily Mail' survey also brought to light conditions in several Reserves which had been badly hit by drought—a ten-fold increase in the incidence of pallagra, 15,000 others on the verge of starvation and so on. These reports were greeted by the Minister of Bantu Administration as 'unfavourable and distorted'. He added that such malnutrition as existed was due to 'wrong eating habits'. The reply from Dr. O. Marthiny, a director of the Nutrition Corporation put the problem in its true perspective. 'The Reserves today are places where women, children and the aged live, depending on money sent home by their menfolk. But wages in the cities and on the farms make it impossible for them to support their families . . . Eighty per cent of all labourers on the Reef are themselves malnourished.'

There is no doubt that the African standard of living, far from rising, is declining in South Africa. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act, if passed, will be the logical conclusion of a process which can only accelerate that

¹ The infant mortality rates for certain other countries, as recorded in the 1960 U.N. Demographic Year Book are: India 185; Egypt 141, Ghana 90, Nigeria 96.

decline. It will finally deny to Africans the right to work in any but the least profitable jobs in the 'white' economy; while the direction of labour will put an end to any organised attempt to raise wages in these categories of work. The government's past record provides no ground for confidence in its own machinery to raise African wages. The Reserves, meanwhile, cannot conceivably replace the 'white' economy as a source of earnings and therefore of purchasing power.

Economic Capacity

It seems, then that South Africa's economy will not recover anything like its full potential until the attempt at apartheid is abandoned. But before we conclude that the government must therefore be brought down by the weight of economic evidence and the force of economic laws, certain other factors have to be considered.

The first is that apartheid could not be implemented under boom conditions. The administrative machinery required to remove Africans from industrial areas which were crying out for their labour would be overwhelming; and the machinery itself would be overwhelmed. The demand for labour would strengthen the African trade unions. In a declining economy, the unemployed are more easily 'endorsed out', labour can be more easily directed. Workers are more amenable if they know that to lose a job means to lose one's right to seek another and so to provide for one's family. From Dr. Verwoerd's point of view there is a lot to be said for an economy which is not too buoyant—provided that his voters can be kept happy. Nor is that very difficult, since they consist largely of Afrikaner workers in the cities, protected by the Job Reservation Act, and farmers whose supply of labour is protected by restricting the right of Africans to work in the towns.

What about South Africa's economic position in relation to the rest of the world? Up to 1959 her exports other than of gold paid for about half her imports. Gold exports covered the gap, usually with little to spare. But 'invisible' imports turned this favourable trade balance into an unfavourable balance on current account. This deficit was in turn covered over the years by a net import of capital.

Today the position is less vulnerable. Exports other than gold (£480 million) now pay for about four-fifths of imports, while the output of gold has risen steeply: it will probably reach nearly £300 million this year. While this continues, South Africa is assured of a favourable balance on foreign account, particularly since imports are quickly responsive to controls. Even a comparatively large flight of capital, supposing exchange controls were lifted, could be borne if the trading picture continues as rosy as it is. It is true that a flight of capital would have serious psychological effects upon confidence and hence expansion. But internal savings could be mobilised on a considerable scale for development.

Indeed this is already being done. Last year several major new expansion projects were announced. The most spectacular of these will be the harnessing of the Orange River for irrigation and hydro-electric power, a project costing £225 million. In addition £1,000 million is planned for spending mainly on expanding the three giant government corporations—ISCOR for

iron and steel, SASOL for making oil from coal, and the Electricity Supply Commission. There is no doubt that capital on this scale can be raised internally and will inject new life into the economy.

There is also no doubt that it will require considerable African labour, and hence produce some relief from the increasing embarrassment of African unemployed. To Opposition claims that this will be incompatible with the government's apartheid policies, the reply is that migrant labour will be available from the Reserves for as long as the 'white' areas need it. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act will clearly make it easier to direct labour more efficiently to the areas of need.

But although we must accept that the South African economy has an impressive capacity to survive the strains put upon it by government policies, it would be unrealistic to ignore two conditions for survival in the future. The first is that economic relations with the rest of the world remains undisturbed. And the second is that the rigid direction of labour envisaged in the proposed new legislation does not provoke open African resistance.

5. Struggle and Defence

THERE is now no hope of a non-revolutionary transfer of power in South Africa. In theory it is still possible to envisage a non-violent revolution, using weapons like the strike and passive resistance, but in practice, with the administrative, military and economic power firmly concentrated in the hands of the government, such an approach is now virtually impossible. The Africans and their allies cannot by persuasion produce a change of heart in the white electorate; nor can they bring to bear the kind of economic sanctions that would force a change of mind. These are the facts the African Congresses are digesting at present.

Whatever the means proposed to upset the *status quo*, whether by non-violence, sabotage or terrorism, it is clear that the seat of leadership must be underground. The country has moved away from open political parties, democratically led, with a public appeal based on overt campaigns and declared tactics. These open methods may continue to form a part of the overall campaign. But only a secret, highly disciplined underground leadership can now prevail. Over the past three years both the African National Congress (A.N.C.) and the Pan African Congress (P.A.C.) have been working—painfully and with catastrophic lapses in security—to turn themselves into this kind of movement. The current impression of political inactivity on the African front is illusory. It is a reflection of the trend towards underground organisation.

Inherent in this phase is the gradual acceptance of the use of violence as a means of struggle. Spokesmen for both Congresses have given public and explicit warning of the inevitability of violence unless the rest of the world intervenes. Nelson Mandela, former Secretary-General of the African

National Congress, conducting his own defence at his trial in November 1962, said: 'Government violence can do only one thing and that is to breed counter-violence. We have warned repeatedly that the government, by resorting continually to violence, will breed counter-violence among the people, until ultimately, if there is no dawning of sanity on the part of the government, the dispute between the government and my people will finish up by being settled in violence and force.'

In October 1962 Mr. P. K. Leballo, General Secretary of the Pan African Congress, called a Press conference in London after his escape from South Africa. He warned: 'White South Africa is irrevocably set on its course to maintain and perpetuate white domination . . . and the African people are equally determined to rid themselves of foreign rule at all costs. Given this situation, an armed clash is inevitable . . . The African people recognise that to effect any change in South Africa, the present position whereby white South Africa holds the monopoly of military power must be changed. This can be changed only by our acquisition of the means of challenging that power.'

But it is obvious that the minimum condition for effective action is unity among the African people. Certainly a place must be found in the struggle for non-Africans, both because it is unrealistic to ignore them, and because a purely racial clash will prolong and embitter the struggle itself. But non-Africans cannot be fully effective until African unity has been achieved. This presupposes a movement which is led and controlled by Africans and which responds to the initiatives of its own membership, obviously very largely African.

What are the chances for the growth of such a movement? The leadership of the Congresses remains at present deeply divided. In principle the issue between them is the role of non-Africans. In other respects their objectives, methods, manner of speaking, and degree of militancy are virtually indistinguishable. In practice the P.A.C. co-operates with Europeans it trusts no less than does the A.N.C.: indeed its admission to membership of a European, Mr. Patrick Duncan, goes very much further than the A.N.C. has done. But the fact is that non-Africans have not in the past been content to commit themselves wholeheartedly to an African leadership. They have been a divisive factor precisely because they have not been responsive to the African understanding of the local situation. They have tried to impose theories and patterns of their own. They have tried to mould the African movements, and to use them as a platform for their own beliefs.

The Communists

The principal offenders in the past have been the Communists. Believing as they do that the revolution cannot succeed until the 'objective' conditions, dogmatically defined, are right, they are unable to act pragmatically. They insist that the struggle is essentially a class struggle, which must be led by 'class-conscious workers and peasants' of all races. Their attempt to explain the reactionary politics of the Afrikaner worker is one of the most tortuous in the Marxist vocabulary. But the ordinary politically-conscious African knows that this struggle is not primarily a class struggle: it is a struggle for

political rights for himself, and for Asians and Coloureds. The denial of economic and other rights follows from the lack of political rights. The principal qualification for a successful leadership is not whether it is 'class conscious', but whether it can command national support, and whether it can organise efficiently.

But the point here is not primarily whether the Communists are right or wrong. The point is that they confuse and therefore divide the movement. If they were content to accept majority leadership until conditions were established in which they would be free to propagate their political views, their role would be uncontroversial. But their own doctrine forbids them to do this. Their role as they see it now is to 'educate' the movement so that the revolution itself should be controlled and led by 'class-conscious', meaning Communist, elements. That process is inevitably divisive. It involves the use of 'pressure-group' tactics to impose standards upon the African political leadership which are irrelevant to the needs of the struggle. It entails intrigue and manoeuvre against 'non class-conscious elements', and the introduction of organised factions on issues which are not germane to the South African struggle.

It is true that the Communist Party and its members in the Congress Alliance do not claim to lead the struggle. They declare that 'the leadership of the (Congress) movement is and always has been the African National Congress'. But they insist also that 'although there is no formal relationship between (the Communist party and the A.N.C.) the masses of the people increasingly recognise that together they form the leading forces in the freedom struggle . . . a new unity is growing in practice between them.'¹ But meanwhile a new journal, calling itself *Assagai* (sic) published in London makes no bones about claiming the A.N.C. for the international Communist movement. 'We see the national struggle as merely the first step towards socialism . . . We believe that in our National struggle . . . the foundation for the next step—that is a socialist society—must and can now be laid . . . Participation in the revolutionary struggle . . . must be the right of everyone who honestly desires . . . freedom. It cannot be the sole right of Marxists. But such a broad alliance will be at its strongest and best if led by the most advanced sections of the workers in close alliance with the peasants, who will constantly review the current situation in the light of scientific analysis and practical knowledge . . .' The second issue of *Assagai* concludes with an offer of 'revolutionary writings on Guerilla Warfare' and a list of quotations from Lenin, together with one from Robert Burns.

Equally rigid, and for the same kind of motives, are the doctrinaire anti-Communists who refuse to work with a Communist in any context. They conceive it as a major part of their work to warn African political leadership of the dire results of associating with the sinister Reds. Both Communism and anti-Communism have sown in South Africa the seeds of a dogmatic approach to the immediate struggle which could divide the resistance forces as deeply as they were divided in Spain in the 1930's. That, above all, is the situation which anyone concerned with the interests of the South African peoples, rather than with Cold War priorities, must seek to avoid.

¹ See 'International Bulletin', issued by S.A. Communist Party, December, 1962.

There is one other extraneous factor which could also become divisive, again because it imposes irrelevant standards of leadership. This is the doctrinaire 'Africanist' who believes the struggle can be waged as though South Africa were Ghana, Nigeria or Nyasaland. There is some danger of African governments to the north attaching conditions to their support which would not be appropriate to the situation in South Africa. Non-Africans cannot be excluded from the struggle, provided they accept their role as individuals in a primarily African movement; and denunciation of co-operation with non-Africans as 'moderation' and a denial of the 'African Personality' is mistaken and doctrinaire.

Sabotage and Poqo

Both Congresses claim to have members receiving training in sabotage and guerilla warfare outside South Africa. Two separate organisations, already claim responsibility for acts of sabotage. They are *Umkonto We Siswe*, claimed by the African National Congress, and a body calling itself the National Liberation Committee. In both, Europeans and other non-Africans, as well as Africans, are involved. It is fair to say that the differences between them revolve once again round the issue of Communism.

Information about the extent of sabotage is not easily available. Several hundred Africans have appeared in court this year on charges connected with sabotage, some of them schoolboys. Four have been sentenced to death for sabotage, another six for the attempted murder of Chief Matanzima. Many others have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between ten and twenty-five years. The Johannesburg 'Sunday Times' Political Correspondent reported on March 10 1963 that twenty-six Africans had been sentenced to a total of 404 years' imprisonment for sabotage since January.

What is Poqo? Every week during March and April, 1963, scores of Africans were arrested by the police on suspicion of belonging to Poqo, and in two weeks in May over 2,000 were arrested. Police authorities have announced confidently that the movement has been crushed. The trials are continuing. At first the A.N.C. denied that the movement had any real support. More recently, as evidence of apparent widespread sympathy came in, it has vigorously attacked the movement as racialist, opportunistic and undisciplined. In March the Vice-President of the P.A.C., Mr. Potlake Leballo announced from exile in Basutoland, that Poqo was led and controlled by the P.A.C. And in May the 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Act laid down that for the purposes of the Illegal Organisations Act, Poqo would be regarded as the successor to the P.A.C.

As far as one can judge, Poqo is led by former members of the P.A.C., who may have deviated from it after the Congress was banned. The name means 'we stand alone' or 'pure'. The movement's straightforward racialism, fortified with a tendency to atavistic (Xhosa) tribalism, has a strong relationship to the cruder interpretations of the P.A.C. doctrine that each racial community should wage its own separate struggle, and none at all to the non-racial, class doctrines of the A.N.C. There is nothing whatever to suggest that the government's claim that communists are behind the movement is anything but a ludicrous reflex action.

Poqo recruits, for its local leaders as well as rank and file, among the least sophisticated sections of the population. Its appeal is particularly strong among the worst casualties of apartheid—the chronically ‘illegal’, the unemployed, the men from the Transkei who are forced to live without their families, the migrants from starvation in the Reserves who find themselves debarred from finding work elsewhere. Many of them are physically and emotionally crippled by the rootlessness of their existence. It is not difficult to understand the appeal of a secret exclusive organisation, rooted in the emotional security of a ritual tribal past, and committed to the destruction of these responsible for their despair.

This interpretation of the growth of Poqo is given weight by the fact that it apparently operates at present exclusively in the Western Cape and the Transkei. It is true that this was always the chief stronghold of the P.A.C. but the growth of this extreme and sometimes blind form of terrorism is a product of the government’s intensified efforts to remove the Africans from the Western Cape to the Transkei. It is comparatively recent that Africans have come in large numbers to work in the Cape; this makes it that much easier for the government to shift them back, especially since the country’s ‘Coloured’ population is concentrated in the Cape. The spread of Poqo between the Transkei and the different towns of the Western Cape is accomplished partly through the good offices of the government, which shunts the Africans constantly between these areas.

Most of the detailed information about Poqo became available at the hearing of the Commission of Inquiry into the Paarl riots, and at the trials hearing of the Commission of Inquiry into the Paarl riots in September 1962, and at the trials of Poqo members subsequently arrested in the Cape and the Transkei. It is clear that the first target of the movement is the network of government informers and the government-appointed chiefs in the Transkei. In Paarl, police had suspended inquiries into eight Poqo murders for lack of witnesses. Four of them were acknowledged police spies, three were coloured women allegedly killed for ‘distracting the men’, and the eighth was a white store-keeper killed allegedly to prove members’ willingness to kill whites. It is clear that at least part of the movement’s strength derived from very violent intimidation, which has provoked considerable resentment among Africans, especially in Capetown, but witnesses at the various trials and at the Paarl Inquiry estimated that most of its members joined voluntarily, themselves excluded, of course. Witnesses at the Inquiry were heavily disguised and guarded, and several witnesses for Poqo trials were beaten up or disappeared.

Poqo activities so far do not give the impression of efficient planning or organisation. None of the attacks, with the possible exception of one, have been armed with modern weapons or properly planned. They have given the strong impression of lashing out with an almost suicidal lack of foresight, planning or skill. With the exception of the white store-keeper killed in Paarl, none of the attacks on Europeans have been disciplined acts, but rather the result of spontaneous action sparked off by an immediate situation. It is probably truer to suggest that the P.A.C. is trying to establish control over Poqo than that the P.A.C. leadership inspired and controls its activities.

Poqo represent a new mood—of bravado, desperation, extreme black racism. In a recent conversation an African woman with, as it happened, no particular grievance of her own, said: 'What make a man and gives him self-respect is the ability to protect and look after his wife and children. My husband can't do that any more. If the government orders me out of Capetown tomorrow, he can do nothing but wave me good-bye. If they order him back to the Reserves he can do nothing to keep the family together unless we all want to starve. So life is not worth living. We are helpless unless we fight back, and may as well lay down our lives in the fight.' These are brave words, seldom means, but in the case of Poqo they apparently express the movement's inspiration literally.

As it is organised today Poqo cannot bring about the revolution. Instead it is likely to provoke a phase of repression which will make previous police action look like the controlled exasperation of the London police at a C.N.D. rally. But no one should delude themselves into thinking that the South African struggle can be won without provoking the authorities to ruthlessness on the Algerian scale. Indeed, the analogy may be carried further. The struggle in South Africa starts at the stage reached in Algeria towards the end: with the confrontation of the F.L.N. and the O.A.S. In South Africa the extreme manifestation of *Algerie Francaise* is embodied in the Afrikaner nationalist government which dares not capitulate. But in South Africa the equivalent of the O.A.S. has access to all the modern weapons of the State and of war. They will be more difficult to defeat than the O.A.S. There is no General de Gaulle to undermine them.

But however inappropriate a means of national struggle, Poqo has in one vital respect changed the perspective of South African politics. It has shaken the confidence of Europeans in their ability to maintain their position in peace. It has introduced the frightening spectre of sudden, secret attack against which normal precautions are useless. Ordinary people for the first time fear for themselves and their children. They are facing the fact that the future holds battle stations, a defence build-up, and a continuous state of peril and conflict. The pre-1960 Congresses, seem, in retrospect, to have been no more than nasty, noisy gatherings, sources of resentment and irritation rather than of fear and foreboding. Poqo has revived all the European fears of the 'dangerous black masses.'

Armed Forces

The reaction of the government which anticipates and reflects these fears is a defence build-up which costs nearly twice as much as was spent by South Africa at the height of the last war. The budget for 1962/3 provided for the expenditure of £60m. on defence, which together with the vote on police and prisons, brought the total 'security' vote to £86m. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Fouché, announced at the time that this was simply the beginning of the expansion. So it has proved. The 1963/4 budget provides for an increase of £17.5 m. on defence alone. Part of these sums are spent in buying abroad, modern aircraft, helicopters and naval craft largely from Britain and France. They are designed, according to Mr. Fouché, to increase the striking power of the navy ten-fold 'in the next few years'. The striking

power of the Defence forces, he said, had already been increased to twenty times what it had been two years before.

Much of this expenditure, the government insists, is for external defence, not for internal security. It is made necessary by South Africa's commitment to the West, and more recently, by the threat of 'invasion' by the independent African States. The latter claim has been particularly emphasised since the formation, on paper at least, of the African High Command, by the 'Casablanca' group of African states. Whether or not the government believes in the possibility of such an invasion, it has provided a reason for the purchase of Victor bombers, Mirage jet fighters and anti-submarine craft.

Leaving aside this aspect of South Africa's defence—it is, in fact difficult to see how equipment of this kind could be effective in combatting internal revolution—the provisions made specifically for internal security are sufficient to prove the government's serious intentions. By the end of June 1963, 10,000 fully trained troops will be available for combat within an hour. Two years hence the number will have increased to 20,000. A recent £20 m. deal between the government and African Explosives, a subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries, will make the country self-sufficient in ammunition and small arms, including automatic weapons. From this year, 19,000 young men will be called up each year for training in the Citizen Force.

In addition to these, there exist a number of semi-official local defence organisations, supported by the government. The oldest of these are the Commandos, part-time volunteers who make themselves available for call-up in times of need, and who are given training in the use of firearms. 206 of these units existed by the end of March 1963, some of them special 'English-speaking' Commandos. Members have been showing their enthusiasm recently by asking to be equipped with automatic weapons and armour. A recently proposed addition to the Commandos is an air commando, 'to provide an opportunity for keen private pilots with their own light aircraft, to serve our country' (Mr. Fouché, in the Senate, 15/3/63).

Finally, newly organised Police Reserve and Home Guards will add to the strength of volunteer defence. They may be called upon for patrol services in their own neighbourhoods, for co-operation with the police in times of emergency, or to do guard duty at key industries which might be threatened with sabotage. They will be given training in the handling of firearms, and on their powers of arrest. In April the government announced the revolutionary step of forming a special police reserve for Coloured people and Indians, while a special Bantu Reserve or Home Guard was being considered'. It can be predicted with some confidence that these units will not be armed: even so their formation will carry risks for the government—as well as the possibility, clearly the hope, of winning some non-whites to the side of 'law and order'.

There can be no doubt that preparations on this scale anticipate a state of civil war. In 1961 the Minister of Defence, Mr. Fouché made the point: 'In the same way as world powers are continually preparing for war, so South Africa intends to be ready for internal trouble'.

6. Proposals for Policy

FEW people in Britain still need persuading about the evils and dangers of apartheid. But there remains a wide gap between public feelings and official policies. Public opinion is unsure what kind of policies might be effective to change the trend of events in the Republic, so that pressure for a change of British policy remains relatively ineffectual. And the government, informed by similar doubts, finds it more convenient to protect British interests by doing as little as it dares and equivocating whenever possible. This will remain the situation until the public and the government are persuaded both of the danger attaching to Britain's equivocal policies, and of the possibility that alternative policies might produce positive results. Mr. Harold Wilson's announcement in March 1963 that a Labour government would not continue the sale of arms to South Africa is the first fruit of such a reappraisal.

However, alternative policies can be formulated, but their acceptance depends in the first place on making people understand that there is not the slightest chance of getting the present South African regime to change its policies 'by persuasion', as was advocated recently by the British and American permanent representatives (Sir Patrick Dean and Mr. Adlai Stevenson) at the United Nations.¹ Dr. Verwoerd repeatedly stresses that the Republic's policy on apartheid is 'like granite'. It is important to avoid making the mistake about Dr. Verwoerd that was made in the 1930's about Hitler, the mistake of not taking these leaders at their word. Verwoerd's 'Kampf' is as resolute and inflexible as Hitler's. Precious years were squandered by the Men of Munich who also believed in 'policies of persuasion'.

There can be no change of heart in South Africa; people who feel themselves to be surrounded in their *laager* by vastly superior, hostile forces do not surrender by persuasion from abroad. Nor are their fears entirely unjustified. The situation of the white community in the Republic would change drastically as the result of a change in the *status quo*. The destruction of three centuries of white privilege is a revolutionary act. It is the lesson of history that privileged classes do not give way in the teeth of revolution. There is no reason to suppose that white South Africans will behave differently.

Four other important facts must be taken into account in the formulation of British policy. First, there is no longer any hope of avoiding a violent conflict in the Republic: indeed, it has already started. Second, neither side can hope to defeat the other finally without help from abroad. Third, the only chance of preventing the struggle from becoming purely racialist is by limiting its duration, which, again, can be achieved only by the right kind of external intervention. Fourth, external intervention of some kind in South Africa is as inevitable as it was in Spain during its civil war. The only doubt is whether the tragic Spanish pattern needs to repeat itself in South Africa.

¹ The Guardian, May 13, 1963.

What will be Britain's role in the coming struggle for South Africa? Her involvement is already established; how she will carry out the responsibilities of her involvement remains in doubt. On this depends not only what happens in South Africa, but probably also what happens in the rest of the continent. Africa cannot remain neutral in the struggle, even if Britain thinks she can. And Africans will react strongly to British policy, since they feel themselves directly involved. Thus the challenge of South Africa is also a challenge to Britain's future influence in Africa, and throughout the non-aligned world. It is a challenge which the Commonwealth will certainly have to face, and on which it may well founder. Already some African states are considering whether their own membership of the Commonwealth might be affected by the South Africa issue. It is only a matter of time before the issue is sharply raised inside the association, where the African members will certainly have the support of the majority of the Asians, and possibly Canada too.

Policy for Arms

Some of the decisions that need to be taken in formulating a policy towards South Africa are Britain's alone; others involve her allies in the West, and especially the United States. The most immediate and practical question is the sale of arms to the Verwoerd regime. There can be no justification for continuing this practice. Employment and profits in the British arms' industry cannot provide the sole criterion of policy. Arms shipments have been stopped to Israel and Egypt, to the Batista regime in Cuba, and to the Communist countries. There are many precedents for stopping arms exports; indeed, the practice of licensing arms exports is an acknowledgement of the need to make arms exports subject to overall policy. Nor is it possible to distinguish between arms for purely internal use and for external defence. For one thing it is clear that arms sold under the second category are being adapted for use in local suppression. It must be remembered, too, that South Africa's capacity to withstand future attempts to implement international decisions—which are likely to arise over South West Africa—depends on the strength of her Air Force and Navy. Britain need consult nobody about placing an embargo on the export of arms. Every moral and political consideration points to the importance of such an embargo.

But Britain's arms policy is only one aspect of her ambivalence towards South Africa. It is reflected also in the dual role given to the British Ambassador to South Africa who is at the same time High Commissioner for the three Protectorates—Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. This duality in the past has invariably meant the subordination of British responsibilities in the Protectorates to her interests in the Republic. For more than half a century these territories, which lie either wholly or partly inside the Republic, have been allowed to stagnate, politically and economically. Until very recently they shared none of the constitutional or economic advance of the other British territories in Africa, with the result that they are now highly vulnerable to South African pressures. The argument that the 'dual role' offers the best chance of looking after the Protectorates' interests is not supported by their history. How, indeed, can a diplomat

whose primary responsibility it is to maintain good relations with the Republic be expected to stand up vigorously for the rights of the Protectorates where these conflict — as they must increasingly do — with those of South Africa?

Britain is clearly in a dilemma over the Protectorates. She is now committed to speeding up their economic and constitutional development to enable them to achieve internal self-government as quickly as possible, and she is defending the rights of political refugees from the Republic to seek asylum in the protectorates. But self-governing protectorates are likely to make Britain's task more and not less difficult, for she will then be expected to provide protection for the Territories even if their self-governing legislatures embark on policies hostile to the Republic. If she tries to dissuade the Protectorates' governments she will incur their hostility; if she does not, she will incur South Africa's. Yet these conflicting interests are now expected to be reconciled by the same person — the Ambassador in Pretoria.

Policy for the Protectorates

Despite economic advance, especially in Swaziland, all three Protectorates will for some time remain dependent on South Africa for trade, communications and especially for jobs. More than half of Basutoland's adult male population depend for their livelihood on work in the Republic. But South Africa is presently engaged in a policy of eliminating 'foreign Bantu' in order to find jobs for her own unemployed. Politics apart, therefore, the need for a massive economic and technical aid programme for the Protectorates is an urgent priority. Here is a policy that Britain should actively pursue. She should seek as a matter of deliberate policy — both in order to redress the wrongs of the past half century of neglect and to protect her wards against the tides of apartheid — to devote a considerable part of her overseas aid to the High Commission Territories. But this can be done effectively only if there is a drastic change in the quality of the administration. Each territory should be given high-ranking governors with energy and influence to co-operate with the new Protectorates' governments in speeding up development.

The question of security is much more difficult. So long as Britain remains the protector she must be ready to defend the three territories against direct or indirect pressures. This need has increased in recent months. In April, 1963, Dr. Verwoerd spoke openly of 'retaliation' against the Protectorates because they offered sanctuary to 'hostile forces'. The government supporting paper, *Die Burger* said on 4 April, 1963: 'For South Africa, actively hostile frontiers are matters of life and death. It should be prevented by all available diplomatic and economic means and, in the last resort . . . by military action'. Once the Protectorates become self-governing the need might arise for their frontiers to be guaranteed not only by Britain but possibly by the United Nations or, at least, by a group of powerful nations chosen by the Protectorates' governments themselves. Such an international guarantee, reinforced perhaps by an 'international presence' in the form of technical and military personnel, could stabilize the frontiers in this area.

Diplomatic Policy

Britain's conception of the role of her Ambassador to South Africa needs to be reconsidered, quite apart from his position as High Commissioner for the Territories. It is sometimes argued that Western diplomats can exercise a 'moderating influence' on the Republic's government by maintaining good relations with it. The shallow optimism of this view has already been stressed. What is often not realised is the positive harm it can do. The main effect of maintaining 'cordial relations' with the Verwoerd regime is to make white South Africans feel less isolated, more secure in their relations with the West, and hence less inclined to accept the need for making radical changes. Mr. Macmillan's 'wind of change' speech in Capetown in 1960 is sometimes quoted as an example of the effectiveness of British influence. This is a facile view. Important though the speech was in other respects, it had no practical effect on the policies of the Verwoerd regime; and in so far as it had any impact on the thinking of South Africans, it was almost entirely due to its implied threat of a possible withdrawal of British support. It jolted South Africa for a moment because it held out the danger of complete isolation. But every time a British Ambassador emphasizes the 'important mutual strategic interests' between the two countries (as Sir Hugh Stephenson, the new Ambassador to South Africa, did in his first public speech in May, 1963), the Republic heaves a sigh of relief and gets on with the job of applying apartheid.

Maintaining good diplomatic relations with South Africa should no longer be a primary aim of British, or indeed of Western, policy. Indeed, there are many prominent people in South Africa, who would not be regarded as 'extremists', who argue that the time has come to put South Africa 'beyond the pail' of the civilized world. They believe that a collective decision to isolate South Africa diplomatically might have the effect of making white South Africa realise the vulnerability of its position, especially if it were seen as a prelude to international sanctions. Those who take this view argue that this action would be morally justified in the case of South Africa, because it is the only country in the world where authoritarianism is based officially on racial discrimination.

Policy for Sanctions

Finally, how should Britain react to the growing Afro-Asian pressure for international sanctions against South Africa? Hitherto Britain and the United States have actively opposed this proposal. The South African government claims that such action would be illegal under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, which states: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in any matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter. This principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7'. Chapter 7 concerns action, on the part of the General Assembly and the Security Council, 'with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. Calls for U.N. action against South Africa are generally based on the claim that the government's policies represent a threat to the peace under Chapter 7 of

the Charter. By voting for the 1962 U.N. resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa, two-thirds of the world's nations imply an acceptance of this view.

But the difficulties of applying a trade boycott are immense, especially for South Africa's chief trading partners. Neither Britain, France, the United States nor West Germany could afford to declare a unilateral boycott without serious damage to their economies. To do so would throw their own workers out of jobs and see South Africa's trade diverted to rivals. It is certainly unrealistic to expect Britain, acting on her own, to end her trade with South Africa. This is a matter which must be undertaken in concert with South Africa's other major trading partners. It is also clear that an effective boycott would require agreement between the major world powers, even if the U.N. were the means of enforcement. In practice the Soviet bloc is unlikely to refuse to take part in sanctions: it is the Western powers who are dragging their feet.

The United States administration shares Britain's ambivalence about economic sanctions, but the emphasis is slightly different. The argument against sanctions rests less upon the trading and financial interests at stake than upon the fear of losing a reliable ally in the cold war. It is true that the United States has about £400m. invested in South Africa — some of it earning, according to Mr. Marcus Banghart of the Newmont Mining Company, an annual profit of 27 per cent — and 16 per cent of South Africa's imports come from the United States. But this is a small economic stake compared with that of Britain, which has £1,000 m. worth of investment and supplies nearly half of South Africa's imports. Thus those in the Kennedy Administration who oppose American commitment against the Verwoerd regime are moved more strongly by the 'strategists' than by the financiers.

South Africa's Lobby

Meanwhile, the organised lobby against outside intervention is growing in all the Western capitals. The South African Information Services are hard at work in financial and government circles, stressing both the economic stake the West has in South Africa, and the strategic value of the Republic to the West. Their work is supplemented by the South Africa Foundation, an organisation of industrialists and businessmen whose declared purpose is to 'present South Africa abroad in its true perspective' by adopting a 'non-political' approach to the economic prospects offered to foreign investors in the Republic. In practice the major energies of the Foundation are devoted to countering suggestions for outside intervention, and thus to minimising the dangers of the situation in South Africa. No one should underestimate the effect in financial and government circles of the efforts of these rich and powerfully supported organisations. Their influence however will have to be weighed against the increasing and united pressures from the Afro-Asian world backed by the Soviet bloc. Nor should we ignore the possibility that the African states might embark upon action of their own. This may include the refusal of overflying rights to South African aircraft, or aircraft of other nations destined for South Africa. African pressures against South Africa could well come to be extended against

other nations which continue to maintain full relations with South Africa.

What kind of sanctions could be effective against South Africa? Probably the quickest and the least damaging to world trade patterns would be an embargo on the sale of petrol and other fuel oils. At present the government corporation, SASOL, making oil from coal, is South Africa's only local source of oil; but this constitutes a negligible percentage of its total requirements. But since there is little chance of agreement between the oil producers not to supply South Africa, the embargo would have to be enforced. The simplest way of doing this would be by imposing a blockade of South African ports.

How would a blockade work? The U.N. could invite all its members who control navies to contribute suitable ships to maintain patrols outside the territorial waters of South Africa. These would prevent any ships or tankers (depending on whether the embargo were to be total, or limited to oil supplies) from leaving or entering the Republic's ports. They would confront ships and order them to turn round — as President Kennedy did in his brief embargo of Cuba. If they refused they would be boarded and taken in tow. If they resisted boarding they might have to be attacked, though it is hardly likely that this would be necessary. Such a naval blockade could be mounted by detachments from the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, the Scandinavian countries, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the U.A.R. and Canada. What could the Verwoerd regime do against such a blockade? It could not hope to attack the blockading ships from the air, since South Africa's planes would be no match for the aerial defence available to modern navies. South Africa would, in fact, be helpless. It is estimated that her own oil and other fuel resources could not maintain her industries and transport for more than about four to six months. This period is too short to produce serious starvation conditions. But if famine threatened, it would be possible to soften the blockade to allow food ships to pass under supervision. In practice the government would be unlikely to try to hold out to the bitter end, if only because it would rapidly lose support from the white as well as the black population. The chief advantage of a blockade is that it would avoid the long drawn out strangulation of voluntary trade sanctions unevenly applied, and it would minimize the period of disruption of world trade patterns.

But there are serious difficulties which would have to be considered before embarking on a blockade. The High Commission territories and the Rhodesias receive a large part of their trade through South African ports; and alternative routes would have to be found for them. The Portuguese-controlled ports of Lourenço Marques, Beira, Lobito and Luanda could be used by South Africa to evade the blockade; and the U.N. would have to be prepared to 'police' these ports to see that the supplies which enter them are limited to the requirements of the territories which they normally serve. Thirdly, however limited the period of the blockade, the effect upon South Africa's chief trading partners might be considerable. Other nations might have to be prepared to help by replacing markets and supplies to these countries, at least temporarily.

Even supposing political agreement for a programme of sanctions had been secured, these and many other technical questions would have to be

studied. There is no reason why an attempt should not be made at the U.N. to answer them, even before political agreement for sanctions has been reached. For example, the newly-established Apartheid Committee of the General Assembly might be set the task of planning a strategy for sanctions, as though the political agreement had been reached. This exploratory work might even contribute to reaching a political decision later. Meanwhile this work can be set in motion by the General Assembly; it does not require the approval of the Security Council.

Atlantic Agreement

The British and the United States governments might well be able to agree to give their support to a U.N.-sponsored study of this kind. It would commit them to the principle that concerted international intervention in South Africa through the U.N. is the only humane and realistic way to avoid a tragic and drawn-out bloodbath and an international dogfight over the corpse. It would not necessarily commit them to accepting the results of the study, if the technical difficulties should seem insuperable. It would provide the possibility of a constructive alternative to unilateral or unco-ordinated sanctions which would do serious damage to the economies of South Africa's chief trading partners. It would provide the opportunity for active participation in the study itself.

Two questions remain to be answered. What are the chances of getting British and American support for a blockade? And what might one expect if it were finally achieved? With more than two-thirds of the U.N. already committed to action of some kind, it will become increasingly difficult for the Western countries to continue to avoid commitment. The time will come, within the next year or two, when the pressure of forces inside the Republic and the United Nations make it impossible for any country to avoid taking a stand. The Soviet bloc is certain to back the Afro-Asians in their demands for action. If positive action seemed likely to emanate from such a coalition of forces it is most unlikely that the United States, at least, would continue to remain aloof. And once she decided to act, others, including Britain, would find it impossible to remain neutral, regardless of their own wishes. It is important to understand the *dynamic* of present international forces, and to realise that a *static* approach to South Africa offers no guide to future policy.

A determined blockade could be expected to achieve two immediate results. It would raise the morale and increase the effectiveness of the opponents of apartheid inside the Republic; and it would administer the traumatic shock necessary to provoke white South Africans into reconsidering the realities of their position. In such a situation, white leaders can be expected to emerge who would be willing to participate in a representative conference to discuss a democratic constitution for the Republic. Such a conference has often been asked for by African leaders and by the white opponents of apartheid. It could provide the conditions for agreement to allow for the development of a non-racial society resting on guarantees to protect the rights of all citizens regardless of their colour. Under these circumstances, the transition from a racial autocracy to a non-racial democracy could be achieved with justice to all the races, and so rescue white

South Africa from the blinkers of its past. But such a solution is not conceivable unless the power of the Verwoerd regime is broken by concerted international action. Outside intervention can diminish the tragic consequences of a race war. It can minimize the threat to international peace arising from the introduction of cold war forces in South Africa. And it can prevent the Republic's basically strong economy being destroyed.

For Britain the only real issue is whether she will try to help the international community to achieve these purposes or whether, as in the Congo, she will act to thwart international action. In South Africa the stakes for everybody concerned are much higher than they ever were in the Congo. Dr. Verwoerd cannot be deflected; he can only be defeated. Will Britain be counted among those who helped to defeat him?

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