fabian tract 401 
a socialist foreign 
policy? 
contents 1 introduction 1 
2 
3 
socialist principles and foreign 
policy 
Labour since 1964 
2 
11 
4 the future 15 
5 conclusion 24 

,'~ \ 

J 

3{) IGI)r I( fr ol ) 


this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
view of the individual who prepared it. The responsibility of 
the Society is limited to approving the publications which it 
issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour movement. 
Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1 . 
July 1970 SBN 7163 0401 5 


introduction 


~he recent general election in Britain 
onfirms the view that foreign affairs 
1lay little part in deciding the issue. In-
teed, on this occasion international 
ffairs featured less prominently in the 
ampaigning of the parties than in any 
1revious election since 1945, despite the 
act that which ever party was returned 
here were going to be negotiations for 
nembership of the EEC. That the elecorate 
are concerned almost exclusively 
vith domestic issues, is perhaps concluive 
evidence that people accept Britain's 
Lew status in the world ; but if this is the 
vay the public mind has turned it is a 
egrettable development, for whilst Briain 
is no longer able to command events 
m the international scene she nonetheless 
ontinues to have an important part to 
1lay. Together with other powers of com


•arable standing Britain could draw upon 
ter tradition of international involvenent 
to work constructively for the beterment 
of international society. But to 
lo this the present trend towards narrow 
nwardness in Britain has to be reversed, 
.nd in this respect the quality of the 
1olitical leadership will be all important. 
low important is the socialist view of 
oreign policy to Britain's role in the 
uture? In the immediate period ahead 
his will now be a matter of judging the 
oolicy of the Labour Party in opposition. 

)uring its period of office the Labour 
:Jovernment had to concentrate its attenion 
upon the economic problem at home 
nd consequently was unable to use effecively 
British influence a'broad. Inherited 
conomic problems appear in fact to be 
ndemic to Labour rule, looked at from 
he experience of 1945-51 and 1964-70, 
vhich make it extremely difficult to carry

•ut a positive foreign policy. How a 
,abour government might have devel•
ped Britain's role in the world in the 
arly 1970s from a position of domestic 
trength, must now remain one of the 
1teresting speculations of history. In the 
me the Labour Party has the reponsibility 
in opposition of formulating 
:s attitude to the key issues which con-
root Britain abroad, particularly in relaion 
to the negotiations for entry to the 
EC. 

This moment of transfer from government 
to opposition provides an opportunity 
to look back upon the ideas which 
have helped to formulate the Labour 
Party's view of foreign affairs, and to 
see how as a government it has attempted 
to translate these ideas into policy. Finally, 
it is important to consider how appropriate 
its philosophy will be to Britain's 
future place in the world. 

The essential thesis of this pamphlet is 
that British socialism, in relation to foreign 
policy, has been based upon an 
illusion : the illusion that British power 
ensured the easy translation of a particular 
set of ·ideas into foreign policy. 
In this British socialists have drawn too 
heavi·ly upon the imperial past in their 
formulation of world programmes. When 
confronted with the reality of the situation 
by having a Labour government the 
tendency of many socialists is to return 
to the formularion of Utopian concepts,

and to attDibute the behaviour of the 
government to the corrupting effects of 
power. This view is a direct denial of 
the need to handle the power factor in 
politics and is fundamentaHy at fault in 
a party which aims at assuming responsibility 
for the nation's affairs. These are 
the politics of the outsider, refusing to 
expose moral concepts to the practical 
test of political action. The contraction 
of our involvement overseas and the concentration 
of the British interest in a 
European context have at ieast created 
the conditions in which suitably circumscribed 
objectives in foreign policy based 
upon realistic principles can be realised. 
A foreign policy imbued with contemporary 
socialist principles should have a 
olear purpose. This need to have a definable 
purpose in foreign policy is particularly 
necessary for Britain at this 
juncture in order to give people in Britain 
a sense of direction and belief in 
what their country is doing. In outline 
what is needed is a sound appreciation 
of the power factor in international 
affairs whilst working to cut1b the effects 
of power politics; the desire to have a 
moral criterion for political action ; a 
concern for mankind as a whole expressed 
in internationalism and a sense 
of realism in relation to objectives. 


2. socialist principles and 
foreign policy 
The traditional view of socialists about 
international affairs has not been a veryuseful guide to the Labour Party in its 
effort to understand the processes of in-
ternational politics. For whilst it did not 
produce a marked effect upon the atti-
tude of the leadership of the party, nor 
seriously influence its conduct of foreignpolicy as a government, it helped to per-
petuate a division between the leader-
ship and a sizeable proportion of the 
rank and file. It also meant that Labour 
leaders had to give a disproportionate 
amount of time and attention to matters 
of internal party cohesion. In a generalway this need to look over its shoulder 
did not help the Labour government to 
act with confidence in the field of foreignaffairs. The experience of the last Labour 
government in its handling of the parlia-
mentary party suggests that a great deal 
of time and energy has to be expended 
on simply keeping the party in order. 
ideologyFor soc~ia~l~is~t-s~th~e__p_r_o~b~l~e-m---o'f--sq_u_a_t~i-n-g 
international facts with ideals derives in 
large measure from a misunderstanding 
of the nature of foreign policy. Often it 
has been assumed that foreign policy i 
" made", in the same way that the decis-
ion to nationalise an industry at home 
might be taken; or, that if a Labour 
government legislates in order to trans-
form domestic society then similarly it 
has only to legislate to create changewithin international society. Resolutions 
introduced at the annual conference of 
the Labour Party year after year give 
te tament to this view. It is perhaps nat-
ural that a party attached to a set of 
a priori principles should find it difficult 
to accept the limitations placed upon a 
Labour government in its handling of 
mter-state relations. Within a large area 
of foreign policy, however, ideology is 
qutte marginal to the relatively traight-
forward matter of dealing with affair a 
they pre ent them elve . Even where the 
ideological conception of foreign affairs 
find it most complete expre sion as in 
the Marxi t view, it is ignificant that it 
prove a quite inadequate guide to 
action 
The changes in the behaviour of th 
Soviet Union in her relations with othe1 
states over the years, whilst partly dm 
to the tactical demands of ideology, ha• 
also been largely influenced by the ex-
perience of living in a non-communist 
world. As Leonard Woolf observed, "the 
relation between socialism and questiomof foreign policy is nearly always remot 
and obscure". This may have been the 
unduly pessimistic conclusion of a man 
reflecting in his later years upon a life-
time's study of foreign affairs, and, a~ 
these words were written in 1949, Woolf 
may have been influenced by the alreadydisillusioning effects of the "cold war" 
For all that, however, there remains a 
considerable element of truth in the com-
ment. This is not to deny that principl~ 
have their place, but their relationship tc 
a specific aspect of policy, as distinct 
from a general formulation, is by nr 
means as palpable as the pure socialist 
view would maintain and persuade u< 
to believe. 
Even so the commitment to beliefs per-
sists and with it the sense of betrayalwhen a Labour government fails to trans-
late the ideals into firm policies. At the 
same time, a kind of political schizo-
phrenia develops ; reasons are evoked t 
explain away the actions of a Labour 
government which enable the tradition:1l 
beliefs to be upheld. Thu~ the two min-
ority Labour governments of the inter-
war years failed in foreign policy becau e 
of their slen-der majorities and the econo 
mic conditions at home and throughoutthe world. The foreign policy of Ernest 
Bevin, despite the sustained and at time< 
bitter attack upon it from within his own 
party, could at the end of the day b 
excused on the grounds of the "need 
of the moment", the economic weaknes< 
of Britain (a plausible explanation for 
the failure of aiJ governments in Britain 
ince 1945), reliance upon the ~trength 
and goodwill of the United State , and 
the intran igent attitude of the oviet 
Union . Underlying the whole of thi ap-
proach i the notion that if the circum-
tances were different a Labour govern-
ment would be able omehow to make a 
sociali t conception into a viable foreign 
policy. 
2. socialist principles and 
foreign policy 
The traditional view of socialists about 
international affairs has not been a veryuseful guide to the Labour Party in its 
effort to understand the processes of in-
ternational politics. For whilst it did not 
produce a marked effect upon the atti-
tude of the leadership of the party, nor 
seriously influence its conduct of foreignpolicy as a government, it helped to per-
petuate a division between the leader-
ship and a sizeable proportion of the 
rank and file. It also meant that Labour 
leaders had to give a disproportionate 
amount of time and attention to matters 
of internal party cohesion. In a generalway this need to look over its shoulder 
did not help the Labour government to 
act with confidence in the field of foreignaffairs. The experience of the last Labour 
government in its handling of the parlia-
mentary party suggests that a great deal 
of time and energy has to be expended 
on simply keeping the party in order. 
ideologyFor soc~ia~l~is~t-s~th~e__p_r_o~b~l~e-m---o'f--sq_u_a_t~i-n-g 
international facts with ideals derives in 
large measure from a misunderstanding 
of the nature of foreign policy. Often it 
has been assumed that foreign policy i 
" made", in the same way that the decis-
ion to nationalise an industry at home 
might be taken; or, that if a Labour 
government legislates in order to trans-
form domestic society then similarly it 
has only to legislate to create changewithin international society. Resolutions 
introduced at the annual conference of 
the Labour Party year after year give 
te tament to this view. It is perhaps nat-
ural that a party attached to a set of 
a priori principles should find it difficult 
to accept the limitations placed upon a 
Labour government in its handling of 
mter-state relations. Within a large area 
of foreign policy, however, ideology is 
qutte marginal to the relatively traight-
forward matter of dealing with affair a 
they pre ent them elve . Even where the 
ideological conception of foreign affairs 
find it most complete expre sion as in 
the Marxi t view, it is ignificant that it 
prove a quite inadequate guide to 
action 
The changes in the behaviour of th 
Soviet Union in her relations with othe1 
states over the years, whilst partly dm 
to the tactical demands of ideology, ha• 
also been largely influenced by the ex-
perience of living in a non-communist 
world. As Leonard Woolf observed, "the 
relation between socialism and questiomof foreign policy is nearly always remot 
and obscure". This may have been the 
unduly pessimistic conclusion of a man 
reflecting in his later years upon a life-
time's study of foreign affairs, and, a~ 
these words were written in 1949, Woolf 
may have been influenced by the alreadydisillusioning effects of the "cold war" 
For all that, however, there remains a 
considerable element of truth in the com-
ment. This is not to deny that principl~ 
have their place, but their relationship tc 
a specific aspect of policy, as distinct 
from a general formulation, is by nr 
means as palpable as the pure socialist 
view would maintain and persuade u< 
to believe. 
Even so the commitment to beliefs per-
sists and with it the sense of betrayalwhen a Labour government fails to trans-
late the ideals into firm policies. At the 
same time, a kind of political schizo-
phrenia develops ; reasons are evoked t 
explain away the actions of a Labour 
government which enable the tradition:1l 
beliefs to be upheld. Thu~ the two min-
ority Labour governments of the inter-
war years failed in foreign policy becau e 
of their slen-der majorities and the econo 
mic conditions at home and throughoutthe world. The foreign policy of Ernest 
Bevin, despite the sustained and at time< 
bitter attack upon it from within his own 
party, could at the end of the day b 
excused on the grounds of the "need 
of the moment", the economic weaknes< 
of Britain (a plausible explanation for 
the failure of aiJ governments in Britain 
ince 1945), reliance upon the ~trength 
and goodwill of the United State , and 
the intran igent attitude of the oviet 
Union . Underlying the whole of thi ap-
proach i the notion that if the circum-
tances were different a Labour govern-
ment would be able omehow to make a 
sociali t conception into a viable foreign 
policy. 

\othing could, in fact, be more mis-
aken or more unhelpful to a future Lab-
Jur government which is trying to curb 
he impact of power politics and human-
se t:1e relations between states. The root 
Jf the matter, which is that extenuating:ircumstances provide the normal factor 
n international politics and that it is this 
¥hich a Labour government, like anyJther government, has to come to terms 
¥ith, is hardly ever given its due weight, 
f indeed it is even recognised. 
['he international system, consisting of 
.orne 140 sovereign states, is far too 
;omplex to allow of dogmatic formula-
ions about how it should be organised. 
Nhatever the view of a particular state 
nay be, its freedom of action is so 
imited in the international field that it 
tas of necessity to compromise and 
earch for a common basis of agreement. 
[his is as relevant to the two super-
>owers in our day, despite appearances 
o the contrary, as to a country such as 
3ritain, which has witnessed gradual but 
'ast diminution in its power. It is not 
tretching the point to say that to a 
3ritish foreign secretary the external cir-
:umstances will often present themselves 
nore in the shape of imperative condi-
ions than malleable situations that can 
1e moulded according to political prin-
iple. "Needs of the moment" constitute 
he permanent feature of the interna-
ional environment and the jo>b of a 
~abour foreign secretary is to weave 
ocialist .principles into his responses to 
hose needs, rather than always attempt 
o transmute the needs. Moreover, as a 
10wer with world interests and a lar,getake in international trade, it is not 
:ranted to Britain to adopt unilateral 
nora! and political .positions. To do so 
vould be to relegate us to a not particu-
arly splendid form of isolation. It is 
uestionable how far Britain influenced 
'ther states tby her own policy even at 
he height of her power in the nineteenth 
entury. It is certain, however, that this 
of influence has deteriorated in 
'ur own day. British policy, socialist or 
'therwise, must be to seek those points 
!1: which our interests merge sufficiently 
vith the interests of other states to estab-
sh workable agreements. 
Within the Labour Party as a whole the 
general predilection to view foreign af-
fairs in terms of a set body of ideas can 
be partly attriburt:ed to Labour's failure 
to retain the support of the British elec-
torate over long periods of time. Relative 
inexperience of high office has meant that 
the party has never fully acquired a 
direct governmental attitude-the prag-
matic, administrative technique which 
goes to make up so much of the business 
of government, not least in the realm of 
foreign policy. Hence the sense of un-
ease, almost of shock, which reverber-
ated through the Labour Party when 
Harold Wilson in response to a question 
said rt:hat the policy of his government 
was "to govern". The party as a collec-
tive entity still could not think of powerand government with a proprietorial air. 
Opposition mentality is not only a matter 
of ideological disposition, it is also in-
fluenced by the lack of contact with 
power. Equally, political realism is not 
so much the result of rational analysis 
as due to the experience of exercising 
power. Even when Lalbour has begun to 
acquire familiarity with high office and a 
knowledge of the constraints placed upon 
the exercise of power, particularly in the 
face of the exigent nature of the inter-
national system, as it did in the period 
1945 to 1951, this was quickly dissipated 
when the party reverted to opposition.
These 'brief periods of government inter-
spersed between long interludes of oppo-
sition have not in the past encouraged 
the Labour Party to engage in the pain-
ful process of adjusting theory to reality. 
There is, however, a constructive side to 
ideology that is important to a progres-
sive movement such as the Labour Party: 
the function of synthesis. With a com-
prehensive set of ideas, a consistent pat-
tern of interpretation can be given to 
events, and it helps form the mental 
attitudes of both the rank and file and 
the leadership. This creates unity of con-
viction and purpose throughout the party, 
whatever might be the differences be-
tween .particular sections. Principles and 
ideals are important in that they pro-
vide the ultimate goals of political ac-
tion and the conviction by which judg-
ment is made upon immediate and con-
\othing could, in fact, be more mis-
aken or more unhelpful to a future Lab-
Jur government which is trying to curb 
he impact of power politics and human-
se t:1e relations between states. The root 
Jf the matter, which is that extenuating:ircumstances provide the normal factor 
n international politics and that it is this 
¥hich a Labour government, like anyJther government, has to come to terms 
¥ith, is hardly ever given its due weight, 
f indeed it is even recognised. 
['he international system, consisting of 
.orne 140 sovereign states, is far too 
;omplex to allow of dogmatic formula-
ions about how it should be organised. 
Nhatever the view of a particular state 
nay be, its freedom of action is so 
imited in the international field that it 
tas of necessity to compromise and 
earch for a common basis of agreement. 
[his is as relevant to the two super-
>owers in our day, despite appearances 
o the contrary, as to a country such as 
3ritain, which has witnessed gradual but 
'ast diminution in its power. It is not 
tretching the point to say that to a 
3ritish foreign secretary the external cir-
:umstances will often present themselves 
nore in the shape of imperative condi-
ions than malleable situations that can 
1e moulded according to political prin-
iple. "Needs of the moment" constitute 
he permanent feature of the interna-
ional environment and the jo>b of a 
~abour foreign secretary is to weave 
ocialist .principles into his responses to 
hose needs, rather than always attempt 
o transmute the needs. Moreover, as a 
10wer with world interests and a lar,getake in international trade, it is not 
:ranted to Britain to adopt unilateral 
nora! and political .positions. To do so 
vould be to relegate us to a not particu-
arly splendid form of isolation. It is 
uestionable how far Britain influenced 
'ther states tby her own policy even at 
he height of her power in the nineteenth 
entury. It is certain, however, that this 
of influence has deteriorated in 
'ur own day. British policy, socialist or 
'therwise, must be to seek those points 
!1: which our interests merge sufficiently 
vith the interests of other states to estab-
sh workable agreements. 
Within the Labour Party as a whole the 
general predilection to view foreign af-
fairs in terms of a set body of ideas can 
be partly attriburt:ed to Labour's failure 
to retain the support of the British elec-
torate over long periods of time. Relative 
inexperience of high office has meant that 
the party has never fully acquired a 
direct governmental attitude-the prag-
matic, administrative technique which 
goes to make up so much of the business 
of government, not least in the realm of 
foreign policy. Hence the sense of un-
ease, almost of shock, which reverber-
ated through the Labour Party when 
Harold Wilson in response to a question 
said rt:hat the policy of his government 
was "to govern". The party as a collec-
tive entity still could not think of powerand government with a proprietorial air. 
Opposition mentality is not only a matter 
of ideological disposition, it is also in-
fluenced by the lack of contact with 
power. Equally, political realism is not 
so much the result of rational analysis 
as due to the experience of exercising 
power. Even when Lalbour has begun to 
acquire familiarity with high office and a 
knowledge of the constraints placed upon 
the exercise of power, particularly in the 
face of the exigent nature of the inter-
national system, as it did in the period 
1945 to 1951, this was quickly dissipated 
when the party reverted to opposition.
These 'brief periods of government inter-
spersed between long interludes of oppo-
sition have not in the past encouraged 
the Labour Party to engage in the pain-
ful process of adjusting theory to reality. 
There is, however, a constructive side to 
ideology that is important to a progres-
sive movement such as the Labour Party: 
the function of synthesis. With a com-
prehensive set of ideas, a consistent pat-
tern of interpretation can be given to 
events, and it helps form the mental 
attitudes of both the rank and file and 
the leadership. This creates unity of con-
viction and purpose throughout the party, 
whatever might be the differences be-
tween .particular sections. Principles and 
ideals are important in that they pro-
vide the ultimate goals of political ac-
tion and the conviction by which judg-
ment is made upon immediate and con-

4 
temporary issues ; but they also help to 
give the moral content to political action. 
This aspect of socialism, most completelyand articulately expressed on the left of 
the party, can have a salutary effect uponthe leadership, particularly when as a 
government there is a danger of them 
veering too far toward the purely admin-
istrative approach and neglecting the 
philosophy of the party. The ideologicalpurists embodying the conscience of the 
party do serve to alert the leadership to 
"its duty" and generally reminds them of 
the "correct" party course of action. In 
this way the more devout element acts in 
a general and continuous manner as the 
ideological obstacle against which gov-
ernment policies have to be tested, and 
on occasion the pressure of the militants 
is more eJQplicit through the threat of 
open revolt. 
In the recent experience of the La·bour 
Party the central fault with the militant 
section in their exhortations to the gov-
ernment to take ·a stronger line on Viet-
nam and on Rhodesia and, from another 
section, to get the moral issue clear over 
Nigeria/ Biafra, is that they have con-
tiually failed to take account of the limits 
upon Britain's power effectively to influ-
ence events at all points in the world. 
Moral influence is directly related to the 
ability to place power behind it, and at 
a time when Britain has been reducing 
her international commitments because 
of her inability to mpport them, it is 
next to useless to suppose that we can 
influence other states by adopting a 
moralising posture. Above all it is im-
portant to remember that for ideology 
to retain a useful function it has to be 
cl·osely related to the politically possible. 
Once a strong tendency develops the 
other way, it easily degenerates into 
doubtful righteousness untouched by real 
issues, or it becomes merely the mouth-
ing of slogans. 
socialist principles 
British democratic socialism has never 
possessed a systematic theory of interna-
tional affairs, preferring eclecticism to 
the watertight formulatJions of Marxism. 
It has grown out of, and 1built upon, th' 
liberal tradition and been refined by sev 
era! leading theoreticians within the Lab 
our Party, such as Leonard Woolf, Ken 
neth Younger, John Strachey and Deni! 
Healey. Also, the limited experience oJ 
Labour governments in handling foreigr 
affairs has helped to produce a practica 
appreciation of the subject. It is surpris· 
ing, however, just how little there is ir 
print on Labour's conduct of toreigraffairs in contrast to the amount published on defence and strategy, which i~ 
perhaps indicative of how internationa 
affairs are seen in a strategic form 
Nevertheless these contPibutions do not 
add up to an integrated way of interpret-
ing world affairs. The socialist view ol 
foreign affairs has been influenced exten· 
sively by the liberal/ radical traditior. 
with its general bias toward pacifism anc 
belief in moral progress. Socialists havt 
also shared the liberal ·belief in the essen· 
tial co-operative quality of men and na· 
tions. This linking of the two modes oJ 
thought has become so close in our own 
day that some observers of the current 
scene have suggested that there are nc 
significant differences between the two 
In terms of foreign policy the modern 
Labour and Liberal parties may not b 
so very different, but it would be wrong 
to conclude from this that they hole 
identical views on all matters. It is neces· 
sary to look at the whole programme oJ 
a political party which should be, anc 
often is, traceable to an integrated poli· 
tical philosophy, and when viewed in thi~ 
way differences appear between partie~ 
which are not apparent when selectingisolated parts of their policy. 
The socialist image of international 
society was, and still is to a large degree 
of democratic nations devoted to the pur· 
suit of welfare and equality conducting· 
their relations with one another within a 
moral code and framework of law. B 
whereas liberals talked of the co-opera· 
tion of men generally and meant ~pecifk 
ally their economic !behaviour, socialists 
placed the concept on a class basis and 
talked of the international soLidarity of 
the working class. Held in this form the 
concept had an even more tenuous hold 
on reahty than its earlier liberal formu· 
4 
temporary issues ; but they also help to 
give the moral content to political action. 
This aspect of socialism, most completelyand articulately expressed on the left of 
the party, can have a salutary effect uponthe leadership, particularly when as a 
government there is a danger of them 
veering too far toward the purely admin-
istrative approach and neglecting the 
philosophy of the party. The ideologicalpurists embodying the conscience of the 
party do serve to alert the leadership to 
"its duty" and generally reminds them of 
the "correct" party course of action. In 
this way the more devout element acts in 
a general and continuous manner as the 
ideological obstacle against which gov-
ernment policies have to be tested, and 
on occasion the pressure of the militants 
is more eJQplicit through the threat of 
open revolt. 
In the recent experience of the La·bour 
Party the central fault with the militant 
section in their exhortations to the gov-
ernment to take ·a stronger line on Viet-
nam and on Rhodesia and, from another 
section, to get the moral issue clear over 
Nigeria/ Biafra, is that they have con-
tiually failed to take account of the limits 
upon Britain's power effectively to influ-
ence events at all points in the world. 
Moral influence is directly related to the 
ability to place power behind it, and at 
a time when Britain has been reducing 
her international commitments because 
of her inability to mpport them, it is 
next to useless to suppose that we can 
influence other states by adopting a 
moralising posture. Above all it is im-
portant to remember that for ideology 
to retain a useful function it has to be 
cl·osely related to the politically possible. 
Once a strong tendency develops the 
other way, it easily degenerates into 
doubtful righteousness untouched by real 
issues, or it becomes merely the mouth-
ing of slogans. 
socialist principles 
British democratic socialism has never 
possessed a systematic theory of interna-
tional affairs, preferring eclecticism to 
the watertight formulatJions of Marxism. 
It has grown out of, and 1built upon, th' 
liberal tradition and been refined by sev 
era! leading theoreticians within the Lab 
our Party, such as Leonard Woolf, Ken 
neth Younger, John Strachey and Deni! 
Healey. Also, the limited experience oJ 
Labour governments in handling foreigr 
affairs has helped to produce a practica 
appreciation of the subject. It is surpris· 
ing, however, just how little there is ir 
print on Labour's conduct of toreigraffairs in contrast to the amount published on defence and strategy, which i~ 
perhaps indicative of how internationa 
affairs are seen in a strategic form 
Nevertheless these contPibutions do not 
add up to an integrated way of interpret-
ing world affairs. The socialist view ol 
foreign affairs has been influenced exten· 
sively by the liberal/ radical traditior. 
with its general bias toward pacifism anc 
belief in moral progress. Socialists havt 
also shared the liberal ·belief in the essen· 
tial co-operative quality of men and na· 
tions. This linking of the two modes oJ 
thought has become so close in our own 
day that some observers of the current 
scene have suggested that there are nc 
significant differences between the two 
In terms of foreign policy the modern 
Labour and Liberal parties may not b 
so very different, but it would be wrong 
to conclude from this that they hole 
identical views on all matters. It is neces· 
sary to look at the whole programme oJ 
a political party which should be, anc 
often is, traceable to an integrated poli· 
tical philosophy, and when viewed in thi~ 
way differences appear between partie~ 
which are not apparent when selectingisolated parts of their policy. 
The socialist image of international 
society was, and still is to a large degree 
of democratic nations devoted to the pur· 
suit of welfare and equality conducting· 
their relations with one another within a 
moral code and framework of law. B 
whereas liberals talked of the co-opera· 
tion of men generally and meant ~pecifk 
ally their economic !behaviour, socialists 
placed the concept on a class basis and 
talked of the international soLidarity of 
the working class. Held in this form the 
concept had an even more tenuous hold 
on reahty than its earlier liberal formu· 

:ttion. Should this solidarity be confined 
J the industrial proletariat? As a poli-
ical weapon based upon perceived inter-
sts this is how the doctrine evolved. In 
his way the theory limited itself to in-
ustrial states with well developed pro-
!!tarian movements and ignored the mass 
f peasantry and, indeed, the industrial 
:tbour of states which had not developed1 the classical Marxist sense. More im-
IOrtant, is the objection that in a world 
•f nation states the worker's loyalty will 
1e, and must be, to his own state which, 
:1 the last resort, is the only political 
nit through which he can work to safe-
uard his interests. Nor has the view of 
olidarity based upon common socialist 
ystems been of great value to Labour 
dministrations. It is perhaps true that 
here will be a disposition toward agree-
1ent on foreign policy issues betweea 
ocialist states, but the awkward fact re-
1ains that states possess interests which 
re not removed, even .if interpreted dif-
erently, by changes of government. The 
octrine of "left talking to left" received 
sharp blow on the occasion of Ernest 
tevin's negotiations with the Soviet Union 
1. fter 1945, and there is no reason to sup-
ose that it would be significantly dif-
between specifically democratic 
ocialist states. An inclination to view 
•olitics in this way is clearly different 
rom a Conservative approach to foreignolicy with its emphasis upon the na-
ional interest and the pursuit of power.
:onservat-ives are disposed towards "rule 
5 f thumb" and "feel of the situation" 
1ethods, which easily become a matter 
f conducting foreign affairs according to 
narrow definition of the national inter-
st. Also· capitalism with concomitant im-
erialism has prov·ided socialists with the 
rm edge to their own philosophy and 
1e opportunity to dissociate themselves 
rom the legacy of the British imperial 
ast. 
>nee the more primitive aspects of ideo-
Jgy are removed there remains a resi-
ue of socialist values which help to in-
uence Labour's foreign policy. Fore-
lost amongst these influences has been 
1e desire to curb the power factor in the 
1ternational system. Whilst Labour gov-
rnments have recognised the importance 
5 
of power in international politic~ theyhave worked to check the effects of 
power politics. Particularly, the Labour 
Party has sought to legitimise the use of 
power through international institutions. 
This is apparent !both from the attention 
which the Attlee government gave to 
ensuring that its foreign policy was based 
upon the charter of the United Nations 
and the emphasis which the last govern-
ment gave to placing British policy firmly 
in line with UN principles. ConsistentlyLabour's view has been that expressedby Hugh Gaitskell in 1957 that a nation 
"should never use force except in self 
defence or unless in obedience to UN re-
commendations ; and it should alwaystake contentious issues to the assembly". 
kpart from these considerations a Lab-
our government will be judged by what 
it pronounces itsel,f to be. As with other 
political parties it is entrapped by the 
image is seeks to promote. If it declares 
in favour of a moral approach to politicalproblems and wishes to place suitable 
constraints upon the sources of power, it 
will be judged accordingly. A political 
party cannot escape this. The Labour 
Party in particular cannot encourage the 
notion that it eschews the use of po·wer 
politics and then try to wield the bigstick. A party which acts contrary to the 
view in which it is held by the publ·ic 
will quickly find the •basis of its supportcrumbling. So that electoral pressures of 
this kind, however subtle and indirect, 
do serve to keep a party on the straight 
and narrow. 
Socialist internationalism also permeates 
Labour's foreign policy. For all its short-
comings, its lack of precision, and the 
sentimentalism, it does at least try to 
move away from a policy exclusively 
based upon national interest. More than 
this, however, it indicates a positive ap-
proaoh toward international policieswhich commend themselves to other 
states, such as the advancement of free-
dom, the right to national independence, 
and the welfare of mankind as a whole. 
The point was eloquently put by Sidney 
Webb in the 1920s, "It is high time that 
we ·based our foreign policy not on what 
we presume to think our rights, but on 
what we can discern to be in the com-
:ttion. Should this solidarity be confined 
J the industrial proletariat? As a poli-
ical weapon based upon perceived inter-
sts this is how the doctrine evolved. In 
his way the theory limited itself to in-
ustrial states with well developed pro-
!!tarian movements and ignored the mass 
f peasantry and, indeed, the industrial 
:tbour of states which had not developed1 the classical Marxist sense. More im-
IOrtant, is the objection that in a world 
•f nation states the worker's loyalty will 
1e, and must be, to his own state which, 
:1 the last resort, is the only political 
nit through which he can work to safe-
uard his interests. Nor has the view of 
olidarity based upon common socialist 
ystems been of great value to Labour 
dministrations. It is perhaps true that 
here will be a disposition toward agree-
1ent on foreign policy issues betweea 
ocialist states, but the awkward fact re-
1ains that states possess interests which 
re not removed, even .if interpreted dif-
erently, by changes of government. The 
octrine of "left talking to left" received 
sharp blow on the occasion of Ernest 
tevin's negotiations with the Soviet Union 
1. fter 1945, and there is no reason to sup-
ose that it would be significantly dif-
between specifically democratic 
ocialist states. An inclination to view 
•olitics in this way is clearly different 
rom a Conservative approach to foreignolicy with its emphasis upon the na-
ional interest and the pursuit of power.
:onservat-ives are disposed towards "rule 
5 f thumb" and "feel of the situation" 
1ethods, which easily become a matter 
f conducting foreign affairs according to 
narrow definition of the national inter-
st. Also· capitalism with concomitant im-
erialism has prov·ided socialists with the 
rm edge to their own philosophy and 
1e opportunity to dissociate themselves 
rom the legacy of the British imperial 
ast. 
>nee the more primitive aspects of ideo-
Jgy are removed there remains a resi-
ue of socialist values which help to in-
uence Labour's foreign policy. Fore-
lost amongst these influences has been 
1e desire to curb the power factor in the 
1ternational system. Whilst Labour gov-
rnments have recognised the importance 
5 
of power in international politic~ theyhave worked to check the effects of 
power politics. Particularly, the Labour 
Party has sought to legitimise the use of 
power through international institutions. 
This is apparent !both from the attention 
which the Attlee government gave to 
ensuring that its foreign policy was based 
upon the charter of the United Nations 
and the emphasis which the last govern-
ment gave to placing British policy firmly 
in line with UN principles. ConsistentlyLabour's view has been that expressedby Hugh Gaitskell in 1957 that a nation 
"should never use force except in self 
defence or unless in obedience to UN re-
commendations ; and it should alwaystake contentious issues to the assembly". 
kpart from these considerations a Lab-
our government will be judged by what 
it pronounces itsel,f to be. As with other 
political parties it is entrapped by the 
image is seeks to promote. If it declares 
in favour of a moral approach to politicalproblems and wishes to place suitable 
constraints upon the sources of power, it 
will be judged accordingly. A political 
party cannot escape this. The Labour 
Party in particular cannot encourage the 
notion that it eschews the use of po·wer 
politics and then try to wield the bigstick. A party which acts contrary to the 
view in which it is held by the publ·ic 
will quickly find the •basis of its supportcrumbling. So that electoral pressures of 
this kind, however subtle and indirect, 
do serve to keep a party on the straight 
and narrow. 
Socialist internationalism also permeates 
Labour's foreign policy. For all its short-
comings, its lack of precision, and the 
sentimentalism, it does at least try to 
move away from a policy exclusively 
based upon national interest. More than 
this, however, it indicates a positive ap-
proaoh toward international policieswhich commend themselves to other 
states, such as the advancement of free-
dom, the right to national independence, 
and the welfare of mankind as a whole. 
The point was eloquently put by Sidney 
Webb in the 1920s, "It is high time that 
we ·based our foreign policy not on what 
we presume to think our rights, but on 
what we can discern to be in the com-

mon interest of the world ; not on national 
hatred, national greed, or even 
national fear, but on a sense of brotherhood 
with all men; not on what we mayhope to make out of other nations to 
our own profit, but on how, with our 
particular gifts and special opportunities, 
we can best serve humanity as a whole". 

Thus La'bour's policy is characterised by 
its close relationship with the principlesof the charter of the UN, and its specialised 
agencies in the field of social and 
economic matters. Internationalism also 
implies a sympathy for the needs and 
aspirations of the peoples of other lands 
based upon the idea of the brotherhood 
of man. This is particularly true in relation 
to the underdeveloped parts of the 
world. T<he expectations of these peoples 
may not be satisfied by the actions of a 
Labour government in Britain, but it remains 
true that they continue to have 
faith in the international ideals of the 
Labour Party. It is up to a Labour government 
to ensure that its foreign policy 
has high regard for the interests of the 
less well off regions of the world. Recent 
Labour foreign policy would seem to be 
influenced, therefore, by these socialist 
aspects: emphasis upon moral ideals, a 
civilising effect upon power, and internationalism, 
otherwise expressed as a concern 
for the whole of mankind. 

Labour's experience 

The Labour movement as a whole gained 
little from the experience of the two 
minority La'bour governments of the in-
ter-war years. If they influenced the mass 
movement at all, they confirmed it in 
the view that radical change in foreign 
policy waited upon the return of a Lab-
our government with a large majority 
behind it. To the intellectual element 
within tJhe party and particularly those 
who professed to expertise in international 
affairs the inter-war experience 
meant that an independent socialist foreign 
policy depended equally upon radical 
transformation of the domestic structure. 
It was necessary to have control of 
the pre-eminent power sectors of the 
economy in order to have leverage in 

foreign affairs. In fact, under MacDonald's 
•leadership both periods of La'bom 
minority rule were marked by the con· 
trast between their achievements in for· 
eign policy and their lack of ideas a1 
home. In tJhe field of foreign affairs the 
Geneva Protocol was at one and the 
same time the most imaginative and 
practical attempt to ensure collective. 
security proposed in tJhe inter-war years. 
Labour based its policy on firm support 
for the League of Nations, and the 1924 
government went a long way toward restoring 
friendly relahons with France. It 
also accorded diplomatic recognition to 
the Soviet Union which cleared the wayfor a trade agreement. Certainly if a 
government is judged by what it sets ou1 
to do then the record of both the minority 
Labour governments is good in the 
field of foreign affairs. 

With an overwhelming majority behind it, 
in 1945 the opportunity to embark upona truly socialist foreign policy seemed at 
last to have been granted to the Labour 
Party. In the event two factors came 
rapidly to condition Labour's foreignpolicy. First, was Britain's economic 
weakness, a condition which has since 
come to be regarded as endemic. The 
precarious state of our economic position 
plagued the Labour government to the 
end of its stay in office. It is worth recalling 
that in 1945 Britain inherited vast 
debts from the war, overseas assets had 
been seriously reduced to pay for the victory, 
and lend lease was brought to an 
abrupt end. Britain lost approxlimately 
one quarter of her national wealth during 
the second world war and lost two 
thirds of her export trade. The economyhad been geared to the war effort to the 
extent that by 1945 some 9 million people 
were serving in the armed forces, civil 
defence and the war industries. Suddenly. 
to meet the demands of international· 
earning power, Britain had to swing her 
industry •into the export market, and this 
largely meant dollar exports to pay for 
the badly needed supplies. There was 
little choice in the matter_ "The economyof the United Kingdom," wrote Aneurin 
Bevan, "was inextrica1bly interlocked with 
that of the United States". That alone 
dictated the close association with her. 


lecond, the then apparently intractable 
ature of the international situation also 
imited their freedom of manoeuvre in 
oreign affairs. As a result of this a 
ichotomy soon developed within the 
"abour movement between the leader-
' hip and a group of intellectuals sup-
1orted by a substantial number of the 
ank and file. Whilst Labour leaders 
uickly grasped the exigencies of the in-
ernational situation and appreciated the 
mportance of the power factor, this 
lienated those who clung to the idea 
a purely socialist foreign policy and 
!rove them more deeply into utopianiews. The Labour government soon real-
sed the need for a military alliance of 
he western democracies and seized upon 
IATO as a means to get the us firmlyommitted to the defence of western 
~urope. The Attlee government also took 
he decisrion to produce independent 
, uclear weapons. 
~he real issue of debate between the 
r eaders and their critics in the partyentred upon the question of whether 
lritain should work in close harmonyvith the United States, or seek agreement 
vith the Soviet Union. The Government's 
e !iligent efforts to have the us associated 
. t all stages with its poLicy in relation to 
;urope, whioh saw fulfilment in securing 
rs military involvement in Europehrough the Truman Doctrine and NATO, 
urther antagonised the left. The left 
ving of the party varied its position from 
n initial desire to have agreement with 
he Soviets to advocacy of a form of 
third force" through agreement with the 
ountries of western Europe in associa-
i.on witJh the commonwealth. The pre-
Ise form that such an arrangementhould take was at no time made clear. 
~s developed by G. D . H. Cole, for 
xample, it appears to have been seen as 
n economic entity. It was, however, the 
lesire to be free of the constraints of 
"cold war" rather than a positive 
rge to link with western Europe that 
ncouraged the notion. I1 certainly held 
• o wide attraction for a large section of 
1e La,bour Party as a practical pro-
ramme, whatever might have been its 
motional appeal. At this time LaJbour 
1as still inclined to cling to its social•ist 
7 
achievements at home. What is interest-
ing and significant about this formula-
tion of British interests is that it antici-
pated in several respects the expression 
of the British attitude in recent years. 
Looking back upon this controversy of 
Britain's relationship to the superpowersit can be seen that the left wing position 
was weak. Setting the ideological ques-
tion aside, a close working agreement 
with the Soviet Union was not a prac-
tical policy in terms of Britain's historic 
relationship with Europe. It was onlywith considera!ble reluctance that Britain 
had entered into arrangements with 
Russia in the past, and from a very early 
day Russia had posed the long standing 
threat to British interests at a number of 
points throughout the world. In 1945 she 
constituted the one threat, the ability to 
dominate Europe, that had caused Bri-
tain in the past to interfere in the affairs 
of the continent. British weakness in the 
years after the second world war and the 
even more depleted condition of the 
countries of western Europe meant that 
the supplemental power of the United 
States had to be sought to protect the 
area against possible Soviet expansion.
The traditional elements in British for-
eign policy combined with necessity, to 
lead BritaJin in the direction of close 
association with the us. There was never 
any doubt, therefore,ibuUhat Bevin would 
prefer the freedom of manoeuvre and 
anticipated coincidence with British world 
interests that close association with the 
us appeared to offer. 
In marked contrast to the other aspects 
of its policy in international relations the 
Labour government of 1945 managed to 
satisfy all sections of the party in its 
benevolent handling of colonial policy. 
It displayed a large measure of sympathywith the aspirations of the colonial 
peoples of Asia and Africa in their de-
sire for self government. Attlee's "grandgesture" to India enabled LaJbour to em-
bark upon a commonwealth policy based 
upon the co-operation of free and inde-
pendent peoples together with economic 
.assistance to newly independent states. 
What it could not do on the world stage 
in the way of creating a socialist interna-
lecond, the then apparently intractable 
ature of the international situation also 
imited their freedom of manoeuvre in 
oreign affairs. As a result of this a 
ichotomy soon developed within the 
"abour movement between the leader-
' hip and a group of intellectuals sup-
1orted by a substantial number of the 
ank and file. Whilst Labour leaders 
uickly grasped the exigencies of the in-
ernational situation and appreciated the 
mportance of the power factor, this 
lienated those who clung to the idea 
a purely socialist foreign policy and 
!rove them more deeply into utopianiews. The Labour government soon real-
sed the need for a military alliance of 
he western democracies and seized upon 
IATO as a means to get the us firmlyommitted to the defence of western 
~urope. The Attlee government also took 
he decisrion to produce independent 
, uclear weapons. 
~he real issue of debate between the 
r eaders and their critics in the partyentred upon the question of whether 
lritain should work in close harmonyvith the United States, or seek agreement 
vith the Soviet Union. The Government's 
e !iligent efforts to have the us associated 
. t all stages with its poLicy in relation to 
;urope, whioh saw fulfilment in securing 
rs military involvement in Europehrough the Truman Doctrine and NATO, 
urther antagonised the left. The left 
ving of the party varied its position from 
n initial desire to have agreement with 
he Soviets to advocacy of a form of 
third force" through agreement with the 
ountries of western Europe in associa-
i.on witJh the commonwealth. The pre-
Ise form that such an arrangementhould take was at no time made clear. 
~s developed by G. D . H. Cole, for 
xample, it appears to have been seen as 
n economic entity. It was, however, the 
lesire to be free of the constraints of 
"cold war" rather than a positive 
rge to link with western Europe that 
ncouraged the notion. I1 certainly held 
• o wide attraction for a large section of 
1e La,bour Party as a practical pro-
ramme, whatever might have been its 
motional appeal. At this time LaJbour 
1as still inclined to cling to its social•ist 
7 
achievements at home. What is interest-
ing and significant about this formula-
tion of British interests is that it antici-
pated in several respects the expression 
of the British attitude in recent years. 
Looking back upon this controversy of 
Britain's relationship to the superpowersit can be seen that the left wing position 
was weak. Setting the ideological ques-
tion aside, a close working agreement 
with the Soviet Union was not a prac-
tical policy in terms of Britain's historic 
relationship with Europe. It was onlywith considera!ble reluctance that Britain 
had entered into arrangements with 
Russia in the past, and from a very early 
day Russia had posed the long standing 
threat to British interests at a number of 
points throughout the world. In 1945 she 
constituted the one threat, the ability to 
dominate Europe, that had caused Bri-
tain in the past to interfere in the affairs 
of the continent. British weakness in the 
years after the second world war and the 
even more depleted condition of the 
countries of western Europe meant that 
the supplemental power of the United 
States had to be sought to protect the 
area against possible Soviet expansion.
The traditional elements in British for-
eign policy combined with necessity, to 
lead BritaJin in the direction of close 
association with the us. There was never 
any doubt, therefore,ibuUhat Bevin would 
prefer the freedom of manoeuvre and 
anticipated coincidence with British world 
interests that close association with the 
us appeared to offer. 
In marked contrast to the other aspects 
of its policy in international relations the 
Labour government of 1945 managed to 
satisfy all sections of the party in its 
benevolent handling of colonial policy. 
It displayed a large measure of sympathywith the aspirations of the colonial 
peoples of Asia and Africa in their de-
sire for self government. Attlee's "grandgesture" to India enabled LaJbour to em-
bark upon a commonwealth policy based 
upon the co-operation of free and inde-
pendent peoples together with economic 
.assistance to newly independent states. 
What it could not do on the world stage 
in the way of creating a socialist interna-

tiona! community it endeavoured to 
establish through its formulation of the 
commonwealth concept. There can be 
little doubt that this policy did much to 
gain the approval of the peoples of Asia ; 
an appreciation that has extended down 
to the present day, which partly eXJp!ains 
the acttachment shown to the British by 
Singapore, when it became known that 
we would withdraw by 1971 . In Africa 
which had not begun to experience 
colonial freedom under a Labour government 
the understanding has been less in 
consequence. 

Nevertheless, de&pite the ,fact that the 
La'bour government showed a deft understanding 
of the nature o.f international 
politics in the post-war world, a significant 
element of the party remained unconvinced 
about the need to adapt to 
international reality and continued to 
believe in the viability of a socialist foreign 
policy. There was the idea too that 
the Labour government had been able to 
get away with its policy because of the 
massive authority of Ernest Bevin in the 
cabinet, within the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, and in the party and trade uniuns 
throughout the country. In other words, 
the left retained the belief that a less 
commanding figure as foreign secretaryin a Labour government would have to 
respond to socialist pressures inside the 
party. If there be an overall criticism of 
the foreign policy of the 1945-51 Labour 
government it is that in its desire to 
grasp the power factor in international 
relations it too readily accepted traditional 
policy based upon "the facts of 
the situation" and "the merit of the 
case", and thus undervalued the placethat goals and objectives should have in 

policy making. 

the struggle in opposition 

The long years of opposition of the 
'fifties and early 'sixties witnessed the 
bitter fight between the right and the left, 
at times bordering on the fratriciaaJ , for 
possession of the party's ideology. The 
struggle in the main focussed upon foreign 
and defence policy. Such issues as 
German re-armament, neutralism, alii


ance politics, and acttitudes toward the 
us and the Soviet Union, which held the 
party and threatened to tear it lilpart. 
were mirrored in the early 'sixties by the 
all possessing nature of the deibate upon 
the " bom'b" ; more specifically as to 
whether Britain should retain nucleaL 
weapons. llhe subject of German re-armament 
struck deep into the party's tradi· 
tiona! opposition to armaments ; and 
worse, the militaristic background to 
German politics was calculated to putthe party's faith in its own beliefs to the 
severest test. In fact, the party divided 
over this issue in almost equal proportions, 
between those who advocated a 
German contribution, headed by the 
new realists (Healey, Younger, Mayhew, 
and Strachey) and those who held to 
their traditional socialism. Indeed the 
shadow cabinet's motion in favour of 
German re-armament, when put to a 
meeting of the parliamentary party on 
23 February 1954, was approved by the 
narrow margin of nine votes. 

This rift between left and right reoccurred 
in the controversy over nuclear 
weapons. The long drawn out debate 
concentrated upon the "independent"
quality of the British nuclear deterrent, 
and concerned not only its effectiveness 
but also the moral aspect of the case. 
There was the argument •by those who 
had a grasp of power politics that the 
British nuclear contdbution gave us leverage 
in our dealings with the United 
States, and at the same time prevented 
"excessive dependence on the United 
States". The left, on the other hand, revealed 
its classical dilemma. There were 
those who wanted the unilateral gesture 
of renouncing nuclear weapons as a 
moral example to other states, directed 
in particular presumably at the superpowers. 
But there were also the longstanding advocates of general and com-· 
plete disarmament who through the 
multilateral process looked to the establishment 
of a genuine international community. 
This latter position coincided 
with the official policy of the Labour 
Party until, in 1960, the annual conference 
carried a unilateral resolution. In 

this debate upon nuclear weapons inside 
the party throughout the late 'fifties the 


eft wing socialists depended on moral 
!aims, the technical and political aspects 
avoured the right. Furthermore, the left 
vere put into disarray when Aneurin 
levan, as shadow foreign secretary, de-
Jared his position as one of favouringlritish retention of nuclear wea:pons at 
he 1957 party conference. From there 
m the left's position faded and lacked 
oherence; yet it persisted in its opposiion 
and in fact carried the unilateral 
ote in 1960. It required all of Gaitskell's 
kill as party leader and a not insignifiant 
amount of moral courage to assert 
he right of the parliamentary party not 

o be bound by this decision. 
t is ironic that the left should have tri.
mphed politically at the annual confernee 
at a time when the technical argu1ent 
would have granted them victory1 any case. The cancelllation of Blue 
:treak in 1960 by the Conservative govrnment 
altered completely the nature of 
ne debate inside the La'bour Party. Preiously 
Labour's official position in favur 
of Britain's independent nuclear role 
ad been based, apart from other reaons, 
upon its assumed effectiveness . 
.J"ow, with the collapse of the Blue 
treak programme it was seen that Brilin 
could not produce an effective 
ocket 1based delivery system, and this in 
1rn made the idea of an independentuclear deterrent less feasible. As a re-
ult, the party was soon able to mend its 
ences on this issue and come out in 
1vour of renouncing the independent 
eterrent. In retrospect this ramification 
round the subject of nuclear weapons 
nd Britain's independent role can be 
~en as almost totally irrelevant to the 
;sue that was soon to become crystallear; that Britain's reduced means were 

o longer adequate to the sophisticated:chnological demands of the nuclear 
ge. By the close of Gaitskell's leader1ip 
it is true to say that for one reason 
r another most of the controversies over 
Jreign and defence matters which had 
reviously divided the party at one stage 
'ere now healed, and Harold Wilson inerited 
a relatively united party with 
'hich to go into the election of 1964. 
y the time the party was bequeathed 

to Harold Wilson in February 1963 manyof the previously controversial matters 
had •been resolved, or were no longer relevant. 
In the fight inside the party it was 
those who argued in favour of a realistic 
policy who won through, and the Labour 
Party in 1964 had very largely refined its 
ideas in foreign pollicy by discarding the 
more old fashioned, moralistic aspects of 
socialism. The general lines of policyagreed under Gaitskell were built uponand amplified by Wilson in a series of 
major speeches which he made duringthe course of 1964. There was the firm 
declaration to remove the pretence of 
Britain's independent nuclear role, and 
to substitute for it a more prominentpolicy within NATO by placing our nuclear 
forces inside the alliance. A shift in 
policy away from a narrow regard for 
British interests and toward a positiverole in international society was envisaged. 
This was seen as involving greater 
respect for and participation in the UN, 
developing the commonwealth concept, 
and extending moral and materia1 support 
to the underdeveloped parts of the 
world. Much of this became embodied in 
Labour's election manifesto, which stated 
that "Labour will reassert British influence 
in the United Nations", and then 
went on to say that the UN could become 
"the chosen instrument by which the 
world can move away from the anarchyof power politics towards the creation 
of a genuine world community and the 
rule of law". In all of this there was a 
judicious balance between keeping in 
touch with the traditional idealism of the 
party and a realistic assessment of Britain's 
aJbility and power in the modern 
world. 

There was also the intention to strengthen 
the original objectives of the charter of 
the UN and to follow the 'lead set byCanada and the Scandinavians by earmarking 
military units to its service. This 
was made clear by Harold Wilson in a 
speech in March 1964, and again stressed 
by him when, as Prime Minister, he told 
the House of Commons on 23 November 
1964 that h•is government, "certainly 
want to make real progress towards 
strengthening the peace keeping functions 
of the United Nations, and we are very 


ready, as a government, not only to 
pledge our general support to this, but 
to make an effective British contribution". 
The idea of a Commonwealth 
force, based upon the idea of "fire brigade" 
units to cope with limited outbreaks 
of violence, was also aired. The 
attempted coup in Tanganyika and Zanzibar 
in 1963 and the renewed trouble in 
Cyprus in 1963-64 undoubtedly helped to 
ca!ll forth this view. In both instances 
British forces had been used and it was 
to safeguard against a repetition of this 
whilst ensuring that Britain continued to 
play a role within the Commonwealth, 
which helped inspire the idea of a Commonwealth 
force. It a!lso had the added 
advantage that it would ena'ble Britain 
to continue with the semblance of a 
world role whilst having the practicalside of it supplemented by Commonwealth 
countries. In the event the idea 
was not taken up by the Commonwealth 
with any enthusiasm and so it was quietly 
dropped from the party programme. 

On the other hand, at a more practical . 
level the party endeavoured to tailor its 
policy <to the realities of power as it t:Xisted 
in the mid-'sixties. Foremost in this 
line of thinking was the declarat·ion to 
remove the illusion of Britain's independent 
nuclear status, and in its place to 
work for a more positive role in the 
western alliance. Th·is was to be done 
by committing our nuclear element 
firmly within a comprehensive programmeof integration inside NATO. To aohieve 
this dbjective, soon after it came into 
office the Labour government put forward 
its own proposals for the Atlantic 
Nuclear Force (ANil) as a substitute for 
the American conceived Mixed Manned 
Force. The intention behind the proposal 
was that it would give the non-nuclear 
members of the alliance a genuine measure 
of control over nuclear policy and 
also help to prevent the spread of the 
weapons. Proposals for reforming NATO 
in this manner have usually come unstuck 
over the difficulty that essentiallythe United Stll!tes·, as the super power, 
will go to extreme lengths to ensure that 
her nuclear sovereignty remains unimpaired. 
In the meantime, the NATO policystructure has had to be remodelled be


cause of the withdrawal of France from 
the military side of the alliance. With 
the desuetude of the AFN idea the LaJbour 
government's pledge to make both the 
V bomber force and the Polaris submarines 
of this country available to the 
AFN has not been implemented in full. 
Only the V lbomlber force has been completely 
handed over to NATO. 

In office a number of minor official 
changes by the Labour .government were 
introduced to mark the distinction from 
its predecessor. To keep faith with its 
principle to steer British foreign policy 
more in line with the charter of the UN 
the British representative to the UN was 
given ministerial status. To give further 
emphasis to the need to make progresswith disarmament a minister at the foreign 
office with special responsibility for 
this task was appointed, while to givemeaning to that part of the programmerelated to developing countries a separate 
Ministry of Overseas Development 
was established. Underlying all of this 
is the curious faot that Labour gave so 
little real aHention during its preparation 
for return to office to the likelyeconomic condition of Britain in the 
event of their becoming the government. 

Whilst the party argued out the bigmoral issues in foreign and defence 
policy, it gave the economic situation in 
Britain no fundamental scrutiny. Yet. 
ultimately, as the Labour governmentfound to its cost, Britain's external role 
is largely determined by the state of 
health of the economy. The lessons of 
history had still to be learnt. 


Labour since 1964 


~abour come to office in 1964 in circum.~
ances that would have tested the most 
1ardened and experienced ministerial 
.earn, and they, apart from a mere hand·
ul of men, such as Harold Wilson him:
elf aad Patrick Gordon-Walker, were 
·elatively untried with only their enthusasm 
for office to set against their as yet 
mknown governmental qua11ties. Two 
·actors from these circumstances were to 
>e with them for the next 18 months; the 
1arrow overall majority of five (reduced 
.till further during the term of parlianent) 
and the recurring problem of the 
>alance of payments. Clearly the governnent's 
slender margin meant that they.vould not be able to play a confident 
nitiatory role in international affairs, nor 
ignificantly alter the balance of relation-
hip within the Atlantic-European frame¥
ork. An inherited deficit on the balance 
>f payments of the order of £800m is 
:alculated to upset the policies of any 
~overnment, let alone one that had onlyust emerged from 13 years in opposition. 

lhe Labour government in these circumtances 
never got under way with a 
:hance. The advent of a Labour governnent 
in Britain generates an external 
:conomic environment that makes it exremely 
difficult for such a government 
o pusue a policy of its own choice. This 
veakness basically derives from the char.
cter of Britain's economic vulnerability; 
,ecause of dependence upon foreignrade, her role as an international banker 
.nd the extreme sensitivity of the balance 
,f payments to external pressure. The 
lements abroad, such as investors, 
1ankers, traders, and speculators, initially 
uspicious of a Labour government in 
lritain are in a position to apply presure 
upon the British economy and there'
Y influence, if not determine, the poliies 
of a Labour government in Britain. 
I think perhaps the biggest mistake that 

would feel," admitted the Prime Miniser 
one week af·ter devaluation in 1967, 
is that I underrated, we underrated, if 
ou like, the power of speculators at 
tome, or aJbroad, even when our balance 

•f payments was improving, as it was 
:tst year, to put the pound in jeopardy 
.nd force us into short term measures 
vhich are injurious to this country". This 
extreme vulnerability of Britain to outside 
opinion and therefore the corresponding 
need to create confidence 
abroad in the measures which a Labour 
government wishes to implement is perhaps 
the hardest, yet most important lesson 
for British socialists to learn. It is a 
phenomenon which for all practical purposes 
has become a law of Labour politics, 
and which was masked in 1945 only 
by the very poor and low state of world 
economic activity generally. What is 
quite inexcusable in the light of this is 
the kind of optimism that was radiated 
by the Prime Minister in 1965 when he 
is reported to have said to a parliamentary 
party meeting, "The economic crisis 
with the unpopular measures it has demanded 
is now virtually over. The future 
is 'bright with promise"-a mood which 
was at least publicly maintained up to 
the point of devaluation in November 
1967. If this is a problem likely to beset 
a Labour administration during its early 
months in office it is that much more 
important that the party should have a 
plan of action to cope with this type 0f 
situation, instead of simply living in the 
hope that all will come out well in the 
end. 

A second aspect of the recurring balance 
of payments problem since 1945 is that 
there has been a long standin.g and deepmalaise in Britain's internal economic 
structure, and at the same time Britain 
has been involved in commitments 
abroad far beyond the capacity of any 
government in this country to fulfil. 
These internal difficulties derived from 
an industrial structure much of which 
had become obsolete and required modernisation 
on a vast scale. Britain's role 
as banker of the sterling area also did 
not permit her to engage fully in domestic 
economic reforms which, although 
necessary by internal criteria, conflicted 
with the demands of her stef'ling role. 
The extent to which the awareness of 
this position underlay the responses of 
successive British statesmen :is a matter 
for argument, but that it has contributed 
towards the piecemeal approach of meeting 
issues as they arise is beyond question. 
Together with the limitations that 
are placed upon the freedom of a coun



try to choose its foreign policy, it is 
necessary to add that in the case of Britain, 
and particularly for a Labour government, 
a viable, independent policybased upon principles is not possiblewh'ile statesmen have continually to look 
over their shoulders to see that theyhave the margin of strength to grapplewith particular situations. Very largelythe conditions experienced by Labour 
after 1964 mirrored Ernest Bevin's lament 
a•bout British power whilst he was 
Foreign Secretary, "I had neither coal, 
goods, nor credit, I was not in the same 
position as my predecessors . .. I have 
noth1ing with which to do it . . . I have 
had nothing with which to negotiate". 

issues in Labour's foreign 
policy 

There is very little doubt that in relation 
to a wide range of foreign policy issues 
Labour's reputation has taken a hard 
knock. It may be that its own pub!icrelations were lbad, and that it did not 
have a sympathetic handling of its policy 
by commentators who were generallydisposed to its cause. It is true also that 
the humdrum nature of foreign policywith its unheroic achievements, does not 
lend itself to good publicity in the same 
way as the apparent neglect of greatmoral issues. Whatever the reason, the 
general impression was of a government 
which lacked a coherent and integrated 
view of foreign policy with hardly anything 
at all to distinguish it from its 
Conservative predecessor. 

In fact this is wrong, and when separate 
parts of policy are looked at, there is 
much to suggest that it has been guided 
by a clear sense of principle. The government's 
refusal to dissociate itself publicly 
from American policy in Vietnam 
has probably been the most persistent 
and divisive issue in the Labour Party. 
It is not part of the case presented here 
to defend or to condemn American policy, 
but rather to seek to understand the 
actions of the last British government.
It must be taken that both the government 
and its left wing critics wanted the 
war to end, the question therefore concerned, 
and still concerns, the means of 

bringing it to an end. A unilateral moral 
gesture of denouncing American policyin Vietnam would perhaps satisfy the 
conscience, but it must seriously be questioned 
whether it would have affected 
American policy. One of the faults of 
those who !become committed to a par~
icular moral cause that requires the 
stricture of an ally is that they fail to 
take account of the overlapping and extensive 
nature of the interests and relationships 
·between friendly states. Whatever 
might be the moral feel·ings toward 
the Vietnam war a Labour governmentin Britain had to balance the moral consideration 
against the benefits it derived 
from American support of its Interests 
nearer home, for example, in Rhodesia. 

This is not to argue that the government 
of this country should not warn, or caution 
the United States when it believes 
that the policy of that country can no 
longer command the support of its allies. 
Indeed, that has been done on several 
occasions ; for instance, Attlee's warning 
to Truman over General MacArthur's 
conduct of the Korean War, and similarly 
Eden's warning to President Eisenhower 
concerning the proposed military 
involvement by the us, perhaps at tactical 
nuclear level, on •behalf of the French 
in Indo-China in 1954. What is suggested 
is that where the relationship between 
two allies is unequal to the extent that it 
is between Britain and the us, the most 
positive way of exercising •influence over 
the powerful ally is by friendly advice, 
persuasion, and cogent reasoning, rather 
than engaging in a form of moral blackmail. 
It is to the credit of the Labour 
government that despite its precariouseconomic position, and its heavy dependence 
upon the goodwill of the us, Harold 
Wilson persisted in his initiatives to bring 
the war to an end, and had the good 
sense to muster support fo r a Commonwealth 
initiative in order to supplement 
the British voice in Washington. 

The government remained firm to a 
moral course of action in respect of two 
issues in foreign affairs ; the sale of arms 
to South Africa, and its insistence upon 
constitutional advancement to majority 
rule in Rhodesia. The decision to refuse 


to sell arms to South Africa was a difficult 
one to take. It was likely adversely 
to affect Britain's ·balance of payments 
at a time when they badly needed supporting 
; the arms sales decision was 
taken in December 1967, and it was 
always open to the South Africans to 
retaliate by denying us naval facilities at 
Simonstown, which at that time was important 
to the British position in the 
Persian Gulf and the Far East. The refusal 
to sell arms was clearly decided on 
consideration of its effect upon our moral 
standing amongst the Afro-Asian countries, 
and because it accorded with the 
traditional moral principle held by a 
large section of the party. 

The issue of Rhodesia is at once complexand involves a great moral problem. It 
has already been written aJbout in a Fabian 
context (George Cunningham, Rhodesia: 
the last chance. Fa!bian tract 368, 
September 1966), and so does not requireextensive comment here. It is sufficient 
to say that short of being able to associate 
a British decision to use force with 
a United Nations action, then quite apartfrom all the other reservations related to 
the use of British force against the Smith 
regime, including the difficulty of conducting 
a military campaign against a 
land locked state, it was not possible for 
a La·bour government to contemplate a 
unilateral British military operation. An 
action of this kind s•imply does not correspond 
to the range of expectations held 
about a Labour government by the public. 
Here again, despite the enthusiasm 
for action by a militant section of the 
Labout Party. the freedom of action 
open to the government was affected by 
the popular image which it represented. 
As a party that aJbhors the use of force 
in the affairs of nations, it cannot readilymuster public support for military action 
other than on an issue which is seen to 
bear directly upon the vital interests of 
this country. The difficulty over Rhodes·ia 
is that it is remote from the real•ity of 
life in Britain. Perhaps, principally for 
this reason, Harold Wilson's comment at 
the outset of the crisis that ".force it out" 
was a shrewd attempt to avoid future 
embarrassment inside the party and in 
the country at large. 

Though, if the issue of Rhodesia has remained 
difficult and obscure, the issues 
at stake in the civil war in Nigeria with 
the secession of Biafra were at all times 
clear to the government, and its policy 
was without ambiguity throughout. That 
·it acted in a correct manner in supporting 
the legitimate government of a sovereign 
state in the Commonwealth is not 
in doulbt. What did cause anxietyamongst some elements of Lalbour opinion, 
and elsewhere, was the British government's 
support of Nigeria with arms. 
The point is both moral and legal. Legally, 
Nigeria, as with any other sovereign 
state, was perfectly entitled to ask 
and receive arms from other countries. 
to that extent, it was a straightforwardtransaction between sovereign states. 
Morally, the criticism was that the sale 
of arms helped to cause the agony of 
suffering in Biafra. As so often with 
moral questions the issues were not clear 
cut. The right of a people to expressnarional self determination and to live 
under a government of their own choice, 
has to be set alongside the equallystrongly held view that the integrity and 
unity of .the state must be preserved. A 

balance has to be reached between morality 
and expediency. There is in fact a 
strong case for arguing that by givingfirm support to the Nigerian government 
the war was more effectively perpetrated 
and thus brought to a speedier conclusion, 
which ·in turn helped to reduce the 
total amount of suffering. In view of the 
almost certain ultimate victory of Federal 
Nigeria what perhaps was misguidedhumanitarianism was the support givento the Biafran people in both words and 
deeds by a lot of people who felt they 
were doing the morally correct thing. 

An aspect of foreign policy which has 
al.ways been important to socialists is 
that of aid to underdeveloped countries. 
In this field the Labour government'srecord was not as good as many hopedfor, nor was it as good as perhaps it 
could have been. It is true that no cuts 
were made in the aid programme in the 
January 1968 economy measures, but on 
the other hand the total volume of aid 
going to undeveloped countries rema.ined 
depressingly low and never reached the 


point of 'being one per cent of the GNP-
the figure stipulated as the minimum 
target by the Pearson Commission on 
International Development in its reportof September 1969. In fact, the British 
figure, in common with that of several 
other leading industrial countPies, has declined 
during the 1960s. For example, the 
total flow of public and private resources 
from this country to developing countries 
declined from 1.21 per cent of the 
GNP in 1960 to 0.77 per cent <in 1967, 
although it increased again in 1968. And 
while the recently announced increases 
in the BPitish aid programme do represent 
an advance on the present situation, 
the total still does not approach the minimum 
1 per cent target. The rpoint, which 
has previously been argued in a Fabian 
pamphlet in favour of raising British aid 
by 50 per cent, can only be reiterated 
here (Britain and the developing world, 
Fabian research series 267, February1968). 

Britain's reduced role 

The compelling and persistent nature Of 
Britain's economic weakness, exacerbated 
by the failure on the part of the government 
to inspire international confidence, 
virtually forced it to take decisions to 
reduce BPitish commitments overseas, 
which should perhaps have lbeen taken 
on grounds of political principle as 
argued by the socialist foreign policyadvocates. In any event there is little case 
fo r a country to spend in the proportionof 6.5 per cent of its GNP on defence 
(more than health and housing combined) 
unless a major external role is 
necessary to the defence of its own direct 
interests. Following devaluation a series 
of measures were taken to reduce our 
commitments abroad, the most importantof which was the decision to discontinue 
our military role east of Suez, involving 
the withdrawal from the Singapore base 
and the Persian Gulf by 1971. At the 
~arne time there was the firm -indication 
that British forces would be concentratd 
in Europe. As the discussions took place 
which led to the cabinet measures of 
January 1968, a list of priorities became 
esta'blished in which the domestic claims 

of health, housing, and education, were 
set alongside the needs of military expenditure 
overseas. There was takingplace, perhaps for the first time in recent 
British his·tory, a fundamental appraisalof British interests and objectives in foreign 
policy ; and •again, perhaps for the 
first time for many years, defence policy 
was designed to support foreign policy 
rather than the other way round. Instead 
of taking our commitments and interests 
for granted, both were examined and 
then made to fit the pol·itical objectives. 
In brief, a definitJion of British interests, 
foreign policy to support these interests, 
and military effort necessary to defend 
them, was outlined. 

OccasionaHy, it is granted to a countryto choose between continuing the genera'!
lines of its policy in the traditional way, 
or settling off on a new course. This comparative 
freedom can result from a drastic 
curtailment of world commitments 
and obJ.igations, in which the policymakers find that it is possible to give a 
different orientation to policy. Broadly 
this ·analysis corresponds to the positionof Britain in the modern world. She can 
choose to continue to have as wide a 
range of international contacts as possible, 
she may stress the qualri·ty and 
benefits of the Anglo-American ties, or 
she may select the European option. In 
that she is free to choose, however, it is 
a modification of the point made earlier 
that foreign policy is not "made". Policyin this situation will be "made", and it is 
for this reason that recently Britain presented 
socialists with the unique chance 
to v~ew principles in relation to different 
courses of action and to see which appeared 
most appropriate to British interests 
and their own ideal. 


the future 


[t is possible to continue British policy 
along lines that have been basically ac~
epted by both .politica<l parties in this 
~ountry since 1945; that is a policybased upon the Atlantic Alliance with 
primary emphasis on the quality of 
1\nglo-American relations. -This would 
not necessarily rule out an association 
with Europe, ~ndeed actual membership 
of the European Economic Community, 
but it would imply that British policy 
was not to be totally oriented toward 
Europe. Such a policy would perhapsbroadly correspond to the position that 
Harold MacMillan endeavoured to esta:blish 
in his bid to enter the Common 
Market. In many respects this is a course 
of action which corresponds closely to 
the traditional British approach, and one 
which, if it were entirely within the province 
of a British government (Labour 
or Conservative) to select, would no 
doubt be the one adopted. The practicability 
o.f such a policy, however, depends 
upon two factors . In the first place, it 
requires a winingness on the part of the 
United States to recognise this particular 
role for Britain and to accept her differentiation 
from western Europe in certain 
important matters. This is in fact to 
claim a great deal when most of the 
evidence about American views on Brit<
tJin and Europe since 1945 suggests the 
contrary. ~his view of Britain's role by 
her own statesmen has also meant that 
American aJdministrations have had to 
put up with the solicitations of successive 
British governments presuming upon 
our espeoia<l status in Washington. In this 
respect the "special relationship" has not 
had in recent years quite the s-ame value 
or emphasis in the us as it has in Britain . 

Nevertheless, the relationship is not entirely 
devoid of meaning, and would perhlllps 
have more value if British governments 
did not presume too much upon it. 

It would seem, yet again, that at the very 
moment when many were prepared to 
perform the bur~al rights of the relationship, 
Harold Wilson's visit to Washington 
to confer with the President in January 
1970, may have done something to 
resuscitate our consultative power with 
the Americans. The timing ,of the visit 

is not without sigruficance in view of the 
fact that the President was soon to de·
liver to Congress his report on American 
foreign policy in the 1970s. In that report 
he suggested that the European allies 
"deserve a voice in the aUiance and its 
decisions commensurate with their growing 
power and contr~butions". More 
specifically, the President was requesting 
that the Europeans assume a larger burden 
for their own defence. The success 
of such a policy depends heavily upon 
the measure o£ support given to it by 
the British government and the influence 
that we can exert upon the EuropeanaUies, and for this reason President 
Nixon was no doubt anxious to find out 
in advance the British reac~ons to his 
proposals. In the light of this it is reasona-
b-le to claim that · Britain's special 
status with the us continues to rest on 
the fact that her support is necessary to 
the success of America's European policy. 

The value of the American tie to Brit~n 

is that it allows us a freedom of action 
within the Atlantic Alliance in not forcing 
us to identify with a strictly European 
approach. At the same time part of 
its importance to the United States since 
1945 has !been that it has helped her to 
understand the needs of western Europewithout having to become too engrossed 
in their affairs. This argument has, of 
course, lost its value with the increasing 
strength and independence shown by 
western Europe through the EEC, and by 
the breakaway of France from the military 
structure of NATO which has compelled 
the us to ta•lk more directly with 
her. Trus tendency to consult with the 
Europeans in addition to Britain has become 
more apparent under the Nixon 
administration. A further advantage to 
Britain stemming from the American 
connection has been that America's role 
as a world power has supplemented our 
interests throughout the world. As Britain 
has withdrawn from one area after another 
on the world scene :it may be that 
our desire to be involved in world affairs 
will similarly contract ; in which case 
American support of British intrests is 
no longer so necessary and by the same 
token we will not feel so bound to support 
American policy in all regions. 


Anglo-American relations can also be interpreted 
in terms o.f domestic affinities 
which are in some respects congenial to 
socialist views. It is true that aspects of 
American society revealing the worst 
sides of competibive freedom are anathma 
to socialists ~n this country, and it has 
long been a standing complaint of the 
left wing that American society is the 
worst example of untamed capitalism.
On the other hand, there is much in what 
contemporary American administrations 
have been trying to do in recent years 
wlcich meets with the approval of socialists. 
For example, the extent to which 
the federal government intervenes to enforce 
rights, or establish reforms. Also, 
the equality of opportunity afforded in 
the United States appealed to Gaitskellites 
in the party, as did such specific features 
as the American system of redistributing 
wealth through a ca~tal gains 
tax. Furthermore, the freedom of action 
that the association with the United 
States allows a British government corresponds 
with the tradition of internat,
ionalism in British socialism. Where the 
relationship appears more constricting, it 
may be argued that a socialist policyshould be aimed at keeping the avenues 
open to a world power in order to influence 
her international policy generally, 
and particularly toward the underdeveloped 
world. This can best be achieved 
within the consultative framework of the 
relationship. 

The major 'blot upon the relationship 
over the last two or three years has, of 
course, been American policy in Vietnam, 
and the signal failure of the Wilson 
government significantly to change that 
policy. This, it could be argued, is ampleevidence that because of reduced circumstances 
Britain no longer commands influence 
in Washington concerning areas 
of the world in which she herself no 
longer has a major presence. Moral exhortation 
is not enough, power is the 
more relevant criter,ion of influence. 

However, with the Nixon policy of edgingthe United States out of Vietnam, a more 
normal and balanced relationship between 
Britain and the United States maybe achieved. Clearly the Anglo-American 

relationship has changed, but that is notJ 
to suggest that at a lower, less globaLlevel it cannot still be active. It no 
longer means that the United States can 
call up British support on behalf of its 
own commitments around the world ; the 
disenchantment of the western allies with 
us policy in Vietnam has contributed to-· 
ward this development; and it does not 
imply that a British government will 
automat,ically be taken into American 
confidence over major decisions on world 
policy. Alternatively, it can mean that 
'both countries see the value of complementary 
diplomatic initiatives in world 
affairs, particularly ,in dealing with the 
Sov,iet Union over European affairs. Consistently 
since 1945 Britain has been the 
least intransigent of the western allies in 
handling the Soviet bloc. Successive British 
governments have sought to initiate 
talks with the Russians upon Europeanissues in order to produce agreement that 
would make the status quo in Europe 
more manageable and acceptable to both 
sides. Moreover, despite the numerous 
setbacks to these efforts there is still 
reason to think, and hope, that the British 
view carries weight in Moscow because 
it ,is seen as a modifying influence 
upon the more rigid attitudes of the other 
members of the western alliance. In the 
current phase of effort by the us to find 
agreement with the Soviet Union on outstanding 
European questions, there maybe a positive mediatory role for Britain 
to play as a power concerned with 
Europe though less directly committed 
than the western Europeans, whilst more 
closely involved in its affairs than the us. 

The major objection to this line of discussion 
is that it 'begs the most important 
question: would the EEC countries 
allow Britain to continue with this 
"middle" role if she joined the Europeancommunity. The answer is almost certainly 
in the negative. Even though it 
was de Gaulle's personal veto, based 
upon his conception of what the European 
community should be, which closed 
the door upon the Macmillan government 
and the first approac:1 by the 
Labour government, ~t should not be assumed 
that matters will readily change 
under the management of M. Pompidou. 


The President's first response to Britain's 
"enewed application at the EEC summit 
n January 1970 was perhaps more in-
icative of the real attitude of France 
his later conciliatory approach at 
:he end of the mee1Jing. The plain fact 
.s that de Gaulle's attitude, whilst ex-
.reme, nonetheless reflected real interests 
France and indeed perhaps of the EEC 
;ountries as a whole. After all, none of 
:hem was prepared to force the hand 
France in their support of the British 
;J.aim for entry. What is certainly at the 
"oot of the French attitude, and perhaps 
:hat of other members of the Six, is the 
1uestion as to whether Br.itain ~s ready 
:o become truly European in her com-
llitment, which in the long term goeswell beyond the economic communitymd extends into the field of foreign pol-
and a political community. British 
.is at a critical juncture, for it ap-
to be no longer possible to keep:he traditional "bridge" position open in 
:he Atlantic partnership. If Brita:in de-
;lares for membership it would seem to 
cequire an unquahfied acceptance by Bri-
:ain of the conditions laid down by the 
:OEC countries, and in this they would, of 
;ourse, be asking for no more than they 
were themselves prepared to undertake. 
This position has been made clear by 
various European statesmen at repeatedintervals in the recent past, and it is as 
1 well to be very clear upon this point. 
a re-appraisal 
A..ll the relevant factors in Britain's pre-
sent and projected condition point to-
ward a closer association with Europe. 
That much is not in doubt. The contin-
ed reduction in Britain's role as a world 
s oower since the end of the second world 
war, and the need primarily to focus 
British policy within a region, leads in-
!Xorably, for all practical purposes, to-
ward Europe. Consistent with this view a 
1umber of re-orientations of British pol-
icy have been made. The defence review 
Jf 1969 more explicitly than 'before ex-
e xessed BDitish defence interest as speci-
'ically residing in Europe. In its designa-
e :ion of Europe and North America as an 
'area of concentration" the Duncan Re-
17 
port (the Report o.f the Committee on 
Overseas Representation 1968-69, Cmnd 
4107. Summer, 1969) also expressed Bri-
tish interest as fundamentally based upon 
a European policy. Furthermore, the 
context in which the Duncan Committee 
was set up substantially determined its 
terms of reference, which lends emphasis 
to the orientation of British policy to-
wards Europe. The committee was asked 
"to review urgently the functions and 
scale of the British representational effort 
overseas (including defence and other 
attaches and advisers and British defence 
staffs) in the light of the decisions on 
foreign and defence policy announced 
by Her Majesty's Government on 1 Jan-
uary 1968), the balance of payments and 
the chang.ing international role which 
these imply for the United Kingdom". 
After 1967 Harold Wilson was lookingfor some part of the British industrial 
stock that could be made attractive to 
the EEC countries, and thus make us a 
worthwhile proposition for inclusion in 
the community ; hence the concept of a 
"technological community". Its appeallay .in two directions : first, it had the 
appearance of presenting the opportunity 
to the western Europeans of preventingan American investment ·takeover of their 
own technology ... "a powerful Atlantic 
partnership", as Harold Wilson said dur-
ing his round of talks in the Europeancapitals in January 1967, "can be realised 
only when Europe is a:ble to put forth 
her full economic strength so that we can 
in industr.ial affairs speak from strength 
to our Atlantic partners". And second, it 
helped to portray La:bour in Britain as 
having grasped a new European dimen-
sion in contrast to its previous insularity. 
If this is a fair interpretation of British 
interest and policy then the importantquestion is: to what extent could the 
then Labour government influence the 
basis of its entry in a way that was con-
sistent with sooialist objectives, whilst 
recognising that in any major policy de-
cision the relationship of principles to 
policy is uncertain. This involves making 
assumptions about a whole range of mat-
ters in Europe related to its future de-
velopment. For example, what form 
The President's first response to Britain's 
"enewed application at the EEC summit 
n January 1970 was perhaps more in-
icative of the real attitude of France 
his later conciliatory approach at 
:he end of the mee1Jing. The plain fact 
.s that de Gaulle's attitude, whilst ex-
.reme, nonetheless reflected real interests 
France and indeed perhaps of the EEC 
;ountries as a whole. After all, none of 
:hem was prepared to force the hand 
France in their support of the British 
;J.aim for entry. What is certainly at the 
"oot of the French attitude, and perhaps 
:hat of other members of the Six, is the 
1uestion as to whether Br.itain ~s ready 
:o become truly European in her com-
llitment, which in the long term goeswell beyond the economic communitymd extends into the field of foreign pol-
and a political community. British 
.is at a critical juncture, for it ap-
to be no longer possible to keep:he traditional "bridge" position open in 
:he Atlantic partnership. If Brita:in de-
;lares for membership it would seem to 
cequire an unquahfied acceptance by Bri-
:ain of the conditions laid down by the 
:OEC countries, and in this they would, of 
;ourse, be asking for no more than they 
were themselves prepared to undertake. 
This position has been made clear by 
various European statesmen at repeatedintervals in the recent past, and it is as 
1 well to be very clear upon this point. 
a re-appraisal 
A..ll the relevant factors in Britain's pre-
sent and projected condition point to-
ward a closer association with Europe. 
That much is not in doubt. The contin-
ed reduction in Britain's role as a world 
s oower since the end of the second world 
war, and the need primarily to focus 
British policy within a region, leads in-
!Xorably, for all practical purposes, to-
ward Europe. Consistent with this view a 
1umber of re-orientations of British pol-
icy have been made. The defence review 
Jf 1969 more explicitly than 'before ex-
e xessed BDitish defence interest as speci-
'ically residing in Europe. In its designa-
e :ion of Europe and North America as an 
'area of concentration" the Duncan Re-
17 
port (the Report o.f the Committee on 
Overseas Representation 1968-69, Cmnd 
4107. Summer, 1969) also expressed Bri-
tish interest as fundamentally based upon 
a European policy. Furthermore, the 
context in which the Duncan Committee 
was set up substantially determined its 
terms of reference, which lends emphasis 
to the orientation of British policy to-
wards Europe. The committee was asked 
"to review urgently the functions and 
scale of the British representational effort 
overseas (including defence and other 
attaches and advisers and British defence 
staffs) in the light of the decisions on 
foreign and defence policy announced 
by Her Majesty's Government on 1 Jan-
uary 1968), the balance of payments and 
the chang.ing international role which 
these imply for the United Kingdom". 
After 1967 Harold Wilson was lookingfor some part of the British industrial 
stock that could be made attractive to 
the EEC countries, and thus make us a 
worthwhile proposition for inclusion in 
the community ; hence the concept of a 
"technological community". Its appeallay .in two directions : first, it had the 
appearance of presenting the opportunity 
to the western Europeans of preventingan American investment ·takeover of their 
own technology ... "a powerful Atlantic 
partnership", as Harold Wilson said dur-
ing his round of talks in the Europeancapitals in January 1967, "can be realised 
only when Europe is a:ble to put forth 
her full economic strength so that we can 
in industr.ial affairs speak from strength 
to our Atlantic partners". And second, it 
helped to portray La:bour in Britain as 
having grasped a new European dimen-
sion in contrast to its previous insularity. 
If this is a fair interpretation of British 
interest and policy then the importantquestion is: to what extent could the 
then Labour government influence the 
basis of its entry in a way that was con-
sistent with sooialist objectives, whilst 
recognising that in any major policy de-
cision the relationship of principles to 
policy is uncertain. This involves making 
assumptions about a whole range of mat-
ters in Europe related to its future de-
velopment. For example, what form 

should the British relationship w.ith 
Europe take? Should it be limited to 
some form of "associate" status? Should 
we seek full membership of the EuropeanEconomic Community but limit our 
commitment to the economic sphere?
However much either of these courses of 
action might appeal to opinion in this 
country, or fit British needs, they have 
virtually been ruled out for the presentby the statements made at official level 
about ·the intention to seek full membership. 
The La:bour government made it 
quite clear that it rejected associate 
status, it also shared the desire of the 
six for greater political unity. The election 
of a Conservabive government has 
in no way altered this particular policy.
That being the case it is important to be 
clear ac'bout such matters as the extent 
of influence that Britain might be expected 
to hold in the community ; and 
related to this, the scope rfor Br.itain to 
help shape a political community. There 
is also the matter of the relationshipwhich this community should have with 
the countries of eastern Europe, which 
in turn relates to the perplexing question 
of the two Germanies. Finai'ly for socialists 
an important point is the form and 
qual·ity of the relationship of the EEC 
with international institutions and with 
the outside world, particularly the vast 
underdeveloped part. 

The international links historically embodied 
in Br.itish policy of which socialist 
internationalism is an expression,
might suggest that Britain should not tie 
herself exclusively to one area of the 
world but aim to keep open the avenues 
of international contact. In keeping with 
this view is the idea that British interests 
outside Europe have been not so much 
the result of imperial rule as rather the 
other way round, and that the imperial 
role grew out of involvement with the 
world beyond Europe. In this case the 
nature of British interests in the world 
continue beyond the liquidation of empire. 
In the language of the Duncan Report, 
as a "first rate power of the second 
order" should we not be looking in the 
direction of that group of "middle" 
powers as the 'best way of enabling us 
to conduct an international role. The 

nature of British interests, particularly in 
relation to trade and security in the 
modern world suggest that we should 
look to international channels as a means 
of buttressing our own needs. If we, together 
with other middle sized powershaving interests in common, endeavour 
to build the general lines of policy in 
relatJion to multilateral techniques, then 
international institutions and the concept!
of an international community could take 
on a new and enlarged meaning. It is in 
relation to the United Nations that Britain 
can most obviously be in the vanguard 
of a new approach to a range of 
international subjects. Canada and the 
Scandinavian countries have already set 
an admirable example in their approach 
to the work of the United Nations, and 
in other directions. These are efforts w.ith 
which we, particularly under a Labour 
government, should have been associated. 

the European Economic 
Community 

It is necessary at the outset to be clear 
about the kind of community in Europewe wish to join, and the kind of community 
we wish it to become. It is all 
very well talking a!bout the desirability 
and inevitability of our having a closer 
associatiOn with Europe, but within that 
broad policy, even in actual membership 
of the EEC, there is a margin of preference 
and choice, and it is about these 
preferences that socialists should have 
clear ideas. It is a mistake to claim too 
much for British influence inside the 
community as some· pro-marketeers, <both 
in and outside the Labour Party, are 
to do. There is in this view a tendencyto think that by entering Europe Britain 
can in some way gain fresh access to the 
corridors of world power; a hankeringfor the trimmings of the imperial role 
in a new guise. But the idea of Britain 
exercising world influence through Europe 
as a kind of third "super power" is a 
very questionable asset. If it were to succeed 
it could well add a new element of 
instability to the present equation of 
East/ West power. The essential pointhere is that the logic of the present Euro·
pean power structure dePives from the 
predominance of the two super powers in 


· respective spheres of influence, and 
military strategic deadlock between 
Out of this there has developedfor some form o.f mutual un-
and to sustain this atmos-
super power welcomes de-
relopments within their respective alli-
mces calculated .to weaken the confid-
!nce in one another's abihty to control 
:vents. It is against this background that 
:urther moves to strengthen the integra-
of western Europe, including the en-
argement of the community and stepspolitical integration with com-
non foreign and defence policies, have 
:o be judged. If further unification i.n 
Nestern Europe is impelled lby the motive 
:o be independent of the us it could, at 
:his stage in the development of East /
relations undermine the relation-
;hip betJween the super powers. 
fo serve the wider purpose of stability 
n Europe the moves toward further in-
:egration in the western half, of a pol·i-
:ical and defence character, should be 
;onsonant with the policy of a Europeandetente which the us and the Soviet 
Union wish to promote. The British gov-
~rnment, for this reason alone was right 
:o insist upon being involved in the talks 
l.mongst the six for a common foreign 
oo~icy framework and the plans for a 
oolit"ical community. The strength of the 
oosition from which we negotiate for 
entry to the EEC will make a lot of dif-
:erence to the influence that we mightwield later on. In asking us to be more 
'European", in order to make us a suit-
l.ble candidate, the six have meant that 
we should jettison all the features which 
l.dd to the appearance of a world role--
:he Commonwealth, EFTA, and the "spe-
;ial relationship". Thus we will not bar-
?;ain from a position of strength based 
lpon this supplemen~ary leverage from 
:he outside. This aspect of the case has 
Jassed largely unexamined by those who 
;trongly advocate British membership.
fhey argue in favour of British influence 
l.S though we would still have these in-
;remental advantages in support of our 
Josition. There is no such likelihood, in 
:act it was precisely the fear of this very 
:hing happening that caused the door to 
.:>e slammed on our first application. 
19 
Britain would be one of eleven countries, 
assuming that the other EFTA applicants 
came in simultaneously with us, and 
whilst it is !1ikely that we would have 
equality of voting with the big three 
(France, West Germany and Italy) that 
would not give us a particular advan-
tage. The influence which Britain might 
have will reside largely in the strengthof our case and the force and persuasive-
ness with which it is put forward. Here 
again, the situation is likely to work 
against us. Influence amongst states 
normally exists in common interests 
based upon similarities, lbe they geogra-
phic, traditional ties, trade connections, 
or political institutions. In relation to 
these features several of the countries 
within the EEC, indeed the bloc as a 
whole, have enough in common and are 
sufficiently different from Britain in terms 
of interests and methods of procedure, to 
suggest that on major issues of policyinside the community Britain will usually 
be in a minority position. Furthermore, 
any influence that we may possess is 
11ikely Ito be discounted by the fact that 
we will be the latecomers into a com-
munity that is already well formed, with 
established procedures, almost habits, 
and in which there may well be resent-
ment at having arrangements, carefully 
drawn up, upset by the outsider. "... 
Their entry into the Common Market", 
de Gaulle said in 1967, meaning Britain, 
"would amount to imposing the building 
of a completely new structure which 
would virtually wipe out everything that 
has just been built". There is in this 
view the quite natural desire to protectand preserve what has already been 
achieved. Nor would the veto device in 
our hands be as powerful as it has been 
to France, for the simple reason that 
whereas the other members have already 
indicated <that they regard France as 
essential to the survival of the EEC, no 
such assumption is warranted concerningBritain's position. 
If this line of discussion is continued it 
follows that the pursuit of British inter-
ests requires that we should seek to en-
large that element inside 1Jhe EEC with 
which we have most in common. The 
states which have simil•ar interests to our-
· respective spheres of influence, and 
military strategic deadlock between 
Out of this there has developedfor some form o.f mutual un-
and to sustain this atmos-
super power welcomes de-
relopments within their respective alli-
mces calculated .to weaken the confid-
!nce in one another's abihty to control 
:vents. It is against this background that 
:urther moves to strengthen the integra-
of western Europe, including the en-
argement of the community and stepspolitical integration with com-
non foreign and defence policies, have 
:o be judged. If further unification i.n 
Nestern Europe is impelled lby the motive 
:o be independent of the us it could, at 
:his stage in the development of East /
relations undermine the relation-
;hip betJween the super powers. 
fo serve the wider purpose of stability 
n Europe the moves toward further in-
:egration in the western half, of a pol·i-
:ical and defence character, should be 
;onsonant with the policy of a Europeandetente which the us and the Soviet 
Union wish to promote. The British gov-
~rnment, for this reason alone was right 
:o insist upon being involved in the talks 
l.mongst the six for a common foreign 
oo~icy framework and the plans for a 
oolit"ical community. The strength of the 
oosition from which we negotiate for 
entry to the EEC will make a lot of dif-
:erence to the influence that we mightwield later on. In asking us to be more 
'European", in order to make us a suit-
l.ble candidate, the six have meant that 
we should jettison all the features which 
l.dd to the appearance of a world role--
:he Commonwealth, EFTA, and the "spe-
;ial relationship". Thus we will not bar-
?;ain from a position of strength based 
lpon this supplemen~ary leverage from 
:he outside. This aspect of the case has 
Jassed largely unexamined by those who 
;trongly advocate British membership.
fhey argue in favour of British influence 
l.S though we would still have these in-
;remental advantages in support of our 
Josition. There is no such likelihood, in 
:act it was precisely the fear of this very 
:hing happening that caused the door to 
.:>e slammed on our first application. 
19 
Britain would be one of eleven countries, 
assuming that the other EFTA applicants 
came in simultaneously with us, and 
whilst it is !1ikely that we would have 
equality of voting with the big three 
(France, West Germany and Italy) that 
would not give us a particular advan-
tage. The influence which Britain might 
have will reside largely in the strengthof our case and the force and persuasive-
ness with which it is put forward. Here 
again, the situation is likely to work 
against us. Influence amongst states 
normally exists in common interests 
based upon similarities, lbe they geogra-
phic, traditional ties, trade connections, 
or political institutions. In relation to 
these features several of the countries 
within the EEC, indeed the bloc as a 
whole, have enough in common and are 
sufficiently different from Britain in terms 
of interests and methods of procedure, to 
suggest that on major issues of policyinside the community Britain will usually 
be in a minority position. Furthermore, 
any influence that we may possess is 
11ikely Ito be discounted by the fact that 
we will be the latecomers into a com-
munity that is already well formed, with 
established procedures, almost habits, 
and in which there may well be resent-
ment at having arrangements, carefully 
drawn up, upset by the outsider. "... 
Their entry into the Common Market", 
de Gaulle said in 1967, meaning Britain, 
"would amount to imposing the building 
of a completely new structure which 
would virtually wipe out everything that 
has just been built". There is in this 
view the quite natural desire to protectand preserve what has already been 
achieved. Nor would the veto device in 
our hands be as powerful as it has been 
to France, for the simple reason that 
whereas the other members have already 
indicated <that they regard France as 
essential to the survival of the EEC, no 
such assumption is warranted concerningBritain's position. 
If this line of discussion is continued it 
follows that the pursuit of British inter-
ests requires that we should seek to en-
large that element inside 1Jhe EEC with 
which we have most in common. The 
states which have simil•ar interests to our-

selves, in relation to European affairs and 
to the outside world, are those within the 
EFTA. For this reason, it should be as 
much our concern as for those EFTA 
countries who are applicants with us for 
membership of Vhe EEC to see that their 
interests are treated in a similar manner 
to our own. Quite apaPt from a certain 
likemindedness based upon similar interests, 
the support of the Scandinavians is 
consonant with socialist objectives in 
Britain. Socialists in BPitain have found 
it relatively easy to come to an understanding 
with their Scandinavian colleagues 
a:bout the nature and purpose of 
social democracy, in contrast to the experience 
of working with the continental 
left. 

Admittedly, this is not so true today 
as it was in the 1950s. In the case of 
the German Social Democrats there is 
perhaps an affinity of approach with 
Brutish Labour that is becoming more 
obvious now that the SPD have control 
in Germany. In fact, with the British 
Labour government and the Gerrr.an 
Social Democrats ho,lding similar views 
upon the future of Europe, there was a 
good chance of achieving a basis of 
mutual understanding in Anglo-Germanrelations for the first time since the 
Federal Repub!J.ic was established. Within 
the middle range of powers, to which 
Britain appears to have admitted herself, 
the Scandinavian countr,ies atpproximate 
in their behaviour more closely to a 
socialist conception of an international 
community than any other group of 
states. Their general sense of obligationto the international community goes well 
beyond the regional concept. Indeed, 
the practical service given by these states 
including Canada, to the United Nations, 
proVlides a record wiVh which this country, 
with its own history of international 
involvement, should have been associated. 
The internattionalism of British 
socialism must, equally, convey this general 
sense of obligation to an international 
community, and for this reason it 
was important that a Labour governmentin its effort to gain access to the EE:: 
should not have forgotten the wider concept 
of Europe and its own relations with 
the world at large. 

Furthermore, the extent of British influ· 
ence in making the EEC more outwarc 
looking in its approach must be set ir 
the context of what Britatin has already 
done to direct its policy towards EuropeBy the liquidation of a large part of om 

overseas commitments linked to the 
to get our balance of payments strongthe earmarking of our military posses· 
sions to the European arsenal, and the 
recommendations of the Duncan Com· 

mittee, British policy is clearly envisagec 
as that of a regional European powerWhilst on the whole these policy changes 
have been decided upon, by reference to 
British criteria, nevertheless their coin· 
cidence with the decision to re-activate 
our application to the EEC give the ap· 
pearance of measures aimed at making 
us acceptable to the six. There is also 
an important institutional dbstaole in the 
way of making the EEC enthusiastic about 
the needs of the underdeveloped world. 
that will in turn restrict British influence 
inside the community. Creating the ap-, 
propriate pohitical institutions, whether 
they 'be federal or something less, carries 
with it a substantial degree of insularity. 
It took the United StaJt:es a longtime, even ·after it had welded together 
the Union, to take up its place in the 
international society, and the Soviet 
Union as a further example of a largefederal state showed no great incLination 
to become ·involved in world affairs unt-il 
their communist society had been forged. 
It may be said that the political maturityof the western European states wiLl enable 
them to overcome this initial tendency 
to look inward, but it is as well to 
a·ppreciate that, in its ear.ly stages of development, 
a community has a strong inclinahon 
to concentrate upon its own 
affairs. H has to focus the loyalties of 
a'JI sections of society (from the political 
hierarchy through the administrative 
'bureaucracy to the different populations) 
upon the new community. A regionalgrouping of states of commun~ty status 
will tend therefore during its formative 
years to 1ook inward and discriminate

1

against, or at least be indifferent to, 
states outside the system. British weight 
alone in t:he European scales will not 
seriously affect this tendency ; indeed if 
anythirug, it wiH assist the process through 


the renewed incentive that British membership 
will give rto progress towards a 
political community. In view of this, it is 
in Britain's interest to see that the other 
EFTA applicants are admitted at the same 
time as ourselves so that the outward 
looking group is enlarged. 

1 European security and the relationshipbetween western and eastern Europe is 
-of major ·importance. It does not much 
:natter what the present Soviet motive 
:night be in accepting the need to reach 
;orne form of understanding with the 
West upon issues in Europe. What is 
important is that an opportunity does 
' appear to exist for some bas,is of discus;
ion between the two si-des on means to 
lessen rtension in the area. The question 
, Jf relations between the two Germanies 
is central to any programme of detente 
n Europe. That two Germanies exist, 
3.nd a:re likely to continue to exist into 
foreseeable future, must by now be 
the cardinal fact that has to be accepted. 
Only ~f that is taken for granted can 

r there be real progress in the relations 
Jetween the two halves. With the present 
3DP coatl,ition government in Bonn there 
s the chance of a gradual understanding 
being worked out with the German 
Democratic Republic. The recent talks 
between the two sides, and held on each 
::>ther's territory, are encouraging, if only 
oecause they mark a break in the more 
Jpen hostility that existed •between them. 

J More than that ~t is difficult to claim. 
[nitial exchanges upon 'issues that divide 
:hem are obviously necessary to any 
~ventual normalisation of their relations 
but it would be unwise to make predic:
ions concerning the eventua!l outcome. 
Whilst the question of •the two Gernanies 
is the most important aspect of 

11 :he European scene, it is only part of 
genera'! approach now being renewed 
Jy the eastern European 'bloc to reach 

J, 

t satisfactory understanding with wes,t-
JI !rn Europe. To the extent that this 
1! !astern move can be shown to be genuine 
j[ and not just a further step -in the long 
~ ;tanding game of East/West politics in 

Europe, it should be treated seriously. It 
is of course d'ifficult from a western 
standpoint to establish the seriousness of 
any one offer from the Soviet bloc. Proposals 
from eastern Europe are so much 
~ed up with the internal rpolibcs of the 
Warsaw Pact and the vagaries of the 
Soviet Union that western poJI.icy has to 
remain cautious without shunning at-
temps at settlement. It is true that if 
eastern European initia·ruves are looked 
at over a period of bime, say from the 
Bucharest communique of the Wars<iJW 
Pact in 1966 to the present, there is revealed 
a consistent attempt to raise the 
sutbject of European security, embodied 
in the proposal for a European SecurityConference. In responding to these proposals 
the western powers have ;to be 
clear a•bout what they are wiltl"ing to accept 
in the way of Soviet control in 
eatern Europe. In a recent United Nations 
Association pamphlet, the authors 
argued that "it is clear ~hat Russia has 
keprt large numbers of troops in eastern 
Europe, less to be ready to invade the 
West or to repeJl invaders, as to keep 
eastern Europe .aware of her presenceand ensure no escape from the communist 
fold". This is the most important 
aspect of the Soviert invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968. It is necessary in relation 
to any effort to arrive at a better 
understanding in Europe for the western 
powers to realise the true nature of, and 
reasons for, Soviet control of eastern 
Europe, and to accept into the distant 
future that the Russians wiU continue to 
regard the area as one in which theyhave a "legitimate" security interest. 

At the same time it 'is important to remem'ber 
tlhat it is ~n the interests of the 
eastern European countries to reach 
agreement with •the western half of 
Europe. To secure a greater degree of 
independence of the Soviet Union and 
alleviate the necessity for her intervention 
in their affairs, the states of eastern 
Europe need positive indication that the 
two halves in Europe can work together. 
This does not conflict with the view that 
the communist governments of eastern 
Europe are aware that tiheir ultimate 
mi'htary safeguard is in Russi,an hands, 
or that in the overall East/ West balance 


in Europe they are in the Soviet sphere 
of interest, 'but it does mean that theydesire to make an immediate Russian 
presence less necessary by pointing to 
the willingness of the West to engage in 
detente. The effeot of the Brezhnev doctr
·ine has 'been to encourage eastern 
Europe to reach agreement with the 
West, though understanda!bly the Warsaw 
Pact countries are careful to interpret 
the Soviet attitude accurately in anyinitiatives they take. 

European security 

~--.--.-----~------~


How can further development in western 
European integration, including the enlargement 
of the community, take placewithout adversely affecting East/West relations 
in Europe? Soviet fears concerning 
the conwlidation of western Europewith Brit<Vin inside are well known, and 
perhaps stern from the simple ideological 
point that Russia does not want to see 
a strong western Europe. In relation to 
a posstble West European Defence Community, 
however, there is a firmer base 
to Russ·ian hostility. Her main fear is 
that inevitably West Germany would 
dominate this development, with the 
added factor of control over nuclear 
weapons. To keep an atmosphere of detente 
going at the same time as negotiatitons 
are taking place for enlarging the 
Economic Community and extending it 
into the foreign policy and defence fields, 
will entail considerable diplomatic sk,ill. 
The ideal situation would be that in 
which the defence pllans of western 
Europe formed part of a comprehensive 
system of European security guaranteed 
by the super powers, but this is unlikelyto be a practical programme in the foreseeable 
future. However, it is at least 
possible to avoid creating a defence 

union in western Europe that would increase 
tension and have the additional 
effect of driving the eastern states more 
firmly into the hands of Russia. 

As the possi'bility of the two super powers 
negotiating the future of Europewithout reference to their all'ies became 
more apparent, the ,jdea of a West European 
Defence Communi•ty based upon 

nuclear deterrence gained favour. Th~ 
notion has perh<11ps acquired a new im 
petus in the 'light of President Nixon' 
statement, in February 1970, concernin1 
United States' policy toward Europe wit! 
its envisaged force reductions. The Bri 
t.ish attitude is important in this matter 
A European deterrent would initially a 
least depend upon British co-operation 
Our experience and guidance in thest 
matters together with the practical con 
tribution of our warheads would bt 
necessary to the success of the profectMost [nformed writers upon EuropeaLdefence are now o.f the opinion that < 
European nuclear deterrent is no Ionge, 
the major consideration. Whether this b1 
true or not, the fact remains that at thi: 
juncture in western European affairs 
with the British application for member 
ship of the EEC pending, and the Wes 
Europeans looking for ways to strengtherand develop their institutions, British co 
operation in a nuclear scheme become: 
a relevant factor. With her nuclear statw 
Britain has a measure of power to deter· 
mine the character of events in this field : 
and many <would a11gue that the wisesi 
use of that power would be to rnaintair 
the effectiveness of the western alliance 
and not to create a new element of in· 
stability by helping to develop a Euro· 
pean deterrent. Harold Wilson's words ir 
I 967 made very clear British policy a1 
that time, "I certainly do not believe 
that to join the community . . . rneam 
fundamental changes in European de· 
fence arrangements, destructive of tJhc 
western alliance, destructive of the hope~ 
of a East/West detente". More recentlyDenis Healey specifically rejected the idea 
of a "European NATO". This policyshould continue to form part of the pre· 
sent Brutish government's basic approach 
to Europe. It is a policy aimed to preserve 
the western ailliance and to accommodate 
East/ West security ta•lks. 

The idea of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation 
within the framework of the 
western alliance has two main implications. 
In the first place, Anglo-French 
collaboration could have a cohesive effect 
upon the Atlantic aN,iance, br-ingling the 
French more closely into the military 
structure of NATO again and requiring 


hem to join NATO's nuclear planning;roup. This would result in a strength-
ming of the alliance and a more even 
listri'bution of its burdens, wJth con:
omitantly a greater voice :by the prin:
ipal European partners. Denis Healey1inted that British co-operation with 

•ranee upon nuclear matters would be 
>ossible, "if France were to decide to 
lo this (join NATO's nuclear :planning1roup), a new situation would arise 
¥hich could lead us all to a closer co>
peration in the nuclear fie1d". Secondly, 
~iven the anti-us orientation of French 
>olicy, Anglo-French nuclear co-operaion 
could be used by France to establish 
. western European nuclear capacity 
rom which a negotiating position on 
~ast/West relations could be adopted inlepently 
of the us. In view of this, Briish 
insistence upon keeping nuclear colaborartion 
wdth France firmil.y inside the 
\tlantic alliance, is the necessary safe:
uard against France using the conjuncion 
of the British applioation for mem>
erSihip of the EEC and nuclear co-operaion 
as an anti-American device. 
!:'he traditional opposinion of socialists 

o armaments can find partial satisfacion 
in the policy which the Labour gov~
rnment pursued on the question of 
~uropean security. Included in recent 
:xchanges between East and West has 
>een the udea for an all European securty 
conference as a means of workingmt a comprehensive security system for 
~urope. Whilst it is premature to taJlk 
,f a security system for the whole of 
!-urope, this will remain the long term 
1bjective. In the meantime certain initial 
neasures can help toward the reahsation 
,f comprehensive security. For example, 
1 
afuer than working directly for the 
ingle "settlement" t}'lpe conference it is 

•erhaJps more realistic to aim art estabishing 
joint East/ West working parties 
.t a lower than official level, though inluding 
some government representation 
o ensure that the centres of power are 
arried along. This mlight take the form 
1 
,f preceding a full conference by a series 
,f such preparatory work,ing parties and 
ontinuing beyond it with similar exhanges. 
In this way, the holding o.f talks 
bout common security problems be


tween the two sides would become established, 
and once the practice was embedded 
it would be difficult for either 
side to reverse the process. As an alternaJtive 
it should prove possible for representatives 
of the two alliance systems 
to exchange views upon security ques~
ions. The super powers might make a 
gesture to European feeling in this respect 
by allowing only the European 
partners •to hold the initial exchangesand, depending upon the progress made, 
alllow them to do most of the preparatory 
work. 

Havling got themselves into a militaryconfrontation in the centre of Europewith complex aJlliiance systems, both sides 
are going to find it very difficult to extricate 
themselves and engage in fue practical 
side of detente. There will be a great 
amount of preparatory work entailed, 
with signs of sustaJined good intent, and 
practical steps lin arms control pointingthe way to a security system. The accepted 
liines of development are likelyto include joint inspection of zones where 
phased military withdrawal has been approved, 
in order to prevent rapid reentry, 
agreed means of ensuring that 
rapid troop movements do not occur, and 
a suitably composed supervisory body 
consisting of both s~des and meeting at 
agreed intervals to ensure that the system 
is worl~ing satisfactorily. If this can 
be achieved both sides may approachthe condition in whidh they can live together 
·in Europe and agree upon procedures 
to accommodate change in, and 
between, their respective systems. The 
BDitish view of its contribution to European 
affairs should continue to be that 
outlined by Harold Wilson in 1967 when 
discussing European unity with the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, "our conception 
of European uruty is not based on 
something narrow or inward looking ... 
There are far bigger issues at stake. The 
essential one Js whether 1it is going to 
be possib1e to build up Europe, as I think 
most Europeans understand it, with as 
a major objective the breaking down of 

tension between East and West. The 
countr.ies of western and eastern Europe 
al,ike aofl have a V'ital role to play in 
achieving this objective". 


5. conclusion 
In recent years Britain has been compelled 
to come to terms w.ith her reduced 
circumstances. The process has been 
painful, and has in large measure contributed 
to the current mood of national 
intro&pection. Neverthroess this was essential 
.irf we were to be a credible power. 
Work1ng now from a different premiss 
of power contemporary socialist philosophy 
can 'be real•isticaHy conccived and 
made relevant to Britain's role in the 
future. The exigencies of international 
politics combine with the nuclear factor 
to narrow the margin of unilateral action 
of any state, and at the same time create 
the necessity for a sense of international 
re&ponsibility. 

In Britain's case, of course, these internal 
and external developments have helped 
to produce a bi-<partisanship :in foreign 
policy. Ernest Bevin had to withstand 
attacks from the left wing of the La•bour 
Party because of his alleged conservative 
foreign .poticy, but what is not sufficiently 
emphasised is that Conservative 
foreign policy has in turn 'been ir.fluenced 
by the sociaJiist view. J1his similarity 
of the part•ies on basic :issues in foreign 
policy was bound to happen as the 
"el'bow room" in our external relations 
became restricted. Successive British governments 
since 1945 have found it necessary 
to achieve a consensus among their 
a•llies in order to make British pol·icyviable, and have been suscept'ilble to the 
pressure of other states operating throughthe UN. This can be seen in the fact that 
Conservative governments have been 
more influenced by the effects of the UN 
than ever their inter-war counterparts 
were by the LeaJgue of Nations. 

As Britain adjusts to her new place in 
the international system, different factors 
will correspondingly be em:phas•ised in 
her foreign relations, such as efforts to 
strengthen the concept of international 
society, more assi&tance to the poorerareas of the world, and policies to curb 
the impact of power politics. Br•itain has 
a long history of international involvement 
and ·increasingly in the future her 
policy wiN have to be based upon agreement 
with other states in Europe, and 
elsewhere in the worild. In this context, 

the socialist view of foreign affairs wil 
help to formulate a large part of Britisl 
foreign policy, in contrast to its previou 
assi·gnment of a revolutionary doctrin1 
seeking to supplant the conventionaJ 
pattern. 

The conjuncture of Britain's loss o 
world power and the conso:Jidation o 
western Europe has rforced Brita>in to re 
assess her relationship wi•th Europe in : 
far more critical way than hitherto. As : 
result, whatever happens-whether w• 
join the Common Market or not-Britisl 
policy will become more aJbsorbed wit! 
Europe. On •balance, the projected inter 
ests of Britain come out in favour of : 
positJive European po•l1icy involving ful 
membership of the European commun 
ity. But it is unfortunate that member 
ship of the EEC rather than being con 
sidered as one orf severa1 proMematicall: 
balanced options, has been presente1 
more in the form of a necessity, thus pu1!
ting rational discussion at a discount an1 
weakening our negotiating position i1 
Europe. 


Fabian society 
lhe Fahian Society emts to fwther 
ocialist education and research. It is 
liated to the Labour Party, both na-
ionally and locally, and embraces all 
hades of Socialist opinion within its 
anks--left, right and centre. 
:ince 1884 the Fabian Society has en-
oiled thoughtful socialists who are pro-
laced to discuss the essential questions 
•f democratic socialism and relate them 
:> practical plans for building socialism 
1 a changing world. 
leyond this the Society has no collective 
olicy. 1t puts forward no resolutions of 
political character, but it is not an 
rganisation of armchair socialists. Its 
embers are active in their Laibour 
rarties, Trade Unions and Co-operatives. 
bey are representative of the laboW' 
11ovement, practical people concerned to 
tudy and discuss problems that matter. 
ne Society is organised nationally and 
ocally. The national Society, directed 
y an elected Executive Committee, pub-
hes pamphlets, and holds schools and 
'onferences of many kinds. Local Socie-
es--there are some 80 of them-are 
elf governing and are lively centres of 
iscussion and also undertake research. 
:nquiries about membersltip should be 
:nt to the General Secretary, Fabian 
ociety, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, 
W1; telephone 01-930 3077. 
BN 7163 0401 5. 
the author 
Rodney Fielding is Principal Lecturer 
in International Studies at Lanchester 
Polytechnic. He went to Ruskin College, 
Oxford, on a Robert Addy HopkinsonScholarship in 1954 and later graduated 
at the LSE in international relations. His 
study of British foreign policy includes 
an M .PH degree from Sussex University 
on the career of Sir Norman Angell. He 
is chairman of the Coventry Fabian 
Society. 
Cover design, Jonathan Green-Armytage ; 
typogra>phy, Geoffrey Cannon. Printed by 
The Walrus Press Ltd. (ru), 769 Harrow 
Road, Sudbury, Wembley, Middlesex. 
Fabian society 
lhe Fahian Society emts to fwther 
ocialist education and research. It is 
liated to the Labour Party, both na-
ionally and locally, and embraces all 
hades of Socialist opinion within its 
anks--left, right and centre. 
:ince 1884 the Fabian Society has en-
oiled thoughtful socialists who are pro-
laced to discuss the essential questions 
•f democratic socialism and relate them 
:> practical plans for building socialism 
1 a changing world. 
leyond this the Society has no collective 
olicy. 1t puts forward no resolutions of 
political character, but it is not an 
rganisation of armchair socialists. Its 
embers are active in their Laibour 
rarties, Trade Unions and Co-operatives. 
bey are representative of the laboW' 
11ovement, practical people concerned to 
tudy and discuss problems that matter. 
ne Society is organised nationally and 
ocally. The national Society, directed 
y an elected Executive Committee, pub-
hes pamphlets, and holds schools and 
'onferences of many kinds. Local Socie-
es--there are some 80 of them-are 
elf governing and are lively centres of 
iscussion and also undertake research. 
:nquiries about membersltip should be 
:nt to the General Secretary, Fabian 
ociety, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, 
W1; telephone 01-930 3077. 
BN 7163 0401 5. 
the author 
Rodney Fielding is Principal Lecturer 
in International Studies at Lanchester 
Polytechnic. He went to Ruskin College, 
Oxford, on a Robert Addy HopkinsonScholarship in 1954 and later graduated 
at the LSE in international relations. His 
study of British foreign policy includes 
an M .PH degree from Sussex University 
on the career of Sir Norman Angell. He 
is chairman of the Coventry Fabian 
Society. 
Cover design, Jonathan Green-Armytage ; 
typogra>phy, Geoffrey Cannon. Printed by 
The Walrus Press Ltd. (ru), 769 Harrow 
Road, Sudbury, Wembley, Middlesex. 

recent fabian pamphlets 
re~earch series 
233 
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A. Lester, N. Deakin (eds) 
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Society of Labour LawyersD. Rubinstein, C. Speakman 
J. Agate, M. Meacher 
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Society of Labour LawyersRoy Moore 
a Fabian GroupLord Kennet 
Alf Morris 
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Peter Draper and others 
Lord Walston 
D . Bourn, N. Howard 
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323 Richard M. Titmuss 
331 Richard Wollheirn 
353 Brian Abel-Smith 
374 Brigid Brophy 
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young fabian pamphlets 
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H . Glennerster, R. PrykeD . Atkinson and others 
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Margaret Cole 
Brian Abel-Smith and others 
Brian Lapping and Giles Radice (eds) 
Peter Townsend and others 
Peter Townsend and others 
Workers' control in Yugoslavia 4s 
New look at comprehensive schools 3s 
Policies for racial equality 5s 
Equality for women 5s 
Justice for all 8s 
Legal education 5s 
Leisure, transport and the countryside 4s 
The care of the old 5s 
Politics and the multinational company 5s 
Occupational accidents and the law 3s 
Self management in Yugoslavia 5s 
Planning for education in 1980 Ss 
Controlling our environment 3s 
Value added tax: a tax on the consumer 3s 
The future for Indian democracy 7s 
Action for welfare rights 3s 
The NHS: three views 4s 
Farm •gate to Brussels 6s 
The future of telecommunications 5s 
The irresponsible society 
Socialism and culture 
Freedom in the welfare state 
Religious education in state schools 
The case for capital taxes 
Democracy and individual rights 
The press : a case for commitment 
Which way for social work'! 
Welfare rights 
Labour's pension planThe ·rue: a plan for the 1970s 
Europe: out of the impasse 
Paying for the social services 
Community action 
~ 
6s 
Is 
3s 
4s 
3s 
5s 
5s 
2s 
4s 
5s 
3s 
3s 
6s 
The publlc schools 3s 
Students today 5s 
Whither Kenyan emigrants? 4s 
Free communism : a Czech experiment Ss 
· and Labour in 3s 
Fabian essays (sixth edition) 
The story of Fabian Socialism 
Socialism and affluence 
cased 30s 
paper ISs 
paper I2s 
paper 2Ss 
pa>per ISsMore power to the peopleSocial services for all? 
The fifth social service hard cover 30s 
recent fabian pamphlets 
re~earch series 
233 
237 
262 
268 
273 
276 
277 
278 
279 
280 
281 
282 
283 
284 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 
F. Singleton, A. TophamM. Armstrong, M. Young 
A. Lester, N. Deakin (eds) 
M. Rende! and others 
Society of Labour Lawyers 
Society of Labour LawyersD. Rubinstein, C. Speakman 
J. Agate, M. Meacher 
Louis Turner 
Society of Labour LawyersRoy Moore 
a Fabian GroupLord Kennet 
Alf Morris 
Sitanshu Das 
David Bull 
Peter Draper and others 
Lord Walston 
D . Bourn, N. Howard 
tracts 
323 Richard M. Titmuss 
331 Richard Wollheirn 
353 Brian Abel-Smith 
374 Brigid Brophy 
388 Oliver Stutchbury 
390 Anthony Lester 
391 Eric Moonman and others 
393 Adrian Sinfield 
395 Tony Lynes396 Tony Lynes397 John Hughes 
398 Norman Hart, Ernest Wistrich 
399 R. H. S. Crossman 
400 Anne Lapping (ed.) 
young fabian pamphlets 
7 
17 
18 
I9 
20 
books 
H . Glennerster, R. PrykeD . Atkinson and others 
Vincent Cable 
Anthony OsleyNicholas uet 
Bernard Shaw and others 
Margaret Cole 
Brian Abel-Smith and others 
Brian Lapping and Giles Radice (eds) 
Peter Townsend and others 
Peter Townsend and others 
Workers' control in Yugoslavia 4s 
New look at comprehensive schools 3s 
Policies for racial equality 5s 
Equality for women 5s 
Justice for all 8s 
Legal education 5s 
Leisure, transport and the countryside 4s 
The care of the old 5s 
Politics and the multinational company 5s 
Occupational accidents and the law 3s 
Self management in Yugoslavia 5s 
Planning for education in 1980 Ss 
Controlling our environment 3s 
Value added tax: a tax on the consumer 3s 
The future for Indian democracy 7s 
Action for welfare rights 3s 
The NHS: three views 4s 
Farm •gate to Brussels 6s 
The future of telecommunications 5s 
The irresponsible society 
Socialism and culture 
Freedom in the welfare state 
Religious education in state schools 
The case for capital taxes 
Democracy and individual rights 
The press : a case for commitment 
Which way for social work'! 
Welfare rights 
Labour's pension planThe ·rue: a plan for the 1970s 
Europe: out of the impasse 
Paying for the social services 
Community action 
~ 
6s 
Is 
3s 
4s 
3s 
5s 
5s 
2s 
4s 
5s 
3s 
3s 
6s 
The publlc schools 3s 
Students today 5s 
Whither Kenyan emigrants? 4s 
Free communism : a Czech experiment Ss 
· and Labour in 3s 
Fabian essays (sixth edition) 
The story of Fabian Socialism 
Socialism and affluence 
cased 30s 
paper ISs 
paper I2s 
paper 2Ss 
pa>per ISsMore power to the peopleSocial services for all? 
The fifth social service hard cover 30s