

Papers of Hugh Dalton:
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DIARY

4. 7. 39.

Go to see Maisky, as I have another question to P.M. to-morrow on Russian negotiations.

M. says that the two outstanding points are -

- (1) The British proposal that Holland, Switzerland and Luxemburg, in addition to other States already discussed, should be named and guaranteed, if not in the Treaty itself, at least in a protocol attached to it. He says that this is a new proposal from the British side and is put forward to balance the British concession regarding the Baltic States. He says that the Russians have pointed out that this is a new extension and that they can only agree if there are pacts of mutual guarantee between the S.U. and Poland and the S.U. and Turkey. Their General Staff, he says, have worked out that 100 Divisions would be required to implement their existing guarantees, and the new British proposal would mean a further extension.
- (2) The Russian's desire that "aggression" in the draft should be both "direct or indirect".

I press him as to whether the British proposals on the small States in the west are really new. He says this is the first time they have been formally put forward, though he admits that Strang made a vague reference to them when he returned to Moscow. M. adds that neither Holland nor Switzerland have diplomatic relations with Moscow. I say that the argument of his General Staff is sheer tripe and reminds me of the sort of arguments we used to meet when we were arguing in favour of definite commitments on the Continent. Either, I say, there will be a war in which the S.U. is engaged, or not. It will make no difference to military calculations whether it breaks out through a direct attack on France or Britain or through an indirect attack via Holland, Luxemburg or Switzerland. I add that I am appalled at the thought of now widening the area of negotiations to bring in the Poles and the Turks. I warn him that there will be a good deal of criticism of the Russians for delaying the conclusion of the Pact, even though they may seem to themselves to have good arguments. But so will British Ministers if they stress the similarity between Russia's interest in the Baltic States, which we are now prepared to recognise, and French interest in the Low Countries and Switzerland.

I add that I shall not be able to make any reference to Holland and Switzerland to-morrow, unless to-morrow's press gives

me an opening. I gather that M. will take steps to provide the opening. (Next day the "News Chronicle" carries a full, and "Daily Telegraph" a partial, disclosure. The N.C. stresses the fact that a "new obstacle" and "new issues" have arisen as a result of the British proposals.)

M. thinks that, as to Staff talks, it should be arranged that they should begin immediately and be concluded by a definite date. He says that we have now, even without H., S. and L. a family of 8 children - "3 mammas and 8 children" - and surely this is a big enough family to begin with. Other children could be taken care of later.* (The 8 are Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium, Finland, Estonia and Latvia.) I say that 7 out of 8 are in East Europe and only one in the West. This is very advantageous for the S.U. He says that in the case of 5 out of 8 guarantees were given without consulting the S.U.

We speak again of the possibility of a 3-Power Pact alone, and I say that this seems unsatisfactory since it deals only with direct aggression against any one of the three parties. It would not, therefore, cover a German attack on Poland through Danzig. He says that he thinks it might be possible to extend the definition of aggression in this case. But I did not gather that the Russians have suggested this.

5. 7. 39.

Speak to A.G. who was asked to see P.M. last night, when latter dwelt on difficulties of Soviet negotiations. I tell him of my talk with M. and say that I think I must "raise the temperature" a bit at questions to-day, without positively threatening a debate. He agrees, though not, I thought, very enthusiastically. He and H.M., who comes in in the middle of our conversation, both feel that H.M.G. have got a case on H., S. and L. I say yes, but why bring it in so late in the negotiations?

At question time I ask whether it is true, as stated in the press (I mean, of course, the N.C.), that one of the outstanding difficulties is due to new proposals by H.M.G. to extend list of States named and guaranteed in Treaty. P.M. says it is not desirable to give details of negotiations. I then ask whether he

* He hinted that there might be an extension to the Far East.

realises that these negotiations have dragged on for nearly three months and that he has been treated with great forbearance both in the House and in the country. At this stage, our people cheer and the Tories growl. I then add that we will soon have to have a show-down if he cannot settle.

I am told that this is put over the wireless with some emphasis later on. Ammon, next to me on the bench, says "You should not have said 'Show-down'". He clearly thought this was a lapse from pure English! I tell him that this word was pre-meditated, as it is vaguer than "debate". The next day, 6th, I am well reported in N.C. as well as in larger papers, but not in D.H., which carries a long explanation by Ewer tending to put most blame on the Russians.

*I speak to Williams, who says the report was omitted by mistake. I write to D.H. on the 7th next day, saying that
for L answer.*

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Come back in the morning from W.L., having been sorely tempted to stay down there another day, but have a P.Q. to Chamberlain on Anglo-Soviet negotiations. Speak to Maillot in the morning, who says that latest formula of Molotov is, the French think, "not unacceptable". The French, as usual, are trying to bridge gaps between us and the Russians, thinking us both unduly sticky. Corbin has been continuously active in this direction. The latest formula relates to "indirect aggression". I do not put any Supplementaries to P.M. We are in a dilemma. Either we press the Government or not. In the first case, we may encourage the Russians to be more difficult and be represented by Ministers here as impeding the negotiations (Kirkpatrick has told Stokes that "if only your Front Bench would keep quiet for a little while, we could get an agreement"); in the other case, we are taken to be acquiescing in H.M.G.'s conduct of the negotiations and make our supporters in the country impatient.

P.M., clumsily and curtly, in reply to V. Adams who asked whether it was intended to send Halifax to Moscow, replied merely "No, sir". Maillot, whom I saw again in the afternoon, said that this was typically clumsy; it might well give the Russians further cause for offence.

The long statement by the P.M. on Danzig sounds fairly good. If one did not so distrust the man, one would be satisfied with it, but it does contain a possible get-out in referring in successive sentences to "raising grave issues affecting the independence of Poland" and "if Polish independence were clearly threatened". Greenwood and I think, however, that no Supplementaries would help, particularly since the statement is a joint draft and P.M., if questioned, might do less well.

Raczynski is in the Gallery and I afterwards ring up Polish Embassy and ask Balinski to tell R. that we thought the statement pretty satisfactory and, for this reason, sat tight and silent.

B., a little later, rings me up and says R. is grateful and would like me to go to lunch on Wednesday to discuss things "quietly".

Greenwood says that a Czech came to see him who had recently left Prague. He had been to see Neurath and suggested that he might visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden. N. advised him not to do so, saying that H. was "quite unbearable" at present.

Apparently he is in a state of violent frustration after the "firm stand" over Danzig.

Gillies, who always brings sensational tales from Refugees, tells me that he hears (a) from German refugees from sources within Germany and (b) from someone who has met a "high Swiss military officer" that Hitler has decided to attack Poland in August or September with four armies, one from East Prussia, two along the Western Polish frontier, and a fourth across the Carpathians from Slovakia; that he will throw 80% of the German forces against the Poles and thinks he can win that war in a few weeks; that meanwhile he will take no action against the West unless we and the French attack him, in which case he will retaliate with aircraft; that, if he defeats the Poles, he will then "offer peace" to France, involving, presumably, large concessions to himself and Italy in the matter of colonies, etc; that the German High Command is prepared for a high proportion of desertions from the Army and also for great ferment both in Austria and in the Czech lands, which will necessitate the detachment of large police, and some military, forces; that France will be compelled to keep, as a precaution, 400,000 men on the Alpine frontier, where also there will be some German units to stiffen the Italians, and another 400,000 on the Pyrenees.

All these people may be saying this kind of thing, and it is certainly not to be excluded. On the other hand, there is ground for believing that the Nazis deliberately spread these sort of stories as part of their "war of nerves".

11. 7. 39.

At Parliamentary E.C. great concern expressed at failure to get Anglo-Soviet Pact. Is there anything further that we can do, either publicly or privately? It is felt by some that the Russians are probably being pernickety now, just as the British side has been in the past. Suggested that some of us should see Chamberlain, but to this it is pointed out that he does not really know the details of the negotiations very well. Finally decided that Greenwood and I should see Halifax, probably tomorrow, and report to E.C. on Thursday.

See Stanczak, Polish Miners' Leader, at his request. The son of Ebby Edwards acts as interpreter. S. says nothing very new except that there is some doubt in Poland, though it is not stated officially, whether the country can stand the financial strain of the arms programme and the continual mobilisation of a great army (it is to help this obvious defect that the latest British

loan is intended, but I do not discuss this with S.). He is not satisfied with the internal policy of the Government and would like to see the Peasant Party participating, and, if possible, also the Socialists. He asks whether I could come to Poland with, perhaps, a representative of the T.U.C. to meet some of them in a private conference, possibly at Gdynia. He has already mentioned this to E. Edwards and is, apparently, going to speak to Citrine about it. I say that anything of this sort should have official sanction, e.g., from the N.C.L., and that if it is desired that I should go, I would be glad to do so.

are (1) the definition of "Indirect Aggression", with special reference to the Baltic States, and (2) the Russian demand that staff talks should have been concluded before the agreement itself is signed. I say that when Citrine, Morrison and I were told that H., S. and L. were to be included, we were not told that this was a new point raised for the first time from the British side. This was only brought out in three or four newspapers some days later. I say that, if indeed it was a new point, then, however reasonable it might be, it was a great mistake to introduce it at so late a stage of the negotiations. Halifax, looking me rather straight in the eyes, says "On that I am inclined to agree with you". (I am more than ever sure that this was a Simonism.) On the two points still outstanding the original French view was that "something might be made" of Molotov's latest formula on indirect aggression, but that the proposal to delay signature till after staff talks was quite impossible. The British view had been the exact reverse of this. They thought M's latest formula highly dangerous, but were willing, if an announcement of agreement were made, to postpone the actual signature till after military conversations. They realise, on the other hand, that these might turn out awkwardly if, e.g., the Russians demanded that we should put battleships in the Baltic. Corbin had, however, come back, after reflection and consultation with his Government, and said that they now agreed with us about indirect aggression, and it was Halifax's hope that in the next stage of the talks at Moscow it might be possible to barter a modification of the Russian formula on I.A. against an acceptance of the Russian demand that staff talks should start quickly without signature of the agreement. H. said that Molotov, when asked by Seeds what he had in mind as an example of I.A., said "If, for instance, the Estonian Government accepted German instructors in their Army". He seemed to mean that, in such a case, the Russians would send them an ultimatum and, if they did not yield, might invade Estonia. "This", said H., "would open a wider door than I could walk through". The British formula on I.A. turned on the phrase "threat of force". Unfortunately, there seemed to be no round-table discussions in the Moscow talks, and H. repeated, though less crudely, the story the P.M. had told C., M. and me about Molotov sitting on a dais and the others on lower levels, "which makes it all very difficult". I said that the "Daily Telegraph" reported that the others sat in deep easy chairs and that this version did not sound so bad. I asked whether Seeds could not get hold of someone unofficially, outside these formal conferences. H. said this seemed impossible. He added, "Seeds is the only Englishman I have met who really wanted to live in Moscow".

Greenwood was less soft this afternoon than on previous occasions when I have been with him to see Ministers, and began by putting the point that there was great concern, not only in our Party but in much wider circles, at the long delays over the Pact.

I put it all a good deal more bluntly, and told H. that I thought it was a great mistake that he and Molotov had not yet met. I had suggested it before Whitsun in a P.Q. but the idea had been brushed aside. I appreciated that, if they met now for the first time with nothing settled, and after their meeting there was still nothing settled, this would be worse than not meeting, but I strongly urged that if only something, however partial, could be agreed and announced, a meeting would then both be good news and might, by diminishing mistrusts and misunderstandings, ease the next stages. H. did not disagree, though he said it would be very difficult for him to go to Moscow. He wondered whether M. would like to be invited here; he thought probably not, particularly for negotiations, since it seemed that he too had to refer everything back to a group of his own colleagues. (I thought, "You like to suggest to us that he is tied by the leg just as tight as you!") I said "What about meeting at Geneva?" and H. said that he would be very glad to go if M. would go, but the next Council meeting was not till September. I said that we could not possibly avoid a debate before Parliament rose, but if there was still a real chance of pulling off an Anglo-Soviet agreement, it would be better to have the debate after this had been done. But I added that we were under very heavy pressure to have it all out in the House now. H. said that he quite understood this and thought that we had treated the Government very well in Parliament. He would be delighted to see us again at any time and tell us how things were going on. If a debate became necessary and no agreement had been reached, perhaps a Ministerial statement, so phrased as to make the best of a bad job, could be drawn up and shown to us before the debate. He did not ask for an answer on this now, but perhaps we would think it over.

On the possibility of falling back on a simple Three-Power Pact for mutual assistance against direct aggression, H. said that the French were wholly against this. It would be a plain confession of defeat, would encourage Hitler, and would not cover any of the most dangerous cases, e.g., a German attack on Poland or Rumania. I said "If that is to be ruled out, do try and think of some other partial agreement which could be announced and which would do something to restore confidence while further discussions were going on". He said he was already turning this over in his mind.

As we were leaving, he said that he had seen Raczynski who reported that the Poles were in a very confident mood. Beck was quite satisfied with the P.M.'s declaration on Danzig. H.M.G. was sending Gen. Ironside to Poland to talk to Smigly-Rydz. This would not be officially announced but would certainly leak out. I said "You should also send British bombers on training flights over Poland as well as over France, and let that leak out too".

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21. 7. 39.

Maillot says that, in their latest instructions to Moscow, the British now accept the principle of simultaneous political and military agreement, but still reject the Russian definition of Indirect Aggression as being too wide. The French Government have pressed the British to give way on this last point also, being most desirous of getting the Pact signed and regarding it as vital for the peace of Europe. I said that I feared that some of our Cabinet wanted to break with the Russians and to break most plausibly.

As to the financial negotiations with Poland, M. says that Leith-Ross has sent a most rude and curt note to the Poles, rejecting their demand that they shall be free to spend the proceeds of our Loan where they like, and insisting that they shall only have credits to be controlled and expended here, in spite of the fact that they need many things which we cannot at present supply. M. says that he has seen many diplomatic notes in the past, but none so rude as this. On these negotiations also the French have been urging us to give way, since it is urgent to reach agreement.

The negotiations with Rumania are also sticking.

We speak of Wohltat's visit. I tell M. of the lunch at the Savoy on the 20th when W. was cross-examined and bullied by a large company, including Kindersley, D'Arcy-Cooper, Trenchard, Stamp - who admitted that he had believed in Munich and bullied W. less than the others - Alexander, Clement Davies and myself. I said that the purpose of the lunch was to impress W. with the unity and determination of British opinion to resist any further aggression by Hitler. I thought it had been reasonably successful. I had told him that I had asked K. Wood to consider putting part of the R.A.F. in Poland for the next few months; to help to defend Poland if attacked. This suggestion, I said, had been greeted with cheers from our Benches and would be applauded by audiences in the country. W. had said "The British Air Force would have my sympathy if they were stationed in Poland in time of war". I said "We might perhaps exchange sympathy". Maillot said that he had no doubt that W. had been much harranged on these lines. He was himself a "Moderate" and a Goering man. The German Embassy had, M. knew, been sending -- to Berlin for months a stream of evidence in support of the now much stronger British attitude.

M. said that W. was over here primarily to discuss

(1) the finance of refugee settlement, whereby refugees might be allowed to bring out some small fraction of their wealth, and (2) the setting off of British credits in the Czech lands against other claims. Asked whether Hitler would be interested to discuss an economic framework of a general settlement, W. had apparently replied that Hitler was not quite this kind of man, but that Goering would be glad to talk on such lines.

R.S.Hudson, Sir Horace Wilson and others have been throwing out suggestions to W. of a Peace Offer which might be made at the end of September. This would include a large British loan conditional upon substantial German disarmament. It would also include provisions whereby export markets for Germany might be secured, in the British Empire and elsewhere. Danzig and other troublesome and disputed matters might be postponed. News of these talks, in which at least one member of the Cabinet was interested, had come to M. via the Duke of Alba. Sir H.Wilson had seen Wohltat more than once during his visit.

I said the principle in all this was good enough, but one did not trust the persons concerned. If Chamberlain makes this sort of proposal in the autumn, just before an election, the Labour Party will be in a hole, for if we oppose we are warmongers, and if we support we agree with the Government. M. said that he thought the Germans would like Chamberlain to win the next election so as to be free to appease them further. Meanwhile, I added, they will wear out the Poles.

M. spoke of Sir H.Wilson's visit to Berlin immediately before Munich. He had seen a note of Wilson's conversation with Hitler. Hitler had asked three times "Does your Government mean war?", and three times Wilson had said "That is a question which I cannot answer".

As to respective responsibilities of British and French for collapse, M. says that Corbin, a most correct and reserved man, had returned to the Embassy on the 12th September saying between his teeth, "We are betrayed".

24. 7. 39.

Hudson's indiscretions to Wohltat are in the press this morning. They will, I suppose, be disowned by the P.M. to-day.

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DIARY

August, 1939.

Greenwood, as acting Leader, reported roughly as follows to Parliamentary Executive and National Council of Labour in the third week of August.

Hfx

Wednesday, 9th. A.G. saw Halifax, most concerned then about the Far East, where our strategic position was difficult. He said that ~~xxxx~~ more evidence had come in against the four Chinamen. A.G. said "We must have no more Munichs in the Far East". In Danzig he said the position was not good, but, on the other hand, in Moscow the Staff talks were beginning well. He had not yet seen Strang and was inclined to let the political talks rest while the military talks went on. (How, at every point, the Russians have beaten us! In retrospect Molotov insisted on Staff talks beginning in order to bring Ribbentrop up to the scratch. At the Staff talks the Russians first asked for French and British plans against Germany; when they had got dangerously much of this and were asked for their own, they made impossible demands for occupation of Poland and used this as one ground for breaking off. Some date the change in Soviet policy from the disappearance of Litvinov. On this view, Molotov, ~~xxx~~ as Foreign Commissar, was playing a double game from the first.)

Wednesday, 16th. A.G. saw Halifax. As to Danzig, Burckhardt had been asked by Hitler to see him. He got the approval of British, French and Swedish Governments before he went. He asked Hfax. what message he should take to Hitler, and Hfax. said "We have declared our policy on Poland and there it is." B. reported to Hfax. later that Hitler in the last two years has grown much older, gave signs of being under the weather, spent much of the interview raving and shouting. He must have timber, wheat and oil, he said. "Why don't the English leave me alone?" he demanded. 2

A.G. asked whether any progress had been made with the definition of Indirect Aggression. A week before A.G. had told Hfax. that in his view the political conversations should proceed. Hfax. said that now Strang had convinced him that this was right. S. had four formulae, two of which he thought Molotov would not accept, but two of which should be acceptable. It was proposed to send these through to Moscow. (Did they ever get there?) A.G. was shown two despatches, one from Seeds and the other from Admiral Drax. Both expressed great satisfaction at the progress of the Staff talks and at the general cordiality prevailing. The question of aid to Poland and Rumania had been raised by the Russians. At first the British and French had suggested that the Russians should approach P. and R. directly, but after withdrawing for an hour for consultation, the Soviet Delegation, headed by Molotov, returned and

again demanded that the British and French should act as intermediaries. These they then agreed to do, though apparently without recommending acceptance.

Thursday, 17th. European situation had got worse. Halifax came back to London.

Monday, 21st. Situation much worse. A.G. saw P.M. at 5.30. Germans now widening their claims far beyond Danzig and showing every sign of intending a sudden attack on Poland. This is a repetition of the situation at Easter, when our sudden guarantee to Poland (given without securing prior agreement with Russia and without effective consultation with our military authorities) stopped war. P.M. said he was not going to climb down. He himself proposed the summoning of Parliament this week. A.G. decided to call N.C.L. for 23rd. No reference by P.M. to Russo-German Pact.

Tuesday, 22nd. A.G. had ten minutes with P.M. before Cabinet and saw him again in the afternoon. P.M. said he had no prior information at all about German-Russian Pact. (Clearly they had had plenty of rumours, as distinct from information, and it is a shocking commentary on the intelligence of our diplomats and spies if P.M.'s statement is correct.) First intimation was letter sent by Lindsay from Washington at request of Cordell Hull, by Air Mail so as to avoid danger of cypher breaking. This only reached F.O. to-day. Later in evening A.G. with me to Moscow. Maisky.

Wednesday, 23rd. A.G. saw P.M. at 12.30. Situation growing worse. Last night P.M. said that Moscow talks were suspended sine die, but Hoare had given the press a less definite impression. Seeds had sent a despatch regarding his last talk with Molotov. Very gloomy reading. M. said that he had never trusted, and did not now trust, the British Government. He accused them of bad faith and complained that they had not sent the right men either for the political negotiations or for the Staff talks. He repeated complaints about British delay. He refused to disclose the terms of the proposed German-Russian Treaty and told Seeds that he might have to wait a week until it was concluded. Asked by Seeds whether, if there was general war, Russia would help Poland, M. said "You will have to wait for our answer to that question". M. also said "We must put our troops into Poland if we are to give the Poles any effective help."

P.M. confirmed that N. Henderson was flying to Berchtesgaden. Last week the P.M. had been working on a letter to Hitler, but had not sent it. Now he had sent it through N.H. It was in the name of the Government and reaffirmed the statement made by them last night. We had entered into an agreement with Poland without reference to Russia and should stick to it. He ended with a proposal to Hitler

that there should be a truce between Poland and Germany for a period, including a press truce, and that then "free negotiation" should take place between P. and G. over Danzig. (The last part of this letter is rather similar to later American proposals, and may have been influenced by Anglo-American diplomatic exchanges.)

P.M. told A.G. that the French had given the Russians very full information in the Staff talks, but that we had been much more guarded. The Russians had asked us for particulars about the defences of London against air attack. We had declined to give this, telling them that we had not even told such details to the French. (How odd, again in retrospect, that the French, who resisted the idea of Staff talks in Moscow and wanted to give in to Molotov on Indirect Aggression, should have been so rash!)

The French had delayed putting out a Government statement similar to ours. The F.O., I heard, were bothered about Bonnet, but on Friday, 25th, Daladier made quite a good statement on the air,

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Rabbit a kind of
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Mussolini referring to Tolstoy
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From Aldbourne to London, as news in the morning papers seems bad. German pressure against Poland is increasing and there is news of the projected German-Russian Pact. Our family not d'ordre is "no wobble"; R. fears that I may find some colleagues wobbling, but in fact it is not so.

Some time making any contacts; Citrine out of London; Greenwood out of touch till after 3 p.m. He, however, is doing pretty well - better than poor little Rabbit ever did - seeing the P.M. and Halifax frequently, taking notes after his talks, and reporting pretty fully to colleagues.

This afternoon see Raczynski. He is very calm. The new Russo-German Pact, he says, makes no difference at all to Poland. The Poles never expected much from the Russians, nor believed that they had either the will or the organised capacity to give much aid. Nor did the Poles ever put much trust in the Russians. It was last Saturday, 19th, that the most serious hitch occurred in the Staff Talks at Moscow. The Russians demanded that they should have the right, "in order to make contact with the Germans" - R. said he did not much like this phrase - to occupy and wholly take over the administration of two large areas in Poland, (1) the Vilna Corridor, to be administered from Vilna, and (2) East Galicia, to be administered from Lwow. This proposal had been rejected by the Poles on the ground that it was already a new partition of Poland. No plans, so far as he knew, had been made for the supply of materials and munitions by Russia to the Poles. I warn him of the effect on public opinion here if the Poles should seem to have refused Russian aid.

He said that Attolico is the real father of the Russo-German Pact. It is said that the Germans will agree completely to disinterest themselves in the Ukraine and also in Finland and the Baltic States, which they will recognise as being within Russia's sphere of influence. Also it is proposed, as a bribe to Turkey, to recognise Bulgaria as falling within the Turkish sphere.

Beck has telegraphed that R. may, if necessary, publish here the rejected terms of Russian aid.

R. says "For Poland there is no choice. We must fight if we are attacked. For your country I think there is a little more choice, but not much. If you stand aside now, the next victim will be France, then you will have again a very small choice, but not much. Either you must fight with France, but without other European allies then, or you must let France too go down. And then

at last you will have no choice at all. You will be left alone face to face with Hitler's Europe."

Later this evening go with Greenwood to see Maisky. I arrive first, G. being still with the P.M., and have a few words with Korj who, G. thinks, is the Communist watcher over Maisky. Anyhow, not a very pleasing character. He says that Moscow has decided to sign the Pact with Germany "in order to teach your Government and the French a lesson". But he sneers also at Ribbentrop who, he says, may find that he will have to spend a long time in Moscow. He does not know what will be the terms of the Pact but says that all Russian non-aggression pacts contain an Escape clause in the event of aggression by either party against a third.

Maisky also tells us this. But it is quite clear to us that he really knows nothing of what is going on and has been as much surprised as the rest of us by the latest turn. When asked why, in view of existing Treaties, there is need for a new non-aggression pact between Moscow and Berlin, he says that it is a principle of the Soviet foreign policy always to accept any request for a non-aggression pact from any other State, and that the request in this case came from Hitler only a few days ago. When asked whether the Pact will be of the German or the Russian type, he repeats his point about the escape clause. When asked why the Russians and the Germans have been talking secretly for months behind our backs while we and the French have been negotiating with them in the eyes of the world, he says that the German-Russian talks up till a few days ago were only about trade. I ask how he justifies secret talks with Germans even in the last few days about political matters when the Russians were ~~xxxxxxxx~~ conducting Staff talks with the French and ourselves on the assumption of a war against Germany. He says that the Anglo-French-Soviet Pact was for the defence of peace; it was not directed against Germany "in the interests of British and French Imperialism". He says that at last Russian irritation at British methods has passed all bounds. We would not send a Minister to Moscow; we sent only a Foreign Office clerk; ~~wxxxxxx~~ when Staff talks were agreed to, we sent second- and third-rate French and military representatives, none of whom were fit to speak on equal terms with Voroshilov. "You have treated us", he said, "always like poor relations". "Finally", he bitterly complained, "the Poles have rejected our help. They have refused to have any contact with our troops."

He then protests against the "Daily Herald" leader of this morning. (It turns out, a few days later, to have been quite

just.) He asks several times what difference we think this will make to the Staff Talks. Shall we withdraw the Mission from Moscow at once? He seems rather apprehensive about this.

Finally, he says to me alone, while A.G. is elsewhere, "If you don't hurry up and finish the military and political conversations, we shall be neutral if there is a war."

It is a most unsatisfactory and displeasing interview. When we are outside, A.G. exclaims "Oily old dodger!"

(When, two days later, on the 24th, Parliament meets, Maisky is conspicuously absent from the Diplomats' Gallery. Normally he has always been there for important debates.)

A.G. and I then go to the D.H. and talk to Williams and Ewer. W. says that Hoare was very clear and firm to the press to-day and showed no sign of wobbling. The only wobblers in the country are the large advertisers who, having held back for some weeks, are now buying space again, delightedly exclaiming that the Russo-German Pact will mean anyhow that if there is a war, we shall keep out now.

DIARY24. 8. 39.

At Parliamentary E.C. this morning I raised the question of any of our people joining a mixed bag Government. I say that I assume no-one is committed, nor will commit himself, to this without authority from the Party. A.G., rather nervously I thought, said "Of course not; I haven't heard of anyone being approached." Snell said "I hope that will apply to Trade Union leaders outside Parliament as well. There are rumours about some of them." The meeting was, however, unanimous in my sense, it being understood that administrative work, such as Johnston and Alexander, were already committed to was not banned.

At Party meeting immediately after this question was raised and Rabbit, from Chair, said that no-one had been approached and no-one would accept unless Party so decided. "We have our own constitution", he said.

25. 8. 39.

Same question raised at meeting of Three Bodies. Marchbank spoke violently in semi-revolutionary language, as I have heard him often before, against "this Government". Some wanted to pass and publish a resolution declaring that, if asked, we should refuse. But this was not done, when Citrine pointed out that we should make ourselves ridiculous, and Lees-Smith that we should give Goebbels a bull point.

These ventilations have, I think, done good. My present feeling is that we should decline participation in Government if war comes - at least at the beginning. I remember how A.H. fared in the Great War, and it is not as if our present "leaders" were supermen capable of exercising vast influence though in a tiny minority.

DIARY25. 8. 39.

At meeting of the three Executives it was decided, on my proposition, to send a final Message of friendship and warning to the German people. It was left to Laski and myself, with the Chairmen and Secretaries, to make a draft. This we did in the afternoon, and, its terms having been finally agreed, I took steps with Will Henderson, from his office, for its broadcasting. Copies were sent to the B.B.C. (including additional copies to its Foreign News department); also to Vansittart's private secretary and to G.P.Young, Perth's secretary at the F.O. Laski had spoken to de Margerie at the French Embassy asking him to get it put over in German from Strasbourg and Luxembourg. de M. had expressed approval but told us that the practice now was for the British F.O. to pass through all requests to the French for the use of these two stations. This is why, having failed to get Van on the telephone as he was deeply engaged, I sent two copies to his secretary. Copies were also sent - though not, apparently, delivered, owing to some error by the messenger, - to the Polish Ambassador to be put over in German from Polish stations.

On Laski's proposal, which I supported, it was agreed that we should ask the B.B.C. to let Citrine, in his dual capacity of Secretary of the T.U.C. and President of the I.F.T.U., himself deliver the Message in English on the short-wave length. It was felt that this would make the Message more impressive and personal to the many Germans who listen in to British news. (The Message was only some 450 words long and would have taken only some three minutes to read.) I speak to Ogilvie's secretary, a little before 5 p.m., conveying this request, and she promises to let me have a speedy answer.

I am, however, kept waiting for nearly an hour by the B.B.C., being told more than once, when I have rung up to ask whether a decision has yet been reached, that "there is a consultation going on now about it", and that "there are some difficulties which are being gone into." Finally, about 6 p.m., Ogilvie rings through and says that some points have arisen which are difficult to discuss on the telephone, but would I come round and see him. I reply that I will come with Citrine.

At Broadcasting House we see Ogilvie and Graves. Ogilvie begins by explaining, in opposition to our proposal that Citrine should deliver the message, that it is the B.B.C.'s experience that messages are less effective when delivered personally than when reported as news. We do not accept this view, but admit that it is

a technical question on which the B.B.C. are entitled to their opinion. I then say "Very well then, I take it that you will put over our Message as news, both in your English bulletins to-night and in your translations, especially the German". Ogilvie replies that he "hesitates" to give any undertaking on this matter. Both Citrine and I take him up very sharply at this point. We ask whether he is suggesting that what the Labour Movement has to say at such a time is not news. I tell him that "We are not nobodies"; this message is spoken in the name of many millions of Trade Unionists and electors, and by the representatives of the alternative Government in this country. Citrine says that he has had previous experience of mutilation of important material submitted to the B.B.C. O. shows signs of being very uncomfortable; he tries to take back his words and regrets that we have put the interpretation upon them that we have. He also expresses the hope that our conversation has been quite confidential. After some further exchanges, I say "I am now going to ask you a question to which, I give you notice, I am not going to treat your answer as confidential. The question is, do you or do you not undertake to put over to-night, both in the British and the Foreign bulletins, a reasonably full version of our Message?" He declines to give a straight answer to this question and says "You must wait and judge by results". We warn him that if our Message is not properly put over, he will hear more of this, and Citrine tells him very frankly that he is not fit for responsibility. We then leave, Ogilvie accompanying us to the ground floor of the lift and endeavouring to make friendly advances on other matters. It is now 7.40 p.m.

I arrive at a friend's house a little before 8 p.m. and find two telephone messages, one from the Polish Embassy to say that our copy of the broadcast has not arrived, and the other from the Foreign Office. I take the second first, and find that Butler wishes to speak to me. He says that our Message has been considered by Halifax himself and by "all our experts". Their view is that it would be inadvisable to send it over from Strasbourg and Luxembourg to-night. I ask why, and he replies, first because a long new message has just come in from N.Henderson, which is even now being deciphered, and second, because the F.O. has evidence that "in many parts of Germany where your Message would normally have made a strong appeal", such as Saxony and many of the mining areas, the workers are so delighted with the Pact with Russia that they are walking about with the Swastika in one hand and the hammer and sickle in the other. I do not enter into any debate with Butler on the telephone, but tell him that there may have to be further consideration of this whole question by us, and that we have already this evening "had words" with the B.B.C. on the subject. He says "I am not surprised to hear that". I say that I presume he realises that our Message will be published to-morrow by the press, as it has gone some hours ago to all the agencies. I understand that he is only speaking

to me about Strasbourg and Luxembourg, and that the F.O. is not proposing to try to prevent publication by the newspapers. He says "Oh no, of course not." I finally ask whether the opinion which he expressed to me that the Message should not go over the air in France would apply also to the air in Poland. He says "Yes, certainly, I think that would be even more dangerous." I say that I take note of his opinion but that I am not going to enter into any argument with him at this stage. He offers to see me to-morrow if I should wish.

I then get in a car and go from Kennington to the Polish Embassy and hand personally to Balinski the copy of our Message which Transport House has failed to deliver. This failure has in fact made it impossible to use our Message at Polish stations to-night, and I say "I think it is my duty to tell you that in the opinion of the F.O. this Message should not go over foreign stations to-night. I am not to be taken as accepting this opinion, but I report it to you. In any case, our Message might still be useful to you to-morrow or the day after, and you have complete discretion to use it as and when you think best." He gives me in return a copy of the newly-signed Anglo-Polish Treaty.

I listen in to the 9 o'clock news in English. Only two sentences are picked out of our Message and reported. I listen in also to the H.B.C. news in French, German and Italian between 10 and 11 p.m. In all these three foreign languages it is stated "The British Labour Movement has to-day sent a Message to the German people". That is all, no hint of the contents of the Message and not a word of quotation. Ogilvie asked us to "wait and judge by results". These are the results!

I do not think that the matter can be allowed to rest here, particularly at a time when the Government are trying to enlist our aid in connection with propaganda and Ministry of Information. What has happened is that they have deliberately censored our Message.

I shall not accept Butler's invitation to see him to-day,
26th.

B. C.

Dalton I 21

21

28. 8. 39.

Citrine writes to Halifax a long and strong letter on the treatment of our Message. He sets out the facts, emphasises that, in our interview with O., we were "treated like children", and that O. tried to make us believe that his "consultations" were to be entirely with his subordinates on technical matters. We, on the other hand, realise quite clearly that it was the Foreign Office whom he had to consult. Citrine goes on to say that he is instructed by the N.C.L. to state that they took a very grave view of this incident and of the management of the B.B.C. They were determined not to let the matter rest where it was, and he himself was disposed to advise the General Council of the T.U.C. to take no further part in any form of co-operation with the Ministry of Information. The Council desired to send a deputation - him, me and Phil - to see Halifax, and would be glad if he would telephone, on receipt of the letter, what hour that night he could see us.

Later, Butler came on the phone to Citrine and said that Hfax. was very much concerned over the whole matter and was most anxious that it should be fully investigated and that nothing should be said or done which would prevent the full co-operation of the N.C.L. with the Government in publicity and other ways. Butler suggested that Citrine and I might like to go and see Ogilvie again, to which Citrine replied "Certainly not. We have had one very bad experience of him and it is no more use talking to him than talking to a chunk of wood." Butler said that Halifax could not possibly see us to-night, and tried to hint that perhaps we should like to see him, but Citrine had pretended not to understand this hint and had suggested that a letter should be sent, giving Halifax's explanation of the incident for our consideration and also appointing a time to see us to-morrow.

29. 8. 39.

When the House meets this afternoon, Butler engages me in conversation, and I go alone to his private room. (our interview at the F.O. has now been fixed for 7 p.m.). Butler says that (shall find to-night that Halifax will express great regret for the incident and will not deny that a mistake has been made. It is now admitted that neither Halifax nor Butler was consulted before the F.O. advised the B.B.C. against publication of our Message. I do not know, and do not ask, what official was responsible. I hope that it was not any of my particular friends! Butler said that there had been "A difference of opinion" in the office on the subject, and it had undoubtedly been very much mishandled. Halifax and he were most

anxious to create some machinery - none now existed - to prevent any repetition of such an incident. Butler tries, up to a point, to defend Ogilvie, though he admits that the latter said to him - he was asked to come down to the F.O. as soon as they got Citrine's letter - that he felt he had not conducted his conversation with Citrine and me very well. O., however, had alleged to B. that he had made it clear to us that it was the F.O. whom he desired to consult. I say most emphatically this was not so, and I am sure that C. will support me in this. "Foreign Office" was never mentioned from start to finish of our conversation. Had he once shown candour and told us that it was the F.O., we should of course have said "Very well then, we will go and discuss it with them ourselves".

Butler also refers to the praise of our Message in "The Times" leader of 28th. I say, rather grimly, "Yes, I have that leader in my hand". *I shall quote it - tonight.*

7 p.m. Interview at F.O. Halifax, Butler and Perth; Citrine, Phil and I. Citrine states the case very clearly and forcibly. Says that, in his view, Ogilvie is not fit for his job and that Graves, his Deputy, seems to try to impersonate Napoleon, who walks up and down the room as impressively as he can with his hand inside his coat, and gains a reputation for strength and wisdom by saying nothing. C. also says that our people are getting pretty fed up with being expected to shout with the Government one day and being treated like a lot of children or nobodies the next. Both C. and I completely repudiate O's allegation that he told us it was the F.O. whom he was to consult. I ask Halifax for more information regarding the reasons why our Message was suppressed. He can only repeat that it was felt that appeals to-day were not effective, nor were attempts to divide Hitler from the German people. I ask if this is all. He says, so far as he knows, yes. He repeats what Butler had told ~~him~~ that neither of them knew of the decision; nor did Perth; it was taken on the judgment of his officials, for whom, of course, he must accept responsibility. "Then", I say, "I venture to remark that whatever officials advised you on those grounds to suppress our Message never attempted to apply their intelligence to the question at all. These are most superficial and trivial considerations. In so far as they have weight, they can be met by a few minor drafting amendments. I know many of the officials in this office. For some I have a high regard; for others a less high regard. I do not ask you which of them was responsible for giving you this advice, or rather taking this important decision without consulting either yourself or Butler, but I do say that whoever it may have been, you have been ill served." Phil weighed in a bit and said that this had a great bearing upon our future co-operation with the Ministry of Information. He was

quite sure he could not co-operate if we were to be treated like this. Here Perth, making himself almost excessively affable, sought to pour gallons of oil upon the troubled waters; placed himself unreservedly at the disposition of any of us at any time; said that it was his dearest wish to have the very closest contact with the representatives of the Labour Movement in all phases of the work of his Department; trusted that we should exercise a great influence upon this work, and paid a tribute to the many sources of information which we had, both here and abroad, of which he hoped that we should allow him, in consultation with us, fully to avail himself. He almost, but not quite, said that if we refused to help him he would chuck up his job in despair. Citrine ignored most of this, merely saying that if Perth or the Government thought that we should be satisfied in having one member, who would count for nothing in an Advisory Committee of 20, they were much mistaken. Perth replied that he hoped, on the contrary, that we should exercise an influence not less than that of any other section of the community. Halifax then tried to defend Ogilvie. He said that when he had been one of a group of young Tory M.P.s who "used to rag Lloyd George", Ogilvie had devilled for them and collected their material. He knew him to be a first-rate man. C. Said "He might have been good enough to collect material to help you to rag Lloyd George, but that doesn't satisfy me that he is fit to be Director General of the B.B.C." Halifax said "I can only say that I know you are mistaken about Ogilvie."

Halifax then said that he was prepared to write a letter to Citrine ~~expressing~~ taking responsibility for what had happened and expressing his regret and making suggestions for machinery to be set up permitting of effective consultation in the future. Citrine expressed appreciation of this offer and said "I don't see how you can do more than that at this stage", though he indicated that there would be various points of detail to discuss. I said "Of course, it will be understood that there is a point below which we shall not be prepared to go in this office in such discussions as you suggest. We should not be prepared to enter into debates on merits with subordinate officials." Halifax agreed and hinted that either Butler or Perth would be the natural people with whom to talk. We neither agreed nor disagreed with this.

Finally, just as we were breaking up, I said "And now, what about our Message? Would it not be helpful now that, perhaps with a few modifications, it should be broadcast after all?" I repeated that nothing I had heard this evening had suggested to me that anything more than minor amendments would be required. Hfax., I think, was rather vexed with me at this point, and said "Perhaps you would like to have a talk with Lord Perth about that". I asked C. whether he saw any objection to such a talk from our point of view. He said no, and it was therefore fixed that we should meet next morning.

partly
I raised this point at the end, ~~particularly~~ because I was anxious to make them broadcast after all, thereby publicly admitting they had been wrong, and also because I also wanted to make contact with P. at this stage and find out what he was up to.

I was amused to see how this incident had given rise already to a fat dossier. Both Perth and Butler had a thick lump of papers in their hands.

30. 8. 39.

Interview with Perth in morning (see separate page).

Afternoon. Ring up G.P.Young, Perth's secretary, and suggest that as it was agreed this morning to advise Ogilvie to put the Statement in his German News, the F.O. should likewise inform the French Embassy that in their view it would be suitable for German ears via Strasburg and Luxemburg. The principle, I say, seems the same, and I regret that I did not mention the matter this morning, but should be glad if he would convey the suggestion to Perth, adding that, in my view, this further step would help to mollify some of my angry colleagues. He says that the message to the B.B.C. has already gone and he will take up the further point with Perth.

10.15 p.m. Listen in to the B.B.C. News in German. Our "Message", transformed into a "Statement", and with one or two very unimportant omissions, exactly as agreed between me and Perth this morning, was put over with great gusto and licking of lips by B.B.C. spokesman.

31. 8. 39.

Soon after noon, Locksley, Butler's private secretary at F.O., rings up to say that Butler had wished to speak to me but has just been summoned by the S. of S. He wished to tell me that the B.B.C. have decided to repeat our "Statement" in German to-day in their midday bulletin. I express satisfaction and say "We are doing quite well in the end". I tell him that I had heard it delivered in full last night, as agreed between Perth and me. I tell him also that I spoke to Young yesterday afternoon asking for the Statement to be put through from Strasburg and Luxemburg. Locksley says that he saw a letter which went yesterday afternoon to the French Embassy suggesting that the Statement should go through both these stations.

30. 8. 39.

As arranged yesterday, see Perth at F.O. this morning. Phil also arrives - late - and Kirkpatrick is brought in half way through. P. explains that K. had no responsibility for the treatment of our Message. P. suggests at an early stage that he would be prepared to recommend Ogilvie to broadcast to-night in the German News our Message, with only a few changes. I say that if there are no more serious criticisms of the Message than that (1) it is in the vocative, and (2) that it seeks to distinguish Hitler from the German people, it is clear that only a very slight re-drafting will be necessary. This makes me all the more astonished at what occurred. P. again admits that a great stupidity was committed by some-one, whose name I do not seek, in the F.O. I say that if they had told me on the telephone what the grounds of objection were, any clerk could have done the necessary re-drafting. In any case, P. and I could have done it together in five minutes. I am inclined, however, to think that his proposal will be regarded as "reasonable reparation" by my colleagues, some of whom, I emphasise, are much angrier about the whole affair than we who saw the S. of S. last night. (Unnamed bogeymen in background have some utility!) I say that whoever in the F.O. was responsible is a Chinovnik of the third class. I hope that henceforth this particular person will have no voice in any decisions regarding statements by us.

I ask P. whether the S. of S. has elaborated in his letter to Citrine his proposals for the future handling of any difficulties. P. says that the letter has gone this morning and that it proposes two possibilities, either consultation with someone at F.O. after any difficulty with B.B.C., or before a statement is finally submitted. "Someone at the F.O." is intended to mean either Halifax or Butler or Perth himself. I say that we should not, as a general rule, be disposed to discuss such matters with officials, but that, so far as I personally am concerned, we should be quite prepared to discuss them with him, though not with "any deputy Assistant Under-Secretary".

We leave it, therefore, that P. will advise Ogilvie. P. explains elaborately that of course O. is the final arbiter. I merely observe that if O. refuses his advice we shall take our own measures, both by publicity and otherwise.

I ask whether the same channel runs from the F.O. to the B.B.C. regarding foreign broadcasts and broadcasts in English. He says no, they are only concerned with the former. I do not pursue this point, but note it, since clearly pressure was put on against using our Message in English, and P. has thus dissociated himself and his Department from this.

Xerox copy. For original copy -
See correspondence section
See Dalton 5/5

31st August, 1939.

Sir Walter Gilrino,
The Japanese Hotel,
Bridlington.

Dear Walter,

You and your colleagues on the General Council will, I think, be interested to hear that I went yesterday morning to see Lord Perth at the Foreign Office, as was agreed when we met Halifax and the others the previous evening. You will remember that at the end of the conversation with Halifax, I raised the question as to why our message should not now be broadcast after all, since the objections reported had been so trivial and superficial. My impression was that Halifax was not very pleased at my pressing this point after he had undertaken to write a letter expressing regret and making proposals for future procedure.

None the less, yesterday morning when I saw Perth, he had in his hand a copy of our message and began by saying that he would be very happy, if I agreed, to "advise" Ogilvie to let it over yesterday night in the German News. He added that the amendments which he would suggest were very few and, he thought, unimportant. He and I then went through the document, called it a statement by British Labour, instead of a message from British Labour, cut out a few words - not, in my view, important - here and there, and I then accepted his offer. He said "Of course, we can only advise Ogilvie". I said "All right, you advise him, and I shall listen in tonight and if I find he has not taken your advice, we shall have something more to say". Perth again said that someone in the F.O. had been guilty of an act of great stupidity and bad judgment in the handling of this matter, and again assured me that neither Halifax, Butler nor he had been consulted. He said that he understood that Halifax had already written to you expressing regret and making certain proposals for the future. I said that no doubt the latter would be discussed by us in due course. He was obviously most anxious to secure our good will. I said that the broadcasting of the message now would, I thought, be regarded by some of our colleagues

as a very proper act of "reparation". I also hinted to him that he should understand that a number of our colleagues were even more angry about the whole affair than those with us who had visited the F.O. I did not, of course, mention any names, but was anxious to produce the maximum impression upon him, with a view to the future.

In the afternoon I rang up Perth's Private Secretary and said that, having thought over my talk with Perth in the morning and his undertaking to give certain advice to Ogilvie, I thought that it would give satisfaction to my colleagues if the F.O. now communicated with the French Embassy and asked them to arrange for our Statement to be put over in German from Strasburg and Luxembourg. Perth was out of the room at the time, but his secretary undertook to convey my message. He added that he had seen the papers after my talk with Perth in the morning and that a letter to Ogilvie had already gone.

Yesterday evening I listened in to the B.B.C. News in German between 10.15 and 11.45. Our Statement, as agreed between Perth and me, was put over word for word, and with great vigour, by the B.B.C. spokesman.

This morning I had a telephone call from Butler's private secretary at the F.O. to say that he thought I might be interested to know that the B.B.C. were proposing to repeat our statement to-day in the midday News in German. I said that I was very glad to hear this, as I had listened in last night and the Statement had gone over very well. I mentioned to him what I had said yesterday to Perth's secretary about Strasburg and Luxembourg, and he told me that a message had already gone from the F.O. to the French Embassy proposing that our Statement should go in German over these two stations.

It seems to me that we have now won a pretty complete victory, and that there is ground for supposing that in future we shall be treated with more respect and with greater candour.

Yours ever,

DIARY28. 8. 39.

Francis Williams says this afternoon that when the Editors and Proprietors saw Hoare yesterday afternoon, he felt slightly uncomfortable; he fancied there was a faint flavour of appeasement in some of Hoare's remarks, e.g., when he said that no doubt as regards minorities, there were faults on both sides, i.e., German and Polish. Williams said "I hope you don't intend to say that kind of thing in public", and Hoare replied "Oh no, of course not."

29. 8. 39.

It is indignantly rumoured this morning that the British reply to Hitler has been leaked in the U.S. and broadcast from there early this morning. In fact, what has been broadcast is only an "intelligent anticipation". I receive by post from Liddell Hart a most gloomy military appreciation, leading up to the suggestion that we should seek to arrange a settlement with Hitler over Poland involving large concessions by the Poles. This Note of L.H. is all military; even if it is sound on its own ground, of which I am not convinced, it leaves out so much politics and economics that it is not conclusive. Nor, finally, does it meet the argument that we and the French shall certainly be attacked later, by an even stronger Germany, with even fewer allies, if we give way now.

Meetings of Party Executive in morning, Party meeting at 1.45, House of Commons at 2.45, National Council at 6, and meeting at F.O. at 7 on Broadcast (separate note).

Greenwood is still reporting well. Hitler's message yesterday took the Government completely by surprise. It lacked any clear and definite proposals, merely expressing great feelings of friendship and respect for Britain and her Empire - in one version H. offered himself to "guarantee" the British Empire if real friendship could be established. He would like to discuss with us Colonies, Trade, and Disarmament, when once he had "settled the Polish question". He expressed the hope that we should not try to interfere with his relations with Italy any more than he intended to interfere in the relations between ourselves and the French.

Our reply had been friendly but firm. We had said in short that we should be very happy to discuss all the questions named by Hitler, and also some others which we ourselves would suggest when the time came, but that meanwhile the immediate issue

was German-Polish relations, and we stood by our Treaty with Poland. It had been inserted in our message at the last moment, a good reply having just come in from Warsaw, that we were very glad to know that the Polish Government were quite prepared to open fair and free negotiations with Germany.

My colleagues on the Parliamentary Executive are as loquacious as ever until, for the second or third time, I draw the attention of those present to the clock and to the fact that G. has to speak for the Party this afternoon and should have time to prepare his speech, including the many suggestions which have been made to him by them. Since they show no sign of stopping, I then rise to say "We are all only gossiping. I move that we now all leave the room, so that the Chairman can now think about his speech".

Such is the force of example that, as I walk out, the others all rise and follow, though I hear poor old Pethick protesting in the passage, "After all, we do meet in order to exchange ideas".

The Party meeting is also a little vexatious; too many people asking questions of the Chair, very often the same questions, and showing the usual lack of confidence, generosity and mental concentration, with the usual corresponding excess of suspicious egoism. I am also rather sorry that H.M. and Phil, both of whom have come from an Executive only an hour before, make speeches emphasising the reasons why they still mistrust Chamberlain - as who of us does not? This creates an impression that the Executive is not really united, and there is a good deal of growling. Towards the end I make a short, and I am afraid rather bad-tempered and hectoring, speech in which I say that if there is no more inclination to wobble in this Party Meeting than there is on the National Council of Labour and the Parliamentary Executive, then things are all right. I say that Greenwood has been doing a very heavy and difficult task well, and that now so many questions have been fired at him that it is about time someone else took a few. I strongly support the proposal that he alone should speak for us this afternoon. I say that last week, as the debate proceeded, the speeches got worse, including some from our own ranks, though some also from political odds and ends who owe no allegiance except to their own egotism. Some interrupt here and say "To their constituents". I say "No, we in this Party owe an allegiance to the Party and its decisions," and I refer to the decisions at Southport in favour of resistance to aggression carried by a majority of 2,336,000 to 55,000 (some of them are always annoyed when Conference decisions with figures are quoted, and there are a few growls). I also get across Ellen Wilkinson, who is sitting near the front. In the course of my remarks I say "It's no use Miss Wilkinson sitting there sniggering", whereat she leaps up with flaming face and demands that I should withdraw this remark. This, of course,

I consent to do, saying that she and I have always been good friends. "We shan't be in the future if you treat me like that", she retorts. I end by saying that it is both my right and my duty to repeat that for years it has been my view that the only way to check Hitler is to organise the maximum of armed force against him. Otherwise, I say, you may be sure that if you run away again, he will shoot you in the back. Whereas if you stand firm now, there is just a chance that he will not shoot you in the breast.

Soon after the meeting comes to an end in a rather disturbed atmosphere, having decided, however, to let Greenwood make the only speech.

This, when Parliament meets later, he does pretty well, making allowance for his chronic tendency to speak in well worn and rather empty-sounding phrases. But, at any rate, the substance is all right.

At 6 this evening the N.C.L. meets to hear reports, including that of the deputation - Citrine, Morrison and Mrs Gould - who have been to Chamberlain to urge immediate evacuation of priority classes from London and other evacuation areas. Greenwood this afternoon urged this point in his speech, and yesterday the N.C.L. had authorised Citrine, to write to the Prime Minister on the subject.

It appears that the transport system could not complete this measure of evacuation in less than three and a half days. H.M. says that, having at first been sceptical, he has gone into the details and is satisfied that this is the shortest practicable period. Marchbank, speaking as a railwayman, says that he thinks the schedule is too optimistic, particularly as it would be necessary to move great quantities of goods traffic for military needs in the first days of a war. In other words, evacuation may take longer if you wait till war is started than if you ~~had~~ do it now, quite apart from the dangers of interference with the process by air attack.

The deputation reported that Anderson had been with the P.M. It is known, from a report by Greenwood, that Anderson had wished to start evacuation on the morning of Monday, 28th. He had told one of our people on the Sunday afternoon, 27th, that he was asking the P.M. "to give me the word go". On the other hand, the P.M. and, it is rumoured, Simon, were against it. The P.M. had told the deputation that it was a most difficult matter to decide and he admitted that the balance of argument was nearly level, but it was still the view of the Government that the moment to begin evacuation had not come. He then produced a series of snag-hunter's arguments, typical of the Civil Service mind at its most obstructive. "If you sent the children away, and there was no war, when would you bring them back again?" "If you kept them away some time, their mothers would become very discontented, and there would be strong demands

either that the children should be brought back, or that the mothers should be allowed to go and see them. In either case, this would lead to great discontent and inconvenience." "Would there not be great dissatisfaction in the receiving areas, if all the inconveniences of reception continued for some time and there was still no war?" "Would not the evacuation of the priority classes cause serious panic in the rest of the community?" "Would not business men and others then wish to move, even though it was in the national interest that they should stay?" The P.M. added that he fully realised his responsibilities. After a sentimental reference to the "young children who are always in our minds", he told the deputation that he was a grandfather himself. When someone said that many of the children had a grievance against Hitler because he prevented evacuation last September, Anderson, trying to be bright and pawky, said "I should have thought they would have had a grievance against the Prime Minister."

The N.C.L. felt that nothing more could be done at present, but that we had done our duty in putting the case strongly, and that our action would now be on record for the future.

Zehle
G. reported that the Mystery Man in the German plane was not, as previously stated, Schmidt, of Ribbentrop's Press Department, but a neutral, sent by Goering, whose influence was said to have increased again, to say "Don't close the door; there is hope yet for peace". This message had been conveyed to the British Government. On the other hand, the Poles say that it will take four or five days more before the Germans are fully ready to attack them.

Butler told me to-night in the House that N. Henderson was now doing very well in Berlin, though "about three months ago Halifax was on the point of sacking him". He had now recovered his health and was putting our point of view very effectively. Last night, when Hitler had dwelt upon the kinship ~~between~~ of Germany and England, Henderson had replied that Hitler, he was sure, would agree that it would be neither a German nor an English act to break one's word to a friend (i.e., in our case, to Poland.)

30. 8. 39.

At end of talk with Perth about Broadcast^s, Kirkpatrick - who was for some time Counsellor in Berlin - says that Hitler is "a very odd man", but he is not a madman and in some ways is supremely shrewd. K. believes him to be at bottom a coward, but just for this reason it is very rash to charge him with cowardice or he will try to disprove the accusation. K. hears that H. is suffering from le petit mal, which gives rise to mild epileptic fits. He does not, often at any rate, roll on the ground losing all control, but he is apt to have "brain storms" which, when he is over-wrought, tend to become more frequent and more serious. This is why he is so much at Berchtesgaden, which is recommended by his doctors as a place of rest and quiet. K. says that H. speaks contemptuously of his Generals, saying that they are not fit to push perambulators, with one exception - the man who is an expert on mechanised forces, whose name K. forgets. When K. was at Godesberg he was in the lounge with about 40 leading personages, including Himmler, Hess & Co., and a number of Generals. He notices how, when it was announced "The Fuhrer is coming", they all seemed to shrink back into the wall. Hitler then strode past like a Byzantine Emperor.

"All that", I said, "is mere stage". K. agreed, but said that he was sure that all the rest were frightened of standing up to him, even though in private there might be some sort of discussion round a table.

The Russians, he thought, were leaving every door ajar. There had been tremendous disillusion among the more doctrinaire Nazis at the Pact with Moscow. Rosenberg, for instance, did not know what to say now. I said I hoped that the photographs of Stalin grinning and Ribbentrop looking solemn had been widely published in Germany. He said they had.

He said at parting "I think we have just about a 20% chance of avoiding war".

Blaskovich

DIARY31. 8. 39.

3 p.m. With Greenwood at Polish Embassy. R. is distinctly worried over the trend of H.M.G.'s correspondence with Hitler. He says our Notes are too meek and humble, take H.'s protestations of good will towards Britain too much at their face value, and do not do justice at all either to the calmness and good sense hitherto shown by Poland, or to the obligations of the Anglo-Polish Treaty. He reads passages both from the two British Notes to H. and from H.'s Note to us. H. is demanding (1) Danzig, (2) the Corridor, and (3) a statute for the German minority which would be left in Poland. He argues that he does not wish anything contrary to the vital interests of Poland, nor has he any objection to "an independent Polish State". He agrees with us that there should be a guarantee of any settlement, but insists that Moscow must be one of the parties to this guarantee. As usual, he insists that a settlement is urgent, and demanded in his Note of yesterday that a Polish Emissary should be sent to Berlin forthwith. H.M.G. - I point out to R. that there is some case for their soft-peddling in order to avoid all charges of provocation and to win over American opinion if, in the end, war comes - say in their first Note that the vital interests of Poland must be preserved, and in their second that they are glad to find that H. agrees with them! This has upset R. very much. Up till yesterday he had a rain of telegrams each day from Warsaw. Since then, very little. Which means, he thinks, that Beck is handling things himself. R. has not been near the Foreign Office, leaving it to Beck and feeling distrust and concern at the trend of the Notes. He feels that Poland is being manoeuvred into a position in which, when she refuses some German demand, H.M.G. will encourage the British public to say "Look at those Poles. How unreasonable they are!" He is sure that Beck will refuse to send a special emissary to Berlin. They have already an Ambassador there. What H. wants is another Schussnig or Hacha. The scope of discussions, says R., could only cover (1) the nature of the modus vivendi between Polish economic and German political interests in Danzig, and (2) the question of improving communications across the Corridor. The cession of territory to Germany is undiscussable.

As my talk ends, Lord Lloyd is announced. I tell R. that in the near future I will, if I may, see him each day. He says he will be glad and grateful.

Yesterday's press reported that Sir H. Wilson crossed from No. 10 to the Foreign Office with P.M., Halifax and Cadogan at 2 in the morning. So he is at it again. This is the first mention of him in the press for some while.

R. said that he thought Halifax shared R.'s own views, which others in the Cabinet did not. But, said R., Halifax for a day or two was quite groggy as a result of the failure of his policy for an Anglo-Soviet Pact, and for a while at least he will have lost influence with his colleagues. He may have recovered it again by now. R. also said, with reference to the exact similarity of Hitler's tactics last September and now, "It is extraordinary how, when the circus man performs the same trick for a second and third time, some people are still taken in."

DIARY

2. 9. 39. (evening)

While with Alexander and Noel-Baker, I speak on the telephone with Balinski. He says that to-day bombardment has been very severe. There is fighting on all the fronts. Warsaw has been bombed seven times, also Cracow and Czechoslowa. Strong attacks are being made from the Slovak mountains. The Germans have taken Teschen and there is fighting round Katowice and at the Westerplatte.

Raczynski again this afternoon asked for British help as soon as possible. The Cabinet was sitting and he left a letter. He made the same request again to-night in an interview with Halifax at 10 p.m. On his return from the F.O. he seemed, said Balinski, to be a little more cheerful.

Balinski says that he is satisfied it is the French, and not we, who are to blame for this delay. I ask him the terms of the Franco-Polish Treaty. He says their latest Treaty is in 1936, but its terms are equally clear and binding as the recent Anglo-Polish Treaty. Further, last March, the French gave a new and clear pledge of guarantee for Poland. B. finishes by saying that it would have an immense effect on the morale of his people if they knew that the British and the French were helping them.

DIARY5. 9. 39.

Call on Kingsley Wood at his new headquarters in what used to be the Board of Education. Tell him that I have been asked by A.G. to keep in constant touch with him on behalf of our Party, both to give and receive information. He knows of my talk with Balfour yesterday, and I say that now I am quite satisfied that the answer to my question is Yes in view of the news of the two raids in the press to-day. He says that the raid on the German warships was carried out under most difficult weather conditions. Visibility was so bad that planes, having flown blind, had to go down very low ~~in order to be sure of~~ in order to be sure of their objectives. It was a most gallant effort, undertaken in order to give clear evidence to the Poles and the world that we were really at war. One German battleship was hit by three heavy bombs. This is the end of her. A second was also badly damaged and will not be available for some time. The Germans had five battleships; now only three. Our planes had to fly so low over the water that they could distinguish the names of the German ships. We had casualties, but these were probably due more to low flying in mist than to either A.A. fire or aircraft attack. (While we are talking, Newall comes in and reports that one of our planes has just returned from a reconnaissance over the scene of yesterday's raid and reports that all other German ships have gone away.)

The Truth Raids over Germany were carried out by planes flying singly and very high. They caused great irritation among the German authorities, since all A.R.P. precautions were put in action, it being believed that bombs, and not leaflets, would be dropped.

DIARY

6. 9. 39.

David Keir, and later Maurice Webb, ask me about our liaison arrangements. I tell them that our attitude towards the Government is one of "cold, critical, patriotic detachment". Alternatively, we shall act as patriotic gadflies on Ministers. We shall still be free to criticise if we think fit in the House, and the so-called "political truce" whereby no contested elections take place for the time being, is subject to termination at any time at our discretion.

I speak to Butler in his room and warn him that if Ogilvie does not hurry up and arrange his broadcasts in Polish, Czech, Serbo-Croat, Rumanian, etc., I shall name him in the House. I ask Butler to let ~~me know~~ him know that we are greatly dissatisfied. The other incident, however, about the Broadcast, is now handsomely closed, though no credit for this belongs to Ogilvie.

Butler asks my view on handling of Italy and Japan. Some want to threaten Italy now and press her hard. I say I think this inadvisable, though there should be, beneath a velvet glove, the fingers of which might even hold a post-dated cheque, an unmistakable mailed fist. As to Japan, I suggest that now, although the thing will need very careful handling, we should aim at negotiating away the Chinese concessions. Personally, I would, at a price, let go everything on the mainland north of Hongkong; possibly, even, north of Singapore. He says "Would you let Shanghai go?" I say Yes, certainly, and remind him of the negotiations we were carrying on at the F.O. in 1930/31, when only the incompetence of the Chinese diplomats prevented their getting all the concessions back within a few years. B. says there would be great opposition from Shanghai. I say I would be quite prepared to face this. He says that he, personally, is inclined to agree with my point of view, but that Halifax is being high-minded about it, and the officials at the F.O. are also taking the same line.

He says that we are now watching Turkey very narrowly, hoping that she has in no way been shaken by the Russo-German pact. So far as public declarations go, she is quite all right. He offers to be at my disposal at any time for consultation.

He asks why we decline to join the Government. I tell him that I will answer this question quite frankly. Having regard to our frequently expressed views of the P.M. and Simon, we could not

enter a Cabinet in which these two were Numbers 1 and 2. Moreover, we should require the influence of Sir Horace Wilson to be eliminated. If we read that he had been appointed Governor of the Windward Islands and had already left England in order to take up this most responsible position, we should be favourably impressed. (He asked whether we really attached as much importance to Wilson as this. I say "Yes, certainly, and I have so told a member of the War Cabinet, and one of my colleagues has so told another".) Continuing, I point out that if, for instance, members of the Labour Party were given, say, one seat in the Inner Cabinet, plus the Postmaster General and the Secretaryship of State for Latrines, we should not only be uninfluential within, but we should lose most of our power to exercise influence from without, since we should be continually referred to "Your Mr So-and-So, who is now a Secretary of State". Further, we should lose much of our own credit amongst our own people, who would be filled with suspicions at our official participation. He said that he agreed that these were weighty arguments.

I had told Kingsley Wood substantially the same, and added that, looking back, it was clear to me that Arthur Henderson did no good either to himself or to the Labour Party or to the national cause, by entering the War Cabinet. K.W. had said "I take it that if the situation became desperate, you might reconsider". I said "Our decision is taken now in the existing situation. It is always liable to reconsideration if important circumstances change."

DIARY10. 9. 39.

Meet Gaitskell and Postan at lunch. Both are at present in very subordinate positions in the M.E.W., but no doubt will be promoted later. The only other economists are Hall, who has charge of a Section, Benham (the only member of the L.S.E. staff to be taken on), who is supposed to know facts about Turkey and neighbouring countries, and Peggy Josephs, who is said to be able but is only a name to me. P. says that there is nothing to be bought by the Germans from Russia, but this is the end of his optimism. He is apprehensive of large leakages through Italy and, to a lesser extent, Yugoslavia. He says that Italy is importing large quantities of oil from Rumania and Russia, though at the outbreak of war she was completely without stocks, and this was the real reason why she could not come in. She had "emptied all her oil tanks" into Germany. He thinks she would be better as an enemy than as a leaky neutral.

Both G. and P. are inclined to be pessimistic by nature, but I tell G. that I hope he will keep me regularly informed of what is going on in the Ministry.

DIARY11. 9. 39.

Saw Kingsley Wood at 2.30 p.m. I told him that I took my duties in relation to him and his Department quite seriously. It was understood that all he told me I should tell A.G. To others I should tell some, but not all.

I first took up with him the long-distance problem of securing as great an air superiority over the Germans in the West as they now had over the Poles in the East. He said that they were now using all available floor space in this country. Nuffield's Works at Castle Bromwich had now been turning out Spitfires for some time. This factory had been built very quickly. If war had not broken out, he had planned an official opening in November. He was relying a great deal on the development of production in Canada, which was invulnerable. Work in Canada was going ahead rapidly and, even if there was no change in the American Neutrality Law, there was nothing to prevent the import of all necessary material from the U.S. to Canada, nor, which was equally important, the movement of skilled men from the U.S.

New Zealand would supply a large contingent of pilots, and so would Canada. He also expected to get a considerable number from Australia.

I then turned to the immediate problem, and said that there was much concern, which would no doubt manifest itself in Parliament on Wednesday, at the failure of the Air Force to do anything since the Kiel raid except drop leaflets, while the Poles were being so hard-pressed in the East. I said "Just as Parliament had to hound you into declaring war last week, so it may have to hound you into waging war this week." He said that he quite understood the feeling of impatience, but hoped that the public would be content to wait a little longer. When they moved, they wanted to do something really big. "Attacking German aerodromes is no use", he said, "for they aeroplanes would not be there." I referred again to the Black Forest, and he said that ~~the~~ to set this alight would be contrary to the Hague Convention. They must concentrate upon real military objectives.

I said that the leaflet-dropping raids, though excellent at the beginning, had, I thought, quite exhausted their usefulness, and the planes, I imagined, flew so high that there was no secondary value in the raids; they were too high to do any effective observation. He said that, in addition, we were carrying out reconnaissance flights of which we did not say anything. One of our planes had actually been over Berlin, and this had caused great

commotion, though it had dropped nothing, among the civilian population. He hoped that, just as after I had tackled Balfour on the 4th and shown scepticism and had got a satisfactory answer the next day, so now, within a comparatively short time, I should again feel satisfied.

I then spoke again of the possibilities of sending planes to Poland. I gathered that some had been sent, by round about routes, to be flown by Polish pilots. But to send British planes direct with British pilots would, he argued, be certainly to lose the planes and to send their crews to almost certain death. Even if they dropped bombs and landed safely in Poland, there were no bombs for the return journey and no facilities for repair. The Poles had most obsolete machines and little ground organisation. They had, for instance, no electric starters. As regards effect on Polish morale of arrival of British planes, would not this be fleeting? If our planes were lost, either on the way out or after arrival, would not this depress the Poles? I showed him Article 4 of the Treaty and he was unable to give me any satisfaction as to proper plans having been made.

He said that our losses in the Kiel raid were about what the Germans alleged.

Carroll
After S. of S., saw K. who introduced me to leader of French Mission. Afterwards K. came out with me and said that there was great dissatisfaction in the Air Force with present inactivity. Newall and the others were not strong enough to put the airmen's point of view against the political considerations which weigh with the War Cabinet. No doubt it was important to recognise that we were still at present weaker in the air than the Germans, and must therefore conserve our forces and not throw planes away needlessly, but it was felt that, none the less, there was much which might be done. He hoped I would keep in touch with him, as one member of the House of Commons with another, although, of course, there would be many detailed matters within his knowledge which he would not be entitled to reveal.

Told A.G. later of my talk with S. of S. He thought that K.W. had told him, more than a week ago, that British planes and crews were already in Poland. I said I thought he must have misunderstood. The utmost, I gathered, that had happened was that we had sold some planes to the Poles and were sending them via the Black Sea. A.G. thought that Winston would probably be trying to

persuade his colleagues to embark on a big operation to break into the Baltic. Fisher had wanted to do this in 1914, but now our naval superiority over Germany was much greater. I added that the air was a new factor which worked the other way. Meanwhile, one is only guessing!

DIARY11. 9. 39.

See Raczynski, who is much disturbed at relative passivity of French and British in the West. He thinks that telephone conversations to the Embassy will now be tapped as a normal war measure. He is anxious not to get into unnecessary trouble with the Government; hence the need for caution on the telephone, particularly at his end. Bracken, he says, rings him up regularly, but Churchill has become, naturally, less accessible since he entered the War Cabinet. Lloyd has not been in touch with him for several days.

He shows me a message, dated the 5th, conveyed by the Polish Air Attache to the A.M., asking for immediate action by British bombers against German aerodromes and industrial areas within the radius of H.M.'s Air Forces in order to relieve the situation in Poland. R. wrote to Churchill on the same day, expressing his great pleasure at the raid on Kiel and asking for more.

He had a telegram en clair from Beck on the 9th, saying "Please at once deny all information regarding the smashing of the Polish Army. In spite of crushing superiority of 70 Divisions, and of almost the whole of the German Air Force, directed against Poland", the Polish Army was still resisting and retreating in good order. Out of 21 units of the German Air Force, 20, R. said, were being used against Poland and the other was covering the Kiel Canal. On the evening of the 9th, Beck had telegraphed "Please put the position clearly before the British Government and ask for a more definite answer regarding war plans and help for Poland."

Later in the evening of the 9th Lukasiwicz had telegraphed to R. from Paris that he had called on Daladier who had said that for the last three days the French were willing to help as requested by the Poles, but that the British were not willing to act for fear of adverse reactions in the U.S.A. (This is the same old game of London and Paris each blaming the other for over-hesitation and inactivity.)

On the 10th, R. saw Cadogan, Halifax being engaged, and said "This is very unfair on us. The least that we can ask is what you are prepared to do". Cadogan had said that there would be an answer the same day, but no answer had come yet. R. had postponed making an appointment with the F.O. this morning until he had seen me. He said that he was conscious that he might cause irritation here if he pressed too hard about plans, since he would be told that the War Cabinet has all these questions before them now.

"But, after all", he said, "I am an interested party and I have my Treaty". I asked whether Article 4 of the Treaty, which states that arrangements for mutual assistance "are established" between the competent military, naval and air authorities of the two countries, really means anything. Did the Ironside Mission work out detail? He said that Ironside stayed only a short time and brought with him only a small staff. I gathered that the answer is No, and that Article 4 is a lie.

The Polish General who has come over here on the special mission had seen the General Staff. R. regrets that he was not present at the interview, as he doubts whether the Generals completely understood one another. His General reported that the British said that there will be large-scale and persistent ground fighting in the West, and that this has already begun; that, in the air, the British and French Air Forces are now acting in support of the ground troops. But whether, as regards the separate air arm, long range air attack is to be undertaken, is still in the balance, the decision not yet having been taken by the War Cabinet.

R. feels that this is most unsatisfactory. To sacrifice an Eastern Front altogether is a tremendous price to pay for whatever advantages are supposed to result from air activity in the West. Ciano is saying in Rome that the British and French are fighting a purely defensive war; they don't do anything to help their friends in the East of Europe. This is having a most discouraging effect in the Balkans.

He then described the general situation in Poland. The Germans are using not only almost the whole of their Air Force, but almost all their mechanised troops, in the East. These advance at high speed and in close co-operation. Sometimes more than 1,000 tanks are advancing together "like an Armada", with crushing support from the air, German aircraft flying in front of, above, and on the flanks of these shafts of mechanised ground troops. German air superiority has been such that no Polish operation, e.g., supply, change of position, or troop concentration, can be carried out except at night. "We cannot move one soldier or one cart in daylight without being seen". Even the first concentration of troops from their points of mobilisation could not be effected owing to German air attack. There was continual bombing of railway lines, which had to be repaired every few hours. (I understand, though R. did not say so, that there was an initial bombing of all principal Polish aerodromes, on which were, unfortunately, many Polish aeroplanes.) Great numbers of Polish troops were still fresh and ready to fight. Some divisions had not yet been engaged, but German air action stopped all large movements. For instance, on the 4th and 5th days of the war, preparations were made for large-scale counter-attacks, but everything was seen from the air. Thousands

of German aeroplanes were bombing and cruising the whole time. Few Polish troops had been cut off; a few in the Corridor, but this was foreseen, and also lightly held. R. had been much concerned for the army round Poznan, which had been still fighting on the old frontier when the Germans had made large advances both to the north and the south, but his latest information was that the Poznan army was now successfully extricating itself and was being handled with great skill.

At the beginning of our conversation, R. had said "It is like a shooting party; we are the partridges and they are the guns".

DIARY12. 9. 39.

Phil says that Balinski, like his Chief, is now nervous of telephone talks to the Embassy, and prefers to be rung up at his own house. We are clearly having a repetition of official dislike of relations between foreign diplomats and the official Opposition, as in last September with the Czechs, when Cadogan gave a friendly warning to Masaryk not to tell us too much.

Let us recall that the British guarantee to Poland was given in April. No detailed plans seem to have been made in the interval, in spite of the Ironside visit.

DIARY12. 9. 39.

Made my first official call on Cross, Minister of Economic Warfare, in the School of Economics building. He is a dark horse, but I am not unfavourably impressed. We discuss, in broad terms, the special cases of Italy, Rumania and the Scandinavian States. He has, I think, a reasonably clear picture of his job and is anxious to act vigorously. He says that the Ministry pressed hard for the Three-years declaration. With Italy, quiet conversations are going on. It is not intended to allow her to be a neutral leak. With Rumania, pre-emption plus barter arrangements are being considered. She has agreed to sell 25% of her export surplus of oil to Germany, and we are trying to get the remaining 75%. German engineers are already in Russia trying to improve the Russian railway system. Unless this is done, it will be difficult to transport oil from Russia. I urged him to consider, as regards both Rumanian oil and Swedish iron ore, the possibility of paying them not to produce, a la Roosevelt. He seemed a little scared of this idea, on the ground of money cost to us and unemployment to the other party. He mentioned the need for increased output of coal in this country so that we could have something to pay with. He realised that any question of longer hours in mines was political dynamite, but thought that this might have to be faced. I said that there were many unemployed miners who could be re-absorbed in the pits, without any increase of hours, particularly if some of the older pits, not highly mechanised, were re-opened so that older miners, e.g., in my constituency, could work again. All this seemed rather new to him, but I asked him to pass on these thoughts to the Ministry of Mines.

He said that "financial pressure" did not seem likely to be an important problem. Direct blockade and rationing was what mattered.

He has, on paper, a very formidable staff drawn from the F.O., D.O.T., B.T. and the City, with a few economists.

Dalton I 21.

46

DIARY

13. 9. 39.

We have a useful debate in the House on the Ministry of Information. Hoare admits many blunders and promises to try to do better. Douglas Jay and Bob Fraser are probably both going in, in addition to Crossman who is there now. Someone said that the real trouble with the Ministry was that they had a "Basement full of Blimps" trying to prevent the public from receiving information.

DIARY

13. 9. 39.

Deeply shocked at statement in evening papers of communique from Hitler's Headquarters in Poland announcing that in future German artillery and air men will take "all suitable measures" against open towns, villages and hamlets and the civilian population. Phil and I see A.G. with Will Henderson, and it is agreed that A.G. should go to P.M. and I to Winston (Alexander is not to be found) to press that some additional action shall be taken to support the Eastern Front, whether by putting planes into Poland or by air action in the West to draw away German forces from the East, and, in either case, to raise Polish morale.

I am with Winston at the Admiralty from 7.40 to 8 p.m. I tell him that A.G. is seeing the P.M. and has asked me to see him, whom we regard as our best hope in the War Cabinet. I say that we have for some time been greatly disturbed at the failure to give effective help to the Poles, either directly or indirectly. Morals and decency apart, there is a very grave danger, unless we do something effective soon, of the Eastern Front disappearing altogether. The ~~fact~~ effect of our inactivity on neutrals, especially in the Balkans, is devastating, and Ciano is telling all the little people in S.E. Europe that of course the British and French only look after themselves and leave their friends in the lurch.

W. asks what I propose, and I say: Certainly air action in the West against predominantly military objectives in W. Germany, and also, though here I am less sure about means, direct assistance to the Poles in the East. As between alternative means, the War Cabinet should have knowledge which we outside have not.

W. then deploys the following argument, walking up and down the room throughout the whole of our conversation.

W If we disregard Poland, it is unquestionably in our interest not to make ~~and~~ first move in air warfare in the West. At present the air is quiet, and it is to our advantage that it should remain so for the present, (1) because this allows of the continued improvement of our defences, still somewhat defective, e.g., increased sandbagging; (2) because we are still inferior in total strength to Germany in the air, but our factories are now turning out aircraft at a tremendous pace and diminishing the disparity; It is most important that this process should continue and not be interrupted by heavy German air attacks upon these factories such as would undoubtedly be one of the principal features of German attack on this country. Further, (3), it is most desirable

in order to influence American opinion, que Messieurs les Assassins commencent. Even if you aim at military objectives, "there is always a splash" and some women and children are sure to be hit. If we can, let us secure that the first women and children to be hit are British and not German.

Conditions (1) and (2) are so clearly favourable to us that there is reason to think that the German Air Force will not long remain inactive in the West in any case. The plans, of course, are all ready for a great variety of British air offensives against Germany. One has only to give the word and off they go. Notoriously, too, the R.A.F. is chafing under the strain of comparative inactivity.

So far, the argument has left Poland out of account. Clearly, however, we must take full and anxious account of the Polish situation. The question, therefore, is: What can we do to help Poland now? - in the long run, the only way to help Poland is to win the war against Germany. W. does not believe that British air attacks in the West would help Poland. A large part of the German bombers - and their best bombers - are not in Poland at all. Air attacks by us would draw nothing significant away from Poland. As regards putting planes into Poland, this, he seems to think, is a quite impossible operation, though I have the impression that he has not really focussed this particular problem very clearly, being naturally principally occupied with naval questions. He fears that, in fact, the Eastern Front would go before long, whatever we did. We have some further discussion, in the course of which I say how shocking it is that we guaranteed Poland in April and seem to have made no effective plans for war in the East, to which he replies that if he were not now a member of the War Cabinet he would certainly have much to say on this line, but "I have signed on for this voyage and so I cannot use such arguments now". He also says "If only we had the Czeyhs as well as the Poles!" and, of the Russians, "We might have got them earlier, but at the end they played a deadly game!"

I say that the arguments that he has used, coming from him, have some weight with me, though I am by no means convinced and reserve all rights of public criticism. But, I say, those same arguments coming from Sir Horace Wilson or some of your colleagues in the War Cabinet would have had absolutely no weight with me. He says that he is satisfied now that even those colleagues whom, no doubt, I and others must suspect, are quite determined now to carry through the war. He speaks in a very encouraging way of naval operations. He is quite satisfied that we are beating the submarines. "Many of them are corpses at the bottom of the sea and others have had a very rough ride home". He speaks of the

shattering effect of depth charges on submarine crews. Nothing in war inflicts a greater shock on human beings, - suddenness, concussion and claustrophobia. If, he says, a depth charge exploded as far away from the Admiralty as the House of Commons, it would break every pane of glass. In the early days, German submarines were well placed and did great damage, comparable to the worst days of the last war, but the convoy system is now rapidly coming into full operation, and for the past 48 hours no British ship has been sunk. Just before I go, he asks for the latest news: there are no new sinkings announced; now, therefore, there have been none for 54 hours. He says "I sit here waiting for news, and I only get bad news, of ships sunk. I don't get the good news, when submarines are sunk, because we never know for certain.

frank
We speak of Italy. He is sure it is wrong to urge that we should push Italy into war on the German side. At the same time, the Navy in the Mediterranean is quite ready for action if Italy should come in, and confident of the result, though it is never wise to underestimate one's adversary. The Italians have 100 submarines. I say that it is indispensible that we should stop her from being a leak in the blockade. He most emphatically agrees, and says that this is being done. He adds that "The French think that she may pass, in time, from neutrality into an alliance with us, and this would open up new ~~threats~~ against Germany". He has a dream, he says, though it may be far away and never be realised, of all the States of Southern and South-Eastern Europe moving, in the final stages of the war, against Germany, and of the flags of freedom waving again in Prague and Vienna. But, he says, all this is very far away, and there will be a long, grim interval first.

DIARY13. 9. 39.

A.G. was with P.M. while I was with Winston. When we compared notes afterwards it seems that P.M. told the same tale as Winston, though less persuasively. He told A.G. that the War Cabinet was unanimous on this matter, which had been very fully considered: "unanimous, including Churchill", he said, though A.G. had not mentioned Churchill.

I recall afterwards that Winston, in his talk with me, dropped a phrase about Italy not liking possible Russian advances. He did not develop this and I did not pick it up, but, in view of the turn of events a few days later, it means more.

14. 9. 39.

Spoke to Boothby who said, rather sadly, that Winston had always had a one-track mind. Just now, all his energy was devoted to suppressing submarines. This followed on my remark that I had got the impression that he was quite on top of his job with regard to the Navy, but that he did not seem to me to have focussed the problem of the Eastern Front. The "Pravda" article to-night has a very bad smell, and seems to suggest that the Russians intend to occupy Eastern Poland and so make a new Partition. Then they may take Bessarabia and some Baltic States. And then?

DIARY15. 9. 39.

Maillet comes to see me at his own request. Wants me to try to prevent the Treasury from making difficulties if it is decided to help Rumania to form an Eastern Front. Polish resistance won't last for many more days. Rumania fears an ultimatum from Germany, couched in friendly terms, demanding all her export surplus of oil, wheat, fats, etc. This would be followed, in case of refusal, by German armed attack. King Carol and his P.M. say they will fight if equipped on a sufficient scale and given a loan of at least £12 millions. If not, they will give in. Tilea saw P.M. and Halifax yesterday and thought they were sympathetic to his proposals.

The only other element of Eastern Front left is Turkey - still strong, though there has been long delay over the signature of the Treaty. She wants to have a crack at Italy, and wanted to name her in the Treaty. This has been one cause of delay. If Germany appeared on the Black Sea, Turkey would declare war on Bulgaria. Weygand is at Ankara to organise that end - a good sign.

Hungarian troop movements have distracted Rumania, but routes for Germany through Hungary are not good. The Jugs are saying that, given credits, they might fight against Germany. Is this sincere?

Aeroplanes, guns and other supplies for Poland, going out through the Eastern Mediterranean, should now be in Rumania. They will arrive in Poland just in time to be captured. (I learn later that they never arrived in Poland.)

Wonsan
The French, says M., are not surprised at the Polish collapse. For three years the French General Staff had urged the Poles to make fortifications. The Poles had said that this was contrary to their strategy of mobility. "The Polish authorities have shown great levity" in this, and also as regards assistance from Russian troops. The French pressed the Poles harder than did the British to accept Russian help. In the last three days before the crash of the Anglo-French-Russian Staff Talks, three separate demarches were made at Moscow, the first by the French alone, and the second and third by the British and French jointly. The last of all was very peremptory, and the Poles then agreed in principle to Russian troops entering Poland. But then it was too late. That very day Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow, and the next day the German-Russian Pact was signed. I said that we and the French should long before this have brought the Poles and Russians together round a table. M. agreed with me that Article 4 of the Anglo-Polish Treaty was a lie. Nothing was prepared. The Poles wanted to buy

aircraft from U.S.A. and could have done so, but the British Treasury argued on about sterling versus gold loans, and the devaluation of the zloty, and so the Poles never got the money.

Were the Russians ever sincere in their negotiations for a Pact with us and France? It is difficult to say. They always thought that Chamberlain wanted the war to go East, and that the British would wriggle out of any commitment. And up till April, anyhow, Chamberlain did want the war to be German versus Slav. (Van said to someone two days ago that the first he heard of Strang's mission to Moscow was from the papers. He could have told them that that was a mistake and would be regarded in Moscow both as an insincerity and an insult. Clearly, though he did not say so, if no Minister was to be sent, he himself should have gone.) M. thinks that the Russians will, right at the end, come in against Germany, give her the coup de grace when we and she and the French are all very tired, and aim then at dictating the peace and dominating Central Europe. (This may be French optimism.)

The Russo-German Pact came in a rush at the end. During the Ciano-Ribbentrop talks Germany did not count on neutralising Russia and was urging Italy to come in with her. Ciano said no. Then it seemed that there would be no attack on Poland and no war this year. Then, suddenly and quite quickly, the Russo-German Pact was negotiated.

The British and French Staffs are quite unshaken in the belief that no help to Poland can prolong Polish resistance more than a week or two at the outside, and would, by starting war in the West, destroy much valuable war potential. But M. wonders why the British did guarantee Poland if they did not mean either themselves to concert plans with Poland or to press her to take Russian help or at least to make a good job of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Pact. British conduct, as seen from Moscow, was throughout most suspicious and unsatisfactory.

Unless there can be an Eastern Front, the war will be a stale mate. The attack in the West can only be slow and methodical. The Germans have filled the earth with mine fields. These, if incautiously crossed, might lead to ten or twelve Divisions being blown into the air. Hence Gamelin's scientific caution. As to whether the Siegfried Line, or bits of it, are built of unset concrete this is being tested by bombardment now.

DIARY16. 9. 39.

Lunch with H.G. He thinks Germany may get from Russia manganese and perhaps oil. We should negotiate a trade agreement to pre-empt any available Russian supplies of both these. We should also secure for ourselves Russian timber via White Sea. Some previous contracts to supply Russia with key goods are now held up at demand of our Service Department. F.O. seems quite out of temper with Russians, to judge by Minutes seen by H.G. On the other hand, Board of Trade wants some agreement because they want the timber.

Rumania. H.G. less aware of urgent flurry than I, but suggests an expeditionary force.

If Italy came in, the British Navy and the Turks would both be delighted.

The de Groot's to tea. Vague talk of war aims. I quote Lindbergh as saying that after the last war we treated the Germans "neither with fairness nor with force." If we win this war, we must treat them with both. And primarily create a World Air Legion completely to dominate the air.

DIARY16. 9. 39.

I met Dwyer in a bus. For the moment I did not remember who he was. He seemed in very high spirits and said "I am going back this week". I asked "Going back where?" He said "Why, to ~~Australia~~ New Zealand". I then remembered who he was, and said "Take a good look at Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament. They will probably be gone when you come again". He irritated me just a little.

DIARY18. 9. 39.

Airman A came to see me. He spoke of the mismanagement of civil aviation. Imperial Airways, with a fleet of 60 aeroplanes, had a staff of 1,715 at home, including the pilots and ground staff. Reith, he said, was paid £17,000 a year to look after this small fleet, and Runciman junior £10,000 a year. Runciman, moreover, though an air officer, was screened so that he would not have to fight, and if, later on, he did go and fight, his salary would be made up to £10,000 a year, since he would be treated as a civil servant. (This is what A said, but I am not sure whether it is all true.) Reith wanted to swallow all internal civil aviation concerns and to make a stiff bureaucratic organisation under some retired air officer.

Initially, said A, the R.A.F. wants help with carrying troops, supplies, etc. Civil aircraft would be like merchant shipping. There is no need to amalgamate all ownership and control at this stage. Meanwhile, civil aircraft should be conserved for war communications. There is a good deal of waste of petrol, etc., now, e.g., in restoring flights for maiden aunts from western seaside resorts to Lundy Island.

N.A.C. (National Air Communications), with H.Q. at Bristol, has now been established with Sir Francis Shelmerdine in charge. Reith is at Whitchurch, near Bristol.

 Classification of personnel is getting rather complex. In addition to ordinary R.A.F. there is -

- (1) Auxiliary Air Force (A.A.F.).
 These are rather like Territorials - County families in the air. Many ornamental Air Commodores. But they operate as separate units, many of which are very efficient.
- (2) Air Force Voluntary Reserve (R.A.F.V.R.)
 These are people who have been training in weekends and at odd times. They don't operate in separate units, but are used to fill vacancies.
- (3) Reserve of Air Force Officers (R.A.F.O.)
 Men who have held short-service commissions in the R.A.F. and have had much more experience than most of those in (2).

At present R.A.F.V.R. are called up and living at home on full pay and allowances. For the moment they cannot all be used.

DIARY18. 9. 39.

Last night, after a good day with the Wilmots on the High Weald of Sussex, heard of Russian invasion of Poland. First effect of this news very shattering; then got out the map and wondered whether a Russian elbow round Rumania would now shut off Germany from that country. Rumanian flurry of last week has now to be reconsidered. I mentioned this to A.G. this morning on the telephone. He is to see the P.M. this afternoon. I urge that Russia should not be publicly slanged too much at present.

See A.G. in the early afternoon and discuss pretty frankly the future Leadership. A fairly early prorogation is desirable, and I tell him that, in my view, as things are, I am in favour of his being Leader. C.R.A. at no time, and much less now, having been ill and out of touch, is big enough or strong enough to carry the burden. I am quite frank about my past support of H.M., but tell A.G. that, having regard to all the circumstances, I should advise H.M. not to stand for the Leadership now. I also tell A.G. that sometimes in the past, in my view, he has "sacrificed major things to minor things". This is deliberately vague, but perhaps enough.

He says that Dulanty, obviously speaking for DeValera, said to him at lunch (a) that the Irish attitude would be benevolent neutrality underneath, though a little less than this on the surface, and (b) that Eira would be willing to supply food, but that they were having difficulties about prices at this end. Dulanty then went on to ask whether it would not be possible to make peace when Hitler offered it after the destruction of Poland. A.G. said No; it was impossible to trust Hitler and the gang round him; it would merely be a breathing space for them before they made their final attack on us.

DIARY

18. 9. 39.

I check over the following points with K.W. at our talk to-day.

There are 1,750 German first line long-distance Bombers (some say none of these used; others say about 50% against Poland). Our corresponding figure much lower, and many of our first line Bombers are being used for training. There is still a shortage of training machines relatively to pilots in training.

Our Fighters have an endurance of only one and a half hours, and we have not developed an adequate long-range Fighter type. Converted Blenheims don't fill the bill. German Fighters, on the other hand, have an endurance of six to eight hours.

Whitleys had not got their turrets three months ago, and 12/36 is not yet in the squadrons in any quantity.

The Germans in Poland simply went for the Polish Air Force and killed it on the first day.

DIARY

18. 9. 39.

With K.W. from 5 to 5.50 p.m. What does the Russian move mean? I ask whether they had not foreseen it, and he said yes. We agreed that it might not be as bad as it seemed at first sight. The worst hypothesis of all was that Russian planes might be made available to the Germans, but this was ~~more~~ hypothesis. There was, at present, no evidence whatever to support it. I recalled that I had several times proposed that Russian planes should aid the Poles. I also told him that, some time, there will be many questions to ask as to what H.M.G. had done between April, when they guaranteed Poland, and September 1st, when Hitler attacked, to plan and consolidate the defence of Poland. K.W. confesses that Ironside, when we went out in August, discussed only the Danzig question and took hardly any staff. K.W. says that Ironside and Smigly-Rydz both agreed at that time that each of us would have to do the best we could if Hitler attacked. K.W. says that half the German Air Force, both good and bad, was used against Poland. A large part of the work was done by Army co-operation machines. The attack in the first days was concentrated on aerodromes, hangars, and air training schools. Many Polish machines were destroyed on the ground, not only because they were in the hangars or on the aerodromes instead of being scattered, but also because, being obsolete types, they could not rise quickly. He is inclined to argue that, in the light of events, no direct help to Poland would have been practicable or would have made any difference. I ask whether the planes and other stores en route to Poland via the Eastern Mediterranean had been captured. He says no.

conserving

He advocates the principle of ~~moving~~ our forces in the West. If the Germans did all the attacking in the air, and we did none, their present superiority would soon disappear, for their losses would be very heavy. In fact, he realises that we should have to make some reply. I said that when I last saw him I asked when something more was going to happen. He replied that we have told the French that whenever they decide to make a really big push in the West, we will attack military targets in rear of the Front. Our current production, plus that of the French, is now probably a bit larger than the German, but they still have a large advantage in the total. As to the figure of 1,750 first line long-distance German Bombers, he said "I gave you that figure". When I suggest a figure for our own strength relatively to this, he is evasive. I raise the question of our Fighters' endurance. He says that they would not generally need to be up more than 20 minutes. We did not use Fighters, but reconnaissance planes, for patrols over the North Sea. 12/36 - of which I said Harold Balfour

had told me - is coming along pretty well now. He admits that the training of pilots is limited both by available machines and instructors. He thinks this is the most important limiting factor now in the expansion of all air forces, including the Germans, who are still having heavy casualties in training. He corrects a statement made to me last time; Nuffield is making Spitfire parts, not complete machines, but the work is proceeding quite efficiently at the point of assembly. I remind him that he has now been 18 months at the A.M. He says that if he ever writes his life - or if somebody else writes it for him - he will have a very good story to tell for these 18 months. He is satisfied that all possible has been done during this period. His only regret was that he was not able to start two years earlier.

DIARY

18. 9. 39.

Call on Butler at F.O. at 6 p.m. This is the first time that I have done this, but it may be useful as an occasional alternative approach. On the way in, I have a word with G.J., who says of the Russians "It's wonderful how these peasant diplomats get the better of everyone" (I recall Pritt's report of Chilston's saying to him in Moscow "You know Pritt, it is very remarkable, they are all working men".) I say "We all remember that the best Foreign Secretary we have had here was the one who had the least formal education". Butler's Private Secretary, a young man named Harrison, asked whether he has ever met me before, says "I remember meeting you in 1930 at a Commem. Dinner at King's." I say "I remember that dinner very well. I got so drunk that they have never asked me again". He says "It was a very good evening anyhow, wasn't it?", to which I assent.

With Butler I take a tour of the horizon. I strongly urge that Russia should not be treated with high pique. He says he agrees, and that they are trying to keep relations as good as they can with the aid of the French and the Turks. The French, he says, - though it would be very premature to say anything about it - are considering the possibility of sending some "high personality", e.g., Herriot, to Moscow. He realizes that the Russians don't trust us, not any of us. He has heard that they mistrust Hoare less than the rest. I say that it was a first class blunder not to send Halifax to Moscow. He agrees that the failure to do so, or to send anyone else of importance, has greatly contributed to suspicion, resentment and recent events. On the other hand, the Turks are hopeful that Russia's latest policy will be, on balance, helpful to us. Turkish-Russian relations are still friendly, as are Anglo-Turkish. The Turks are appearing now, not as an immediate ally in the war, but as a very valuable go-between and as a check on certain otherwise dangerous tendencies. The Turkish Foreign Minister is going to Moscow, believing that he will bring back good news. Our Treaty with Turkey is hanging fire, largely because the Turks are dissatisfied with the economic and financial terms and keep coming back with further demands under this head. They do not feel that their Army is yet sufficiently well equipped, nor that we are compensating them sufficiently for the loss of their German market.

The French are already advocating a Sabanika, ^{As they} as in the last war, to attack Germany through the Balkans, on the assumption that there is a German attack on Rumania through Hungary - either willing or unwilling. ~~The British view~~ Weygand, who has been in Ankara, has been working out details. The British view at present

is that a Salonica Expeditionary Force would be premature. (I also gather from A.G.'s report of his talk with P.M. to-day that they are anxious not to "offend Italy".) Butler says that Prince Paul, always anti-Soviet, will now be more furiously against them than ever, and Matchek and the Croats are also very anti-German. The trouble with the Jugs also is lack of equipment. As someone has said, "They have half a million men under arms, but no arms to put them under." I say that in the light of the last war I am an Easterner; it is obvious that the Dardanelles idea was right, though the Admirals and the Generals, with their jealousies and delays, spoilt it. Butler says that Winston is energising the War Cabinet. I say I am sceptical of this; I believe he is too much absorbed in the naval war. I remind Butler that it was from the advance of the Salonica Army that the final victory grew in 1918. He then speaks of the ultimate possibility of an attack on Germany through Italy if she were to come on to our side. Mussolini, he says, will certainly convey Hitler's peace offer soon. For the moment, Mussolini seems to be in retirement, though Ciano tells Loraine that he sees him regularly. Ciano has been much changed since his encounter with Ribbentrop at Salzburg, when Ribbentrop rated and abused him like a schoolboy. Mussolini did not want war to break out now; now that it has begun, he doesn't like it and is full of fears about its repercussions in Italy. Butler is hopeful that we can make an arrangement with Italy, though not sensationally, whereby we shall sell them more coal on condition that they sell little or ~~anything~~ ^{nothing} to Germany.

The Poles do not want us to declare war on Russia, even if we had any inclination to do so. I say that after the war it may well be that the Eastern Frontier of Poland should be a good deal further West, but in that case the Poles should have East Prussia to colonise. He says that Raczynski recently said to him that no Polish State in the future could hope to exist with the threat of a militarised East Prussia in the North. There would be great German efforts to detach France from us, but Butler does not think that these have any chance of success. It is good that Bonnet has left the Quai d'Orsay. Daladier has often been asked why he does not get rid of him altogether, and always replies that he has 30 or 40 followers in the Chamber. He is not likely to do much harm at the Ministry of Justice.

Of the dangers in the West, the gravest, Butler thinks, would be a German invasion of Holland, the Dutch having very poor defences. The significance of this would be that they could then bomb us from Dutch aerodromes, and this would greatly shorten distances - in both directions.

U.S.A. Roosevelt expected to get the Cash and Carry

amendment through both Houses. Lothian seemed to be getting on pretty well with the President, and his despatches were not, as might have been expected, too verbose. The President had said to him "We shall come right in before long", but this was rather typical of the President's way of speaking loosely and optimistically in private conversation.

Far East. I say that my personal view is that we should clear out of the Concessions at the earliest suitable moment. We could not defend them; we did not want war with the Japs; we really could not go on taking risks on behalf of China, particularly in view of the Russian attitude both in Europe and Asia. I said that this was my personal view, with which not all my colleagues would agree. He said that he was anxious to leave North China. There was a battalion still in Tientsin, one of whose duties was to furnish the Legation Guard at Peking, but Peking was now occupied by the Japs and had ceased to be the capital of anything, and we had no Legation there. Meanwhile, in Tientsin, though the stripping incidents had ceased, the place was swimming in floods of dirty yellow water. And the War Office kept on asking for the battalion. I asked how many British nationals there were there, and he said about a thousand. The question was whether we should come out by an agreement, or under duress. An agreement might be called "appeasement". Many of his advisers in the F.O., and also the Americans, especially Dr Hornbeck - whom I remembered having met in Washington - thought that we should leave only under duress. I said I disagreed. Duress would mean further open humiliation. There had been quite enough of this. After the way in which we had sacrificed first the Czechs and then the Poles, we could not stand any more public humiliations. This would lower our credit still further in the Balkans and elsewhere. I said that, as I had told him on a previous occasion, I should be glad to let go everything on the mainland north of Hongkong, and possibly Hongkong as well. But I realised that this might have to be done discreetly and by stages, and it was important to keep in touch, so far as possible, with the U.S.A.

It underlay this talk that the outlook was very grave. Butler said that he was much concerned about the morale of the home front. People would not be pleased to be continually crawling about in the dark, being bombed, and not having enough food. I said "This Government of yours has indeed navigated us into a very tight corner". "It is a very serious position for us all", he said.

DIARY19. 9. 39.

Meeting of P.E.C. at 11.30. Rabbit is back, but leaves A.G. to take Chair. Discursive talk on situation, particularly latest Russian moves. Then rising growl, led by H.M., against Chamberlain and Co. and need to kick them out if war is to be more than, as Shinwell well puts it, "a silly escapade". Some think that a secret session soon would help, ~~in the House~~ not because the House would be told high secrets, but because tongues, particularly on the Ministerial side, would be loosened in criticism of incompetent ministers. Important, however, to time this well. Government can only be changed if there is a serious breakdown among their supporters, and if, as someone says to me privately, "Winston is ready to strike". Not clear that we are ~~near~~ yet. Meanwhile, decide to send A.G. and Rabbit to see P.M. and Halifax on delay over Turkish Treaty.

here/

more to come?

Dalton I 21

64

DIARY

19. 9. 39.

Call on Cross and have a run round the world. He says that only a minority are optimistic about Russia's new moves. The Russians are now playing with Turkey, and this may lead to trouble. I say that it is very hard to believe that either the Russians or the Turks would welcome the Germans on the Black Sea. Cross says that he wants to get all British ships out of the Black Sea in case they should be caught there; in fact, nearly all are out now.

As to Italy, he is getting impatient at Loraine's delay, which has now extended over several days, in replying to proposals for the sending of a mission to Italy. He thinks we may have to embarrass Loraine by pressing for stricter and quicker control of Italian imports. Cross holds that we must treat Italy like any other neutral and ration her strictly. Her stocks of oil have run very low indeed, but she has a lot of oil now on order. Any further deliveries from now on should be taken into account in fixing her ration, but the Italians are probably trying to replenish their supplies before the rationing period starts.

Some Swedes are here now negotiating, and we are awaiting a reply from Norway, regarding the use of her tankers, which is expected to be favourable. The Belgians, on the other hand, are being very neutral. All these neutral Powers, Cross thinks, will want their agreements with us to be kept secret, and he may have to stone-wall in the House, in reply to questions.

Balkan
The Turks are opening their mouths very wide and don't seem to realise how much they are asking for in arms, trade and finance. I say that we take a very critical view of the Treasury's action in regard to Poland and we suspect that Simon is responsible for holding up the Turkish Treaty. I ask Cross what he is doing about tobacco, and he agrees that we must buy substantial quantities from Turkey, Greece, and perhaps Rumania. This may upset the U.S.A. but we must explain the position to them frankly. It is impossible, however, for us to replace Germany as the principal export market of the Balkan States, though we can do something to compensate them for loss of German trade.

As regards neutral shipping, we are doing pretty well. In addition to the Norwegian tankers, we have got about 150 ships from Panama and a good deal from Greece, especially for use in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Dalton I 21 (65)

-2-

m He is still having difficulty with the Treasury about typists and thinks that he will have to ask firms in the City not only to lend typists to the Ministry, but themselves to pay their wages.

He has had to get a new Establishments Officer, as old Robinson, the F.O.dugout, was much too slow.

DIARY20. 9. 39.

Saw Kingsley Wood on two points: (1) the scale of his future construction programme, and (2) the interpretation to be placed on Hitler's reference at Danzig yesterday to some new secret weapon.

As to (1), K.W. says that he hopes within a year to double the output in this country. This makes no allowance (a) for diminished output in this country owing to air attack, or (b) for increased available output owing to new production in Canada or supplies from U.S.A. if Neutrality Act is amended. Within two years he hopes to treble present output, including in this estimate prospective production in Canada and Australia, but not including anything from the U.S.A. He doubts whether Germany can get anywhere near doubling her present output; they are very much nearer than we to the limits of labour power and material. There has been no evidence in recent months of any new aircraft factories being constructed in Germany. Their air frame production has run far ahead of their engine production, and large quantities of the former are in store. As regards resources acquired in C.S., he does not attach much importance to these, believing that their output immediately before March last was not more than 30 to 40 per month. The limit of our expansion in this country is determined by competing claims by other Departments, including the need to furnish ~~xxxx~~ sufficient well equipped man power in France to counter Hitler's propaganda to the French designed to show that they are suffering all the losses.

As to (2), there are several alternatives, and they have been discussing the matter at the War Cabinet this morning. Hitler has for some time talked in private interviews of some new and secret weapon. (I said that soon after N.Henderson went to Berlin he had told me that Goering used the same vague and threatening language about new and secret weapons to him. This is not, therefore, a new German boast.) K.W. says that the possibilities are :

- (a) Just bluff and lies, designed to frighten us.
- (b) Some new weapon to be used against ships, for only this could really fit in with Hitler's statement that the weapon could not be used by us against him.
- (c) Mere indiscriminate bombing on a large scale.
- (d) Some new gas; but as to this, our chemists think that they know all the possibilities and that there can be no important

chemical surprise. They may, of course, be mistaken in this, but whatever new compound might be used against us could clearly, after an interval, be used in reprisal against Germany.

- (e) Some mere new development of ingenuity with regard to bombs, e.g., some new development of delayed action.

I press K.W. as to the efficiency and persistence of our research. He says that he is now Chairman of a committee which co-ordinates research for all the Service Departments. He is satisfied that they are making good progress in many directions, and that we have many inventions which the Germans have not, particularly in the air. On the other hand, much research is disappointing in that it leads to no results of immediate utility. Sir H. Tizard has for years been organising a large staff of scientists for the Government, and K.W. thinks that I might like to meet him.

Plans are now being worked out for further development of balloon barrage - curtains, suspended bombs, etc. Increasing importance is attached, in all spheres of the war, to driving up enemy aircraft and preventing low-flying attack.

I tell K.W. that some of my colleagues say that the people at the top of the War Cabinet are hopeless, but that there are others, including himself, whom we might recommend for promotion later on!

DIARY20. 9. 39.

Further discussion - not quite so formless as usual - at Parliamentary Executive on secret sessions. Lees Smith thinks that these should become a normal procedure at short intervals during the war, although, of course, public sessions also should continue. I and most others stress need, if we are ever to change any Ministers, to break down morale of ministerial mass. This might well be done in secret session, where tongues are free. Leakage through press is now impossible, owing to Government control of press. Leakage, therefore, could only be in M.P.s' private circles, and this would not matter much. None the less, a premature secret session might do harm. We must steer between undue delay while present Ministers mis-handle the war, and plunging into strong criticism without any effective support from ministerialists.

Phil says that he has had a long and rather encouraging talk with the Turkish Ambassador, who thinks that the Turkish visit to Moscow will bring back good results.

Have a word with Butler as we are leaving the House. He verifies that the Turk has come back in a good mood. I say that my colleagues think that many Ministers should be sacked as incapable of running the war. I am inclined to think that Simon should be the first one to be shot down. He messed up the financial discussions with Poland and is now, I gather, endangering those with Turkey, and he is not even a decent Conservative! Why don't the Tories join with us in getting rid of him? Butler says that in the F.O. the view is held that if any Department is losing the war, it is the Treasury. We must pursue this matter.

DIARY20. 9. 39.

Captain Making Jones of the "Courageous" is reported to have gone down with his ship, and to have been last seen saluting the White Ensign. This is as good as any foreigner could have done.

21. 9. 39.

Maillot tells me that Corbin has yesterday made a demarche to Halifax and also to Chatfield, expressing the French Government's concern at our slow tempo. British troops are proceeding very slowly to France. Only one complete Division and parts of a second have yet landed, and they are still concentrated in the neighbourhood of the ports and have not moved up to the front line. The French would also like to see more British aircraft in France, and hold the view that we are keeping an excessive number for home defence in this country. Nor are they satisfied with our rate of expansion in arms production. M. says that it seems to them that we are preparing, not for a war to last three years, but for a war to begin at the end of three years. He says that we seem to be slowly building enormous palaces which one day will, no doubt, be magnificent arms factories, but the French are not satisfied that we are making full use of our existing manufacturing capacity.

I say that, as regards arms production, Burgin is to-day making a statement, and a debate will follow in which we shall express strong criticism much in line with his views. As regards aircraft, I said I understood that we had a substantial number of squadrons already in France, but no doubt this number should, and will, be increased. As regards the Army, I say that I understand we have definitely promised to put four Divisions, fully equipped, into France, as soon as possible, having due regard to the risks of submarine action in the channel. I hear that the Admiralty is showing prudence, in view of this risk, and is putting them across rather slowly. As to their disposition when in France, I understand that it is accepted that Gamelin is in command, as Foch was at the end of the last war. M. admits that this is so, but says that "many susceptibilities have to be considered". He goes on to say that Daladier talks impatiently about British delay, but that when he actually meets Chamberlain and Halifax he has a sense of inferiority in the presence of aristocrats and that he does not press his points. I reply that Chamberlain is no more of an aristocrat than Daladier; his father made screws and Daladier's baked bread.

I thought there was an under-current of uneasiness in M.'s talk. He said that whatever the Germans did, even if they assaulted the Maginot Line in great force, or violated the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg or Switzerland, the French Army would be able to hold them up, but the losses might be very heavy, and it was felt that the British were not yet in a position to take their fair share, nor, he felt, were they hurrying to do so.

Lees Smith, in our Executive earlier this afternoon, had mentioned the same matter in reply to criticisms by Grenfell, who had obviously been coached by Maillot. (I said to M. "I think you have been speaking to my friend David Grenfell", and he said that, not having been able to find me yesterday, he had done so.) L.S. said that at the W.O. they insisted to him that "we are not Westerners" and that there would be no support this time for enormous and costly offensives such as the Somme and Paschendaele. The W.O.'s promise to France was quite definitely limited to four fully equipped Divisions. The French had wanted more, but we were reserving the right to use other troops where it might seem most useful. There were many other possible areas of operations which should be kept in mind, though it was too early as yet to specify them.

DIARY22. 9. 39.

John and Elsa Wilmot come in this evening and are as bright and charming as ever. He thinks that George Hicks should go to Moscow and see Stalin. If any unofficial British Labour representative is to go, I agree that this is the best choice, but he should be unofficial and should go, as secretly as possible, in his private capacity. He has always been ostentatiously pro-Soviet, is Chairman of the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, spoke recently at the I.F.T.U. in favour of affiliating the Russian Trade Unions, and, beneath a jovial and well-nourished aspect, has great shrewdness and determination. I told John that I should not be involved in this, for fear of leaks and the indignation of unconsulted colleagues, but that it would be excellent if he could take the next steps. He will do this on Tuesday, when he is to meet at Norwich a Dutch capitalist who is friendly with Hicks.

23. 9. 39.

Lunch with Maillot and the Counsellor at the French Embassy, whom I have met before but whose name I miss. The latter is rather querulous and, especially as regards Russia, stupidly reactionary. He complains that in England we still have business as usual. In Paris there are no men left in the streets; they are all in the Army. France is making a very great sacrifice, and, if German propaganda is to be repelled, it is necessary for the common people of France, and not only for the French governing circles, to know that the British are making an equal sacrifice. German propaganda can make much of this at present. The British troops are crossing very slowly to France and those who have crossed are still concentrated near the port. They have not brought enough anti-aircraft guns and fighter planes to protect themselves, and these have to be furnished by the French. This question was raised yesterday at the meeting of the Supreme War Council in Sussex and the French were not altogether satisfied with the British reply. The French are also much dissatisfied with our rate of output of output of munitions. France provides enough arms for her ground forces and can continue to do so, assuming that her factories are not heavily bombed and provided that the iron fields of Loraine remain intact, and France has an army of many millions of men. The British, on the other hand, have not yet been able fully to equip more than four Divisions. The British Army is so small, and British industrial capacity so great, that the French do not understand why the British cannot supply arms to hesitating neutrals - why nothing was supplied to Poland, and why Turkey and Rumania are still unable to receive proper assistance. The Turks, indeed,

have said "We will sign the Treaty when we have actually received the arms which we need".

I sympathise with all this and tell him that the Labour Party is pressing the Government very vigorously on the question of munitions supply; I say that I hope the Staffs are studying the possibility of attacks from ~~every direction~~ other directions, e.g. in South-East Europe, and the Counsellor says yes. We then go on to speak of Russia, and the Counsellor says that the French Charge d'Affaires at Moscow had, a day or two ago, a very unsatisfactory reception by Molotov, who told him that he would have to wait and see the consequences of the Russian-German Pact. The Counsellor is very fearful of Russian infiltration into Central Europe, and says that he thinks Russian Communism is as great a menace to our civilisation as German Nazism. I disagree with this on the ground, first that the Russians are further away, and, second, that they are less efficient. Even supposing that the Red Army overran, or got control of, all Poland, part of Germany and the Czech and Slovak lands, so that there emerged a Polish, a German, a Slovak and a Czech Soviet Socialist Republic, I did not feel that this would be a stable constellation, or that it could be run from Moscow. But I would greatly prefer a development of this kind to the continuance of Hitler Germany with its Protectorates. I was not sure that the Counsellor agreed! Maillot was more sensible and optimistic. He added, however, that we must not repeat 1919, when we reconstituted a Germany that suited the Junkers and the industrialists; next time, we must think of other classes in Germany.

They then both complain about our Ministry of Information. M. said there was not enough F.O. influence in it. He had no use for Perth, whom he thought had been a deplorable Ambassador at Rome, but Leeper and his younger assistants in the F.O. News Department were good, and other F.O. officials at least knew something about foreign countries, which no-one at the M. of I. seemed to do. He said that in Spain, after 6 p.m. when Jordana and the other ministers had gone off duty, the Spanish young Turks, who were all pro-German, took control of the wireless. It was very friendly to Germany and adverse to us. Things were nearly as bad in Portugal. In Holland, he said, we had put a German-Jewish refugee named Smolka, who now called himself Smollett, in charge of our ~~propaganda~~ propaganda. If the Germans discovered this, it would be jam for them. German propaganda was still much better than ours everywhere, and it was the first few months that counted with neutrals. (I think this picture may be rather over-drawn, bad though the M. of I. still is.) When I asked what the French M. of I. was doing, the Counsellor said that all their men were with the Army and therefore they could do very little. I foresee that this will be an automatic French response.

The Counsellor said that the Intelligence Service of our Ministry of Economic Warfare was first-class. This was his first complimentary comment on anything of ours. There was a French Mission in this Ministry, and they were delighted with our knowledge of the whereabouts and contents of every ship all over the world.

We then spoke of Italy. "All depends on Mussolini", they said, "and he has been silent for four weeks now" (next day he made a speech at Bologna). Ciano is much changed. The Counsellor said that this was ~~partly~~ partly because the Royal Family had been handling him skilfully. He had been given the Annunziata. The Italians were still nursing grievances from the last war. I said that it had been a first class error not to give them the mandate of Tanganyika, but Orlando ~~Sonnino~~ Sonnino had stupidly absented ~~himself~~ themselves from the Peace Conference, in a huff over Fiume, on the very day when the mandates over ex-German colonies were distributed - or perhaps this distribution was made on this particular day because the Italians were absent - , but equally the Italians were to blame. I asked the two Frenchmen what they would put into the pool for Italy. I said we might begin by offering British Somaliland and the rectification of the frontier in Kenya. Would they give Djibouti? The Counsellor said this was an important port of call on their route to Indo-China. M. said the French might give a few more square miles of the Sahara. I asked What about some seats and salaries on the Suez Canal Board? They had no objection to this. I said I did not suppose they would like to give any of Tunisia. They said Certainly not.

Parting, I said to the Counsellor "I am always at the disposal of France".

24. 9. 39.

Who spoke of "The nightmare world of Hitler's mind"? It is a good phrase. The "Observer" is good to-day on "Working for the King of Prussia" in order to relieve our feelings against Russia; likewise Temperley in the "Sunday Times" on failure of Polish wireless as an additional cause of collapse, and on German short supply of oil, the fundamental commodity of war.

It seems more and more important to make an early contact, through a French or British "high personage", with Moscow. I write a note to Phil, who is flying to Paris to-morrow, to explore this (and also the inner state of the French Socialist Party, which Gillies alleges is all split and that Blum is no longer really Leader).

DIARY25. 9. 39.

Go, on my own initiative, to see Eden at Dominions Office. After some preliminaries on Australia and New Zealand, I speak to him about Russia and urge that the Government should not be too passive nor cultivate any sense of moral rectitude or bruised pride as regards Moscow. He says that "the colleagues" are quite alive to the importance of this. When Russia attacked Poland, Halifax at once proposed to the Cabinet that we should not break off diplomatic relations, though there was a clear legal and moral case for doing this. His proposal was at once accepted by the Cabinet. Last weekend H. saw Maisky and formed the impression that he was very uncomfortable and ill-informed about the intentions of his Government. He could not answer any questions about the future.

For the moment, Eden thinks that our best line to Moscow is through the Turks. He said that Aras had been to see him that very afternoon and left only a short time before I arrived. Aras is still very optimistic, and Eden told him that he had pledged his own credit, whatever that was worth, to his colleagues in the Cabinet that the Turks would not go back on us.

I said that I heard the Turks had refused to sign the Treaty with us until they had actually received the arms which we had promised them. He said that within the last 24 hours things had become a little easier in this respect. I spoke of the urgent Rumanian demands for arms and he said that he understood the arrangement was that the French should arm the Rumanians and we the Turks. I asked him whether he also saw Tilea. He said no. I told him Tilea's story that he could get delivery on 100 American aeroplanes immediately if we would furnish the money. Eden was very doubtful whether this was true, and thought that in any case it would be most unwise, while Roosevelt was fighting for Cash and Carry, for us to try to finance purchases of war material in U.S.A. on behalf of States precariously neutral. This would help the Isolationists in Congress and might upset Roosevelt's much larger manoeuvre.

Eden said that Winston was playing a very active part in the Cabinet. I asked whether he was not at present very much concentrated on Naval questions. Eden said "You can't imagine his remaining silent, and thinking only about submarines, when a general conversation develops!" He said that Carton de Wiart had just arrived from Poland and reported that it was not true that the German Air Force had completely destroyed the Polish Air Force in the first

days of the War. There were large numbers of Polish aeroplanes which had finally flown into Rumania. C. de W. blamed bad staff work of the Polish High Command for the failure of the Polish Air Force ever to come effectively into action. There had been many wonderful targets, e.g., German tanks and other mechanised forces stuck, without petrol, in dangerously advanced positions.

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Accumulating evidence, e.g., failure of wireless communications, suggests that Polish High Command has very heavy responsibility for Polish defeat. Nor can I admire Smigly-Rydz in luxurious "internment" in Rumania, while remnants of the Polish Army fight on heroically in Warsaw and elsewhere.

British Naval news, on the other hand, is steadily good. I hear a good story, only at one remove, of a secret German oil dump in the Hebrides which was discovered by us. We did not interfere with these supplies, but only mined the approaches, and wreckage of three German submarines was washed ashore soon after.

DIARY3. 10. 39.

See Kingsley Wood, who says that the Government has no intention of declaring war on Russia and no evidence that the Russians intend to assist Germany with aeroplanes.

Our Air Attache from Poland has just come back. He says that it is not true that the greater part of the Polish Air Force was destroyed in the first 48 hours by German air attacks. The real trouble was that the whole scheme of communications broke down. Half the Polish Air Force was never in action and never got any orders, and many airmen flew their planes into Rumania. The Polish machines were very obsolete; many of the pilots showed great bravery and skill but had to fly about on their own and find their own targets! They never knew where their High Command had got to. Both telephone and wireless communication broke down completely. I said that this was all very fine, but what had we done to try to get Polish arrangements improved in the interval between the guarantee in April and the outbreak of war? K.W. said we had done our best and that our people on the spot had continually warned the Poles against over-confidence, but without result. He went on to say that he thought the Rumanians were very little good, and would not resist if attacked. (This agrees also with the views of Maisky and Massip, though not with the enthusiastic optimism of Phil.)

As to the attack on the German fleet in the Heligoland Bight, two of our squadrons attacked; one - six aeroplanes - all came back; the other - five aeroplanes - were all lost. It is not sure how much damage was done.

On the Western Front, he said, we were acting in close consultation with the French. The only reason why there was not more bombing activity was because Gamelin was not ready. It was to our advantage to delay major actions. It was five Battles - old fashioned machines, as I knew - which engaged the 15 Messerschmidts the other day.

Our machines flew over Berlin and dropped leaflets while Ciano was there, and while Berlin was all lit up because they were boasting that, having ~~one~~ the Polish war, they did not need any A.R.P. there. *won*

DIARY4. 10. 39.

Lunch with Jean Massip, now in uniform and attached to the French Military Mission. He dwells, as they all do, on the unequal effort of France and Britain in the war. Why are we not training more British soldiers? Even if there is still a shortage of equipment, more classes might be called up for their preliminary training - "instruction sans armes", which is quite an important and lengthy phase of the French conscript's training.

He insists upon the importance of maintaining an Eastern Front. "What is left?" I ask. He replies "Turkey, and we should certainly, if possible, place a force in Rumania". He does not, however, think much of the Rumanian Army (here agreeing with witnesses so diverse as Kingsley Wood and Maisky). He says that most of the officers are no good and the High Command poor. On the other hand, the Rumanian soldiers would do very well if commanded by French officers and generals. An allied force in Rumania could, if they had to retreat, destroy the oil wells - and this might be the chief value of their presence - so that the Germans could get no oil. All this on the assumption of a German attack, which may not come. There was also the difficulty of entry through the Straits, to which the Russians might object.

Massip said that Mussolini was now only interested in women. Court circles in Italy were also strongly against the war. He was opposed to offering the Italians anything, but would rather let them hear that we had promised the Turks that they should have back not only the Dodecanese, but also Libya, if Italy came into the war against us.

He was in favour of reducing the size of Germany by splitting off Austria, etc., so that the German population should not much out-number that of France or Britain. I told him that, immediately before Hitler, the German birth rate had fallen below the French. He was astonished and delighted at this information.

DIARY

5. 10. 39.

With Phil, at his suggestion, to see Maisky. We had a long and not very satisfactory talk. He seemed glad to see us but, as usual, went over much past history and grounds of complaint rather than revealed the future. He said that Halifax had been very frigid at their recent interview and that the British Government were behaving "like spoilt children". He had been asked to call on Halifax on Saturday, September 23rd, this being his first visit since the end of July, and had been asked to explain his Government's attitude. He had said that they were neutral. He had been asked "Were they prepared to trade with us?" He had said yes. He had then been requested to get in touch with Moscow for verification of his replies. On Wednesday, September 27th, he had seen Halifax again and had repeated, on instructions, that Russia was neutral in the war and would remain neutral so long as Britain and France committed no hostile act towards her. ("This, I thought, is an indiarubber formula. Suppose, e.g., they attacked Rumania or Iran or Afghanistan and we reacted.") He added that they would like to trade with us and would welcome the resumption of trade talks. Since his last conversation with Halifax, he has learnt that the British Commercial Council in Moscow has asked whether the Russians would sell us timber, and that they had replied "Yes, if we can have the machine tools which we have already ordered". (I understand that a number of these, ordered before the war, are being held up by our Service Departments.)

In a long historical disquisition, Maisky explained how his Government had been most anxious to work through the League of Nations but had suffered a long succession of disappointments - Austria, Munich, Litvinov's rejected proposal for a conference in Bucharest last March, the slow progress of the Anglo-Soviet talks, etc. M. said that on June 12th he had conveyed to Halifax an invitation to come to Moscow, and Halifax had said that he would "bear it in mind". "He is still bearing it in mind", said M. (It is not quite clear to me whether this invitation was really as formal as M. suggested. It may have been a hint dropped in the course of conversation. Halifax and Co. are greatly to blame, but M. may be twisting this incident a bit.) He repeated his complaint that when staff talks were agreed upon and the situation was threatening, he urged that the British and French representatives should fly to Moscow, or failing this, come in a fast cruiser, but that instead they "went in a cargo boat". He also complained that when they arrived in Moscow, they had no credentials and were not authorised to conclude any military convention. They were, moreover, unimportant men. "We appointed Voroshilov", he said, "and we

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expected that you would send Gamelin and Gort". He said that the talks with the German representatives began on August 1st. I said "You made sure that war should come this summer by making a non-aggression pact with Germany". He did not take up this point.

We passed to speak of Rumania. He spoke very contemptuously of their Army, saying that all the officers painted their faces and wore corsets. He said that, as in Poland, there was great internal weakness in the State owing to the exploitation of the peasantry by big landlords and capitalists. He did not believe that, in any event, the Rumanian Government would fight. He said that Russia had never abandoned her claim to Bessarabia, though she had for a long while left it in abeyance. All this, we thought, had sounded most unsatisfactory. I asked him whether he would regard it as a hostile act if British and French troops passed through the Straits in order to land in Rumania to defend that country against German aggression. He made an evasive reply, from which we gathered that in fact the answer might perhaps be yes. I asked whether it would be regarded as a hostile act if troops entered Rumania from the South by way of Aegean ports and Bulgaria. He laughed and said "There are no good communications that way."

He asked whether we were determined to have a long war with Germany. We said that, unless there was some important internal change in Germany, this now seemed inevitable. He said, rather naively, we thought, and with some gusto, "Of course, the only real change that could come would be a Communist Germany." It seemed rather clear that this is what the Russians want. He said "We are the only Socialist State in Europe", and, after Phil had, with his usual enthusiasm and clarity, explained the conditions of a desirable peace - real League of Nations, real disarmament, real economic co-operation, etc. - , he said "That would only be possible if Russia, Germany, France, Italy and Britain were all Socialist States". There is no doubt some truth in this, but it left on my mind the impression that Moscow is not without hope that the Westward spread of Communism will go beyond the German frontiers.

I asked him whether his Government took any interest in the Czechs and Slovaks, and whether they had any intention of seeking to liberate these Slav peoples as they claimed to have liberated the White Russians and the Ukrainians of Eastern Poland. He replied, with an Oriental grin, "We have a proverb in Russia which says that 'Every vegetable has its season'".

DIARY

7. 10. 39.

H.G. says that our exports are falling off very badly and there seems no vigorous effort to maintain them. The D.O.T. has been stripped of nearly all its officials and Hudson is doing nothing. Why does he not resign and make a row? D.O.T. is now doing part of the export licensing, and nothing else. No Department is encouraging exports, though this is the best way to get dollars. Bewley, of the Treasury, is resisting acceptance of a Rumanian offer to sell their oil for 10% dollars and 90% British exports. The Treasury says "This is not good enough. We must get better terms". Meanwhile, precious time passes.

Lack of co-ordination between Ministers with economic interests is very serious. There is now a Co-ordination of Purchases Committee consisting of officials, but this is purely advisory, e.g., Burgin may be advised to buy Rumanian oil but may prefer to buy from South America, where it is fractionally cheaper.

There is a serious shortage of timber in this country which was not foreseen by anyone. The Russians have been suggesting that we should buy their timber and sell them rubber in exchange. Why not? There is lack of energy in buying Balkan products. Our ministers in those countries have been urging large purchases, e.g., of oil cake and oil seed from Bulgaria and Rumania, but hardly any has been bought. This is the stuff the Germans want and it is their only source of supply. Pre-emption is no doubt understood by Leith Ross and others, but not applied.

Morton is a good official and sees the points. He is also a friend of Winston.

There are disagreeable rumours that Russia may intend either (1) to invade Persia, which might lead to awkward encounters and embroilment with us in the oil fields or the Persian Gulf, or (2) to poke forward from Sinkiang into Cashmere, or (3) into Afghanistan. Any of these might be represented as anti-Imperialist wars for the liberation of colonial peoples.

H.G. suggests that with Cross I might converse as follows: Pre-emption. What is happening about Rumanian oil? Have we got it? And how about oil cake and oil seed from the Balkans? I hear rumours from business friends that Germany is very active in her export trade. Is anyone here taking a charge of British exports? Is the D.O.T. still alive?

DIARY

12. 10. 39.

Dine at Polish Embassy - rather like a funeral - to meet Zaleski, whose features and manner at no time diminish such an impression. Sit between Lord Lloyd, who says that he bears me no grudge over my part in his dismissal from Egypt, and that he has lately been much more in sympathy with the Labour Party than with the Prime Minister over foreign policy, and Clifford Norton, who has a most vivid tale of retreat and bombing in Poland.

German aircraft unquestionably and continually bombed and machine-gunned undefended towns and villages of no military significance. At one of the last places where Beck and the diplomats stopped before going into Rumania - it was, he said, a pleasant little semi-University town in a well wooded and undulating country - German planes dropped a series of bombs right up the main street, and when people were seen running, fired at them with machine guns as though they were rabbits. Biddle, the American Ambassador, "a rich young man in the middle forties", was magnificent and rallied all the other diplomats. He was full of plans for hiring special trains from Bucharest, or aeroplanes, or "a Russian ship" - Norton did not know why Russian - from Constanza, to bring the diplomats and their staffs away. He also led the movement for a joint protest to the German Government against the bombing. In this he was warmly supported by the Papal Nuncio and, to Norton's surprise, by the Hungarian Minister, "not a very pleasant person, rather a sybarite". But the Italian, Jap and Bulgarian, not yet quite sure where their countries would stand in a war, said they must seek instructions. When Biddle was proposing at one place to move on rather quickly, and asked the Nortons to come with him, C.N. said that he did not think Kennard would want to go that day. Whereat, Biddle said "Well, of course, we can't leave the old boy behind", and waited on.

Mrs Norton drove an Embassy car from Warsaw through all this, having told Kennard, who was no feminist, that either she would drive one of his cars or she would join the Polish Army as a motor driver. I said that I thought a full story of the journey of the British Embassy from Warsaw to the Rumanian frontier should be published, with eye-witness accounts of German atrocities.

After dinner, talk to Max Muller, who says that, though he is a Conservative, he cannot justify Polish occupation of the lands east of the Curzon Line. The only Poles in that area are big land owners and their retainers, and some of the big estates are "really kingdoms". I said that I recalled that before 1918 they

stretched on to Kiev and beyond. He agreed. The White Russians, he said, were almost animals, the Ukrainians a little higher in the scale. In the chaos in that part of the world after the last war, Polish landlords were often murdered, not by their own peasants, but by those from the next village, who had no personal feelings towards them and were incited by Communists. He understood that many Polish landlords and their families had been murdered in the course of the recent Russian advance. Numbers of people had "gone east" when the German attack began, thinking that this was the safest part of the country. I say that, after the war, if we win, it would be wise for Poland to let go everything east of the Curzon Line and to seek some compensation in the West, e.g., in East Prussia. He agrees, saying that there you have the reverse of the situation in the East, Polish labourers on German-owned estates, e.g., in the Masurⁱⁿ area. The Prussians are an old Slav tribe, the Borussi, who were Christianised and Germanised by the Teutonic Knights. We agree that the transfer of population, now that Hitler has taken it up officially, should be carried much further in any new post-war settlement. Ironside, says M.M., was deceived by the Polish High Command and persuaded that their Army was much better than it has turned out to be. When war came, the High Command was hopeless. The swift collapse was principally their fault. Before, they had been too conceited to listen to any advice from outside Poland, and they refused to employ Sikorski, who was much the best of their generals, while Sosnkowski had to go down himself to Lwow after the war had started, and, unauthorised by Smigly-Rydz, to take command of the Army there. S.-R.'s name stank; no-one would ever speak of him with affection or respect again.

I said that I hoped in the coming days Poles, Czechs and Slovaks would draw much closer together. The mutual antipathy of Poles and Czechs had been stupid and suicidal on both sides. M.M. agreed, but said it had been quite impossible to bring them closer together.

To Zaleski I recalled that the last time I had seen him was when he came to the Lobby of the House of Commons and asked me to fetch out Austin Chamberlain. He said "I think Sir Austin suffered in his own Party for being more clear-sighted than many others". Z. said he had been much touched in the gallery of the House this afternoon at the warm reception given by all Parties to the P.M.'s references to Poland. The New Polish Government would be at Angers, where they would have more elbow room than in Paris. I said that I was glad that Stanczyk was a Minister. Z. replied that all the popular and democratic forces were represented in the new Government. Witos was still in Poland, so the Peasants were represented by Lados. I asked where Niedzialkowski was, and he

said "Likewise still in Poland" - I had heard from another source that he was in Warsaw till the end. Z. spoke well of N. and told me that his uncle had been a bishop in Vilna.

Z. was, as I should expect, most sensible and realistic about "war aims". He was anxious to do nothing to antagonise Russia, and he did not want any precision regarding the future boundaries of Poland. I am inclined to think that there is a general convergence of intelligent opinion in favour of letting go the East.

At West Leaze, October 15th, 1939.

Dalton I 21

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I have read this week-end ^{and some passion} T.P.V., - I put a lot of work and travel and hope into that book, - and Masefield's Gallipoli, - a ^{tale} book of wonderful beauty and still more wonderful courage, - and The Trojan Homer - ~~I think~~ ^{that} those poets were Remnants of Chivalry - compared with the Greeks. ^{see Masefield pp 19, 33-6, 84, 146 and 153.} ^{But the Turk now says we have chosen the wrong friends.}

Twice in my lifetime - and in that of all the rest who were in the last war - Germans have pulled this lever. The immediate causes are much simpler this time. This is Hitler's War. Compare the tale told in the Portrait of a King - and all that went before at Munich and elsewhere - with Gordon's marvellous of the International Armageddon.

The League of Nations hasn't yet been told that this is a War on.

Well, we have tried & failed. And now we feel old and cold, and stale and slow. We were exhausted last time. (This time he shall for all possibility say soon.) And now this generation has to do it all over again.

(Some of us have put most of the effort ^{problems} ^{can't be taken back} ^{we might have done now} ^{been many other things} ^{in the last War of peace} ^{before the war} ^{we} ^{shall go into the chapter of Decline now - inevitably.} I am happy but ^{like kind} ^{my} ^{with} ^{here} ^{any more}.

How long will it last? How bad will it look? What lies beyond?

We were very near declining population ^{in the last War of peace} before the war. We shall go into the chapter of Decline now - inevitably.

DIARY18. 10. 39.

Lunch with Van at Coq d'Or. He hopes we shall keep an eye on the leaders of the Link, namely, Admiral Barry Domville, Carroll, an Australian with a Nazi wife, and Professor A.P.Laurie. Van understands that all these have now joined the Council for Christian Settlement in Europe (I hear later that John Becket is Secretary of this body!). He says that Moseley is also being active.

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There is a danger of a Peace Push by the same people, including Horace Wilson, who were Munichois last year if, as is possible, Goering takes Hitler's place. G., however, is just as bad as H. He is an expansionist and a bandit, and just as great danger to us. Perhaps more dangerous, since he is full-blooded and enjoys high living, and therefore gets on well with Londonderry and other rich people, whereas Hitler can only drink water and is not a pleasant social companion. (Riddle: What is Hitler's secret weapon with which he has been threatening us? The one he showed to the American film lady, only it would not work.)

If we patched things up with Goering, there would simply be a waiting period and then a Western Blitzkrieg with no Eastern Front. At least Polish resistance prevented this last month, and allowed time for French mobilisation. Those who have great possessions find it hard to believe that these and their comfortable ways of life are really in danger. They won't face the facts. Hence Ribbentrop's conviction that Mayfair will never fight.

Others believe that there is always a "good old Germany" just round the corner. They hope for just a small change, a Government of Generals, or even a Monarchist restoration, and then all danger will be passed. This, too, is an illusion. There is no "good old Germany" just round the corner. Until the leaders of the Nazi Party have been physically exterminated, and until the German military class has been broken, there can be no hope of steady peace in Europe. But it is much too soon to say this, or anything like this, in public, or we shall simply drive together these two dangerous classes.

One of the great mistakes of Versailles was that it left Germany 100,000 soldiers with a great array of arms, and also a Navy, including pocket battleships. She should only have been allowed 100,000 policemen, armed only with truncheons and revolvers. Then it would have been easier for other Powers

within a short time to move down towards this same police level.

The Russians have long since passed away from Communism. They have become first Nationalists and now Imperialists. But they don't want to fight, their infantry in particular being of poor quality. The best of their Air Force and of their mechanised troops are good, but it is very doubtful whether, in a serious war, they could maintain their supply and transport arrangements. From the diplomatic point of view, they have been terribly mishandled by us and the French. In spite of the F.-S.Pact, Bonnet refused to communicate with them before Munich, and there they were not even invited. They distrust Chamberlain and his Government very deeply. Also they are double-crossers by nature. They are taking much more than the Germans expected in the Baltic, where Lithuania in particular was always regarded by the Germans as falling within their sphere of influence.

Italy will certainly remain neutral for some time to come, unless we suffer a military disaster in the West.

Next day, H. Nicolson had a P.Q. on the Link. At a meeting of our P.E.C. on the evening of the 24th it was proposed by Lees Smith that we should suggest to the Government that Van should go to Russia to try to negotiate something. A Trade Mission is to go anyhow, but we need to introduce politics as well. I said that the difficulty was that Chamberlain did not like Van, and that he might be sent with crippling instructions. None the less, the general feeling was favourable, and C.R.A. is to make the suggestion at an appropriate moment, either to P.M. or Halifax.

DIARY27. 10. 39.

Visit Benes at his house in Putney, a small suburban villa, very quiet. Kalina comes with me. I am alone with B. for about an hour. Not surprisingly, he has aged since I saw him in the Hradschin at Prague more than four years ago, when he had said to me two very memorable things: first, in reply to my suggestion that he might perhaps find it worth while to cut off more of the German rind round his Czech cheese, "Yes, if that were regarded by the Germans as a final solution, there would be much to be said for it, but what they want in Berlin is not merely to get the Sudetens back, but to send a Stadthalter to come and sit here and give us Czechs orders". And, second, when he spoke of war, which he did not then think would come, "But if England is on our side, I am confident, for I know that, where England is, there is victory."

Now, though he uses the old technique, saying "I will now give you an analysis of the situation as I see it", followed by a long and lucid discourse, there is not quite the same grip, and here and there a lapsus linguae. He says Poland when he means Germany, etc.

Of the Russians, he says that they are full of suspicions and have a very complicated psychology, but this makes it all the more important to keep on talking to them even if you have nothing much to say. This, he thinks, has been one of the faults of London and Paris. The Russians have been left too much alone. They are obsessed by the fear of a four-Power Pact against them: Britain, France, Germany and Italy. This has been their fear for 20 years. Therefore, when these four Powers met at Munich and they were not invited, their suspicions increased enormously, and it was from this moment that the difficulty of enlisting them against Hitler became really formidable. But B. is quite sure - he repeats very emphatically, quite sure - that if C.S. had resisted alone in September 1938, or even last March, Russia would have given her substantial assistance. In the last phases of the negotiations of 1939 before the War, the Russians became more and more convinced that Britain and France would not really fight against Germany, either in defence of Poland or in support of the Russians themselves, but would go easy in the West, hoping that Hitler would throw all his weight eastwards. That is why they preferred the Pact with Germany - which required them to do nothing - to the Pact with Britain and France - which required them to do much. And now, looking at the development of the War, they will say "And now look. We were quite right." The difficulty about the entry of Russian troops into Poland, was, he is convinced,

merely an excuse for breaking off the negotiations.

Turning to the future, he is as much against a return of the Hapsburgs as ever, but, in reply to me, would welcome and work for a close union with a democratic Poland. The colonels having been discredited and the great eastern estates having been lost, he thinks the new Poland will be democratic.

He presents me with a copy of his lectures in America on "Democracy to-day and to-morrow".

DIARY

Visit to France with party of M.P.s, October 28th to 31st, 1939.

28. 10. 39

Party, led by the admirable General Spears, consists of Grenfell, Phil Baker and I; Amery, Wardlaw-Milne, Sir Robert Bird, Harold Nicolson and Rothschild. The last of these crossed yesterday. The other eight of us reach Heston just after noon. It is very rough and windy and Spears says that it is very doubtful whether the plane (Air France) will start. If not, we might cross to-night from Newhaven to Dieppe. I urge Spears to tell them that the plane must fly; it will be much better to have a short and unpleasant crossing than to lose a day. He agrees, and after some hesitation the pilot consents. It is indeed pretty rough and we have to fly low, so as to be visible all the time from the ground - otherwise we might be shot at or chased by Fighters - and to-day the clouds are very low. We bump a good deal and one has the illusion that only the engine is fixed and the rest of the plane blowing about in the wind. Phil is very discreetly sick, and one or two other passengers less discreet. A woman behind me fills the air with eau de Cologne. I succeed in drowsing and arrive without more than the mildest premonitory sensation of discomfort.

Met at Le Bourget at 2.30 by group of French Deputies, including Delbos, Grumbach, Taittinger, Moutet and Delattre. We drive in military cars driven by soldiers wearing the very becoming and utilitarian French tin helmet, to the Ritz Hotel in the Place Vendome, where Spears has arranged for relatively cheap rates. Taittinger, who says that he is the Deputy for the Ritz, provides several of us with chicken sandwiches and a glass of very good saumur.

Thence to Comedie Francaise, where a Polish matinee is in progress. Our party is put very visibly in two boxes opposite to President Lebrun. Many items of the programme are very moving. There is a Lament for Poland "whose very name has to-day been blotted out from the map of Europe" very well read in French; the diary of an airman who was present at the defence of Warsaw and got away in an aeroplane the day before the city fell; a selection from Chopin played on the piano by Cortot, who prefaces his performance with an eloquent short speech, and then plays several nocturnes and the Dead March and other pieces which I do not recognise. There is also a symbolic short play done in French from a Polish dramatist of the early 19th century whose name I missed, showing a young girl, who is Poland, going down to the Underworld and bidding farewell to her mother. Behind, one dimly discerns soldiers bearing tattered Polish flags. Then there enters a procession of shrowded torch bearers to lead the young

girl away. Her mother cries "Down there you will never see again the light of the sun", and she replies "I shall come back ~~again~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ Spring, flying on the wings of Victory".

At the end of the performance, there are played the Polish, British and French national anthems. Our presence is seen and noted. As we leave our boxes, we are greeted by Zaleski, Lukasiwicz and little Stanczyk, who picks me out as his special friend among all these and embraces me on both cheeks and lays his head upon my breast in front of them all, clutching me for many seconds.

Thence to Chamber of Deputies for conference with our French colleagues. Talk rather general.

Dine very well at La Perouse on the Quai Voltaire close to some of our old haunts. Sit between Moutet and Boussoutrot. M. was Blum's Minister for the Colonies and reminds me a little of Longuet, but is, I think, stronger and more effective. B. is Chairman of the French Air Commission of the Chamber, and speaks very cheerfully of the French experience, particularly with their Fighters - Curtis, Morane and a new type about to be delivered from the U.S. He says that he thinks that, apart from purchases from U.S., we shall have a numerical superiority over the Germans in seven or eight months. Also that our machines are better, our airmen are better, and we have more oil.

29. 10. 39.

By train from Paris to Nancy. Called at 6.15 a.m.; train leaves Gare de l'Est at 7.45; to the station in military cars; three reserved compartments; our party accompanied by Delbos, Grumbach, Taittinger, Delattre, Bastide, and a Major specially attached to us for the trip from the Grand Quartier General. There have been very heavy rains and there is tremendous flooding all along the line. The Marne has widely overflowed its banks. Without a dry period first, no big operations on land are possible. Lunch on the train and reach Nancy at 12.45. Met by a large number of Colonels, etc., and by Louis Marin, who is Deputy for Nancy. I hear that he is a professor of anthropology, a familiar figure for the caricaturists with his drooping walrus moustache. He is a little distant at first, but gradually thaws.

We leave in military cars up a steep road into the wooded foothills of the Vosges, which begin on the outskirts of Nancy, to a chateau, where a very clear, short lecture is given to

us by a Staff Officer who points out on a map the principal features of the defence. Not a word too much nor a word too long. He explains that the Maginot Line is not a continuous line on the ground, but a continuous line of fire, so that over a wide zone, both in front and behind the ouvrages, there is no dead ground. The French staff believe that the Maginot Line cannot be forced, though the Western Section of it behind Luxembourg and Belgium is much less elaborate than the sections which face Germany.

Drive back through Nancy, Pont a Mousson, Metz, Thionville, to the nearest point of the Line at Sierck, south of Apach, at the western end of the zone in which fighting has been taking place. (The British troops are in the Line a little west of this, behind part of the Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers.) I travel in the same car with Delattre and H. Nicolson, who has a bad cold and coughs all the time. Probably I catch his germs. Very few signs of war until quite near the Line, though some anti-aircraft batteries near the road are pointed out to me, and a number of machine gun and other posts in the field. At Thionville blast furnaces are working continuous shifts, and beyond there are lines of barbed wire, including wire to be thrown across the road which, we understand, is also mined at many points.

We spend more than two hours inside the ouvrages. It is an amazing experience. We go down in a lift more than 130 ft., which seems the equivalent of about five stories. Lofty underground passages with electric railways to carry supplies and persons, central heating, formidable electric power plants, laboratories to test for the presence of all known kinds of gas if any should get in. We are shown the arrangements for the direction of fire on the surface from a chamber in the lowest stratum of this subterranean world - some say it is like a great subterranean battleship. On the wall of this chamber are maps, taken from the air, of the ground immediately above us, and an "exercise" is arranged by the lieutenant in charge who reports the receipt of news that some German tanks have appeared at a certain point on the map against which a fire of anti-tank guns from a number of casemates are to be directed. All the "elements" of the fire are worked out very quickly and quietly down here below and the orders sent up after only about 40 seconds from the receipt of the information. We are shown also the men's sleeping quarters, the cook houses - our party is being led here by a General who picks out a piece of meat in his fingers from the saucepan and pronounces it to be good - a barber's shop, the electric plant, etc. Then, ascending, we go into a casemate in which are four anti-tank guns which amongst them cover 360 degrees. I look out towards German lines, but there is nothing visible nor audible. The Germans have the sky line, but that is more than 6 Km. - the width of no-man's land - away. I am told that they are just beyond a nearer ridge and that their line is out of sight from here. In the foreground is French

barbed wire and tank traps. They have had very satisfactory results with their anti-tank guns, the shells from which will pierce the armour of German tanks, though French tanks have in many cases withstood the German anti-tank guns. We see also a casemate containing French 75 ~~mm.~~ and these also do an "exercise", though not actually firing, for our benefit.

In all passages of the ouvrages there are at short intervals heavy iron gates which can be quickly closed, and arrangements permitting hand-grenades to be thrown through small openings in these. If, therefore, some Germans got into any part of the ouvrages, they could be isolated by the closing of these gates.

The troops here below ground give an impression of youth, intelligence - they are all specialists of different kinds - and self-assurance. They are a distinct corps, having a "roulement" among themselves so that in normal times a certain fraction of them are always on leave, but living, when on duty, always in the ouvrages. It is noticeable that their faces, and also their hands, look very pale. On the other hand, we are told that there is very little sickness indeed among them. These defenders of the ouvrages receive extra pay compared with the infantry outaide, but one might well prefer their lot. It is indeed a queer new troglodytic life.

A long drive back in the dark, reaching Nancy about 8.30 p.m. But the blackout everywhere in France is much less complete than with us, and Thionville is blazing with light, though only a few kilometres from the line. Delattre says that "The Germans know quite well where these works are. We could not hide them, and we want all the iron and steel we can turn out as long as inactivity in the air goes on." Also, if they bomb Thionville, there are many equally good targets within easy reach on the German side of the line. He says that the French heavy guns are set well back, as one would expect, behind the ouvrages. Dine at Hotel Thiers, a good French provincial meal. Fortunately no speeches. We are sleepy and a little tired.

The Major who is attached to us gives an order to the night porter that all the party are to be "alertés" at 6.0'clock next morning. I order café complet at 6.15 and ask how far is the Place Stanislas from the Hotel. The porter says it is just round the corner. I determine to visit it, next morning.

30. 10. 39.

I am alerté right enough by the telephone at 6, but the café complet miscarries, so I get down and go out alone to view the Place Stanislas. The distance has grown in the night to more than

1 Km., so I run most of the way in both directions down a long street leading from the Hotel to the Place. There is a full moon and I have just time to see a general outline of the Place, one side of which is similar to the Place Vendome. In the face of it there is a great arch and on the left a very lovely gilt fountain. In the centre of the Place there is a monument to King Stanislas of Poland and Lorraine. Run back to the hotel, arriving just in time to drink a cup of coffee and gobble a brioche before starting for the train, which leaves at 7.35 a.m. I tell Louis Mariñ that I have just come from his Place doree, which gives the old gentleman great pleasure and he offers to take me all over Nancy next time I come and show me not merely the Place, but the Ville Stanislas and many other architectural beauties of his town. There has been some voluntary evacuation of Nancy, but nothing comparable to the compulsory evacuations in Alsace. In Strasbourg they say there are now only ten civilians left.

Back in Paris at 12.30, just in time to get to Ministry of Finance for a very good lunch with Paul Reynaud, who, I think, is the pick of the present bunch of French Ministers. On the train, Rothschild had told me that the French were bothered because we were talking so much about Hitler and Hitlerism, and they were afraid that if there was a mere personal change in Germany, we should be willing to make a premature peace. Some of them, he said, were determined that after this war Germany should be divided into two or three states. This, they thought, was the only way in which we could avoid having to defeat the Germans in war every 20 years. I said I thought this was a superficial view, but clearly it would do good if we had some private talk on war aims in our joint Group.

Talk after lunch to Coulondre, who was Ambassador at Berlin at the end, and before that, Ambassador at Moscow. He is much hotter against Ribbentrop than Hitler. On August 26th, he says, as a result of French and British representations, Hitler was hesitating. He saw at his feet the abyss. But Ribbentrop came behind him and whispered in his ear "It is not an abyss, it is only a ditch. Jump!" And he jumped. The German generals had said that they could not face a war on two fronts, and Hitler had accepted this. So Ribbentrop said "I will go to Moscow and get rid of one of the Fronts". And he did.

Bastid ~~was~~ at lunch said that he agreed with me that the recovery of the eastern part of ~~Poland~~ the Poland of yesterday was neither practicable nor desirable, and he understood that the Russians were quite prepared that Poland should have East Prussia in exchange. Coulondre said that the French would soon be publishing a blue - or whatever the colour of it is - book on the events leading up to the War. Delbos, who is mild and civilised, said that he thought

a separate Rhineland would soon be assimilated to France. This is short-sighted and stupid and, if Delbos says so, the idea must have gone far among the French.

3 p.m. Our Group, French and British, is received by Daladier. Rather a formal opening. He is alone with us and each in turn is presented. Then he stands behind his desk and we stand in a half-circle around him. Then Spears, Amery and I successively make speeches, to which he replies. (One of the French Deputies said afterwards that at the start he is always rather farouche but that he was visibly moved by our three speeches.) We then all sit down and he talks in free and friendly fashion. He tells us that the other day, visiting the Front, he spoke with a number of soldiers, of whom one of the youngest said to him "I am happy to see that the morale of the President of the Council is so high". He was very delighted with this story. He said that Sarajoglou, on his return from Moscow, said that "Stalin is terribly frightened of Hitler and Hitler is terribly frightened of Stalin". The Turkish President had told Von Papen at Ankara that it was impossible for Turkish relations with Germany to improve unless there was a change of Government at Berlin, to which Von Papen had replied "I do not regard that as being impossible". D. also told us of a letter found on a German soldier in the West written to his wife, saying "I am sending you a little piece of ham. I wish I could send you more this front is very different from the Polish". D. did not think that the Germans could possibly break the Maginot Line.

4 p.m. Meeting of our Group at the Chamber. I raise, in a very general way, the question of War Aims, saying that this matter was much discussed in England, though we all realised the difficulty of making any detailed pronouncement. A very general discussion followed which, however, I think did good, nearly all the Frenchmen speaking. None of them criticised us, but several put the view that it was not only the Nazis, nor Hitler, but the German desire for domination which had to be combatted. It was suggested that at our next meeting in London this matter might be further pursued.

5 p.m. To "tea" with Herriot at the Palais Bourbon. The tea soon became champagne. H. very fat and cheerful - quite a Falstaff. Endless stories about L.G., Beatty, etc. He had been sent over in the last War by Clemenceau to make a strong appeal for more ships for the carriage of French supplies, troops, etc. He had been shown into the Cabinet Room and been sat down opposite to L.G., many other British Ministers and officials being present. He had made, he said, a long, highly documented and, at times, impassioned speech, but after it had been translated, L.G. had simply said "No ships", had risen from his seat and left the room, followed by all the other English, so that Herriot was left sitting quite alone where,

he understood, Pitt had sat during the Napoleonic Wars. He told also a silly story of Beatty who, in the War, had sunk a German ship, and when the German officer had come on board, Beatty had held out his hand, but the German had refused to shake and placed his behind his back. This so infuriated Beatty that he picked the German up by the legs and threw him into the water. But then himself humped in and fished him out again! Spears said that one of the finest naval orders ever given was by Beatty at Jutland when, three of our big ships having been blown up in quick succession, Beatty said "What is the matter with our bloody ships to-day? Turn two points nearer to the enemy."

I told Herriot that many of us wanted to see him go to Moscow to straighten things out with the Russians. He was perhaps the only politician, French or English, whom they credited with bon volonte. He did not dismiss the suggestion, and I heard that Daladier was half inclined to make him Foreign Minister when Bonnet left the Quai d'Orsay.

e H. told me, I having referred to the Protocol of 1924, that Austyn Chamberlain had told him that the Protocol was only rejected in the British Cabinet by one vote, and this was due to the absence of Baldwin because his mother had la grippe. (If Chamberlain said this, I believe he lied.)

Grenfell, Phil and I dine that night with Blum alone in his flat on the Ile Saint Louis. (He has a soldier and a detective always on guard outside, ever since the assault upon him some years ago.) He was, I thought, in very good physical and mental form, and hopes to come to London in a few weeks' time with colleagues, for a consultation with us. He says that the Paul Faurists are in a comparatively small minority in the Party now, and their pacifism is partly due to the exaggerated patriotism of the Communists, which affronted them. The Communists, e.g., had accused Blum of treachery because, when he was Prime Minister, he permitted Schacht to call upon him.

He regretted a little, but not much I think, the action taken against the Communists. Thorez and several others who were in the Army had deserted and were thought to have escaped to Holland where they were waiting for a train or boat to take them to Moscow. The conduct and pronouncements of the Communist leaders had alienated almost all their Working Class following, and the desagregation of the Party had gone very far.

We refer to the talk about cutting up Germany after the War, and he said that there was no support at all for this in the Socialist Party. He held that War Aims must at this stage be general and had secured support, even from the Paul Faurists, for a

statement somewhat on the following lines:

- (1) We must have security against the repetition of war or threats of war every six months;
- (2) Such security cannot be obtained merely by signatures on a piece of paper; it must be embodied in institutions.
- (3) These institutions must provide for general and controlled disarmament, for the solution of international economic questions, including markets, colonies, etc.
- (4) There must also in the Peace Treaties be provision for the redress of injustices, e.g., Poland, C.S. and Austria.
- (5) He likes the notion of an international mandate system for the colonies, and would, I think, go further than some in the direction of a real international administration. He says that such an idea should meet the German grievance while doing something to correct the obvious inappropriateness of small Powers like Holland, Belgium and Portugal having such large colonial positions. *sessions*

Blum would sign a Peace Treaty on the above lines with Hitler or with anyone else, provided that the execution of the Treaty was assured. "But", he added, "if Hitler signed such a Treaty, Hitlerism would already be dead".

As to the Russians, the French Pacifists were now hotter against Stalin than against Hitler, holding the former responsible for the War by having signed his Pact with Germany and refusing to sign a Pact with Britain and France.

In the field of military operations, Blum feared a German attack on Holland, to secure submarine and air bases for attacks on England, and also because there was much food and treasure to be stolen from the Dutch, and Hitler must perform a new large act of pillage every few months. The Belgians had lately offered Holland a Pact of mutual assistance, but the Dutch had refused, desiring to give Hitler no new excuse for aggression. On the other hand, the Belgians, under the influence of their King, had acted very foolishly in detaching themselves from France during the period when he was Prime Minister. The position of Belgium to-day was equivocal and their were cross currents of sentiment among the Flemings, who would wish to help the Dutch to resist a German attack but were very lukewarm towards France.

Schiff calls at our hotel late to-night and pours forth, as usual, a verbose story. The war, he says, is not really popular in France, especially on the Home Front. If the Germans don't attack France but do attack England and make repeated Peace Offers to France, they may have some success. The French will fight well enough if French soil is attacked. On this, Phil makes the appropriate comment that if so, the French are great fools, for it means that they will only fight when failure to do so has already cost them a great deal. I do not attach much importance to this part of Schiff's talk.

He is also in a great fuss over a "campaign" in the French press to dismember Germany. This, he thinks, may have some support from the Government. He leaves me an envelope full of cuttings of articles by Fabry, d'Ormesson, Beilby, etc., in favour of dividing Germany after the War. These are confined to a small number of Right-wing newspapers. Cross-examined by me, he admits that he is in favour of Austria being allowed to leave the Reich after the War; also that he thinks most Austrians would wish to do so; also that we cannot at this stage pledge ourselves to exact frontiers, e.g., in Poland or C.S., or even usefully discuss them now. Why then, I ask, must we assume that the frontiers of Austria must remain as in 1938? What if substantial sections of adjoining Germany, Catholic or industrial, wish to join an independent ~~Germany~~ Austria? What, moreover, if the Germans, in defeat, should wish to split, e.g., in the Rhineland? His answers to these questions are not very clever and, as regards a Greater Austria, the Vatican, he says, is playing for this. I say that I am not sure that it would be a bad thing, though I have not much sympathy with the notion of reconstructing the old Austria-Hungary, preferring to get Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and, perhaps, Hungarians, Rumanians and Yugoslavs, into one federation. None the less, I do not approve of this campaign for dismemberment in the French Right-wing press. Incidentally, it will be jam for Goebbels.

31.10.39.

Call at British Embassy and see Ronald Campbell - to be distinguished from his namesake who is a knight and a most conventional and uninteresting diplomat. C. says that the French are very firm. A few politicians, e.g., Bonnet, de Monzie and Mistler, President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber, are a bit weak-kneed, but they count for almost nothing. There has been some muddle over the evacuation from Alsace to the Dordogne, and the authorities fear that the relatives of some evacuated Alsacians will write letters of complaint to the soldiers and so demoralise them, but things are improving now. There has been and still is a great shortage of blankets both for the Army and the evacuees, but a private fund is being raised.

I speak to him of the articles in favour of dismembering Germany. I urge that he shall take the necessary steps to have these stopped. The censorship in France, I observe, is much stricter than in England, so it should be easy. He agrees, and says he will try. I say that, unless they stop, there will be replies and controversy in England. He says "Yes, they might start a correspondence in the "Times", and that would be most unfortunate". I warmly agree.

In the afternoon I call on the Poles at their old Embassy in the Rue Saint Dominique and have a few words with Lukasiewicz - who might be mistaken for an Englishman - Zaleski and Ciechianowski. Z. says they have now made all their plans for training Polish airmen in England for Bombers and in France for Fighters. He is pleased about this, and says about a thousand Polish airmen will be training in England soon. He and Sikorski are coming to England in a few weeks' time, and Stanczyk next week. He says, "Do keep Stanczyk out of the hands of Retinger".

Phil and I with Dolivet dine with the Grumbachs, who live outside Paris - I don't know where, for we drove in the dark - in the midst of a garden containing 105 very old trees, but, though he has lived there for 20 years, he tells me that he has not planted one tree himself! He says that Blum is too optimistic about the Paul Faurists, both their numbers and their convertibility. The P.F.s are cowards and dare not say what is in their minds, namely that they would make peace with Hitler now. It is only the Pivertistes who say honestly that they are against national defence and in favour of submission, and they count for nothing in the Party. The French C.A.P. have just expelled a professor of mathematics who wrote a letter to a number of his friends saying that they must protest against a Government in which Blum and Herriot would join to pursue a policy of "Collective Murder". The P.F.s on the C.A.P. voted for this expulsion. The Belgians, says G., will be left to face the Germans alone in Belgium. The French ~~skill~~ will stand along their Maginot Line on their own frontier; this was decided when the Belgians broke away from their alliance with France and refused all staff talks and common plans. Dolivet says that the French Army will not wish to engage in open warfare in Belgium, in front of their own fortifications and against the German motorised forces. He is very optimistic about the French Air Force, particularly in defence against German bombing attacks. They have many new and first-class gadgets on their Fighter planes.

1. 11. 39.

Fly back in the morning. Relatively smooth crossing.
Even Phil does not misbehave.

-11-

A very useful and successful trip. We were looked after so well that it will be difficult to do as well for the French when they pay their next visit. Someone suggests they should be taken to see an aircraft factory.

"Twenty-four hours before Munich Daladier was determined to say No". So I was told, but Chamberlain pulled him over. If we had fought then, there was no Siegfried Line and we had the Czechs and certainly something from the Russians, and, if we had handled them well, the Poles too. Against this was to be set the weakness of our air defences.

The other day I saw Maiski and he told this anti-Finnish story. A visitor to Finland was being driven a long distance across country in a droshty. The driver drove him for 20 miles saying nothing. Then he pulled up, dismounted, and spoke to a man working in a field beside the road. He said to the man "How are you getting on?" The man said "Pretty, well, but the ground is very hard". He was ploughing and there was a hard frost. The driver then mounted his seat and drove again without another word for 20 miles. Then, turning to his fare he said "That man was my brother" and drove on another 20 miles without a word. Then, turning to his fare again, he said "I had not seen him for 30 years", and then without another word he drove on to the end of the journey. "That", said Maiski, "is what the Finns are like".

At lunch with Mrs Philimore on 3. 11. 39 another story is told of the Russian-Finnish negotiations. Stalin said to Passikivi "What is the good of your trying to resist us? You have only got a wretched little army of 300,000 men. We should send 3,000,000 soldiers against you". Long silence. "Come on", said Stalin, "What are you thinking about?" "I was thinking of where we could find room to bury 3,000,000 men in Finland".

In France, it makes a great moral impression that the British Parliament meets three days every week. Daladier, asked why the French Parliament could not do the same, said "Oh, England is different. They are better diciplined over there."

5

AIR MINISTRY NOTE15. 11. 39.

See K.W., who says that he is having a special enquiry made into the case of Wood and the Fighter Command. This enquiry is being conducted by a person in whom he thinks I should have confidence, but is not yet complete. He says, referring to Wood, "I should like to do something for him. I daresay he may sometimes have disobeyed orders, but I am very anxious that, in time of War, we should not have too much military routine in these matters". I ask whether he has not found that Dowding and other high officers in the Fighter Command are on Wood's side, and he says, quite emphatically, "Yes, that is so".

I raise the question of the new arrangements with Nuffield. He says that he is convinced that this will work extremely well and, indeed, will "get us out of a hole" as regards repairs. The scale of necessary repairs will increase very rapidly, both as our total production increases and if bigger operations take place. I say that I may have to put up to him one or two criticisms and queries which I have heard, but I do not press these to-day.

I ask about the Empire air training scheme in Canada. He says there are some very big decisions to be taken about finance. I say I hope that he will not allow Simon to make him lose the War. He says that he thinks the Canadian scheme may be the decisive factor in securing air supremacy. The American aircraft industry is at this moment only one-third the size of ours, so we must not have exaggerated hopes for the immediate future.

He is puzzled by the comparative inactivity of the Germans. I gather that the War Cabinet for some while have been expecting some big move, either by air attack on our ships or on targets in this country, or an invasion of Holland and Belgium. (He thinks that if they go for Holland they will go for Belgium as well.) German prisoners all emphasize that they have the very strictest orders only to attack our ships and, if attacked by Fighters, to disengage and return to Germany. He thinks there is evidence that some of the German planes are disappointing. He fancies that the Germans are much afraid of air attack by us on the Ruhr, where, if we seriously damaged their industrial apparatus, their war production would be very badly hit. Also they may be saving up oil, having used a great deal in Poland, and not being very sure of future supplies. He does not think they are getting much from Russia.

I ask whether, if nothing much happens till next spring, the War Cabinet have in mind any decisive operations. He says,

rather guardedly, that if we have then got the air supremacy which he hopes for, the Air Ministry would be in favour of undertaking large operations against German targets, but they would wish these to be accompanied by some operations by ground troops, because, otherwise, large numbers of German aircraft would be liberated from co-operation work with the Army and would be available for independent fighting. He adds that Gamelin is very cautious and does not wish to risk anything or undertake any large operations at present. On the German side, none of the present Generals held commands above that of Colonel in the last War. They are now all promoted Nazis and may, therefore, be prepared to accept rash and adventurous projects from their Master.

Talk with Rauschning
on p. 3.

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DIARY

Dalton I 21

18. 11. 39

Dine at Polish Embassy to meet Sikorski and Zaleski. Sit between Layton and Colonel Gubbins. L. thinks that the Reichswehr are urging Hitler to do nothing this winter, saying that France and Britain will get tired, that the blockade is making little impression, that Germany should conserve her oil supplies. He says that Liddell Hart has had a nervous breakdown and that he would not pay any regard to anything written by him just now (this helps to explain the two very defeatist memoranda sent me by L.H). Gubbins is pro-Pole, pro-Czech and intelligent. Smigly-Rydz was unimpressive and conceited. He should have retreated at the beginning of the War to the line of the Vistula and the Bug. Instead, he tried to hold the whole length of the frontier, and, what was worse, had put nearly all the Polish Air Force right on the frontier. He used to talk of large-scale cavalry raids into Germany. After September 7th, there were no communications from the High Command to the Polish Army. German espionage was magnificently efficient.

After dinner Sikorski is very friendly and oncoming. He thanks me and the Labour Party for our effort on behalf of Poland. Halifax, he says, told him that he should not fail to see me as I was the best friend of Poland in the Labour Party. The Polish Army, he says, was very brave, but "tres mal commande". He does not refer to Smigly-Rydz by name, but says that "les Beckistes" are still hanging around the Polish Embassy in Paris but that he intends to get rid of them all. His Government, he says, is to include representatives of all the democratic forces in Poland. He would like Niedzialkowski to be a Minister, but he is in Warsaw and he cannot get him out. Likewise Witos. He is trying to get a Ukrainian and also a Jew from Cracow to join his Government and he is very glad to have Stanczic to represent the Trade Unions. His own wife and daughter are still in Poland. The Germans ~~had~~ do not know where they are. The Germans asked the other day whether they might have their address, in order to prepare a list of Poles whom they would consent to let out of Germany, but this disclosure naturally he refused.

As to future frontiers, he says there are five million Poles within the Soviet zone. Lwow is a Polish town; he was educated there. And there are many Poles at Tarnopol, still further east. He would be willing to let the Lithuanians keep Wilna and surrounding district on condition that they would federate with Poland. Poland should have East Prussia and arrange for the removal of German elements from this area to the Reich. Many peasants, being Masurians, would prefer to stay. He is anxious for close relations with the Czechs. He saw Benes in Paris and
~~again just~~

again yesterday in London. He is seeing him for the second time to-morrow evening. I press him to issue, jointly with Benes, some statement that they are meeting and working together. I also press the same advice on Raczynski.

I get to-day a letter from Phil (attached) about Rauschning, rather suspicious of German Socialist instigation.

19. 11. 39.

Meet A.Gwatkin by chance in the street. He is seeing Rauschning to-night. (I did not know he was in London, though he had been long awaited by G.W.) Gwatkin understands that the German Staff will go on saying No, no, to everything Hitler wants. This can't last indefinitely. He praises the Army as the only element that remained solid in the chaos following 1919. He says that Schacht, early this summer, said that Hitler would attack Poland and would occupy the western part of it, but he would then offer peace to France and Britain. S. further said "Don't start bombing German cities. If the War becomes a stale mate for six months, something will happen in Germany." I tell Gwatkin that German Generals will not be enough. A new German Government with whom one could talk must include popular elements also.

He says that the Italians are now being extremely friendly to us; it seems almost too good to be true. But their trade with Germany is flourishing and they are the principal petroleum leak in the blockade.

Benes and his wife come to tea with us. Also present Phil, Lathan, Kalina and G.W. He says "The Russians have big eyes; they are psychologists." They are doing a good deal of propoganda in Slovakia, the Slavs being more impressionable than the Czechs. They hope for a Communist Poland. He is quite sure that next Spring Stalin will press Hitler to re-establish an independent Poland and C.S. (If this is true, it is very important) The Russians say to themselves "If Hitler wins, he will attack us. Therefore we must occupy now strong points in the Baltic and Central Europe. If Hitler loses, the Western Powers will attack us, or instigate other people to do so." He thinks that relations can be very close between C.S. and a democratic Poland. I tell him what I told Sikorski. He is going straight to Sikorski from my flat. Full co-operation

with Hungary could only come after a revolution there. He is as much as ever against the return of the Hapsburgs. He says that in 1936 he offered to Moscicki a military alliance against Germany. He sent this offer through Gamelin. He had no reply. In September 1938 he told Beck that he was willing to discuss with him a frontier change near Teschen. The reply he got was an ultimatum from Beck giving him 48 hours to clear out of four districts of which two were wholly Czech.

21. 11. 39.

Rauschning comes to tea accompanied by Scheirer, now naturalised, Professor of Pedagogics in the University of London. R. says that it is necessary to destroy Hitler and the whole Nazi regime, including the Gestapo. It would be a great mistake to consent to negotiate with Goering. R. desires to see a Federalised Germany within a Federal Europe. When the Nazis go, the Generals would keep order and would desire to form a National Council, including representatives of the Trade Unions and the Middle Classes, to plan a new scheme of German democracy. There should be some seven to nine Federal Units inside the new Germany. Weimar failed because it tried to centralise too much. In politics, small units are needed; in economics, large units.

The change in Germany will not come immediately. It will come at the earliest some months hence when an "emergency" develops, either through military defeat or through an internal breakdown. At some point the Generals may say to Hitler, "You must take responsibility for this order; we disagree with it. We will obey it, but if the thing fails, we shall hold you responsible." On the other hand, if the War goes on too long, there may be exhaustion in Germany and Communism may spread over Central Europe. In these conditions France and Britain might have to take over and protest some parts of Germany, but R. hopes that this will not arise.

I indicate to R. some of the principal conditions which my colleagues certainly, and I think most English people, would demand. There must be an evacuation of Poland and C.S. up to the pre-aggression frontiers. There will have to be some arrangement for reparations to Poland. There must be a substantial and early reduction of armaments and the establishment of an International Force, which in itself implies a supra-national authority, if you like, a U.S.E. He agrees to all this "without question". We need, he says, to study the U.S.E. in great detail. As to Austria, he would prefer her to be outside Germany in some close relation with C.S. and Hungary. "To have her inside Germany would be awkward", he says. The chief difficulty, he thinks, will be that "France

wants to destroy Germany". (His scheme for a Federal Germany is perhaps devised to go some distance towards meeting French ideas.)

He speaks in a friendly way of Breitscheid, Hilferding and the late Otto Wels. If his talk is sincere, he has been misrepresented by Phil's informant.

Butler, to whom I speak later in the evening, thinks that R.'s contacts with the Generals are not very fresh. R. has seen Hoare and Van (R. also told me this himself). Butler says that undoubtedly some of the German Generals would like to call off the War, including Blaskowitz, who was in command of the motorised forces in Poland and has Hitler's confidence more than most of them. He is not anti-Nazi but he thinks that "This is not a good war for Germany".

22. 11. 39.

Pethick produced O.G.Villard, of the New York "Nation", to talk to a number of us in C.R.A.'s room. V. has just returned from a visit of some weeks to Germany. He spent some time in Berlin, Vienna and Prague. He has long-standing contacts with Germany, speaks the language well, and succeeded, he says, in seeing everybody except the Nazi High-ups. The German people, he says, are very sad and hate the War. But we are doing no good, he was told, in dropping leaflets trying to separate them from Hitler. He heard Hitler praised for all sorts of different reasons. He deplored the vulgarity and abuse in Churchill's last speech, which, he was assured by German diplomats, had prevented Hitler from making the friendly reply which he had intended to the Peace Offers of the Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians. We deceive ourselves, he thinks, if we think that a serious shortage either of food or oil or other essentials will come in Germany within the next two years. He was told that they had great reserves. The only queue he saw was at a fish shop in Berlin. He was told by a Colonel on the General Staff, whom he had known since they were boys together, that Germany would win the war hands down. The Germans were building 400 submarines, most of which would be ready in the spring. One of us asked about crews for these, and V. said "I asked that question too and they said that this was a point which was not being overlooked". The Colonel also told him that next May they would launch an enormous attack on England with thousands of aeroplanes. They would not attack London because they did not wish to bring the U.S. into the War, but they would destroy every town along the East coast of England. They would also destroy the British Army in France. V. had asked "What about the French Army?" and ~~they~~ had been told "They will then be fighting on other

fronts". V. asked "What other fronts?" and they replied "Italy and Spain". He was also told that great numbers of German troops were going to Spain now. He told us several times that he was not expressing any views of his own but only reporting what he had been told. He spoke fluently for more than an hour, but, when asked questions, seemed to be very deaf and slow.

Several of us formed the view that he was a gullible old gentleman. No doubt he reported accurately what he had been told, but what would such Germans as he met think fit to tell an American journalist on his way to England?

12. 12. 39.

James tells me that Belisha and Ironside are pressing very hard for a separate Army Co-operation Air Arm, small planes for low bombing when Army advances, a new type with men less highly trained than R.A.F. pilots and air gunners. Moore Brabazon has been pushing this. He is P.P.S. to Hoare, to whom the matter has been referred. R.A.F., of course, is against this.

Attlee said to me earlier to-day that Moore Brabazon had told him that he thought we were building too many heavy bombers. This is another part of the same story. James was very excited and offered to give me information or assistance at any time. He says that Belisha thinks he is a new Napoleon and has found a new way of winning the War. It is based on false analogies from the German campaign in Poland. James is a volatile little man. I do not trust his judgment much, but he may be right on the merits of this controversy.

DIARY

16. 12. 39.

In Edinburgh for a Peace Aims Conference.

Communists, near-Communists and Pacifists present in force, but have nothing to say against my statement of peace aims except that it is Utopian and that we should make peace with Hitler now, express no condemnation of Russia in Finland, and cease "collaborating" with Chamberlain. Some ask whether France is not as Fascist as Germany, and others whether Hitler is treating Poles and Czechs any worse than we are treating Indian and African natives. One man asks why his son, who is in the Air Force, should have to "defend British capitalism", to whom I reply, "My good man, he is defending you". Poor mental stuff, but not representative of more than an insignificant fraction of the "rank and file" always invoked by such folk. (Next day, a similar Conference at Motherwell for Lanarkshire, though containing a few of these elements, is very much steadier, as one would expect from a mining area.)

Tom Johnston spends two hours talking to me at the Railway Hotel at Edinburgh on Saturday evening. He is thoroughly enjoying his job as Regional Commissioner, and potential dictator, for Scotland, and, I judge, doing it very well. He says he has solved the problem of the deer forests by offering 3d. a pound for all venison delivered cleaned and in good condition at the nearest rail head. This is turned into venison sausages which, he says, the butchers are falling over one another to sell. It is being offered a good deal cheaper than ordinary sausages to the public, and the taste for it is growing. He also thinks that he has put sheep farming in this country on its feet, and also saved the need for large bacon imports, by his new discovery of mutton-bacon. He says that that fool McQuisten nearly spoilt the market by calling it "macon", which sounds silly. Mutton-bacon sounds much better. They are making experiments in curing it which he thinks will be wholly successful. At present it looks a little darker than the ordinary bacon, but it is hoped to make it look and taste just the same soon, and to sell it cheaper. This will be a much more profitable way of selling sheep.

He is very amusing on the differences between the three Services. The Army, he says, are quiet and respectful; the General always salutes on entering his office. The Air Force are cocky and pally; they are quite sure that they have got the Germans beat and outclass them in every way, men, machines, tactics, etc.; they are sure that their Fighters would bring down at least 40% of German Bombers if these attempted a large-scale raid on any part of Scotland. T.J. himself witnessed with a thrill one of our Spitfires chasing, overtaking and shooting down a German Bomber the other day.

The Navy are haughty and distant. They talk much less than the airmen, but he thinks that they are doing their work pretty well now, though at the beginning of the War they were rather casual.

German prisoners of war, naval and air, were put in an internment camp in the middle of Edinburgh which was floodlighted, because there is an Army Regulation which says that camps containing prisoners of war must always be lighted at night. This dates back many centuries before A.R.P. When T.J. protested against this bright patch in the blackout, and insisted that the camp also should be blacked out, several German prisoners escaped on two of the first three black nights. He is convinced that the Army let them escape on purpose in order to confound him. It was then arranged that the camp should be shifted away from Edinburgh to a rural place where it could be half lighted.

There is great animosity in the camp among German sailors between those who are Nazis and those who are Communists. The latter, when orders are given to scuttle their ships, resist and refuse to obey, saying that they do not wish to be drowned and want to bring clothes and other possessions away with them. The Nazis, on the other hand, obey orders blindly. The result is that some sailors (Communists) have arrived in the camp with quite a lot of belongings, while others (Nazis) have arrived with nothing except what they stand up in. The Camp Commandant (British) was asked to compel the Communists to share out with the others, but refused to intervene. There have been fights between the different sections, and T.J. told the following story of a visit which he paid to the camp. He spoke to the Captain of the Cap Norte and asked him whether he had any complaints, about food, about clothing, about accommodation, etc. The Captain said no, he had nothing to complain of. T.J. then said "Very well, now I shall go and tell the German people over the wireless that I have just been talking to the Captain of the Cap Norte who tells me that he is being very well treated and has no complaint of any kind". This rather disconcerted the old man, who said "Yes, I have one complaint. They will not give me a chair". T.J. asked the Camp Commandant why the Captain had no chair, and it was explained that he had pulled his chair to pieces and used the arms and legs with which to belabour the Communists.

There is a certain Scotsman whose duty it is to interrogate all German Air Force prisoners. This he does in a most affable manner after having dined alone with the man in question and given him a very good dinner and plenty to drink.

All telephone messages, without exception, coming from anywhere north of a line south of Edinburgh and Glasgow, are tapped and recorded, harmless on one coloured paper, indiscreet but probably

innocent on a second, suspicious on a third. The second class are interrupted in the middle by a warning, e.g., "We saw a German submarine close in to the shore to-day"; voice, "Hallo there, you will find yourself in gaol if you go on giving secret information like that". The third class are allowed to talk on and on. There is even a known Communist lady in one of the Government offices, and she is being given lots of rope.

"This hotel is being watched", said T.J. to me, and explained that attempts were being made to spread demoralising rumours among the population by the following cunning device. In a public room, where two dozen people might be sitting, someone would say "Let's turn on the German wireless and listen to Lord Haw-Haw". The wireless would then be turned on and his Lordship, in the course of his remarks, would give a number of local warnings, e.g., that there was an ammunition dump at X which might at any time be blown up, so people should get away from it; or a firm at Y were really making poison gas, although not even the workers realised this, and that there might be a serious accident there one of these days, so that the workers were advised to look out. (This last rumour, he said, had disorganised the work of this firm for several days, because a lot of girls, being frightened, stayed away.) These stories were, of course, repeated and passed on by people who had heard them in the hotel. What was happening was that an accomplice of the person who suggested that they should turn on Lord Haw-Haw, and who in fact set the wireless just a fraction to the right or left of the correct wave-length, installed himself in a bedroom somewhere in the hotel with a transmitter which was attached to an electric wire, and himself talked what purported to be Lord H.H. and was heard by those in the room below.

Prince Paul of Yugo-Slavia is said to be in touch with German Generals. If, therefore, you see Prince P.'s name as a protagonist of peace proposals, it will mean that the Generals are getting on top of the Hitler gang inside Germany. Otto Strasser, T.J. thinks, is being paid by us. T.J. thinks that he has converted Lord Airlie, who is one of his official assistants, to much constructive Socialism.