WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE JOURNAL.

EDITED BY LYDIA E. BECKER.

VOL. VIII.—No. 91. PUBLISHED MONTHLY.
REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION ABROAD.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1877.

PRICE ONE PENNY.
BY POST THREE HALFPENCE.

Contents:

ENGLISHWOMAN'S REVIEW.—Published on the 15th of each month. Price 6d., or 6s. per annum.

CONTENTS FOR AUGUST 15, 1877.

I.—Present Aspect of Women's Suffrage Considered by Arabella Shore.
II.—Domestic Economy.
III.—The Line of Least Resistance—H. Blackburn.
IV.—The Property of Married Women.
V.—Events of the Month:—City of London College — Manchester — Kindergarten Training—Married Women's Property Act—Medical Degrees—Memorial Meeting of London University Convocation—Royal Free Hospital—A Mother's Wrong—Lectures on the Factory Acts: Cases under these Acts—Royal Academy of Music—Exhibition of Pottery—Employment—Miscellaneous.
VI.—New Art Schools on the Continent.
VII.—Foreign Notes and News.

Published by Trübner and Co., Ludgate Hill, and at 22, Berners-street, London, W.

LONDON SCHOOL OF MEDICINE FOR WOMEN.—The FOURTH WINTER SESSION begins on the 1st October, 1877. The course of study comprises all the Lectures required for the Medical Examinations and Clinical Instruction at the Royal Free Hospital. Two Entrance Scholarships, of the value of £30 and £20 respectively, will be awarded after a competitive examination on the 1st and 2nd October.—Apply to Mrs. THORNE, Hon. Sec., 30, Henrietta-street, Brunswick Square, W.C.

WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE JOURNAL.—Complete sets, and all the back numbers, may be obtained on application to the Editor, 28, Jackson's Row, Albert Square, Manchester.

WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE JOURNAL. Edited by LYDIA E. BECKER.—Volume VII., January to December, 1876.—In coloured cover, price, post free, 1s. 10d.
London: Trübner and Co., 57 and 59, Ludgate Hill. Manchester: A. Ireland and Co.

A LETTER TO THE RIGHT HON. JOHN BRIGHT, M.P.—From a Lady in "the Gallery."—London: Printed by E. Matthews and Sons, 54, Berwick-street, and 377, Oxford-street, W. Price Threepence, to be had from the Secretary, 28, Jackson's Row, Manchester.

LATEST INTELLIGENCE FROM THE PLANET VENUS. Reprinted by permission from *Fraser's Magazine*.—May be obtained on application to the Hon. Secretary, Birmingham Women's Suffrage Society, 4, Broad-street Corner, Birmingham.

THE BIBLE AND WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE, By JOHN HOOKER, of Hartford, Connecticut. Reprinted from a tract issued by the Connecticut Woman Suffrage Association. Price Threepence. A. Ireland & Co., Manchester.

OUGHT WOMEN TO LEARN THE ALPHABET? By T. W. HIGGINSON. Reprinted from "Atlantic Essays." Price 3d.
A. Ireland & Co., Manchester.

CHOICE OF SCHOOLS: English and Continental.—The *Educational Guide*, and *Literary Review*, post free 2½d. Liverpool: A. W. Gibbs, 99, Gladstone Road, E.

"LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY." A Reply to Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's Strictures on Mr. J. S. Mill's "Subjection of Women," by LYDIA E. BECKER. Reprinted from the *Women's Suffrage Journal*. Price 2d. To be had at 28, Jackson's Row, Albert Square, Manchester.

AN ANSWER to Mr. JOHN BRIGHT on Women's Suffrage. By Arabella Shore. Price Twopence. Office of the Women's Suffrage Society, 64, Berners Street.

READING CASES to hold 12 numbers of the *Women's Suffrage Journal*, cloth, with gilt letters, and 12 elastic bands, price 2s. Published by Messrs. Trübner and Co., 57 and 59, Ludgate Hill, London, and Mr. John Heywood, Manchester. To be had of all booksellers.

MOURNING REFORM ASSOCIATION.—Established in order to aid in bringing into general use Mourning Customs simple, rational, and free from ostentation or extravagance.—For particulars, apply to the Hon. Sec., Miss L. Whitby, Peckleton House, Hinckley, Leicestershire.

WOMEN'S UNION JOURNAL, published Monthly by the Women's Protective and Provident League, records the progress of the Women's Trade Union movement; and contains information, collected from reliable sources, about the wages, hours of work, and other conditions under which women are employed in various trades. The Journal also discusses all questions connected with the industrial position of women, such as the influence of Factory and Workshops' Legislation, Factory Inspection, the establishment of Co-operative Workshops, &c., &c. Its pages are open to correspondence.

Price One Penny; Subscriptions for year, including Postage, One Shilling and Sixpence.

Communications for the Editor and orders for the Journal to be addressed to the Secretary, Women's Protective and Provident League, 31, Little Queen-street, Holborn, London.

BULGARIAN WOMEN.

A special correspondent of the *Manchester Courier*, writing of the social position of Bulgarian women, says :—"My host possesses a good house, a grown-up son who is a sot, and married to a good-looking, hard-working woman, whom he treats in public as a servant, who cooks and waits at table, though there are other servants, and though she has a baby at the breast. The other day at Tirnova a well-educated Bulgarian, who speaks French fluently, was answering some questions as to the status of woman in this country, and after a flow of chivalrous language expressing his view of man's obligation to protect, and what we express in English by the word 'worship,' the gentler half of mankind, wound up by saying, 'Of course it is well known that woman is mentally, physically, and *morally* inferior to man.' So, as far as I have hitherto seen, is she considered and treated in this country. She is man's help, but not his helpmate. He guards and protects her, but it is as a man guards and protects a valuable horse or dog, getting all the service he can out of her, and rendering her in return his half-contemptuous protection. He uncovers her face and lets her chat with her fellows in the courtyard, the street, or the market; but he watches over her conduct with a jealous conviction that she is unable to guard herself. It is a modification yet a development of the Mussulman idea, and he seems to think if she has a soul to be saved he must manage to save it for her. On talking over the subject with intelligent foreigners who live in the country, I am told that the Bulgarian girl, as a rule, is virtuous, and the custom prevails that if after marriage the husband finds reason to suspect previous faults in his newly-married wife, he acts as was laid down in the old Jewish law, given in the Bible, brings what he considers the proofs to old people who wait in readiness, and may return the bride to her parents, who have already furnished her with an outfit."

THE THRONE OF HAWAII.—We learn from the *Times* that Prince William, heir-apparent to the throne of Hawaii, died on the 10th of April last, of rheumatic fever, at the age of 22. He was the brother of the reigning king. On the 14th February, 1874, two days after the election of His Majesty, he was proclaimed heir-apparent to the throne, and invested with the style and title of "His Royal Highness." On the day after his death (April 11th) a proclamation was made in front of Aliiolani House of the appointment by His Majesty, with the consent of the nobles, of Her Royal Highness, Princess Lydia Kanakacha Liliuokalani, eldest daughter of His Majesty, as successor to the throne. The newly-appointed heiress-apparent is a most estimable lady; she was born in 1838, and married in in 1872 to His Excellency John O. Dominis, governor of Oahu.

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO.

The following is the text of the Bill to extend the municipal franchise to women in the Province of Ontario, introduced by Dr. Clarke in February last :—

No. 86.] BILL. [1877.

AN ACT TO EXTEND THE MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE TO WOMEN.

HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, enacts as follows :

1. After the passing of this Act, every woman who possesses the qualifications and performs the conditions required by the laws heretofore in force, as amended by this Act, and is not subject by said laws to any disqualification except as to sex, shall be entitled to be entered upon the proper list of electors, and to vote at municipal elections, and upon by-laws requiring the assent of the electors.

2. No husband shall hereafter in respect of any property of his wife be entitled to vote at municipal elections or upon by-laws requiring the assent of the electors.

3. So much of sections seventy-seven, seventy-nine, ninety-nine, one hundred, two hundred and thirty-two to two hundred and thirty-five inclusive, or of any other sections of the Act respecting Municipal Institutions in the Province of Ontario, passed in the thirty-sixth year of Her Majesty's reign, and of the "Act to extend the Elective Franchise" passed in the thirty-seventh year of Her Majesty's reign, and of any other Act relating to matters within the legislative authority of the Legislature of this Province as is inconsistent with this Act, is hereby repealed.

Mr. John Morley, in a letter to the *Times* in reference to the manner in which the South Africa Bill was passed through the House of Commons, says : "The present session seems to have been without a precedent in this impatience of discussion. When, for instance, the question of women's suffrage was brought up for debate, the majority yelled for half an hour or more against a gentleman who rashly supposed that he was a member of a deliberative assembly. In judging the Irish irreconcilables we must remember that a series of factious motions is not in principle more obstructive than half an hour of inarticulate howling. We must remember that the scene of Tuesday was not the beginning of all the odious disorder and shameful trifling with immense interests. The hands of the majority are not clean. The first attack on the 'dignity of the House,' about which so many fine, sonorous things have been said lately, was surely made, and made systematically, in the earlier part of the session—in the passionate and unmannerly interruptions that came from the quarter precisely opposite to the Irish quarter."

SOCIAL SCIENCE CONGRESS.—The annual meeting will be held at Aberdeen during the week beginning September 19th. Miss Becker has been invited to read a paper at the Congress, the subject of which will be "Some Social Aspects of the Question of Women's Suffrage."

WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE JOURNAL.

EDITED BY LYDIA E. BECKER.

VOL. VIII.—NO. 91. PUBLISHED MONTHLY. REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION ABROAD. SEPTEMBER 1, 1877. PRICE ONE PENNY. BY POST THREE HALFPENCE.

THE demands on our attention and space, occasioned by the discussion in the House of Commons on Mr. JACOB BRIGHT'S Bill, caused us to postpone the notice of an important discussion in the Toronto Legislature, on the question of the granting the municipal suffrage to women. A Bill, the text of which will be found in another column, was introduced by Dr. CLARKE; and, after a debate curiously similar as regards the objections brought forward to the debates in our own Legislature on the Parliamentary franchise, was rejected in a full House by 57 votes to 12. The total number of members is 88; of these 69 were present and voted, and the municipal suffrage for women was rejected by a majority of 45.

The numbers alone show how far behind the "old country" is the New World on this great question of social and political progress, and the difference is even more striking when the debates in the Lords and Commons on the women's municipal franchise in 1869 and the unanimous passing of that measure by both Houses, with the support of the Government, are contrasted with the manner in which the Toronto Assembly discussed and dealt with a similar proposition in 1877. We extract from the *Toronto Globe* the following abstract of the debate :—

"Dr. CLARKE moved the second reading of his Bill giving the municipal franchise to women. He went over the several arguments in favour of the measure, the House being rather disposed to make merry over the question. Mr. CREIGHTON supported the proposal to give the municipal suffrage to Indians and unmarried women, but not to married women. Mr. DEROCHE thought that to give women the right to vote at municipal elections would certainly be followed by the concession of the Parliamentary franchise. The right to vote also implied the right to be a candidate, and he deprecated the introduction (*sic*) into the arena of municipal and political strife. His idea of the true representative woman was the woman who stayed at home and did her duty in the domestic circle. He did not believe there was any desire in the country for the proposed change. Dr. O'SULLIVAN opposed the Bill in the interest of women themselves. Mr. FRASER thought the Bill should be entitled 'A Bill to enable women to become ward politicians.' The women had not asked for the privilege. If they were to give the women the right to vote, as a right, they should give them the Parliamentary franchise and the right to be candidates too. The franchise was not granted on purely logical principles. Although women could vote for school trustees, they seldom or never exercised the right, and this was one of the strongest reasons why women should not be granted the municipal franchise. He hoped the House would vote down the Bill. Mr. LAUDER and Mr. MILLER would vote for the Bill if the mover would, in Committee, exclude the proviso which gave the vote to married women. Mr. ROSEVEAR, in a humorous speech, expressed nearly the same intentions. He would give the women votes at Parliamentary elections, because they were all Conservatives, and would all vote for him (Mr. ROSEVEAR). Mr. SINCLAIR thought it desirable women should vote in certain matters, but not that the measure should be forced upon them unasked. Dr. CLARKE consented to omit the provision according the right to vote to married women. Mr. CURRIE heartily approved of the principle of the Bill, and would vote for it. Dr. WILSON opposed the Bill as an act of injustice to women. Dr. BARR could not support the Bill. Mr. MACDOUGALL could not vote for the Bill as it stood, and it would be practically impossible to amend the Bill in Committee. He regretted to appear to be opposed to the principle of admitting widows and unmarried women to the municipal franchise, for he had always regarded such a proposal as a proper one, but the form of the Bill left him no choice. Dr. CLARKE was unwilling to withdraw the Bill. Mr. ROBINSON would concede the right asked for to women. After some further discussion, the House insisting on the question, a division was taken, and the three months' hoist carried by—

Yeas	57
Nays	12
Majority for the three months' hoist	45

The Bill was therefore lost."

IT will be interesting here to recall the circumstances under which the municipal franchise was given to women

in England eight years ago, especially as attempts are regularly made in the House of Commons to represent that Parliament was taken by surprise, and passed the measure without knowing what it was about.

In 1869, Mr. HIBBERT introduced a Bill to assimilate the conditions of the municipal to those of the Parliamentary suffrage as amended by the Act of 1867, whereupon Mr. JACOB BRIGHT, with the assent of Mr. HIBBERT, proposed the omission of the word "male" from the Bill, and the insertion of a clause securing to women the right to vote in municipal elections.

When this amendment was placed on the paper, the Home Secretary (Mr. BRUCE) requested Mr. HIBBERT to postpone the Bill for a few days, in order that the Government might consider the subject. Mr. GLADSTONE was then Prime Minister, and Mr. JOHN BRIGHT was a member of the Cabinet. A consultation was held, and as the result of their deliberations Mr. BRUCE informed Mr. JACOB BRIGHT that he would support the amendment in the name of the Government.

In the House of Commons on June 7th, 1869, on consideration of the Municipal Franchise Bill as amended, Mr. JACOB BRIGHT rose to move that in this Act and the said recited Act (Municipal Corporation Reform Act, 1835), wherever words occur which import the masculine gender, the same shall be held to include females for all purposes connected with and having reference to the election of or power to elect representatives of any municipal corporation. He stated that his object was to give the municipal vote to every ratepayer within the municipal limits; to give to municipal property the representation which all property enjoyed elsewhere; that, had the proposition been an innovation, a departure from the custom and customary legislation of the country, he would not have brought it in as an amendment to a Bill; but that his object was to *remove an innovation*—to resist one of the most remarkable invasions of long-established rights which the legislation of this or any other country could show. The Bill before the House was an amendment of the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835. That Act was the only Act in regard to local expenditure and local government which established this disability. Before and since, all Acts of Parliament gave every local vote to every ratepayer. The Health of Towns Act of 1848 had a clause almost identical with the one he was moving. He was therefore asking the House not only to make the Bill in harmony with the general legislation of the country, but to allow it to be in harmony with its latest expressed convictions as shown in the Act of 1848. There were in England 78 non-corporate towns which were not Parliamentary boroughs, with populations varying from 20,000 to 6,000. In these every ratepayer voted. There was little if any difference between their government and that of municipal towns. Who could assign a reason why women should vote in one and not in the other? Every parochial vote was in the hands of the whole body of ratepayers. Women held the most important parochial offices. The sister of the member for Stockport had acted as overseer. Miss BURDETT COUTTS had been urged to take the office of guardian. Had she been a large ratepayer in a municipal town, what an absurdity to shut her out from the vote! He then showed how the process of disfranchisement was going on, and quoted Darlington and Southport. The latter town was incorporated in 1867. In 1866, 2,085 persons were qualified to vote for commissioners; 588 of these were women. From the moment of incorporation these votes were extinguished without a reason being assigned, though they had exercised them from time immemorial. Such would be the case with any town incorporated for the future. He appealed to the metropolitan members, and showed them that unless his clauses were carried, when they came to establish corporations throughout the metropolis, as some of them desired, all the female ratepayers would be struck off the roll; that over a population of 3,000,000 of people this exclusion would prevail. He stated that where women had the vote they exercised it to an equal degree with the men. Mr. LINGS, the Comptroller for the city of Manchester, affirms that according to his experience the number of men and women who vote in local affairs bears a just proportion to the number of each on the register. He showed that as the Bill was a largely enfranchising measure his clause was in strict harmony with the Bill, but that while the Bill sought to increase the representation of those who were already considerably represented, the clause which he wished to add would give representation to those who within municipal towns were totally deprived of it. He concluded by saying that questions had come to him, since these amendments had been on the paper, from women in different parts of the country, and from those who by their social and intellectual positions might be regarded as representatives of their sex, asking why there should always be this tender regard for the representation, and therefore the protection of men and this apparent disregard for the interest of women; and he appealed to the House, by its decision, to show that as regards these local franchises it had a common regard for the whole body of ratepayers.

The motion was seconded by Mr. RYLANDS.

Mr. BRUCE (then Home Secretary) said that the hon. member had shown conclusively that this proposition was no novelty, and that in every form of local government, except under the Municipal Corporation Act, females were allowed to vote. The clause introduced no anomaly, and he should give it his cordial support.

Mr. HIBBERT supported the clause, which was agreed to amid cheers; and, as was also the proposal of Sir C. W. DILKE, to leave out the word "male" in clause 1, passed without a dissentient word or the faintest shadow of opposition.

There was both surprise and excitement of a quiet sort, and much pleasure among the real friends, who appeared to be a majority of those present. The House for that hour was a very good one; the Ministerial bench was largely occupied, and the Ministerial side, both above and below the gangway, fairly occupied. Not so many were present on the Opposition side. One of the leading members of the front Opposition bench observed next morning that he supposed there was still a House of Lords, and no doubt the clause might have been struck out then had the case for its adoption been less strong.

The Municipal Franchise Bill was introduced in the House of Lords by the Earl of LICHFIELD, whose attention was specially drawn to the clause enfranchising women, and who stated that he did not consider it unreasonable. The Earl of KIMBERLEY, on the part of the Government, agreed to support the Bill in the Lords, and undertook to defend it willingly. The promoters of the clause also called the attention and invited the support of the following peers:—The Duke of ARGYLL, the Marquis of SALISBURY, Earls RUSSELL, GRANVILLE, MORLEY, and CARNARVON, Lords HOUGHTON, TAUNTON, DUFFERIN, ROMILLY, BELPER, and others. The Bill passed through Committee unopposed, but not without comment.

It appeared that the wording of the enfranchising clause as it passed the House of Commons was defective, and that it did not give women the vote as it was intended to do, although Mr. JACOB BRIGHT had taken the precaution before moving it of reading it to Sir W. VERNON HARCOURT, who had approved it. Mr. HIBBERT therefore gave a corrected clause to the Earl of LICHFIELD, in order that the Bill might be amended in the House of Lords, which was done on the motion of Lord LICHFIELD in Committee. The clause was opposed by Lord REDESDALE, but his proposal found no seconder, and therefore fell to the ground. This futile opposition proved that the clause was not passed unadvisedly. The House of Lords, after its attention had been specially called to the point, deliberately affirmed the principle of giving women votes, the Earl of KIMBERLEY supporting the proposition on behalf of the Government, and Lord CAIRNS, from the Opposition benches, declaring that, "as an unmarried woman could dispose of her property, and deal with it in any way she thought proper, he did not know why she should not have a voice in saying how it should be lighted and watched, and generally in controlling the municipal expenditure to which that property contributed."

Lord REDESDALE afterwards called the attention of Lord GREY to the fact that he had helped to pass a Bill which gave the franchise to women, and Lord GREY then sought an explanation with Lord LICHFIELD, with which he was satisfied. Had he or any other peer not been satisfied, the clause might have been opposed or dropped during the subsequent stages of the Bill.

Some other amendments were made in the House of Lords; the Bill had therefore to reappear in the Commons, that these might be sanctioned. The Lords' amendments were accepted by the Commons, and the Municipal Franchise Bill received the Royal Assent on August 2, 1869.

Since that period women have regularly taken part in municipal elections, and have generally exercised their right to vote in the same proportion as men to the number of each on the register. This proportion varies in different boroughs according to local circumstances, but it may be taken to be, on an average, one woman to six or seven men. Thus every town in England is familiarised yearly with hundreds and thousands of women going to the polling booth to record their votes, and this will make a bridge to the Parliamentary right over which they will walk in due time.

IN 1870 the principle of Women's Suffrage received a fresh extension and confirmation in the Elementary Education Act. This was effected in a most significant and instructive manner. There is no clause enfranchising women, or rendering them eligible for election on School Boards. There is no reference to women from beginning to end of the Act, and throughout the whole of the clauses there is a scrupulous and exclusive use of masculine nouns and pronouns. Neither is there any interpretation clause to declare that such words shall apply to women. Thus women are included in the operation of the Bill as

persons or human beings, without reference to sex. They are not given votes because they are women, but on the other hand they are not excluded because they are women. All laws passed by Parliament apply to women equally with men, unless women are expressly excluded from their operation; and as no such exclusion was made in the Education Act, it follows that the whole of its provisions apply to them.

In the House of Commons, during the discussion on the Bill, Mr. PETER TAYLOR asked the Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education whether, by the use of the words "he" and "his" in the clauses of the Elementary Education Bill, he intended to exclude women from sitting on such Boards. Mr. FORSTER, in reply, said that "though the masculine pronoun was used, it was not the intention to exclude women from the local Boards of Education. The particular words referred to by the honourable member were used in order to include women as well as men. The Act passed by Lord BROUGHAM, namely, the 13th and 14th Vic., c. 21, stated that in all Acts words importing the masculine gender should be deemed to include females, unless the contrary were expressly provided. Under such circumstances it was considered advisable to use the masculine gender throughout the Bill, otherwise a vast number of alterations should be made in the various clauses. He himself believed that in some cases women would make the most efficient members of local wards."

The six years' experience of the operation of the Education Act has brought ample confirmation of Mr. FORSTER'S prognostications, and the action of the Legislature in regard to the local franchise appears to have committed it to a distinct course in regard to the electoral rights of women. Had women never possessed electoral rights in this realm Parliament would probably not have granted them the municipal suffrage. But when there came a question of amending and extending the operation of the Municipal Corporations Act, it was seen that the alternative lay between depriving women ratepayers of rights which they had exercised from time immemorial, or confirming and extending their electoral rights. The choice lay between going distinctly backwards, or taking a step in advance. To the honour of British statesmen they unhesitatingly chose the latter course, and gave women first the municipal and subsequently the School Board franchise. The principle on which the right of women to the suffrage in local elections rests is equally applicable to Parliamentary elections, and we cannot doubt that this principle will receive recognition as the justice and consistency of the demand becomes apparent. The alternative does not, however, now lie between taking away from women something that they have and giving them something that they have not, but between leaving them in possession of existing rights and refusing to extend those rights. It is, therefore, possible to delay the recognition of the further right without actual spoliation of existing rights, and this appears to be the present mind of the legislators. But there are signs that the present arrangement of the elements of political power is not accepted as satisfactory by all sections of the people; and if the principle for which we contend should not have received legislative sanction before the period of the next general Reform Bill, we have a confident expectation that it will be found impossible to admit the claims of any other class of the community to the suffrage, and maintain the exclusion of women from the benefit and rights of representative government.

WE give in another page the sequel to the argument of Mr. CHISHOLM ANSTEY on the legal right of women to the Franchise, reprinted last month, by extracting from his subsequent work on the Reform Act of 1867, those portions which refer to the effect of that Act on the electoral rights of women. Besides the argument, the extract contains a record of some of the proceedings in the House of Commons during the discussions on the measure, which seem to show that the Bill had been framed with a view not to exclude women, also that amendments expressly designed to exclude them were deliberately rejected by the House of Commons. It seems, indeed, almost certain that if Mr. MILL had been contented to trust to the provisions of the Bill as framed by Lord DERBY'S Government, without challenging a division on a proposal expressly to include women, that the registration courts would have felt bound to concur in the interpretation of the Act contended for by Mr. DENMAN in the House of Commons, and by Mr. ANSTEY in the work referred to, and that women would now be in possession of the Parliamentary vote.

THE death of Mr. JOHN FROST, probably the last survivor of the leaders of the party known as "Physical Force Chartists," has given rise to some suggestive comments on the use of that element in political warfare. A Manchester paper says: "The mistake which FROST and the school to which he belonged committed.

was in seeking to gain their ends by violence. The Physical Force party thought they could intimidate the Legislature by defying the law. Many excuses may be found for them . . . . but it cannot be questioned that the *appeal to brute force was utterly and absolutely indefensible.* It was not only an error, but *an error entirely hopeless as regards result.* But," says the writer, "out of evil came some good. The failure of the physical force demonstration strengthened the hands of the Moral Force party in the Chartists' ranks. After this, persuasion, instead of coercion, took its legitimate place among the weapons to be employed in furtherance of National Reform." "Where coercion had failed, persuasion succeeded, and most of the reforms for which JOHN FROST unwisely fought have been won by the honourable triumph of sound argument over prejudice, obstinacy, and fear."

We deem these remarks worthy of notice in connection with an objection sometimes urged against the enfranchisement of women, namely, that women do not appeal to "brute force" to support their claim to free government. We believe that most thinking persons would agree in the opinion expressed by our Manchester contemporary, that the error of an appeal to physical force in support of a political object was an error, not merely because the struggle was hopeless, but an error in itself, "utterly and absolutely indefensible." Political questions must be thought out by the intelligence of the community, and the principles which are to guide the settlement of them must rest on the consensus of the intellectual and moral forces of the persons who are to be governed by the decision. Although no sane person is without some quantity of intellectual force, and no living person is without some quantity of physical force, yet it will hardly be denied that the bulk of the moral and intellectual force of the community rests in another and smaller set of persons than those who possess the bulk of the "brute force" of the nation, and that any attempt on the part of the masses of men to override through physical force the judgment given by the moral and intellectual sense of the people, would overthrow the principles on which freedom and progress depend, and establish a tyranny more crushing and hopeless than any which the world has yet experienced.

THE recent election for North Northamptonshire is suggestive of many considerations touching the claims of the masculine half of the nation to the exclusive possession of political wisdom. The successful candidate was Lord BURGHLEY, a young nobleman, who sums up his qualifications in the words, "It is said I know nothing of politics. Well, probably I don't." In his address to his future constituents during his canvass, Lord BURGHLEY said that he could not enlighten them on any political subject. He said, "You all know what my principles are, and whether you agree with them or whether you don't, don't matter much." In reply to an elector who asked his opinion on County Boards, he said, "You are trying to catch me; you tell me your opinion, and then I will tell you mine." Mr. ATTENBOROUGH wished to ask his lordship's opinion about County Boards. Lord BURGHLEY replied that he had not read of them before. At another meeting, Mr. WATTS asked why a man living in a town was more entitled to vote than a man living in the country, and Lord BURGHLEY replied that he supposed that a man who lived in a borough was a better man than if he lived in the country, and said to his interrogator, "My opinion is much the same as yours, knowing little of politics as I do." Being further pressed with questions, and having apparently come to the end of his ideas, he took refuge in physical incapacity, and said he could not last out much longer; he had got two ears, but only one mouth, and concluded by saying, "Well now, gentlemen, I can't talk to you much longer, because I shall bu'st if I do."

The reception given by Lord BURGHLEY to the deputation which waited upon him to ascertain his opinions on the enfranchisement of women was strictly in accordance with what might have been anticipated from his utterances elsewhere. His idea appeared to be summed up in the sentence, "I have married an heiress myself, and I don't want her to have the same rights as I have," and his manner to the ladies indicated that he did not deem either the subject to which they called his attention or themselves personally worthy of serious or respectful consideration.

It is easy to imagine the sense of indignant shame and humiliation experienced by thoughtful and earnest women in the reflection that measures affecting their dearest interests are confided to the irresponsible control of legislators of the calibre of the newly-elected senator. We do not know whether the men of North Northamptonshire are very proud of their representative, but at least they have had the satisfaction of voting in his election, and they are not disfranchised, as women are, because of their presumed mental and moral incapacity to choose fit persons to govern the country.

ELECTION INTELLIGENCE.

GRIMSBY.

The death of Mr. John Chapman caused a vacancy in the representation of Grimsby. The deceased gentleman, who was a Conservative, was returned to the House of Commons in 1874, and supported Mr. Forsyth's Bill on the Franchise in 1875 and 1876. The day before the polling deputations waited upon both candidates at the Town Hall, to ask them to support the Women's Disabilities Bill. The deputation to Major Seddon included Mr. Alderman Bennett, Mr. Councillor Dyer, with Mrs. Oliver Scatcherd and Mrs. M'Cormick, who represented the society.

In reply to the deputation, Major Seddon stated that he had listened with the greatest possible pleasure to Mrs. Oliver Scatcherd's remarks, and if he was not prepared to give them an answer, "yes or no," at that moment, he must plead as an excuse that he had really not had time seriously to consider the question. No one could value more highly than himself the strong moral influence which women had on the community at large. He doubted, however, if the majority of women desired the franchise: if they did, and if they were prepared to face the trouble and strife of election contests, he did not see that there could be any objection to their having it.

The deputation to Mr. Watkin included Mr. Councillor Smethurst, senior, Mr. Councillor Smethurst, junior, Mr. Councillor Dyer, Mr. Thomas Stephenson, borough treasurer, Mrs. Oliver Scatcherd, and Mrs. M'Cormick.

In reply to Mrs. Scatcherd, Mr. Watkin at once stated that if he were returned to Parliament he should vote in favour of the Bill to Remove the Electoral Disabilities of Women, as he considered the claim made just and logical.

The election took place on August 1st, when the Liberal candidate, Mr. Alfred Watkin, was returned by 1,699 votes, against 1,315 given for his Conservative opponent, Major Seddon.

NORTH NORTHAMPTONSHIRE.

The lamented death of the Right Hon. George Ward Hunt will be felt as the loss of a powerful and genial friend by the supporters of women's suffrage. After an illness which, though severe, was not supposed to threaten fatal consequences, the right hon. gentleman died on July 30th, at Homburg, whither he had resorted to seek alleviation from his sufferings. Mr. Ward Hunt voted against Mr. Mill's proposal in 1867, but he did not vote in 1870, and in 1871 he announced his conversion in a speech made in support of Mr. Jacob Bright's Bill. He said that having considered the matter calmly, he had come to the conclusion that it was no longer right to refuse to accede to the principles contained in that Bill. He believed the feeling against granting the franchise to women was the result of old prejudice and not of reason, and therefore he should with great pleasure support the second reading of that Bill. Special interest was attached to the election of his successor, as it is nineteen years since this division of the county was contested. A deputation from the National Society for Women's Suffrage, including Mrs. Oliver Scatcherd and Mrs. M'Cormick, waited upon Lord Burghley, at his hotel in Wellingboro', and was introduced by the Rev. Mr. Willis, vicar of All Saints'.—Mrs. Scatcherd briefly urged the claims of women householders to the Parliamentary franchise. Lord Burghley, in reply, said: "I am interested in this question, but not as you wish. You want to give women the same rights as men; I don't. I married an heiress myself, and do not want her to have as many rights as I have. I like her to stop at home, and give me her counsel when I ask her for it."—Later on the same day a deputation, consisting of the Rev. J. Ervine (Congregational minister), Mr. Curtis, Mrs. Scatcherd, and Mrs. M'Cormick, waited upon Captain Wyatt-Edgell at his committee rooms.—Mr. Ervine, in a few earnest words, introduced the deputation, after which Mrs. Scatcherd spoke.—Captain Wyatt-Edgell replied that he agreed in the main with Mrs. Scatcherd's remarks, and admitted the justice of the claim made. He could not, however, at once pledge himself to support the Bill, as he had not yet seriously considered it. He promised that it should receive his earnest consideration. The poll took place on August 13th, when Lord Burghley was returned by 2,261 votes, against 1,475 given for Captain Wyatt-Edgell.

REVIEW.

Notes upon the Representation of the People Act, 1867, *with Appendices concerning the ancient rights, &c.*, by THOMAS CHISHOLM ANSTEY, Esquire, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law, London. William Ridgway, 169, Piccadilly, 1867.

The work before us was written, as appears from the date, immediately after the passing of the Reform Act of 1867, and before any judicial decision had been given on the effect of its provisions. We extract those portions of the work which refer to the presumed right of women, and the franchise conferred by the Act, as a supplement to the extracts from a former work which refer to the ancient right under the common law and the statute, previous to the Act of 1832.

"1. OF THE GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS.

We are naturally led to inquire, in the first place, how many of the conditions imposed by the new Act, upon the title to vote at elections to future Parliaments, are common both to the rural and urban constituencies, and to all classes of the new qualifications in each. The Act contains no general provision on this subject, but, with needless repetition, sets forth in the case of each special qualification the common requirements as to all. They are thus described at the head of each new franchise conferred, in county, city, or borough, before the Act proceeds to specify the superadded and particular qualifications of the class.*

'Every man shall, in and after the year 1868, be entitled to be registered as a voter, and when registered, to vote for a member or members to serve in Parliament for a ["County," or "Borough," as the case may be], who is qualified as follows, that is to say—1. Is of full age, and not subject to any legal incapacity.'

These conditions apply to all. The enumeration of the special qualifications belonging to the particular category follow next. Those will be noticed hereafter, each under its proper head. At present, some observations upon the legal effect of the common clause above cited, may be considered to be not out of place.

Who then is to be deemed a 'voter' within the meaning of the new provisions for conferring the rights of such? (*a*) A man (*b*) of full age, (*c*) not subject to any legal incapacity, and (*d*) whose qualification to vote has been registered. Upon each of these four points except the second, there seems to be too much reason to fear that some difficulty in the interpretation will occur, and such as to call for a judicial determination in Westminster Hall.

1. *a*, *b*:—'EVERY MAN OF FULL AGE:'—

The 'Act for shortening the language used in Acts of Parliament,' and commonly called Lord Romilly's Act, provides that† 'in all Acts, words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females, unless the contrary be expressly provided.' We have seen that the Representation of the People Act, 1867, has been framed in strict accordance with that Act, even as to those of its provisions which were permissive merely.* If then the new Act contains no 'express provision to the contrary,' of the above enactment, it can scarcely be said that the omission was owing to an oversight on the part of its framers, or of the Parliament which adopted, without explanation or amendment, the clauses in their original wording, which purported to confer the new franchises upon 'every man of full age, and not subject to any legal incapacity.'

The omission is the more significant because the attention of Parliament, long before the Bill had gone through Committee in the House of Commons, was solemnly called to it, on two occasions, by one of the Gentlemen of the Long Robe who are members of that House;—and because thus challenged, the House on both occasions declined to make clear its meaning, albeit warned of the vagueness and ambiguity of its language, and the danger of litigation, which those causes were likely to open up. It is undoubtedly the more modern doctrine, and it has been so determined, both at law and in equity, of late, that what either those who framed the Bill, or who proposed the measure in Parliament intended is, for the purpose of construing the Act, immaterial; for the words must speak for themselves;—that the Courts can know nothing of the intention of the Act, except from the words in which it is expressed, and by the general rules of construction;—and more especially that they cannot travel out of its language in search of any supposed intention, or into a history of its passage through Parliament:—for 'of such facts, if capable of being ascertained, we,' said Lord Denman, in one of the cases cited, 'are not permitted judicially to take notice.' Nor is it in that view that the reader's attention is invited to what took place within the walls of Parliament, with reference to the subject at present under examination;—but only because those proceedings show that the question had been duly considered by a learned lawyer, that his opinion upon it was in due season presented to the legislature, without contradiction or question on the part of any lawyer there, and that with that opinion the following observations are substantially accordant.

Mr. George Denman, Q.C., the Member for Tiverton, before the 'Bill' had gone into Committee, gave notice of his intention, upon that stage being reached, to inquire the intentions of those in charge of it, with reference to the future application of the 'Clauses' in question.†

The following are the words of the 'notice' of question extracted from 'The Order Book':‡—and, in that form, when the above-mentioned stage was reached (25th March, 1867), the question was put by Mr. Denman, in his place in the House:—

> '3. Mr. Denman,—To ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether, having regard to the Act 13 and 14 Vic., c. 21, s. 4, which enacts "That in all Acts words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females," it is intended by the use of the word "man," instead of the words "male person," in clause 3 of the Bill to amend the Representation of the People, to confer the suffrage on women qualified according to the requirements of that clause.'

It is not the practice of Parliament to record the ministerial answers to questions, however formally put. But the authorised collection of 'Debates' has preserved the reply of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, from the notes of the shorthand reporter, and to the following effect*:—

'It appears to me, sir, that this is a question which the honourable and learned gentleman might have reserved for the Committee on the Bill, when the opinion of Gentlemen of the Long Robe might be taken with respect to it. I am scarcely competent to offer one. But I have considered this subject, and it appears to me, that, if he had studied it more attentively, he would have found it unnecessary to put his question. It is laid down in the Act to which he refers, that, in all Acts, the words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females, unless the contrary is provided. But that is, I believe, provided in this instance.'

Upon an attentive examination of the contents of the Bill, it will be seen that it did not originally purport to make any provision of the kind. None such was introduced in Committee. The Act as passed is, in that respect, a transcript of the Bill.†

Two months later, the same honourable and learned member renewed the endeavour to obtain a clearer indication of the intended effect of the Bill, but with the same ill success. Mr. George Denman's speech on that occasion, as we read in the collection of 'Debates' already referred to,‡ was as follows:

'About four or five weeks ago, when he first read the draught of this Bill, it struck him as a lawyer that it was more than doubtful, whether, as it stood, it did not confer the suffrage upon women. Under these circumstances, he did not think it was unbecoming of him to have asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (who, he had heard, had expressed an opinion that there was no real argument to be used against female suffrage) whether it was the intention of the Government to give the suffrage to women. The right honourable gentleman replied to him by saying that, if he had read the Bill a little more carefully, he would find that the Bill had no such effect. He (Mr. Denman) would however venture to ask the Attorney and Solicitor-General (Sir John Rolt and Sir John Burgess Karslake) whether, as lawyers, they were confident that the Bill, as it stood, would not confer the suffrage on women? The first clause of the Bill provided that every "man," under such and such conditions, should be entitled to be registered. Now, in an Act passed since the Reform Act, it was declared that all words importing the masculine gender should be deemed to include females, unless it was specifically stated to the contrary. In the first Reform Act,§ the word "man" did not occur: but the words "male person" were used instead. He desired to know why a different term had been used in the present Bill. In the fifth clause of the Bill ‖ he found something which strongly corroborated his view; because after saying that every "man" should be entitled to be registered who was a graduate or associate of arts, it proceeded to say, "or a *male person*, who has passed at any senior middle-class examination, &c." He believed if the Court of Queen's Bench had to decide to-morrow on the construction of these clauses, they would be constrained to hold that they conferred the suffrage upon female persons as well as males. In one of the colonies of Australia, by the use of the word "person" accidentally inserted in an Act of the

* 30 and 31 Vic., c. 103, ss. 3, 4, 5, 6. † 13 & 14 Vict., c. 21 (s. 4).

* *Id.* ss. 2–4.
† Bill, &c. Clauses 3–6, post App. (B) pp. xxxix.–xli.
‡ In "Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons," 25th March, 1867.

* Session 1867, Parliamentary Debates of the 25th March, 1867: in Hansard: (Third Series), Vol. 186, p. 467. Compare "St. Stephen's Chronicle," Vol. II., pp. 502-503.
† Compare the Act in Appendix (A) and the Bill in Appendix (B), post pp. i. xxxix.
‡ Session 1867: Parliamentary Debates of the 20th May, 1867, in Hansard (Third Series), Vol. 187, p. 834. Compare "St. Stephen's Chronicle," Vol. III., p. 480.
§ That is to say, in those Sections which created new franchises.—T. C. A.
‖ Post, Appendix (B), p. xl. This was one of the clauses which were struck out in Committee.—T. C. A.

Legislature, the female suffrage was given. Subsequently it was said to have been found that such an advantage had arisen from its operation, that they declined to alter it; not wishing to get rid of it. He protested against the mode in which his question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon this point had been answered. The right honourable gentleman, in his reply, evading the question which was asked as to the intentions of the Government, merely got up a laugh against a private member, whose feelings were as much entitled to be consulted as those of any right honourable gentleman on the Treasury Bench. If he (Mr. Denman) remained in the state of mind in which he was left by the two first speakers upon this question,* he should certainly follow the honourable Member for Westminster into the lobby.'

It appears from the 'Division Lists' that the vote of the honourable and learned gentleman was afterwards given in favour of Mr. Mill's proposal. The fact is not unimportant in connection with what remains to be stated. Neither of the law officers of the Crown so called upon appears to have answered to the appeal. No minister of the Crown appears to have taken any part at all in that discussion. The views of the Administration were not stated. The Committee refused by a large majority to allow any modification or explanation whatever of the criticised term of description introduced into the Bill. The generic word 'man,' with nothing to point or confirm its meaning to males,† was retained in every clause where it had appeared, and in that shape the Bill passed into a law.

It may be not unreasonably thought that so much reticence on the part of Parliament, and so much tenacity to accept no attempt at an explanation of its own meaning, are the more remarkable, inasmuch as long before Lord Romilly's Act, and whilst no similar enactment was as yet in force, the Legislature of 1832 had been careful to employ the words 'male person' in every case where new franchises were being created by that Act which it was not then deemed fit to confer upon females.‡ Whether even those words would be considered sufficiently indicative of an intention to exclude them, within the meaning of Lord Romilly's Act, may be doubted. It may be doubted even whether the effect of the incorporating sections of The Representation of the People Act, 1867, already noticed, has not been to re-enact the incorporated sections of the Reform Act of 1832, as from the date of the new enactment, and so to subject the construction of the former for the first time to the provisions of Lord Romilly's Act. It is at least certain that those provisions must necessarily govern the interpretation of the terminology proper to The Representation of the People Act, 1867. For it is certain that by none of its various enactments, to use the language of the former Acts,§ 'the contrary as to gender is expressly provided.' On the contrary, it is further to be observed that, throughout those enactments, instead of the words 'male person,' employed in some of the like cases by the Reform Act of 1832,‖ either the generic term 'person,' also employed occasionally by that Act,¶ or else the term 'man' (not less generic) has been in every instance (and—as it seems—deliberately) chosen to denote each individual member of every class upon whom, within its meaning and letter, 'rights are conferred' by the principal enactment.

Independently indeed of Lord Romilly's Act, there is authority for holding that in the construction of statutes, and more especially of statutes which concern the Constitution of these realms, the word 'man' must be read in its largest and most general sense—that is to say, as denoting not the 'baron' only, but both the 'baron' and the 'feme.' A remarkable instance of the kind occurred in the construction of the text of Magna Carta itself, in which 'homo,' as Lord Coke observes, has been always held to 'extend to both sexes:'** albeit there are in that Charter also to be found chapters, by which the peculiar rights of 'women' are provided for, in a manner which make those chapters at least to be applicable to women alone.†† But the chapters by which are secured the rights of 'man,' under the generic description of 'homo,' expressed or understood, contain no specific mention of 'woman' at all.‡‡ On the contrary, the use of the masculine adjective and pronominal adjective, in combination with the word 'homo,' might almost justify the inference that these were meant to be excluded.§§ That inference again, if the letter of the enactment which followed were alone regarded, might by some persons be considered to be put almost beyond all doubt by the mention made of the process of outlawry, to which no woman was ever amenable in England;‖‖ and also of the 'trial by peers' (or 'equals') of the 'man' accused:—for equality can scarcely be said to denote the relations of the 'baron' to the 'feme,' and especially the 'feme coverte,' in the old jurisprudence of Westminster Hall. Nevertheless, the contrary has been the uniform exposition of that chapter of Magna Carta, from the time of its promulgation. A very ancient Act of Parliament indeed was once passed for the simple purpose of 'declaring' the meaning of the word 'parium,' in that chapter, when applied to 'femes, damesde grande estate.'¶¶ But that the whole chapter did apply to females as well as to males, that declaratory Act treated as a point so clear and free from doubt, as to need no declaration. In process of time the declaratory Act became in its turn the subject-matter of judicial exposition. 'Duchesses, countesses, and baronesses,' had been mentioned there, but 'marchionesses and viscountesses' were omitted. The omission was holden to be immaterial, as the Act itself had been always superfluous, for that the omitted degrees, 'notwithstanding, were also comprehended within this chapter of Magna Carta;'*** and for that it was very clear law at all times, that a 'dame' might be a 'peer de realm,' and entitled to the privileges of such.†††

It is indeed more especially in the case of charters or statutes, for the conferring or restoring of great civil, political, and constitutional rights, that this method of interpretation becomes peculiarly applicable. That seems to have been the opinion of the legislature which passed the Roman Catholic Relief Act, with regard to the interpretation of that Act.‡‡‡

* Mr. George Denman spoke third in the debate. The question was the Amendment moved by Mr. John Stuart Mill, M.P. for Westminster, for inserting words to make it clear that the intention was to confer the new franchises upon females as well as males.—T. C. A.

† Mr. Powell's amendment to substitute "male person" for "man" was negatived in the House.

‡ 2 and 3 Will. IV., c. 45, ss. 19, 20, 27. § 13 and 14 Vict., c. 21 (s. 4).

‖ 2 and 3 Will. IV., c. 45 (ss. 19, 20, 27).

¶ *Id.* (ss. 12, 18, 22, 23, 31—36).

* 2. Inst. f. 45. † Magna Carta, cc. 7, 34.

‡ *Id.* cc. 1, 4, 8, 10, 14, 15, 18—22, 24, 26—29, 31—34, 36, 37.

§ "*Nullus liber homo* capiatur vel imprisonetur, aut disseisiatur de libero tenemento suo, vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut *utlaghetur*, aut exuletur, aut aliquo alio modo destruatur:—nec super *eum* ibimus, nec super *eum* mittemus, nisi per legale judicium *parium suorum*, vel per legum terræ." Magna Carta, 9 Hen. III., c. 29.—(Hampden's Case, 3. How. St. Tr. 983—4, 1192, and Darnel's Case. *Id.* 14, 18, 38, 79, 86.

‖ "Fœmina utlagari non potest, quia ipsa non est sub lege (id est, *Inlaughe*, Anglice), scilicet in franco plegio sive decennâ: . . . wayviari tamen benè potest et pro derelictâ haberi, cum pro felonià aliquâ fugam fecerit sive ceperit." Bracton. Lib. iii., cap. ii. (Pl. 5). f. 125 *b.* (Compare Fleta, Lib. i., cap. xxvii. (Pl. 12), f. 41. "Nequedent feme ne puit mie estre utlage proprement, pur ceo que ele nest mye ordine a dizeyne, ne a lay, mes weyue puit ele estre, que contre vaut utlagerie." Britton (by Wingate), ch. xii., f. 20. "Men may be called *utlagati, id est, extra legem* positi, but women are *waiviatæ, id est, derelictæ*, left out or not regarded." Co. Litt., f. 122, *b.*

¶ 20 Henr. VI., c. 9. "Statutes of the Realm," Vol. II., p. 321.

** 2 Inst., f. 45.

†† The Lady de Spenser's Case, M. 11 Henr. IV., f. 15 (pl. 34). Staundf., f. 152, *b.* ‡‡ 10 Geo. IV., c. 7.

The words most commonly used throughout that Act to denote the objects thereof, are these:—'Person,' 'persons,' 'subject,' or 'subjects;' and more generally one of the two first words.* But in the singular those antecedents are invariably referred to by the pronominal masculines 'he,' 'his,' or 'him;' and the only instance in which females are specified at all is in the proviso† which exempts them from the restraints and penalties imposed by preceding sections upon 'Ecclesiastics,' ‡ or 'Jesuits, and members of other religious orders, communities, or societies of the Church of Rome, bound by monastic or religious vows, and resident within the United Kingdom.'§ Yet there can be no doubt, from the language used throughout those sections ('*he* shall reside,' '*he* shall be deemed,' &c.) that females were originally not within the contemplation of those who framed them. Still it was prudently considered, that inasmuch as females were undoubtedly comprehended under the generic descriptions employed to denote the objects of that restitution of rights, civil and political—including that of the free exercise of the electoral franchises throughout the kingdom—which it was the main design of the measure to effect, it might be doubted whether, in the absence of words exempting them from the new penal enactments contained in the same measure, the latter would not be deemed equally susceptible of application to females, albeit not within the intention of their framers. It may be admitted that the doubt was not well founded, and that in the case of penal enactments no such inference against their letter would be sanctioned by any court of criminal jurisdiction in which the attempt might happen to be made. Yet the instance is not on that account the less interesting, as showing what has been the practice of the legislature with regard to the construction of generic terms.

But Lord Romilly's Act has removed all former difficulties of interpretation; and now the question is at once reduced to the narrowest dimensions. Is the capacity to vote at a Parliamentary election a thing, *per se*, incompatible with, or alien to, the legal, civil, or political capacities of woman? If it be, then there is something in the context, which by a large construction may induce the courts of registration and revision to hold that merely by the giving of the franchise to 'every man,' if otherwise qualified, 'the contrary is' (as to any woman qualified in like manner) 'expressly provided,' notwithstanding that, even in common parlance, the word 'man' does not necessarily 'import the masculine gender,' but is epicene, or common to both. But, in any view of the case, it is submitted that, if the incompatibility suggested does not exist, that is to say, is not known to the English law, then there is nothing in the Act to prevent that word, even where 'importing the masculine gender,' from being 'deemed and taken to include females.' That is to say, it is submitted that the ancient canon of construction, which was recognised in the case of Magna Carta by some of the earliest Parliaments, which has been always applied by the courts in the exposition of statutes in favour of rights, and especially of political rights,—and which by the above-mentioned Act of the present reign is now extended to all statutes whatsoever, viz.: that 'words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females'—must govern the interpretation of the present Act of Parliament.

That the rights in question are not incompatible with the legal status of the woman, the following authorities seem to show. On the other hand, there cannot be adduced any one authority against the position that the franchises of the shire and the borough were enjoyed by the female 'resiants,' equally with those of the male sex in times when 'resiants,' as such, and not as 'tenants,' had the franchise. The statutes by which the parliamentary franchise in counties was taken away from the 'resiants' and vested in the 'tenants,' and at length restricted to those of freehold tenure,* did not in any manner create or recognise any such distinction as that of the male and female freeholders. Those Acts had relation to tenure, not to sex. For the same reason, in all those boroughs where the 'common right' prevailed, the suffrage would naturally be exerciseable by the female no less than by the male 'inhabitants' or 'resiants.' It is believed that in not one of the boroughs where the suffrage was said to be regulated by 'charter,' or by 'custom,' or by 'prescription'—or even where it was regulated by a local Act of Parliament—there can be found one instance of any provision or usage whatsoever, whereby any voter was excluded from the enjoyment of the suffrage by reason of sex.† That a woman may be a householder, or freeholder, or burgage tenant, or parishioner, is plain enough. That she may answer the description of 'a person paying scot and lot within the city of London,' has been solemnly decided by the Court of King's Bench,‡ and that determination was expressly grounded by their lordships 'singly upon the foot of the common law, without regard to the usage of the parishes in London;'§ which usage nevertheless had been also shown to be in favour of the same construction.‖ In all cases, whether of statutory, of customary, or of common law qualification for the suffrage, the general rule is that which was laid down by the Court of King's Bench, with respect to the choice of parochial officers under the first 'Act for the Relief of the Poor,'¶ which directed them to be made from among the 'substantial householders' of the place. The court held**—overruling a *dictum* in Viner's Abridgment to the contrary—that a woman, being a 'substantial householder,' was properly chosen under that Act to the office of overseer of the poor, notwithstanding the objections raised at the bar that it was a burthensome office, and one of which, being once appointed to it, she would be called upon to perform duties, some of which were above the bodily and mental powers, and others were inconsistent with the morality or, at least, the decency of that sex.†† 'The only qualification required by the 43rd Elizabeth,' it was said by Mr. Justice Ashhurst, in delivering the opinion of the court,‡‡ 'is that they' (the overseers) 'shall be substantial householders.' It has no reference to sex. The only question then is whether there be any thing in the nature of the office that should make a woman incompetent? And we think there is not. There are many instances where, in offices of a higher nature, they are held not to be disqualified;—as in the case of the office of high chamberlain, high constable, and marshal, and that of a common constable, which is both an office of trust, and likewise, in a degree, judicial. So in the case of the office of sexton.§§ In truth, from the highest office of all—that of the Queen Regnant, whose right was 'declared' by statute ‖‖‖ to be so clear that 'none but the malitious and ignorant' could be 'induced and perswaded unto this errour and folly, to think that Her High-

* *Id.* ss. 1, 2, 4—12, 14—21, 23—26, 28—36.

† *Id.* s. 37. ‡ *Id.* s. 26. § *Id.* ss. 28—36.

* 8 Hen. VI., c. 7; 18 Geo. II., c. 18; 31 Geo. II., c. 14.

† On this point see among the transactions of the Social Science Association, a Paper read on the 20th May, 1867, before the Jurisprudence Department, "On some supposed Constitutional Restraints upon the Parliamentary Franchise." by the Author, pp. 18—27.

‡ Olive *v.* Ingram, 7 Mod. 264. § *Id.* 273.

‖ *Id.* 267, 270, 271. ¶ 43 Eliz., c. 2.

** Rex *v.* Stubbs, 2 T. R., 395. †† *Id.* 400. ‡‡ *Id.* 406.

§§ As to this office, the Solicitor-General, who had argued against the woman's right to elect, says, in his own concise report of the case: "I did not think it proper to argue it, . . . there being many woman sextons now in London."—Olive *v.* Ingram, 2 Stra. 1115.

‖‖‖ 1 Mar. I., Stat. iii., c. 1. "Statutes of the Realm," Vol. IV., p. 222.

nes coulde ne shoulde have, enjoye, and use suche lyke royall auctboritie,' &c., 'nor doo ne execute and use all thinges concerning the statutes,' (in which only the name of 'kinge' was expressed) . . . . 'as the kinges of this realme her most noble progenitours have heretofore doon, enjoied, used, and exersised,' down to that of returning officer at an election to Parliament.* There were many other offices—some judicial and all of trust—besides those enumerated by Mr. Justice Ashhurst, to which women were competent, and some of which had been actually filled by women.† That there are some offices as to which it is the practice, by 'the custom of England,' to exclude them is undoubtedly the fact. But it has been well said, as to these, that 'there is a difference between being exempted and being incapacitated,' and that 'an excuse from acting, &c., is different from an incapacity of doing so.'‡ For it must not be forgotten that it is upon the footing, not of disability but of exemption, that those exclusions are rested by the authorities which declare them. Thus Whitelocke: §—'By the custome of England, women are not returned of juries, nor put into offices or commissions, nor eligible to serve in Parliament, or admitted to be members of the House of Peers,‖ but, by reason of their sexe, they are *exempted* from such employments.' The omission of the electoral franchise from that enumeration is remarkable. If women were, at that time, considered to be excluded by any 'custome of England' from the Parliamentary franchise as well as from Parliament, it is scarcely conceivable that Whitelocke would have omitted to mention so important a fact. Singular to say, there is no trace of any such custom or usage in the reports or amongst the records;—not even, so far as the author's researches have been successful, in the journals of the House of Commons itself,—and yet the right of the returning officer to reject the vote of a female elector when tendered at the polling booth is always assumed to be an adjudged point. Mr. Oldfield appears to have been under the impression that the resolution of the House of Commons upon the occasion of the Westminster election, asserting¶ the incapacity of an alien to vote in elections of members to serve in Parliament extended to 'women' also.** If it were so the incident would have no weight, for the enactment, which, according to a second resolution of the same date, was to be prepared for carrying into effect that intention, never received the sanction even of that House. But in truth, no mention of 'women' appears in either resolution. Nor was there in that year, or at any other period, any resolution or determination of the House, so far as the author's information goes, directly impeaching the capacity of any female, in respect of her sex, to vote at an election to Parliament. He is aware that the House of Commons did, upon one remarkable occasion, deny the capacity of a female to be heard even as a witness at their bar; and that this extraordinary vote was obtained through the influence of Sir Edward Coke, the only text-writer who can be vouched for the position that a woman's vote ought not to be received at a parliamentary election.†† It is possible that the latter may, by some persons, be supposed to be involved in the former position, although an incompetence personally to appear in Parliament for any purpose is a very different thing from an incompetence to elect another person to Parliament. It is possible, and even probable, that the 'communis error,' as it is submitted to be, touching the incompatibility of the female *status* with the electoral franchise may owe its origin to some mistake as to the nature and effect of that which the Commons, on the occasion in question, really did resolve. It was this:—

Mr. Lovell, a member of the House of Commons, had been active in promoting and making more stringent the celebrated 'Bill against certain troublesome persons called relators,' &c.,* and one Henry Dayrell appears to have come within the range of a clause, moved by him, for extending the penal clauses to 'Prosecutors of Inquisitions in the Court of Wards.' Lovell denounced Dayrell to the House† for 'having threatened his person,' in revenge of his motion; but he, 'being sent for by the serjeant,' denied the charge at the bar. An inquiry was therefore directed, and on the following day witnesses were ordered to be 'called in.'‡ One of them, however, being 'a gentlewoman'—(one 'Mrs. Newdigate'),—she was objected to by Sir Edward Coke and others; Coke, in particular, urging 'out of S. Bernard,' that 'a woman [ought] not to speak in the congregation.' The objection prevailed. Four members were ordered to examine her (Mrs. Newdigate) 'presently' (and as it seems, privately), and to report her evidence to the House. This being accordingly done, the offence was taken to be proved, and the resolution for Dayrell's commitment passed without a division. The sequel, however, has to be told:—

Notwithstanding that precedent, and the authority on which it was based, the House of Commons, within less than half a century, after 'debate,' adopted a resolution by which it was rescinded, and which has ever since continued to be followed in the practice. The question arose upon an Estate Bill, setting aside a will,§ and, 'on the hearing of the cause at the bar,' amongst other witnesses the mother of one of the parties was tendered as a witness at their bar. The admissibility of the thing was argued by counsel, and again, after their withdrawing from the bar within the House itself;—but at length—'the question being put, that Mrs. Bodville be admitted a witness—it was resolved in the affirmative.'

The truth is, that scarcely any of the precedents from the journals of the House of Commons have the slightest value in a legal point of view. The precedents last cited are, on the whole, a very fair sample of the common mass.

On the other hand, there are extant many Parliamentary returns for counties and boroughs, from the earliest times, which were made by female electors, and yet were received. Some of them are enumerated in Prynne's Collection of Parliamentary Writs.‖ Some of later dates are mentioned in the Commons' Journals themselves.¶ Others are to be found in the repositories of the learned or the curious.**

Three of the returns in question, which related to one and the same borough, were, at a period long subsequent, produced

* 2 Str. 1115.

† For some of these, and the authorities relating to them, see the Paper above mentioned, "On some supposed Constitutional Restraints," &c., pp. 23—26.

‡ *Per* Bootle *arguendo* in Olive *v.* Ingram, 7 Mod. 264. *Per* Probyn, J., *Ibid*, 271.

§ "Notes upon the King's Writ," Vol. I., ch. li., p. 476.

‖ As to the ancient practice, however, of summoning "dames" to Parliament, see the Paper "On some supposed Constitutional Restraints," &c., pp. 19–20; and compare, with the authorities there cited, those collected in I. Whitelocke, *ubi supra*, pp. 479, 480.

¶ 22nd December, 1698:—Commons' Journals, Vol. XII., f. 367, II. Carew, f. 236, *b*.

** Representative History, Vol. VI., Appendix, p. 365.

†† 4 Inst., f. 5, *a*.

* 8th February, 1620: I. Commons' Journals, f. 514, *b*.

† 12th February, 1620. *Id*. ff. 517, *a*, 518, *b*.

‡ 13th February, 1620. *Id*. ff. 519, *a*, *b*, 520 *a*.

§ 19th November, 1666. VIII. Commons' Journals, f. 651, *b*.

‖ (*Yorkshire*): 13 Hen. IV. to 12 Edw. IV. in Brev. Parl. Rediviv. ff. 152—5.

¶ (*Gatton*): Returns of 7 Edw. VI.; 1 and 2 Mar. I.; and 2 and 3 Phil. and Mar.; in I. Commons' Journals, f. 875.

** For instance, *Aylesbury*, 5 May, 14 Eliz.: Return by "Dame Dorothy Packington, widow, late wife of Sir John Packington, Knight, Lord and Owner of the town of Aylesbury," of "my Two Burgesses of my said Town," to Parliament, with powers to act, "as fully and wholly as if I were or might be present there." Brady: Bo. Append. 35. Willis: Notitia Parl., Vol. I., p. 129.

before a 'committee of privileges and elections,' presided over by the great parliamentary lawyer, Mr. Hakewell, as evidences for and against the respective parties to an election trial then pending. The question was whether the borough was close or open; that is to say, whether amongst the former returns so produced, those by 'Mrs. Copley as sole inhabitant,' showed the suffrage to be limited to the Lord or Lady of Gatton for the time being; or whether those by 'Mrs. Copley et omnes Inhabitantes,' showed the suffrage to be of a more popular character. No question of sex was raised on either side; and neither the report of the Committee which found for the popular right, nor the resolution of the House for giving effect thereto, and for 'taking the Lord of the Manor's return off the file,' contain any allusion to the question of sex.*

At that time the House of Commons was not prepared to enter into conflict with the courts of law, and 'privilege' had not attained to the height which, amid the excitements of the era of 1688, it was doomed to reach.† It was impossible for the Committee of Privileges in the *Gatton Case* to deny the female suffrage, without coming into collision with the law, which had been declared but a few years previously by the judges.‡ 'The opinion of the judges,' it was said by Sir William Lee, a Chief Justice of the King's Bench in 1739,§ 'was that a *feme sole*, if she has a freehold [in a county as it seems], may vote for members of Parliament,' and that 'women when sole had a power to vote. . . . In *Lady Packington's Case* [she] returns to Parliament, that the sheriff made a precept to her, as lady of the manor, to return two members to Parliament. . . . . In the case of Holt *v.* Lyle it is determined that a *feme sole* freeholder' [in counties] 'may claim a voice for Parliament men; but, if married, her husband must vote for her.‖ . . . . I only mention what I found in a manuscript by the famous Hakewell.'

It may be reasonably inferred from the silence of Whitelocke as to the right of suffrage, in the passage already cited, wherein he enumerates the various duties or offices from which women are 'exempted,'¶ that the doctrine of Holt *v.* Lyle, and Coates *v.* Lyle (if indeed they be not the same case), continued to be followed after the Restoration, and that women electors were in those days admitted to poll as before the Commonwealth. Between that era and the year 1739, the returning officers, upon what suggestion is not stated, began not to admit women's votes in Parliamentary elections, 'whatever they were formerly,'** and the reason alleged by them is said to have been 'because of the judgment, or improved understanding required in it.' But as to this it might well be asked, in the words of the same learned judge,†† 'is there anything in it that requires skill or judgment? or that a woman cannot do as well as the wisest man in the parish?' And the better explanation would seem to be that which was suggested by the Solicitor-General, Sir R. Strange, in his argument for their exclusion,‡‡ viz., that 'elections being already too popular, this would open a door to greater confusion.'

The same cannot be said of the learned Solicitor-General's objection of nonuser. 'As their claim,' he argued,* 'is at common law, and usage is the only evidence of right at common law, they ought to show it; or else nonuser shall be evidence of a waiver of their right, if ever they had any.' The reply was conclusive enough. 'There was a difference between being exempted and being incapacitated.'† But there was another and a not less conclusive reply. The franchise was a public, not a private right:—*omnis libertas regis est, et ad coronam pertinet*:‡—and of such there can be no waiver, for the right implies a duty, and the duty is co-equal and co-extensive with the right.

Neither must it be forgotten that to this hour the House of Commons has retained upon its journals the once formidable resolutions of the 25th January, 1703-1704.§ Those resolutions, which, during the whole course of the eighteenth century, were no dead letter,‖ asserted that it was the sole right of their House, exclusively of all other authority, 'to examine and determine all matters relating to right of election,' and to 'the qualification of any elector,' and that the bringing of any such matters *ad aliud examen* was 'a high breach of the privileges of the House,' to be visited with its direst displeasure, not only upon the suitor, but upon his counsel, attorney, or agent, and every other person who should abet him in so submitting the same. In the presence of those comminatory resolutions, it is impossible for the courts of Westminster Hall to give their sanction to any argument which is drawn merely from such facts as 'the general submission,—no action brought to try the right—and the silence of the courts.' Lord Camden, C.J., would have replied to such an argument that 'it was a submission of the weak to power, and to the terror of punishment,'—that 'it would be strange doctrine to assert that to be universal law which a few had been afraid to dispute,' and that 'as no objection was taken upon the returns, and the matter had passed *sub silentio*, the precedents' (to the prejudice of the right) 'were of no weight.'¶

Moved by those considerations or not, the Court of King's Bench, in the principal case now under review, were at no loss to conceal their judgment upon the female's right to the parliamentary suffrage, which, albeit a point not immediately before them, their lordships conceived to be involved in the decision of the principal question, viz., the female's right to exercise the scot and lot franchise of the City of London, at elections of civil officers. 'This may,' said Sir William Lee, then Lord Chief Justice of England,** 'be a very extensive determination, if the usage of not voting has avoided the right of voting only where private property is concerned. The question here is, whether a woman is to be taken within the general words of "all persons paying scot and lot?" . . . . The case may be very extensive in its consequences, though not in itself. . . . This case *is* of great importance in its consequences and influence. . . . . The nature of the office is the true consideration with respect to the person who is to execute it. . . . . The right of voting, in women, is to be allowed only *secundum subjectam materiem*, and the case of

* *Gatton*: 16th March, 1628. I. Commons' Journals, f. 875, as corrected in I. Carew, f. 245. And see the comments of Mr. Serjeant Heywood, Co. (2nd edit.) pp. 255, 256.

† Ashby *v.* White: I. Smith's Leading Cases, 227. (6th edition).

‡ Holt *v.* Lyle, and Coates *v.* Lyle, 14 Jac. I. and Catherine *v.* Surrey (Hakewell MSS.), *apud* 7. Mod. 264, 265.

§ Olive *v.* Ingram, 7 Mod. 254, 265, 268, 271.

‖ This last ruling was followed in the *Bedfordshire case*;—2. Luders, 447. But the Committee did not decide what effect should be given to the vote of the *feme* freeholder if *sole*.—*Ibid*. Mr. Rogers, to that extent, appears to have overstated the "ruling." Compare Rogers (*ubi supra*), p. 29.

¶ I. Whitelocke's "Notes," &c., ch. li., p. 476.

** *Per* Probyn, J., 7 Mod., pp. 265, 268.

†† *Id*. p. 274. ‡‡ *Id*. p. 264.

* *Ibid*.

† *Ibid*.

‡ I. Sir F. Palgrave's "Parliamentary Writs" (Record Commission:) f. 383 (7). That Franchise is not lost or waived by nonuser or *laches*, the Commons "determined" in the cases of *Chippenham*, *Agmondesham*, *Marlow*, *Wendover*, *Hertford*, *Haverfordwest*, and *Middlesex*: (Glanv. 57, 95, 114, 118.)

§ xiv. Commons' Journals, f. 308.

‖ *Bewdley*, 8th February, 1708, xvi. Comm. Journals: *Minehead*, 13th June, 1717, xviii. Comm. Journ. 592; 8th January, 1721, xix. *Id*. 704—705, 23rd January, 1721. *Id*. 726: *Wareham*, 19th January, 1747, xxv. Comm. Journ. 480: Heywood. Bo. 407, 408, 421:—and compare Ashby *v.* White, I. Smith's Leading Cases, 227. (6th edition.)

¶ Entick *v.* Carrington. 19. How. St. Tr. 1067—1074.

** Olive *v.* Ingram: 7. Mod. 264, 265, 267, 271, 273, 274.

Coates *v.* Lisle* (that women when sole had a power to vote for members of Parliament) was mentioned only to know if anything more could be discovered or said on that and Hakewell's collection.† . . . . By this it seems as if there was no disability. . . . . And, in respect that is but a private office, women when sole may vote. But it would be a very different consideration in voting for public officers, which concern the Government. . . . . Whether they have not antiently voted for members of Parliament, either by themselves or attorney, is a great doubt. I do not know upon inquiry, but it might be found that they have. . . . . The usage has been to avoid any woman's voting, except in companies, &c. Therefore I think it proper to take further time in this case upon account of its importance. . . . . In the case of Holt *v.* Lyle it is determined that a *feme sole* freeholder may claim a voice for Parliament men, but, if married, her husband must vote for her. . . . . I would not be understood to declare it to be my opinion that women may vote for members of Parliament. I only mention what I found in a manuscript by the famous Hakewell, but give no opinion at present, because I would further consider of this matter. . . . . I think this matter differs from all other offices, and can extend to no other. I do think this must only be considered as a private thing. The judgment must be that the plaintiff must pay the costs of her nonsuit.'

To the same effect were the opinions of some of the other members of the court.

Page, J.‡ 'I am of the same opinion as to the principal case. But I see no disability in a woman voting for parliament men. . . . The votes are good votes, and she is capable of the office.'

Probyn, J. § 'The best rule seems to be that they who pay have a right to nominate whom they will pay to. . . . An excuse from acting, &c., is different from an incapacity of doing so. The case of Holt *v.* Lyle, mentioned by my Lord Chief Justice, is a very strong case. They who pay ought to choose whom they will pay.'

Judgment was accordingly given in favour of the woman's right. It adds to the strength of the decision that the case had been defectively stated, in not showing the female claimants to be unmarried. 'They must,' said the Lord Chief Justice, 'be taken to be so.'‖

The above judgment is the latest on the subject. It has, therefore, been set forth as fully as possible, without introducing such matters as were irrelevant to the point.

It is submitted that the weight of authority is very greatly in favour of the female right of suffrage. Indeed, the only authority against it is contained in the short and hasty dictum of Lord Coke, referred to above. It was set down by him in his last and least authoritative Institute. There is cited not one single reference to support any one of its positions. The prejudices of the learned commentator, of which one remarkable instance has been mentioned already, and his political entanglements of the period at which he wrote, must also be remembered. Nor should it be forgotten that some of the other positions laid down in the same sentence have long since been rejected as unsound law. The passage occurs in the midst of an argument destined to sustain the favourite theory of Lord Coke, but which is certainly not now considered to be law, that parsons are at once ineligible as members of Parliament, and also disabled from voting at the elections of such. The whole passage is verbatim, as follows :¶—'And, in many cases, multitudes are bound by Acts of Parliament which are not parties to the elections of knights, citizens, and burgesses: as all they that have no freehold, or have freehold in antient demesne, *and all women having freehold or no freehold:* and men within the age of twenty-one years, &c.' The '&c.' is Lord Coke's.

It can scarcely be supposed that the inexact language of the above extract was intended to convey the deliberate opinions of the profound writer. It is more probable that he meant them to be regarded only as illustrations of his polemic of the moment. But this at least is certain, that he has been followed neither by the great lawyers of his time, nor by the judicature. What were the opinions of Hakewell, his contemporary, and of Whitelocke, who came after both, we have seen. How little the weight which the *dictum* in question has obtained in the courts we may gather, not only from the judgments above referred to, but also from the silence with which the quotation appears to have been invariably received. It is at least certain that, in the face of these authorities, the *dictum* in question is quite unreliable as an exposition of the law relating to the suffrage of females, which must therefore be looked for elsewhere. The principles of that law, it is submitted, will be found in the cases of Coates *v.* Lyle, Holt *v.* Lyle, Olive *v.* Ingram, and the King *v.* Stubbs. It is unnecessary to add that all those cases were decided under the strict rules for construction of statutes, as they were before Lord Romilly's Act enlarged them.

It is further submitted, that upon the whole the incompatibility of the female status at law, with the possession or exercise of the Parliamentary franchise cannot be established; and that it will be the duty of the Registration and Revision Courts to give effect to the definition provided by Lord Romilly's Act in the sense here expressed, when the time comes for putting a meaning upon the words 'every man of full age,' in 'the Representation of the People Act, 1867.'"

* *Ubi Supra*, p. 96.

† The Court had, "upon account of its importance," ordered the case to be no less than four times argued or "spoken to again," after the first argument. 7 Mod. 264, 266, 268, 271.

‡ *Id.* 265, 273. § *Id.* 265. ‖ *Id.* 273. ¶ 4 Inst. f. 5, *a.*

MANCHESTER SOCIETY.—SUBSCRIPTIONS, AUGUST, 1877.

Mr. P. Goldschmidt	£5	0	0
Mrs. Mills (Tooting)	2	2	0
Mrs. Winder	1	1	0
Dr. Pankhurst	1	1	0
Mrs. R. Glover *(Journal)*	1	1	0
Miss Mabel Sharman Crawford	1	0	0
Dr. Muirhead	1	0	0
Mrs. N. Pearce Sharman	1	0	0
Mr. R. Sutcliffe	0	5	0
Mrs. R. Sutcliffe	0	5	0
Miss Ewing (Chathill)	0	3	6
Mrs. Powell	0	1	0
Mrs. Shaw COLNE.	0	10	0
Mrs. Henderson	0	5	0
Mr. Wildman	0	5	0
A. C.	0	5	0
Miss Bracewell	0	3	0
Mr. W. H. Carr	0	2	6
Mrs. Holt	0	1	6
	£15	11	6

BRISTOL SOCIETY.—SUBSCRIPTIONS SINCE MARCH, 1877.

Miss Ashworth	£50	0	0
Mrs. C. Thomas	5	0	0
Miss Solly	2	0	0
Mr. F. James	0	10	6
Mrs. P. C. Evans, Stroud	0	10	0
Mr. Branth, Portishead	0	5	0
Mrs. Newell Price	0	5	0
Miss Calmady	0	5	0
Mr. Thornton	0	5	0
William Davies, LL.D.	0	5	0
Miss G. Thomas	0	5	0
Dr. Lynes	0	5	0
Miss A. Lloyd (donation)	0	5	0
Miss Mackenzie (donation)	0	2	6
Mrs. Thornton	0	2	6
	£60	5	6

ALAN GREENWELL, Treasurer,
Office, 16, Park-street, Bristol. 1, Arlington Villas, Clifton.

PETITIONS.

EIGHTH REPORT. 21—24 March, 1877 *(Continued).*

WOMEN'S DISABILITIES REMOVAL BILL—*In favour.*

NO.	DATE	PLACE.	NO. OF SIGNATURES.
	Mar	Brought forward, Petitions 231—Signatures	66,975
2419	22	KINGSTON, and other places (Sir Charles Forster)	82
2420	22	BRISTOL, public meeting, Anna Gore-Langton, president (Mr. Morley)	1
2421	22	CROSSHILL (Colonel Mure)	308
2422	22	PETERBOROUGH (Mr. Whalley)	1,802
2423	22	HAPTON and FORNCETT	10
2424	23	TROON (Colonel Alexander)	113
2425	23	SAINT ANDREW'S (Sir Robert Anstruther)	322
2426	23	SAINT ANDREW'S (Sir Robert Anstruther)	1
2427	23	MANCHESTER, women of Medlock Ward (Sir T. Bazley)	660
2428	23	DUBLIN (Mr. Maurice Brooks)	546
2429	23	LONDON (Mr. Cotton)	1,128
2430	23	IRVINE (Sir W. Cuninghame)	280
2431	23	HAMMERSMITH (Sir C. Dilke)	998
2432	23	KENSINGTON (Mr. Gordon)	1,033
2433	23	SUNDERLAND Chamber of Commerce, Members of the, John Knight, president (Mr. Gourley)	1
2434	23	HASTINGS (Mr. Kay-Shuttleworth)	456
2435	23	LAMBETH (Mr. W. M'Arthur)	1,623
2436	23	CLIFTON, Bristol (Mr. Morley)	438
2437	23	DUBLIN (Mr. O'Shaughnessy)	438
2438	24	BRIGHTON (Mr. Charley)	564
2439	24	SALFORD (Mr. Charley)	561

Total No. of Petitions 252—Signatures 78,340

NINTH REPORT. 24 Mar.—10 April, 1877.

NO.	DATE	PLACE.	NO. OF SIGNATURES.
	Mar	Brought forward, Petitions 252—Signatures	78,340
2602	24	BROUGHTON (Mr. Charley)	564
2603	26	CRAIGKENNOCHY and BURNTISLAND (Sir R. Anstruther)	130
2604	26	MARYLEBONE (Mr. Jacob Bright)	733
2605	26	MANCHESTER, Medlock Ward (Mr. Jacob Bright)	448
2606	26	BROUGHTON (Mr. Cawley)	543
2607	26	IPSWICH (Mr. Cobbold)	746
2608	26	BUCKIE (Mr. Robert Duff)	46
2609	26	BUCKIE, public meeting, Stuart Brown, chairman (Mr. Robert Duff)	1
2610	26	KIRKLISTON (Mr. M'Lagan)	101
2611	26	EDINBURGH, Lord Provost, Magistrates, and Council of (Mr. M'Laren)	Seal. 1
2612	26	CARDIFF (Colonel Stuart)	447
2613	27	WALLACETOWN (Sir William Cuninghame)	218
2614	27	CHELTENHAM, public meeting, S. Onley, jun., chairman (Mr. Agg-Gardner)	1
2615	27	BRISTOL (Mr. Morley)	323
2616	27	CHIDEOCK (Mr. Portman)	15
2617	27	TENBY (Mr. Read)	160
	Apl.		
2618	5	ESSEX (Lord Eustace Cecil)	156
2619	5	MOORE PARK (Mr. Downing)	38
2620	6	MIDDLESBROUGH, Mayor, Alderman, and Burgesses of (Mr. Bolckow)	Seal. 1
2621	6	R. A. EGERTON and others (Mr. William Smith)	14
2622	9	HARTLEPOOL, Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of (Mr. Bell)	Seal.
2623	9	CLIFTON (Mr. K. Hodgson)	338
2624	9	PEMBROKE (Mr. E. Reed)	63
2625	9	COWBRIDGE (Colonel Stuart)	59
2626	9	LONDON (Mr. Torrens)	220
2627	10	JAMES F. WEIR and others (Mr. Forsyth)	1,146
2628	10	SWINDON (Sir Daniel Gooch)	152
2629	10	BODMIN (Mr. Gower)	57
2630	10	SAINT ALBAN'S (Mr. Halsey)	42
2631	10	ABERFELDY (Sir W. Maxwell)	109
2632	10	BARRHEAD (Colonel Mure)	205
2633	10	WICK, Provost, Magistrates, and Town Council of (Mr Pender)	Seal. 1

Total No. of Petitions 284—Signatures 85,388

TENTH REPORT. 11—13 April, 1877.

NO.	DATE	PLACE.	NO. OF SIGNATURES.
	Apl.	Brought forward, Petitions 284—Signatures	85,388
3042	11	LEEDS (Mr. Barran)	4,983
3043	11	FORFAR, Magistrates and Members of the Town Council of (Mr. Baxter)	Seal. 1
3044	11	MANCHESTER, Medlock Ward (Sir T. Bazley)	463
3045	11	MANCHESTER, women of Medlock Ward (Mr. Birley)	571
3046	11	MANCHESTER, All Saints' Ward (Mr. Birley)	808
3047	11	HORSLEYDOWN (Mr. J. Bright)	863
3048	11	NEILSTON ,,	152
3049	11	MANCHESTER, women of All Saints' Ward (Mr. J. Bright)	1,052
3050	11	KIRKCALDY, Provost, Magistrates, and Town Council of the royal burgh of (Sir G. Campbell)	Seal. 1
3051	11	SOUTH STOCKTON upon TEES (Mr. Dodds)	100
3052	11	LUDDENDEN and TODMORDEN (Mr. Starkey)	62
3053	12	DUBLIN, public meeting (Mr. Maurice Brooks)	1
3054	12	DUBLIN (Mr. Maurice Brooks)	458
3055	12	DUBLIN, at 68, Abbey Road, drawing-room meeting (Sir T. Chambers)	1
3056	12	MARYLEBONE and others	100
2057	12	CHELSEA (Sir Charles Dilke)	1,175
3058	12	INVERURIE (Mr. Grant Duff)	177
3059	12	SCARBOROUGH, public meeting (Sir C. Legard)	1
3060	12	KILWINNING (Mr. Montgomerie)	201
3061	12	STEVENSON (Mr. Montgomerie)	96
3062	12	STOCKPORT, public meeting (Mr. Pennington)	1
3063	12	EDINBURGH, public meeting (Mr. J. Cowan)	1
3064	12	INVERURIE, drawing room meeting in Council Chamber	1
3065	12	INVERURIE	12
3066	12	ARDROSSAN	280
3067	12	SALTCOATS	266
3068	13	JEDBURGH, Provost, Magistrates, and Town Council of (Sir H. Ferguson Davie)	1
3069	13	CELLARDYKE (Mr. Ellice)	70
3070	13	CHATHAM, Members of the Stand Firm Lodge of Good Templars (Mr. Gorst)	61
3071	13	LINCOLN, Mayor, Alderman, and Citizens of (Mr. Seeley)	2
3072	13	CARMARTHEN (Mr. Stepney)	71

Total No. of Petitions 315—Signatures 97,420

ELEVENTH REPORT. 16—17 April, 1877.

NO.	DATE	PLACE.	NO. OF SIGNATURES.
	Apl.	Brought forward, Petitions 315—Signatures	97,420
3418	16	MARGARET J. DARSIE, Anstruther (Mr. Ellice)	1
3419	16	,, ,,	184
3420	16	KETTON Lodge of Good Templars, Members of the Hope of (Mr. Finch)	25
3421	16	KENMAY, women householders of (Lord Gordon)	6
3422	16	KENMAY (Lord Gordon)	128
3423	16	KENSINGTON (Mr. Gordon)	1,227
3424	16	CHISWICK, drawing-room meeting at the Elms, Strand, on the Green, C. J. G. Eiloart, chairman (Lord George Hamilton)	1
3425	16	EDINBURGH, St. Andrew's Ward (Mr. M'Laren)	823
3426	16	EDINBURGH, meeting, Elizabeth P. Nichol (Mr M'Laren)	1
3427	16	POLLOCKSHAWS (Col. Mure)	337
3428	16	STAFFORD, Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of (Mr. Salt)	Seal. 1
3429	17	CLAVERTON (Major Allen)	39
3430	17	COMBE DOWN (Major Allen)	376
3431	17	BATHAMPTON (Major Allen)	232
3432	17	BATHEASTON and BATHFORD (Major Allen)	208
3433	17	WOOLLEY, TADWICK, and other places (Major Allen)	279
3434	17	LOWER DARWEN (Sir William Bagge)	24
3435	17	MACCLESFIELD, public meeting, John W. White, chairman (Mr. Brocklehurst)	1
3436	17	BOROUGH GREEN (Sir William Dyke)	20
3437	17	BATH (Mr. Hayter)	31
3438	17	GREAT YARMOUTH (Sir Edmund Lacon)	14
3439	17	BRISTOL (Mr. Morley)	370
3440	17	REDCLIFFE, ,,	266
3441	17	ST. PHILLIP'S, ,,	1,287
3442	17	MARCH, public meeting, Edward Bell, chairman (Mr. Rodwell)	1
3443	17	BIRSTALL public meeting (Mr Spencer Stanhope)	1

Total No. of Petitions 341—Signatures 103,208

TWELFTH REPORT. 18—20 April, 1877.

NO.	DATE	PLACE.	NO. OF SIGNATURES.
	Apl.	Brought forward, Petitions 341—Signatures	103,208
3703	18	BRIGHTON (Mr. Ashbury)	1,060
3704	18	MANCHESTER, Women of All Saints' Ward (Mr. Birley)	480
3705	19	SWINTON (Mr. Hardcastle)	30
3706	19	SELKIRK, Provost, Magistrates, and Town Council of (Mr. Trevelyan)	Seal. 5
3707	19	TALKE (Mr. Allen)	32
3708	19	PLUMSTEAD (Mr. Boord)	715

PUBLICATIONS TO BE OBTAINED AT THE OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 64, BERNERS STREET, LONDON, W.; OR AT 28, JACKSON'S ROW, MANCHESTER.

THE RIGHT OF WOMEN TO EXERCISE THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. By Mrs. H. D. POCHIN. Reprint of a pamphlet published in 1855. Price 3d.

THE POLITICAL DISABILITIES OF WOMEN. Reprinted, by permission, from the "Westminster Review," of January, 1872.—Price 1d., or 6s. 6d. per 100.

THE WOMAN QUESTION.—Twelve Papers reprinted from the *Examiner*.—Price, 1s. Post free for 13 stamps.

MRS. FAWCETT ON WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.—Speech at the Birmingham Public Meeting, December 6th, 1872.—Price 9d.

SPEECHES BY MR. J. S. MILL. Delivered in the House of Commons, May 20th, 1867, and at a Meeting in Edinburgh, January, 1871.—Price 1d. each.

SPEECHES OF MR. JACOB BRIGHT, M.P., AND PROFESSOR FAWCETT, M.P., in Parliament, April 30th, 1873.—Price 1d. each.

WHY WOMEN DESIRE THE FRANCHISE. By Miss Frances Power Cobbe.—Price 1d.

SIXTEEN REASONS FOR WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.—Price One Halfpenny.

EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECHES of Mr. Forsyth, Q.C., M.P., Mr. Fawcett, M.P., The Right Hon. James Stansfeld, M.P., Sir Henry Jackson, M.P., Mr. O'Sullivan, M.P., Mrs. McLaren, Miss Anna Swanwick, Miss Helen Taylor.

Printed by A. IRELAND & Co., Pall Mall, Manchester, for the Proprietors, and Published by Messrs. Trübner and Co., 57 and 59, Ludgate Hill, London, and Mr. JOHN HEYWOOD, Manchester.—September 1, 1877.—Entered at Stationers' Hall.