fabian tract 398 
Europe: out of the impasse 
contents 1 Britain's role in an impotent Europe 1 
2 stalemate in the common market 5 
3 way out of the impasse 8 
4 the political community 10 
5 the role for Europe 14 
6 the socialist contribution 18 
A 
,~... ~ 
' ' 0,. J. 
~~~C"JLI f!CAL IJ.: 
•.-AN[) 0 
. .. ' ,,y' 
'~ 
this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility of 
the Society is limited to approving the publications which it 
issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour move-
ment. Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1. 
October 1969 SBN 7163 0398 1 
fabian tract 398 
Europe: out of the impasse 
contents 1 Britain's role in an impotent Europe 1 
2 stalemate in the common market 5 
3 way out of the impasse 8 
4 the political community 10 
5 the role for Europe 14 
6 the socialist contribution 18 
A 
,~... ~ 
' ' 0,. J. 
~~~C"JLI f!CAL IJ.: 
•.-AN[) 0 
. .. ' ,,y' 
'~ 
this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only the 
view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility of 
the Society is limited to approving the publications which it 
issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour move-
ment. Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW1. 
October 1969 SBN 7163 0398 1 

1. Britainls role in an 
impotent Europe 
For the first time for centuries, Europe 
has ceased to be the spear-head for 
progress, and the continent from which 
innovation, culture and the benefits of 
civilisation have spread to the rest of 
rhe world. Since the second world war, 
the production of nuclear weapons and 
massive technological developmentshave enabled world leadership to passinto American and SoVIiet hands, whilst 
Europe, sapped of vitality following two 
imperialist oonfliicts, has become the 
periphery of the two super powersfacing each other across a border 
crudely drawn through the middle of 
our continent. This rivalry and polarisation 
of power 'has tended to accentuate 
political and economic dlifferences 
between the two blocks, and forced the 
majority of smaller countries to choose 
and align themselves with either the 
United States or the Soviet Union. 
This development has taken a particularly 
acute form in Europe, where 
deviation from allegiance is regarded as 
casus belli by the protectling power.
Thus Soviet suppression of the Hungarian 
revolution and last year's military 
occupation of Czechoslovakia has 
·been matched in form if not mcontent 
by America's military alliance with 
'Franco in Spain and more recently by 
her support of the totalitarian regime 
in Greece. Their respective actions and 
policies, justified by over-rlidingstrategic considerations have met with 
the passive acquiescence of the other 
super power. 

Some individual European countries 
have made efforts to detach themselves 
from positions of subservience.. For 
instance both France and Jugoslaviahave striven in specific areas to develop 
independent forei:gn policies. The last 
decade has shown that neither country 
(even when allied to countries in the 
Afro-Asian group) has the power or 
resources to stand alone and exert any 
significant influence on woJ:'Ild affairs. 

Their po~ioies on non-alignment have 
had little effect lin separating or lessening 
the military confrontation of the 
super powers or their total domination 
of world events. Thus major questions of 
war and peace have became the exclusive 
concern of the two super powers, 
and predictably the United Nations 
orgauisaVion has became ineffective 
and 'impotent except when backed 
jointly by the Soviet Union or America. 
In consequence West European countries 
'have had no influence over such 
critical issues as Cuba or Vietnam, nor 
indeed have they been able to affect 
sU'bstantively the whole question of 
nuclear rivalry and d~sarmament. On 
matters of vital European interests and 
concern such as the conflict in the 
Middle East, Soviet naval penetration 
in the Mediterranean, the suppression 
of Hberty in Greece or Czechoslovakia, 
European countries have been forced 
to look on impotently, and with greater 
or .lesser grace follow the atvitudes of 
their protectors. At the same time the 
European nations are obliged to spend 
vast proportions of their nationai income 
on armaments to defend their 
respective satellite positions. 

The !Yig powers' domination extends 
'beyond quest·ions of foreign and defence 
policies. The overwhelming military 
power of the Americans and the 
Russians has been achieved by a 
massive investment in research and the 
development of advanced techn•ology, 
and the fall-out from technological innovation 
has meant for the super 
powers a substanVial industrial superiority 
in those spheres on which future 
econ·omic development and prosperity 
will depend. Thus American industry 
has been ab1e to penetrate and dominate 
industries of advanced technology 
in western Europe, whilst in eastern 
Europe industrial production is gearedprlimarily to sustain the needs of the 
Soviet economy. 


The growing technological gap between 
America and western Europe has not 
yet overtiy affected living standards in 
our continent, and thus concern a:bout 
it has failed to arouse much passion. 
But the increasing American control of 
the fastest growing advanced branches 
of industry, and the resulting brain-
drain, not only to the USA but a!lso to 
Amer1ican subsidiaries in Europe, carry 
alarming implications for our future 
economic growth. When Harold 
Whlson said that Europe wouJd be 
condemned to an industrial helotry, his 
language may have been colourful but 
in the context of the technologicalrevolution hardly inaccurate. 

European impotence is certaWy no less 
significant within the wo11ld monetarysystem. Indeed international trade and 
development is dependent at present 
upon an archaic and chaotic system 
for the exchange of currencies which 
is frequently undermined by temporary 
fluctuations in national ba!lances of 
payments, and uneashly susta•ined bytwo national reserve currencies, the dollar 
and sterling, which are becoming increasingly 
unstable. Thus in November 
1968 we saw the world monetary system 
go to the edge of the precipice, whilst 
Europe, and in particular Britain, 
whose livelihood depends on world 
trade and therefore a reliable means of 
exchange, was incapable of any joint 
action to pull it back. The uneasy compromise 
reluctanHy dictated byattitudes of national prestige and protecilive 
tendencies may yet drag us into 
an international economic crisis of 
similar proportions, though dillerent in 
character, to that of the early 'thirties. 

It is ·becoming increasingly evident that 
as long as Europe remains balkanised 
and d[vided with each individual 
country ineffecVively trying to assert an 
illusory national sovereignty we will 
remain impotent, with ill the important 

decisions about our future economic 
and political development taken either 
in Washington or Moscow. And tomorrow 
a third centre may be Peking. 

"B11itain has lost an empire but has 
not yet found a role." In this perceptive 
phrase used in 1962 Dean Acheson 
summed up our own dilemma. Ever 
since the war crises in our balance of 
payments have been occurring with 
monotonous regularity. This chronic 
economic weakness has forced successive 
British governments to recognise 
that we no longer possess the means to 
play a world rdle as a first class power, 
and we have progressively withdrawn 
from wide-flung military and economic 
commitments in Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East. 

The Empire imaginatively transformed 
·by the Attlee government into a Commonwealth 
of independent nations has 
lost cohesiveness as the mother country 
found 'herself unable effectively to defend 
and economically to assist the 
emerging but severely under-developed 
new nations of Africa and ASia. It is in 
any case a reflection of insular self-
deception to believe that most Commonwea•
lth countries now look to us 
for ~leadership. Neither in political or 
economic terms is this true. Indeed,
those in Britain who retain these at~itudes 
are no more than ~atter-day im


•perialists. Economic self-interest has 
forced the new members of the Commonwealth 
to look increasingly elsewhere 
for capital needed for development, 
and for the diversification of 
-their trade outside the former British 
Empire. 
The advantages of Commonwealth preference 
have been steadhly eroded. 
whilst Britain's place as a leadingtrading nation, largely dependent upon 
her imperial possesSions, has been progressively 
overtaken by others. 


Similarly the commercial advantagesof being a banker in charge of one of 
the world's two reserve currencies have 
been over-shadowed by the intolerable 
burden the international role of sterling 
has become for Britain's fragile economy, 
backed as it is by inadequate 
reserves. Successive British Governments 
have been forced to subordinate 
rational growth policies to the need to 
prop up sterling for the sake of its 
overseas holders. A realistic assessment 
of our economic weakness, of our 
over-extended commitments and our 
resulting impotence has now led the 
present Labour Government to shed 
past illusions, and for the first time 
since the war to tackle the fundamental 
problems facing a Britain which has to 
stand on 'her own feet and which cannot 
expect that the world continues to owe 
her a living. 

Each successive defence review has 
been marked by the reduction of overseas 
military commitments and the 
canceHation of some over-sophisticated 
weapon whidh has become a luxuryfor a country ceasing to play an 
independent world military role. 

The 1969 review has underlined these 
factors and has in addition made explicit 
the sh'ift of our commitment to 
Europe. Efforts are being made to shed 
the burden of sterling's reserve role 
and to insulate our economy from the 
effects of damaging speculative runs on 
our currency which have so much inhibited 
our own economic growth. Our 
whole economy is being restructured , 
industry modernised and made more 
competitive, and capital investment 
diverted from overseas to meet our 
internal needs. These policies are all 
designed to re-establish a powerfu·l 
economic base from which to recapture 
the lead lost in foreign markets for our 
trade, and rega'in some of our lost influence 
in world affairs. 

At the same time, the technologicalrevolution has brought new problemsin its train. In the most ·important and 
basic areas of modern technology, be it 
computers, electronics, telecommunications, 
defence equipment, or nuclear 
power, research and development costs 
are fast reaching a level beyond the 
means of even a medium sized nation 
such as Britain, unless the home market 
for our products were considerably 
enlarged and development costs shared 
with others. This is equally true of 
many of the more traditional industries, 
such as aviation, automobiles and 
machine tools. If these industries are 
to survive and remain under Europeancontrol, design, produotion and marketing 
techn<iques must be developed on a 
continental scale, and this requiresthe development of an effective political 
infra-structure of similar geographical 
dimension. The price we will pay for 
failure is that American industrial 
giants will increasingly control or displace 
our own industries and this 
could lead to major decisions about 
our economic development being taken 
in board-rooms across the At-lantic. 

The alternat-ives facing Britain are thus 
very clear. We can divest ourselves of 
our remaining overseas commitments, 
and concentrate upon economic activities 
within our own means to ensure 
our domestic prosperity without excessive 
dependence upon others. The <logicof this policy would be to cut our military 
potent·ia.l to a level sufficient to defend 
our shores from conventional 
threats and to pursue in foreign relations 
a policy of neutrality and nonalignment. 
Th:is wou]d not necessarily 
lead to a reduct<ion in our defence 
budget as comparisons with that of neutral 
Sweden would clearly show, while 
compared with the two super powers 
and the emerging European communitywe would have little political or economic 
influence. 


A careful assessment of the proposals 
for a North Atlantic Free Trade Area, 
which apart from the liberalisation of 
trade and removal of tariff barriers 
would still be based on the maintenance 
of national economic independence, is 
unlikely to reverse our declining influence 
on world affairs. Indeed, it would 
hasten American domination of our 
economy and accentuate our satellite 
status in political affairs. With marginal 
differences, largely based upon the 
myth of our so-called special relat·ionship 
with the United States, Britain 
shares her economic and politicalimpotence with her neighbours on the 
European continent. To a greater or 
~esser degree their security and economic 
development are subject to the 
same weaknesses. As separate nation 
states we all share the status of 
American satellites and are increasingly 
becoming subject to their expansion-
hungry technologically based industries. 

For the nations of western Europe,
there is, however, another choice, that 
is to work for European integration, 
based upon common policies for 
foreign affairs, defence, science and 
technology, and all those aspects of 
economic and social affairs which 
would lead ultimately to an economic 
and political union of our continent. 
The ultimate object·ive would be to 
create a Europe responsible for its own 
security with a faster growing economic 
strength and prosperity. This would 
enable us to share, on a more equalbasis with the other great powers, decisions 
upon matters of world peace and 
the progress of our civilisation. 

It •is this vision that clearly motivated 
the Labour Government to submit the 
second application to join the Common 
Market in 1967. We were no longermotivated solely by the desire to overcome 
the growing tariff barriers of the 
Economic Community or to enlarge 

our home market to assist the growth 
of our industries. Indeed the best economic 
estimates seemed to show that 
as against the high cost of operating 
the common agricultural policy, short 
term advantages for industry and a 
more rapid rate of growth would show 
only a fine balance of economic advantage 
for Britain in favour of membership. 
Clearly, however, a great deal 
will depend upon the actual terms of 
the final negotiations-notably in relation 
to agriculture and the period of 
transit·ion. In the longer term, however, 
unified technology would clearly result 
in substantial benefits because of the 
advanced position which Britain 
already holds in this field. The real 
motive behind this application was 
political, in contrast to Macmillan's in 
1961. 

The Government had become converted 
to the idea that Britain should 
play a leading part in building a 
Europe that would have power to act 
and to look after the interests of its 
citizens more effectively t·han individual 
nation states are now able to do. 
Harold Wilson expressed this thinking 
when announcing the decision to applyfor membership in the House of 
Commons on 2 May 1967, in the following 
way : " Whatever the economic 
arguments, the House will rea'lise that, 
as I have repeatedly made clear, the 
Government's purpose derives above 
all, from our recognition that Europe is 
now faced with the opportunity of a 
great move forward in political unity 
and that we can-and indeed must-
play our full part in it." 

By this decision, the Government, with 
massive upport from all politicalparties and a clear majority of public 
opinion, has committed Britain unequivocally 
to the task of helping to 
construct a Europe united both economically 
and politically. 


2. stalemate in the 
common market 
The authors of the Treaty of Rome 
believed that the establishment of a 
customs union would provide the basis 
for measures which would bring about 
full economic and ultimately political 
union. Whilst the treaty laid down a 
clear timetable for its first objective, 
the adoption of further common policies 
and the progressive transfer of 
authority from national governments 
to the European institutions was only 
vaguely sketched out. As a result the 
EEC, having achieved a customs union, 
has only an expensive common agricultural 
policy to ·its credit. National 
economic policies still dominate the 
scene. Further progress towards a full 

-economic union or even the limited 
programme to modernise Europeanagriculture have up to now provedunobtainable. 

When on 19 January 1963, General de 
Gau1le declared that Britain was not 
yet ready for membership of the EEC 
he was not only closing the door to 
Britain, he was also making it clear to 
his continental partners that if the community 
was to develop it would be on 
his terms and under French hegemony. 
When eight days 1ater he signed the 
Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation 
he gave notice to his community 
partners that he intended to fulfil this 
promise. The history of the six years 
up to de GauHe's resignation which included 
a rejection of the second British 
application, had shown that despitevigorous protests by her partners, 
France continued to divert the community 
from the essential course which 
it set itself When establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 
1951. 

Undoubtedly, the six community countries 
are much more closely integrated 
than ten years ago, and certain'ly in a 
manner inconceivable 20 years ago. 
There are close and continuing •links 

between governments, politicians and 
civil servants. Par.Jiamentarians from 
different member countries have 
acquired the habit of working together 
frequently on a cross-nationa.J partybasis and industrialists and trade unions 
are increasingly thinking and actingwithin a wider European framework. 
Above all the age-old suspicions between 
the peoples t'hemseJ.ves are being 
gradua1ly replaced, especially amongthe younger generations, by a new 
sense of European identity. 

There is, however, a grave danger implicit 
in the present stalemate. As further 
progress towards economic union 
and the enlargement of the community 
was blocked, the spirit of common purpose 
which characte~ised the earlier 
years of European construction was 
giving way to increasing divergence and 
national rivalries between the partners. 
Nationalist sentiment is once again on 
the ·increase and there is grave danger 
that unless progress in a supra-national 
direction can be achieved the community 
will become, despite the Rome 
Treaty, a bureaucratic structure with 
all the characteristics of a traditional 
inter-governmenta'l organisation, whose 
function will rema:in confined to sustaining 
a tariff-free customs union, so 
a:bly exploited by American industry in 
Europe. 

the French and German 
positions 

Whilst it is fashionable to lay the whole 
blame for the lengthy impasse upon the 
French government, its intransigence in 
certa'in fields has frequently been 
matched by corresponding refusals by 
the other partners <to co-operate in areas 
in which France would like to see progress. 
Thus an impression has been 
built up that divergent nationa'l interests 
will prevent the community from 
progressing beyond a ta~iff free corn



moo market ·leaving indiv:idual nations 
free to pursue their own national policies 
in areas outside the existing framework 
of the treaty, and that France is 
not alone in supporting this as the final 
objective in Europe. Indeed it is sometimes 
said that the other countries apartfrom France are glad that the trend towards 
supra-nationality has been 
arrested and welcome the French for 
doing their dirty work for them. Unfortunately, 
Harold Wilson and to a 
lesser extent Edward Heath in rtheir 
speeches at the Guildhall in July 1969 
lent credence to the view that Britain 
might a-lso adopt a simlilar position. 

A closer analysis of the motives and 
interests of tthe six partners does not, 
however, bear out this view. General 
de Gaulle's basic philosophy depended 
upon seeing national sovereignty as the 
ultimate source of power and influence. 
His attitude was to accept the community 
for the benefits which it could 
bring France, although l'afjaireSoames would seem to indicate that 
he believed that EEC has now fulfilled, 
for French purposes, its primary 
function. His underlying objective, his 
ultimate and consistent aim, was, however, 
the re-establishment of France as 
a world power, and he viewed anydiminution of French sovereignty as a 
retrograde step in reaching this objective. 
It was for these reasons that he 
categorically rejected any proposalsfor strengthening the powers of the 
commission or the European parliament, 
and in the development of common 
policies within the communityhe almost invariably subordinated 
European interests to those of purely 
national advantage. For him the European 
community was a useful powerbase as long as France could dominate 
its policies, but whenever French hegemony 
had been threatened he did not 
flinch from breaking both the spirit

and the letter of the Rome Treaty. 

The fear that de Gaulle might have 
withdrawn completely from the Common 
Market inhibited his partners from 
standing up to him in a solid front. This 
fear as past events ind.jcated was not 
without foundation, paPticularly as the 
French president pursued his aims with 
a devastating logic which would not be 
expected from a regime operatingunder the pressures and normal checks 
and balances of a democratic state. 

Nevertheless France cannot ignore the 
immense gains which she has obtained 
from the operation of the Common 
Market. The powerful French farming 
lobby would not let any French government 
deny them the benefits of the 
common agricultural policy and the 
vast sums accruing to them from the 
common fund . French industry, although 
initially fearful of the effects of 
competition unprotected by tariff walls, 
has made remarkable strides, and 
would suffer grievous losses if excluded 
from the benefits of the enlarged home 
market. Indeed, as the quest·ion of the 
re-financing of the community comes 
up for decision this year the risks for 
the French economy, already weakened 
by the May crisis of 1968, of being deprived 
of the benefits bestowed by the 
community will prevent the presentFrench government from following in 
the general's footsteps. 

Both the composition of the new government 
and its first public declarations 
indicate that France i now ready 
to break with the past and, as explicitly 
stated by President Pompidou, continue 
with European construction in harmonywith and at the ame pace as her partners. 
As regards British membership,
the president is al o on record a declaring 
that France ha no objection" in principle " which, whil t being a 
Cartesian declaration, would eem to 
indicate a major modification to the 

tand of his predecessor. 


The German dilemma is of a different 
dimension. Since the war, the foreign 
pol'icy of the German Federal Republic 
has been dictated by three main objectives. 
Firstly, the rehabilitation of the 
defea'ted, truncated and occupied state, 
and its acceptance by its neighbours as 
an equal, self-reliant and responsiblemember of the family of nations. 
Secondly, to secure the defence of its 
territory and integrity, not on the basis 
of an independent military capability, 
but as a partner in a defensive all'iance. 
Thirdly, to achieve reunification with 
its Soviet occupied eastern lands. 

The re-bu1ilding of the devaS'tated Germany 
and its emergence economically 
as Europe's most prosperous and most 
powerful state has all along carried 
with it the dangers of jealousy and fear 
on the part of her neighbours. If this 
had 'been coupled with an independent 
mii.itary capability Germany m'ight well 
have faced hostile steps by her former 
enemies to redress the balance of power 
in Europe. Reunification of the two 
GePmanies into one independent state 
is even more unthinkable as fears of 
German hegemony in Europe would 
almost certainly result in common 
action by her eastern and western 
neighbours to prevent this happening, 
if necessary by force. 

That is why German statesmen recognised 
at an eady date that the achievement 
of all three elements of this policy 
would be poss'~ble only in uhe context 
of a fusion of the independent na,tion 
states of Europe into a federation , 
firstly of western Europe alone, but 
ultimately with at least a part of eastern 
Europe including the German Democratic 
Repubi.ic. Thus wh!iJe Germanyremains the strongest protaganist of 
European un1ity her insecure position 
has meant that her contribution towards 
the building of Europe has been 
played in muted tones. 

The German economic miracle has 
been achieved without arousing the 
hostil'ity of her neighibours largely because 
of the major financial price she 
has paid towards the construotion of 
the European Economic Community. 
Her economic contribution has ~been 
the main factor in the Common Market's 
success, and her industrial poten-
Uial is seen not as a possible instrument 
of German domination of the community, 
but as an integral part of a 
total developmen't benefiting all its 
members. German security remains entirely 
dependent on the NATO alliance. 
In the face of continuing Soviet hostility, 
the protection of America's nuclear 
strategic umbrdHa, reinforced by 
the physical presence of her allies' 
troops on German soil is the sine qua 
non of German defence policy. Thus, 
however desirable in German eyes may 
be further progress towards a European 
federation and ultimate reunification 
with eastern Germany, these objectives 
will only be pursued as long as existinggains are not placed in jeopardy. 

For Italy and the three Benelux countries 
the achievement of a Europeanfederation, organised on a democratic 
basis, offers t'he only way to avoid dependence 
on one or other of the continent's 
larger powers : France today, 
almost certa!inly Germany tomorrow. 
Their desire for the en:Jargement of the 
community and particularly British 
accession is due to their resentment 
against the present domination of the 
community by France with German 
acquiescence. The present composi1ion 
of the EEC is unstable because eaoh 
smaller country is faced with a choice 
of supporting one or other of the " big 
two." Britain's presence ins~de the 
Community would put an end to the 
possibility of its domination by anysingle coun1ry, and it would assist the 
evolution of a more democratic base for 

decision-making. 


3. way out of the impasse 
The future development of the present 
EEC into an effective European union 
with supra-national institutions subject 
to genuine democratic control is a firm 
objective for at least five members of 
the Common Market, and quite clearly 
in l'ine with the!ir national} self-interest. 
The past frustraNon of their aims wi'th· 
in Vhe framework of the Rome Treatyhas made them impatient for a way out 
of the impasse, if necessary by a new 
initiative which would not be subject 
to the veto by any one member. 

After the second French veto in 
December 1967 little time was ·lost by 
France's partners to try to break the 
stalemate. The British intention ·to keep 
her applicatlion on the table was 
Strongly supported and it became the 
first item on the agenda for discussion 
at each meeting of the Council of Ministers. 
In January 1968 the smaller members 
of the community launched the 
Benelux Plan, the object of whkh was 
to maintain formal contacts between 
t'he community members and candidate 
countries, and to develop co-operation 
with them in fields not covered by the 
Trea'ty of Rome, to set up consultative 
machinery to reduce divergencies between 
differing economic systems, and 
to work towards common policies in 
foreign affairs and defence. This was 
followed by a joint declara'tion issued 
in Paris by the Frendh and German 
governments to whiich the two governments 
gave varying interpretations, envisaging 
commercial arrangements between 
the six and the candidate countries, 
and by an Italian compromiseproposal embodied in the Fanfani 
memorandum. 

In the end none of these modest proposals 
was supported by France who 
refused to invest them with the sU'bstantive 
means which would permit them to 
be used as steps to ultimate membership 
of the community. Finally, the 

German government proposed a progressive 
reduction of tariffs between the 
community and the cand,idates as a first 
step towards the enlargement of the 
EEC. France expressed a wil'Iingness to 
consider these tariff reductions but refused 
categorically to link them to ultimate 
membership. The proposal was 
in clear contravention of GATT rules, 
and in February 1969 the commission 
ruled against it on these grounds. 

Parallel with these efforts, Britain 
sought through the Western European 
Union, of which she and the six are 
members, to obtain co-operation in 
areas outside uhe competence of the 
EEC. Proposals for co-operation in 
foreign policy, defence, technology and 
monetary matters tabled by M. Harmel, 
the Belgian Foreign Minister, in Rome 
in November 1968 were promptlyvetoed by the French representat.ive. 
The It~lian proposal for compulsoryconsultations on issues of foreign policy 
submitted in Luxembourg in February1969 suffered a similar fate. Nevertheless 
in the spirit of the proposalMichael Stewart promptly convened a 
meeting within the framework of the 
WEU for consultations on the question 
of the Middle East. The French boycott 
of this and subsequent meetings underlined 
the General's determination to 
frus1:Talte all effective measures for con· 
suJ.tations inside the Wes1:ern EuropeanUnion. 

What has become increasingly evident 
is that effective progress is unlikely to 
be made as long as the right of national 
veto is retained within the existing inst~
tutions of the European community. 

The international crisis of 1968, particularly 
the occupation of Czechoslovakia 
and the chaos in the world 
monetary system, has underlined the 
need for urgen't action for European 
unity in the fields of foreign affairs, 


defence and monetary matters. The 
slow advance by essentially functional 
means towards an enlarged customs 
union and common market as envisaged 
by Jean Monnet and his friend s 
lwo decades ago no longer meets the 
requirements of this more highly volatile 
age. Of course a political un'ion is 
unthinkable without an economic 
union . But it may weH be that the path 
towards full union through economic 
integration chosen by the architects of 
the Rome Treaty is no longer the mos-t 
practicable route. It is for this reason 
that unofficial consultations have been 
undertaken at government levels about 
a more effective way out of the present 
impasse ; proposals which parallelthose for co-operation launched within 
the forums of the EEC and WEU. 

T:he proposals for what are loosely described 
as " the fourth community approach" 
gradually emerged as a result 
of non-governmenttal discussions in 
1968. They had their first public unveiling 
at the Hague Congress in 
November of that year, and were explicitly 
spelt out in March 1969 when 
George Brown called for a second 
Messina conference in order to start 
negotiations to establish a Europeanpolitical community. The essence of 
the proposal is to establish alongside 
the existing economic community a 
political commun·ity of which Britain 
and other EEC applicants would be full 
members. The new community would 
not compete with or replace the EEC, 
nor indeed would it exclude any of its 
members. Membership would be open 
to all democratic European countries 
prepared to accept its rules and obligations, 
but unlike the EEC and WEU no 
individual member state would have 
the right of veto. The proposal•s were 
welcomed privately by the Italian and 
Benelux Governments and the British 
Government has done nothing to discourage 
these essentially private efforts. 

It is too early to judge whether the new 
French government is yet ready to 
make such a fundamental break with 
the past as to join a new community in 
which the power of veto has no place. 

It is diffioult to know how the countries 
of the six and the other applicant states 
are now likely to respond to this proposed 
initiative. Clearly the French 
situation will modify the timing if not 
the substance of these proposals. As 
long as the'l'e was a total block to the 
geographical expansion of the commun'ity 
there was at least a possibility 
that the five with Britain might have 
tried to break the deadlock by using 
either WEU or a new Messina conference 
as the means for a new pol'itical 
initiative. It now seems more likely that 
for the moment the main effort will be 
directed towards activating the British 
application and that discussions about 
llhe wider poliVical and defence considerations 
will on1ly arise if these 
negotiations reach deadlock. 

There are of course friends within the 

EEC count'l'ies who believe that our ap


plication on the present basis is doomed 

to failure. Dr. Luns, the Netherlands 
Foreign Minister, said virtually as much 
when he wa~ recently in London. There 
are many in this country who see this 
point even if they do not accept it. 
Certainly there will be wide agreement 
wiuh Sir Geoffrey de Freitas who st&ted 
recently " we spend too much time 
thinking how we are going to get into 
Europe, and too little time about the 
kind of Europe we intend to build." 
The best avenue of approach would 
seem to be through the development 
of the exlisting institutional framework. 
No nation, including France, would be 
able to exclude herself from such a 
development. No nation, includingBritain, could now conceive of even a 
transient European institution without 
France. 


4. the political community 
The most desirable solution to the pre'
Sent dilemma would lie in building the 
new politicrul community on the basis 
and as an extension of the existing economic 
community. For th'is reason Vlre 
new body shou1d be patterned on the 
well-tried methods of the EEC, althoughby learning from past mistakes and the 
weaknesses of the EEC some of its pit-
fa.Us could be avoided. It would have a 
commission and council of ministers as 
well as a parliament and a court of justice. 
These last two bodies could be an 
extension of those presently a part of 
the EEC. 

The new community would be provided 
with a commission or ex·ecutive secretariat 
having the right of initiative and 
whose job wou1d be to idenVify the 
common interests of all its members. 
Within the EEC this has been the function 
of the commission which for all its 
weaknesses has performed the task remarkably 
well. It has been the main 
source from which proposals for the 
implementation of the treaty have 
originated, and by representing the all-
European vliew, the commission has 
acted as a spur on national governments 
to agree on common policies. I1: 
is thus the catalyst for forging a con-
census between member states. It has 
ensured a progressive transfer of 
authority from national governments to 
institutions working on behalf of the 
community as a who1e. Its weakness 
stems from its excessive dependence 
upon nation'al governments, in particular 
the pressures imposed by its 
more powerful states. This has led to 
a whole ser.ies of decisions being based 
upon the lowest common denominator 
and placed in jeopardy many of its 
earlier and progressive stages of development. 
Its authority rests almost 
entirely upon powers written into the 
treaty, and has l1ittle else to sustain it. 
The commission has no instrument to 
reinforce its position in the face of 

member governments which fail to 
abid·e by the rules, nor does it have any 
effective ability to enforce sanctions 
against non-complying member states. 
Furthermore, lack of guaranteed 
sources of incom'e, and dependenceupon annual budgets being approved 
by national governments, inhibits its 
freedom of action, and makes long-term 
planning much more difficult. 

The defects which arise from the existing 
narrow base of the community derive 
primarily, not from deficiencies 
within the community itself, but from 
within the political systems of the 
nation states. The institutions have 
often been criticised for lacking an 
adequate democratic base and therefore 
of being too remote from the public. 
Certainly a part of the fault lies in the 
present weakness of the European parlirument 
whose powers exclude legislative 
functions and are merely that of a 
consultative body whose only sanction 
against the commission lies in the highly 
improbable right of being able to dismiss 
the whole body. The parHament 
has therefore little prestige and influence 
and by consisting exclusively of 
nominees of national padiaments lacks 
any direct links with the electorate. 

More fundamental, however, is the fact 
that despite two decades of propaganda 
and education, there is sti.Jl only a 
limited understanding of the European 
idea by the peoples of the six. Many, 
particu1arly of the younger generation, 
feel themselves to be Europeans in a 
geneml sense, and at a certain level 
there is articulate support for the proposition 
of a supra-national Europe. 
In general, however, the mass organisations 
including the political parties have 
fai:led to generate a popular un.derstanding 
of the European issues. One 
reason for th1is is that members of the 
European parliament are only part-
time Europeans, engrossed for most of 


each year in questions of national legislation. 
But a stronger factor is that save 
in the very successful programme of 
social re-adaptation carried out by the 
European Coal and Steel Community 
during its earlier years, few of the community's 
activities have reached down 
to the grass-roots level and when they 
have it has usually reached the people 
via national legislation or regulations. 

The Common Market has not been a 
significant issue in the domestic politics 
of the six save during the 1965 French 
presidential elections when Lecanuet, 
the Catholic centrist candidate and to 
a lesser extent Mitterand, raised the 
supra-nationalist issue, and again in 
1969 when both Pompidou and Poher 
found it a positive political advantage 
to take up the European issue. Undoubtedly, 
one reason for this was that 
until 1958 there was a consensus view 
between aU parties, save the Communists, 
about the overall objectives. Even 
after 1958 there were many on the politica!
l right in France who beiieved that 
de Gaul'le and his followers would ultimately 
become convinced Europeans. 

It is certainly due to this wide consensus 
that national political parties 
and their parliamentarians failed to 
stimulate at a national level anyvigorous debate about communitypolicies except perhaps over the questions 
of agriculture and British entry. 
They have certainly been unable to 
create an appreciation of the need for 
integrated European attitudes exceptthrough the many types of pressure 
groups with European centres in 
Brussels. In fact, the weakness of the 
European parliament has given these 
pressure groups an enhanced standing 
and importance since they represent 
the one direct channel of communication 
between the people and the 
community. Indeed, the influence of 
certain of these groups has been more 

significant than that of the European 
parliament itself. For whilst the 
members of the European parliament 
sit as party rather than national groups 
and estcrblish common viewpoints on 
many questions-and in this the 
socialists have been rather more successful 
than the other groups-the fact 
that the parliament possesses no 
decision making powers which can be 
followed through at either a community 
or national level means that 
individual parliamentarians and the 
party groups have little effective 
authority. Consequently, the voice of 
the community has rema·ined at a 
functional bureaucratic level with the 
commission, and at the political level 
with the council of ministers. 

If, therefore, the proposed politicalcommunity is to develop an effective 
political voice and to establish a line 
of communication with the European 
peoples, the national political parties 
will have to adopt a more positiveattitude towards the techniques of 
supra-nationalism. Indeed, unless these 
steps are taken Gaullism or another 
form of European nationalism 
could well emerge as the dominant 
political force. What is urgentlyrequired is a political structure which 
will synthesise within a series of checks 
and balances both national and community 
interests. Difficult as this may 
be to achieve this ·is certainly an 
objective which should commend itself 
to British socialists concerned with 
building an effective economic and 
political Europe on a supra-nationalbasis. 

Within this context the key to development 
lies undoubtedly with the 
European parliament, which if it 
forms part of a political community 
will become still more of a talkingshop unless given both new powers and 
democratic accountability through 


direct elections. Within the framework 
of such a community the role of the 
parliament should be conceived as that 
of an ally of the executive secretariat or 
commission in the overall community 
interest when counterposed against the 
narrower attitudes of the national 
governments. It will act at the same 
time as a democratic check on the 
bureaucratic characteristics of the 
commission. 

Finally, the important lesson to be 
learnt from the evolution of the EEC is 
the need to lay down a precise timetable 
for the achievement of the objectives 
agreed in principle by the member 
states. In the EEC this was provided for 
in the achievement of the full customs 
union, and the strict timetable enabled 
pressure to be maintained on governments 
to reach agreement at the 
different stages of progress. No time 
limit was, however, laid down within 
the treaty for the introduction of direct 
elections to the European parliament 
or the substitution of direct financial 
resources 1n place of the annual grants 
provided from national treasuries. 

A political community has as its objective 
a united Europe which will speak 
with a single voice for its members in 
those fields of foreign affairs, defence 
and other matters specifically delegated 
to the community. At present the 
nation state is still the main source of 
political power and authority. The aim 
must therefore be to devise institutions 
enabling this power and authority to 
be exercised in common on behalf of 
a united Europe as a whole. Whilst 
this cannot be achieved in one swift 
step and the progressive transfer of 
power will have to be laid down in 
stages, a clear timetable should be 
written into the new treaty. At the same 
time the institutions which will take 
over these powers must be set up at the 
outset, and at an early stage tAey need 

to be endowed with sufficient authority 
to deal with member governments on a 
basis of equality. The timetable should 
also specify the stages at which the 
European parliament would become 
directly elected and responsible for 
fiscal and budgetary control over the 
new community. 

Clearly, the efficacy of the link between 
national parliaments and the European 
parliament depends in part on the 
vitality and multi-national partygroups in each country. Already the 
pressures on individual MPs of dual 
membership of both national parliaments 
and the European parliament 
are too great and the tendency is to 
select the less effective members to 
attend the European parliament. 

It could wdl be, therefore, on purelypractical grounds, that a partial breakthrough 
could be made in the field of 
direct elections by allowing for two 
types of membership in the European 
parliament, half nominated by national 
parliaments, half elected by popular 
vote. Certainly such a transitional stage 
towards a directly elected parliamentwould create a new psychologicalclimate for the European idea. It would 
stimulate multi-national participation,
activate the politically conscious section 
of each nation in a Europeandirection, and provide an effective 
balance between established national 
traditions and the longer-term institutional 
changes which are necessary if a 
political community is to develop. 

Of course to balance these positiveEuropean orientated features, such an 
approach should not undermine the 
standing of national parliaments or 
governments, instead it should consti· 
tute a form enabling a gradualacceptance of the concept of a democratic 
political union. Whilst within 
this framework the first members of 


the commissiOn would be nominated 
by national governments, their confirmation 
in office and the subsequentrenewal of their mandate or the 
replacement of individual commissioners 
should become the responsibility 
of the parliamentary assembly. 

The community should also be given 
certain powers of taxation which in due 
course could totally replace grantsfrom member governments. These 
might take the form of an agreedpercentage of internal fiscal revenues 
of member states. 

Throughout the transitional period the 
council of ministers representingmember governments will continue to 
play a major role. Their function is to 
decide the general lines of common 
policies on the basis of recommendations 
submitted by the commission. 
Once decisions have been taken the 
detailed work of implementing them 
would devolve upon the commission. 
In general, regulations made by the 
commission within the broad framework 
of agreed policies should be 
subject to parliamentary ratification, 
following debate and any amendment 
by the European parliament. The 
crucial problem is, however, the way in 
which common decisions are arrived 
at within the council of ministers. As 
long as these are subject to the rule of 
unanimity, the real power will remain 
in the hands of national governments. 

Thus progress towards a system of 
qualified majority voting must be 
written into the treaty, and a clear 
timetable laid down for this change to 
take effect. The political community 
will fail in achieving its final objectives, 
as the EEC appears to be failing, 
unless the right of veto by any single 
member is removed without qualification, 
and this at an early stage in the 
evolution of the community. 

Considerable thought will have to be 
given to the actual areas of competence 
for the new community. Clearly its 
main aim is to evolve a common 
foreign policy for Europe in its relations 
with the United States, the Soviet 
block, and the developing countries of 
Asia, Africa and South America. 

It should try to establish a common 
defence capability as the instrument 
for this foreign policy within the 
Atlantic alliance and a more credible . 
organisation of its conventional forces 
to meet any conventional threats from 
the East. It could also deal with 
subjects not altogether excluded from 
the scope of the Treaty of Rome, but 
for which the EEC has not acceptedresponsibility. Indeed it is difficult to 
conceive a political community which 
would not be concerned with defence 
policy, arms production, and its concomitant 
advanced technology. 

A European arms procurement board 
could assist with investment into 
research and development, and also 
perform the functions of a Europeanindustrial re-organisation corporation 
to promote cross-frontier mergers and 
the formation of industrial consortia. 
The economies of scale thus achieved 
would reduce Europe's undue dependence 
on American industry. The 
board could exercise a particularlystrong influence on aircraft, electronics, 
and other advanced technologyindustries and thus make a real contribution 
in meeting the "American 
challenge " in these fields. 

Another field of competence is in international 
monetary policy. We need a 
common European policy leadingpossibly to the establishment of a 
European reserve unit to take over 
sterling's reserve role, and bring some 
additional liquidity and stability into 
the world monetary system. 


5. the role for Europe 
A European political communityrepresenting the collective strength of 
its members and having a personalityand a competence of its own, would 
influence developments not only inside 
Europe but also within other continents, 
to an extent that no single nation, 
be it Britain, France, or Germany operating 
individually or jointly in the 
framework of traditional and necessarily 
temporary alliances, is capable 
of doing. It is therefore important to 
define the type of role and areas of 
engagement in which a Europe, united 
for the purposes of a common foreign 
policy, would conduct its relations with 
the rest of the world. 

relations with the USA 

The central element in any European 
foreign policy must be concerned with 
relations with the United States. 
Europe's involvement with the United 
States even at the blackest period of 
the cold war has never been solely a 
matter of crude mutual dependence in 
the name of anti-communism, nor 
conversely has Europeanism any connection 
with a similarly crude anti-
Americanism as frequently expressed 
in Gaullist circles. Indeed, there has 
been a constant paradox in post-war 
American policy in that successive 
administrations have supported the 
development of a uni.ted Europe, even 
though the result might be to provide 
the United States with a potentialeconomic or even political rival. Two 
factors have motivated this attitude ; a 
recognition that an unequal balance of 
power within an Atlantic alliance 
between one super power and a dozen 
or more smaller and weaker partners 
inevitably leads to envy, resentment 
and fear of domination by the most 
powerful ally. The United States has 
been prepared to take risks in order to 
strengthen western democracy and 

simultaneously to provide herself with a 
reliable partner and ally capable and 
willing to share her burdens and play 
a more influential role in both defence 
and development problems. Whilst . 
clearly self-interest has dictated these 
over-riding attitudes there have been 
many occasions when the United States 
has been prepared to bend her policies 
to meet European viewpoints even 
when the European nations have been 
in weak economic or political negotiating 
positions. 

For this reason Europeans should be 
even more aware of the advantages of 
a united Europe speaking with the 
Americans on a greater basis of parity. 
The successful conclusion of the 
Kennedy round is a sensible objectlesson. Both sides gained from the 
existence of a single negotiatorspeaking for the EEC in trade matters. 

If the common market had not existed 
it is doubtful if such an ambitious 
negotiation would have been authorised 
by the United States Congress in 
the first place, and if both sides had 
not been able to negotiate from 
strength the exercise might have failed 
totally or resulted in more limited 
tariff cuts. 

In defence policy western Europe will 
of course remain dependent upon the 
USA as long as a nuclear guarantee 
is required. In conventional terms 
Europe should become more self-
reliant, particularly as pressures within 
the United States are likely to growunder the Nixon administration for 
Europe to shoulder more of its defence 
burden and permit further withdrawals 
of American troops from our 
continent. In such an event Europewould at present be left extremelyexposed, and only an integrated European 
defence capability is likely to be 
able to remedy such a situation. 


In the long term a phased withdrawal 
of us forces in circumstances in which 
Europe was equipped to man its own 
conventional defences could be a positive 
factor in developing policies of 
detente. It could assist in achieving an 
area of conventional disengagementbetween the super powers in Europe 
and thus contribute to improved relations 
between the eastern and western 
parts of our continent. It would 
furthermore simplify the problems of 
developing joint arms procurement by 
releasing Germany from the obligation 
to buy massive quantities of American 
military equipment to meet offset costs, 
and thus stimulate the development of 
a European advanced technology. 

In the nuclear field Europe will be 
unable to free itself of dependence on 
the American deterrent until generalnuclear disarmament under effective 
international control takes place. It is 
sometimes argued that in the absence 
of such disarmament Europe should 
seek to develop its own strategic nuclear 
potential to achieve full independence 
from American tutelage. Indeed this is 
a line of argument attractive to the 
Gau11ists and many British Conservatives. 
It is a line which with equalforce must be rejected by the left. 
Quite apart from the astronomic and 
wasteful cost of developing a credible 
means of delivery, a closer examination 
of the likely development of 
Atlantic relations shows such a course 
to be totally unnecessary. 

In an increasingly inter-dependentworld a united Europe and the United 
States are likely to become more interlinked. 
Whilst there are bound to be 
divergencies of views, a Europecapable of standing on its own feet in 
terms of conventional defence is likelyto have greater influence on the total 
pattern of American defence policyand its overall strategies. The existence 

of a united Europe would act as an 
incentive for the United States to maintain 
its nuclear guarantee because it 
would be providing cover to a 
prosperous and powerful region whose 
support could be quite crucial in the 
world balance of power. The United 
States would certainly be less likely to 
use the threat of the withdrawal of 
nuclear cover as an ultimate diplomatic 
step against a strong and united 
Europe, than to use it to exploit the 
inevitable rivalries implicit in the loose 
association of independent states which 
co-exist in western Europe today. 
Whilst a united Europe with an integrated 
advanced technology industry 
will possess the potential to develop a 
nuclear defence capability, it is conceivable 
that the possible threat to do 
so might well persuade both the Soviet 
Union and the United States to concede 
some measure of nuclear arms control 
and disarmament. 

relations with the East 

The dominant issue in relations 
between western and eastern Europelies in the division of Germany, which 
is unlikely to be ended without an 
entirely new approach. Successive 
independent initiatives to grapple with 
this issue from the Eden plan to the 
recent policies of the French President 
in eastern Europe have failed to lessen 
tension between the contending parties. 
The Federal Republic is now having to 
pay the price of these Gaullist illusions. 

The prospect has always had to be 
faced that effective western European 
integration is liable to incite the Soviet 
Union to tighten its grip on her 
satellites. On the other hand, a policyof detente pursued from a position of 
weakness, made no impact on Soviet 
attitudes as illustrated by the occupation 
of Czechoslovakia, and conse



quently encouraged the Rus8ians to 
increase their threats against West 
Germany. Given these circumstances a 
strong united Europe pursuing an 
active policy would be more likely to 
contain Soviet aggression and exploit 
the internal differences within the 
Soviet power structure, while at the 
present moment it is the Soviet Union 
that is in a stronger position to exploit 
European divergencies, as shown by the 
tactical " sympathy " expressed in the 
past for aspects of Gaullist foreignpolicy. Taking the longer view the increasing 
complexity and wealth of 
Soviet industrial society will force continuing 
decentralisation and stimulate 
the inevitable process of liberalisaii.on, 
for the monolithic concepts of Soviet 
society are in a state of crisis. The 
position could arise where Russia 
might welcome a non-nuclear united 
western Europe, with greater independence 
from the United States, as a safer 
guarantee of order and stability on her 
borders, than the present fragile equilibrium, 
precariously held by a number 
of independent nation states groupedtogether in a NATO dominated by the 
us. A Federal Republic whose sovereignty 
was subsumed within an 
effective European political community, 
which controlled the integrated 
defence forces of its member states, 
might remove Soviet fears of German 

revanchism. 

In pursuit of a policy of detente a 
united Europe would be able to offer a 
concerted policy towards the East for 
trade, credit and technological cooperation 
in place of the competing 
efforts of individual countries. Growing 
economic links in the development of 
joint technological projects would be 
the most effective way of forging closer 
relations and improving the politicalclimate. For in the long run the aim 
must be to make both halves of Europe 
increasingly inter-dependent leading 

ultimately to the unification of the 
whole of our continent. 

The significant fact about the 
capitalist and communist systems is 
that their respective economic organisations 
are undergoing changes which are 
bringing them closer together. The 
rigid central planning of economic 
activities in communist countries is 
giving way to greater freedom of individual 
enterprises to compete with each 
other, and their achievements are 
increasingly measured by profitability 
based on the criteria of a market 
economy. In the West economic 
planning has not only come to stay, but 
its sophisticated developments are 
rapidly encroaching upon the free play 
of market forces. Given a measure of 
political liberalisation in the East and 
the increasing similarity between the 
respective economic systems the divisions 
are bound to lessen and bring the 
possibility of some kind of union of 
both halves of Europe within at least 
the bounds of theoretical possibility. 

the developing world 

Europe's greatest contribution is likely,
however, to be made in its relations 
with the developing world. With the 
widening prosperity gap and the 
desperate need for really massive 
capital investment, the developingnations have been very much a prey to 
competition between the two super 
powers, which through development 
aid and the supply of arms are 
extending their influence and domination 
over increasing areas of the world. 
Despite the hostility of the recipientnations, us domination of South 
America remains unchallenged, while 
Soviet penetration in the Middle East 
is growing year by year. American aid 
sustains many reactionary regimes in 
South East Asia, whilst large parts of 


Africa are once again the stampi~g 
ground for a new style of econom1c 
colonisation. That is why the developing 
world has come to share the 
American view that Europe is onlyeffective and of interest if united. 
Indeed, it is for this reason that Nigeria 
and the states of East Africa have 
sought association with EEC. To the 
countries of Asia, Africa and South 
America, Europe means the common 
market which is the world's largesttrading unit with higher imports than 
the USA and far more dependent on 
international trade for its living. 

For Europe rising living standards in 
developing regions mean largermarkets and openings for their industries. 
For the developing countries a 
united and prosperous Europe raises 
the prospects of increased aid and 
investment, and above all the reduction 
of their dependence upon one or the 
other super power. By developing a 
political system which is neither wholly 
capitalist, nor wholly communist, 
Europe would not impel the polarisation 
of allegiance amongst the recipient 
countries, which have tried unsuccessfully 
to remain uncommitted to either 
super power by seeking aid from both. 
The entry of Europe as a third massive 
source of development aid would 
ensure greater independence and 
stability in the developing world. 

The example of Europe unitingeconomically by choice already provides 
a pattern for others to follow. 
Common markets in the Carribean and 
Africa are already drawing on European 
experience. Political integrationby agreement in Europe would have a 
profound impact elsewhere, for it is not 
only in Europe that the problems of 
balkanisation and nationalism depress 
living standards, impede social and 
cultural development, and threaten the 
security of individual states. The 

lessons learnt in the long process of 
European integration and proof that it 
can succeed, would encourage parallel 
developments elsewhere and in the long 
run provide a blueprint for the 
establishment of an effective world 
authority. 

Our vision of a united Europe, and of 

the contribution which Britain can 
make to it, can not be restricted to its 
present institutional structure. Britain, 
in taking the European option has 
accepted institutional commitments 
which will ultimately embrace the 
spheres of politics, economics, defence 
as well as social action. The Rome 
Treaty and the present form of the 
community can only be regarded as a 
base point for what will evolve into an 
effective government of Europe. For 
socialists the process of communityintegration should be viewed at one 
level as the first stage in the process of 
a fully unified geographical Europe. at 
another level the community technique 
of integration should be conceived as 
a pilot project for the type of continental 
evolution which may ultimately 
create a universal pattern for the 
establishment of world government. 


6. the socialist contribution 
It is sometimes forgotten that the 
concept of a United States of Europe, 
built upon a socialist basis, has deep 
historic roots in the international 
labour movement. Trotsky and Rosa 
Luxembourg in their period argued for 
it, and these concepts were advocated 
by many socialist idealists in the 
'thirties and 'forties and through the 
chain of events which ultimately led to 
the European Coal and Steel Community 
and later the EuropeanEconomic Community. To them the 
European idea expressed in contemporary 
terms the values and historic 
ideas of socialist internationalism. That 
this view was more articulate in 
continental countries than in Britain 
was understandable. By 1945 none of 
the continental countries had the 
economic means, even where the 
political will existed, to play an effecttive 
world role. The problems of 
national and European reconstruction, 
and the need to find a permanent form 
of reconciliation between France and 
Germany and to institutionalise this 
relationship, was given precedence 
over all other external questions.
Indeed, the psychology of defeat or of 
moral exhaustion hung heavily over 
each continental nation both allied and 

aXJS. 

In the immediate aftermath of the war 
the lines of political division between 
the democratic parties were blurred. 
The political right in the pre-war sense 
had ceased to exist. Parties which subsequently 
moved to the right paid lip 
service to socialist ideas and indeed, 
until 1946, it seemed possible that the 
communist parties would be prepared 
to play a constitutional role in national 
policies of reconstruction. By 1947,
however, the post-war Stalinist period 
had been entered. The socialist parties, 
save in Italy where a divided partyappeared, were in the position whereby 
if responsible government was to be 

maintained an alliance was necessarywith the generally democratic but 
religious and bourgeois parties. 

In Germany, it could be described as a 
constitutional alliance, particularlyafter the death of Kurt Schumacher, 
which ultimately found expression in 
the grand coalition. In the other 
countries the form was generallyexpressed through varied types of 
coalitions. In no country in the West 
were socialist parties in a position to 
establish majority governments, as 
Attlee did in Britain, and even if they 
had been similarly placed it is doubtful 
jf in the circumstances of that period 
they would have formed single party 
administrations. Indeed, the relative 
positions, and policies of the British and 
continental parties, in the immediate 
post-war period, which by and large 
have been maintained over the pasttwo decades, would seem to illustrate 
fundamental differences between the 
two systems. 

In fact, on examination, the differences 
are more apparent than real. Ideologically, 
continental social-democratic 
parties and the Labour Party have 
moved in parallel. Continental parties, 
historically revisionist marxist in 
character, have largely accepted the 
general reformist policies, programmes 
and priorities advocated by the Labour 
Party. The best example of this is the 
Bad Godesberg programme of the 
German SPD. Internally the pro-
grammes have emphasised economic 
planning, social welfare and publicinvestment with control and ownership 
of particular industries. Externallythere has been support for the twin 
pillar concept of the Atlantic Alliance 
and a general commitment to the 
United Nations. The success which 
social democratic parties have had in 
implementing their policies has varied 
according to the balance of political 


forces at any given time. The religious 
parties in each country contain trade 
union and left wing elements which, as 
allies of the social democrats, have 
enabled reformist legislation of both a 
structural and general character to be 
introduced. Indeed, in many areas the 
countries within the six have developed 
more advanced social policies than the 
British. This is true in relation to 
investment in housing, family allowances, 
holidays with pay, pensions, and 
equal pay for equal work. Britain's 
health service alone stands as a distinctive 
and advanced landmark in the 
social area. In questions of real wage 
levels, and the growth of real wages, 
Britain is now near the bottom of the 
European league tables ; and with our 
present growth rate, only half of that 
of the EEC countries, we will continue 
to decline. 

Equally in matters of economic 
planning, public investment and social 
ownership the patterns of post-warcontinental development have paralleled 
our own. For example, successive 
Dutch and French governments have 
pursued policies of public intervention 
in the private sector. Similarly the 
Industrial Reconstruction Institute in 
Italy has acted as an industrial pacemaker 
and bears in some respects an 
interesting relevance to our own 
Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, 
whilst in the publicly owned sector the 
number of industries under state 
ownership compare favourably with 
our own. Undoubtedly for the political 
purist the concept of a unified Europe 
still conjures up a spectre of a 
"Europe of the cartels." It is a convenient 
slogan which contains, as do 
most slogans, an element of truth. But 
to accept it is to ignore the positive 
characteristics of the community and 
the support given to it by the social 
democratic forces in continental 
Europe. 

Continental social-democratic parties 
may not satisfy socialist fundamentalists, 
but neither does the British 
Labour Party, and as reformist parties 
they never will. They are, however, the 
best instruments for social advance 
which exist and to an increasing extent 
they are shaped in the image of our 
time. If, therefore, there is to be hope 
of building a democratic socialist community 
beyond national frontiers in the 
forseeable future, it will be with those 
-with all their ideological imperfections-
who share with us a common 
political standpoint and pattern of 
historical development. Indeed, it is 
not an overstatement to suggest that if 
social-democracy is to survive as a 
political idea, if it is not to be crushed 
between the forces of contemporarycapitalism and what passes for communism, 
then it can only survive 
within the context of a politicalEurope. 

Any dispassionate analysis of the facts 
will show that the overall policies of 
the Labour Government are consistent 
with those of the governments of the 
European community, and that an 
effective basis exists for the harmonisation 
of these policies, and in keysectors for the integration of interests. 
It is, therefore, right that the Government 
should maintain its application on 
the table at Brussels. But this is not 
enough. The distinctive contribution 
which the Government and in particular 
socialists can make to the European 
idea is by insisting on the need for a 
European political community with 
democratically exercised politicalcontrol. 

Membership would lead us to accept a 
new and exclusive institutional relationship 
with the continent which will 
require the development of new 
patterns of relationship between 
national political parties -possibly 


leading in the future to European scale 
parties-as well as between nations. It 
will mean rejecting for all time the 
post-imperialist global view derived 
from our own national inheritance. It 
will certainly mean that on key foreign 
policy issues we will no longer be able 
to take unilateral actions. However, it 
is only necessary to review the major 
events of the past decade in Cuba, 
Berlin and Vietnam to observe the 
strategic limitations of British power. 

Membership would formalise within 
an institutional framework what is 
already a political fact, namely that 
Britain no longer exercises world 
power. This is something different 
from saying that she does not and 
cannot influence world events to a 
degree greater than that of any other 
nation of fifty million people. In the 
future, however, her power to influence 
events will be determined by the contribution 
she can make and the strength 
she will gather from membership of a 
European scale group with a common 
foreign policy. It would be through this 
grouping that she would influence 
many of the great issues which today 
are decided in Moscow and Washington 
and possibly tomorrow in Peking. In 
fact, far from Britain opting out of her 
world role, a precondition for her 
being able to influence the strategy of 
world events in the future depends 
upon membership of a Europeanpolitical community. 

Having taken the European option, 
Britain, upon the basis of her own 
essential political interests, must now 
try to take the lead by proposing the 
creation of a European political community. 
There are many complex 
pro~~ems inherent in proposals for a 
pohttcal and defence union, but clearly 
at this stage of the political argument 
it is only possible to set out the objectives 
and the essential elements of the 

general strategy. What is to be 
deplored is the destructive tone and 
level of arguments of many of the 
European detractors. No sensible 
European would deny the difficulties, 
the problems, even the dangers, of 
constructing Europe, but there are 
many, not solely among the ranks of 
the inveterate anti-Europeans, who 
seem to be so overwhelmed by the 
difficulties and the problems, that they 
are unable to see the positive political 
and economic advantages. 

Nevertheless, it is now quite clear that 
there is little danger that Britain will 
reject Europe or that she will be 
seduced tby a series of illusory and 
diversionary policies based upon short-
term politically opportunist expedients 
such as NAFTA. The danger is that 
because of existing difficulties, Britain 
will adopt a policy of inward retreat, 
based upon her rejection by Europe 
and her impotence in the rest of the 
world. The warning signs alreadyexist. This would not only be a tragedy 
for Britain, it would be a tragedy for 
all those who believe in the uniquecontribution of the European peoples 
to world civilisation and development. 
That is why this proposal for a 
European political community is 
urgent . . . to break the impasse in 
European construction. 


fabian society 


The Fabian Society exists to further 
socialist education and research. It is 
affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally 
and loca!lly, and embraces al'l 
shades of Socia.'list opinion witlhin its 
ranks-left, right and centre. 

Since 1884 the Fabian Society has enrolled 
thoughtful socialists who are prepared 
to discuss the essential questions 
of democratic sociaHsm and relate them 
to practical plans for building socialism 
in a changing world. 

Beyond this the Society has no collective 
policy. It puts forward no reso'lutions of 
a pol1itical character, but it is not an 
organisation of armchair socia.Jists. Its 
members are active in their Labour 
Parties, Trade Unions and Co-operatives. 
They are representative of the 
labour movement, practical people concerned 
to study and discuss pr<jb]emsthat matter. 

The Society is organised nationally and 
loca~ly. The national Society, directed 
by an elected Executive Committee, 
publishes pamph1ets, and holds schools 
and conferences of many kinds. Local 
Societies-there are some 80 of them-
are self governing and are lively centres 
of discussion and also undertake research. 


Enquiries about membership should be 
sent to the General Secretary, Fabian 
Society, 11 Dartmouth St'l'eet, London, 
SW1 ; telephone 01-930 3077. 

Cover design and typography byGeoffrey Cannon. Printed by Civic 
Press Limited (ru), Civic Street, 
Glasgow, C4. 

SBN 7163 0398 1 

the authors 

NORMAN J. HART is by profession 
a public relations consultant. He has 
been active since the early 'forties, first 
in the ILP and later in the Labour 
Party. A former parliamentary candidate, 
he has, since the end of the war 
been one of the most consistent 
advocates of a federal Europe. He has 
been a leading figure in a wide range 
of British and continental organisations 
for promoting European unity and is 
currently the Deputy Chairman of the 
Labour Committee for Europe and 
President of the Federation des J eunes 
Chefs d'Entreprises d'Europe. 

ERNEST WISTRICH is a director of 
the British Council of the European 
Movement and of the Campaign for 
Europe. He is an alderman of the 
London Borough of Camden and was 
parliamentary Labour candidate for 
the Isle of Thanet in 1964 and for 
Hendon North in 1966. 

Previous Fabian Pamphlets in 
this field 
fabian tracts 

336 Not wiVh Europe, WiHiam Pickles; 
341 The Common Market Debate, 
Douglas Jay & Roy Jenkins; 360 
Creating the Atlantic Community, 
George Catlin; 381 Europe: the price 
is too high, John Bowers & Harold 
Lind ; 389 Europe: What Next? Eric 
Deakins & Edmund Marshall. 

research series 

201 The Common MaTket and its 
Forerunners, Shirley Williams; 202 
Britain and the Free Trade Area, 
Shirley Williams; 225 The Farmer and 
Europe, Lord Walston; 230 CommonweaiJth 
and Common Market, Tom 
Soper; 263 Europe: problems of negotiation, 
Geoffrey Robinson. 

Most of these pamphlets are still in 
stock and can be obtained from 11 
Dartmouth Street, London, SW1. 


recent fabian pamphlets 


research series 

252 Peter Mittler The mental health services 3s 
257 K. Jones, J. Gdlding 
263 Geoffrey Robinson 
26S Arthur Blenkinsop 
268 M. Rendd.l and others 
270 J. Edmonds, G. Radice 
272 Ben Whitaker 
274 Peter Archer 
27S John Price 
276 Society of Labour 
Lawyers277 D. Rubinstein, 
C.Speakman278 J. Agate, M. Meacher 
Productivity bargaining 
Europe : prdblems of negotiationEnjoying the countryside 
Equality for women 
Low payParticipation and poverty 
Human rights 
ILO : 50 years on 
Legal Education 
Leisure, transport and the countryside 
1lhe care of the oM 
4s 6d 
4s 6d 
2s 6d 
Ss 
2s 6d 
2s 6d 
3s 
Ss 
Ss 
4s 
Ss 
tracts 
321 Audrey Harvey 
323 Richard M. Titmuss 
353 Brian Abel-Smith 
Casua~ties of the welfare state 
The irresponsible society 
Freedom in The Welfare State 
3s 6d 
2s 6d 
1s 6d 
361 L. J. Sharpe 
364 D. Downes, F. Flower 
374 Brigid Brophy 
381 J. Bowers, H. Lind 
387 David Collard 
388 Oliver Stutcllbury 
389 E. Dea1cins, E. MarShall 
390 Antlrony Lester 
392 Andrew Hargrave 
393 Adrian Sinfield 
394 F. Barna:by and others 
395 Tony Lynes 
396 Tony Lynes 
Why ~ocal democracyEducating for uncertainty 
Religious education in state schools 
Europe: the price is too h'ighThe new .right: a critique 
The case for capital taxes 
Europe: what next? 
Democracy and individual rights 
ScotJland : the third choice 
Whidh way for social work? 
The nuclear future 
Welfare rights 
La'bour's :pension plan 
3s 6d 
2s 6d 
2s 6d 
3s 6d 
2s6d 
4s 
3s 
3s 
3s 
Ss 
9s 
2s 
4s 
young fabian pamphl15 David Keene and others 
16 Bruce Lloyd 
17 D. Atk:inson and others 
18 Vincent Calble 
19 Anthony Osley 
ets 
The adult criminal 
Energy policy 
Students today 
Whither Kenyan emigrants? 
1Free communism: a Czech experiment 
3s 6d 
4s 
Ss 
4s 
Ss 

books 


Bernard Shaw and others 
Margaret Cole 
Brian .Atbel-Smith and others 

B. Lapping and G. Radice 
Peter Townsend and others 
Fabian essays (siX!th ed·ition)
The story of Fabian sociaHsm 
Socialism and affluence 
More power to the people 
Social services for aH? 

cased 30s 
paper 15s 
paper 10s 
paper 21s 
paper 12s 6d