Fabian International Bureau 


DISARMAMENTTHE 
WAY AHEAD 


HUGH THOMAS 
Foreword by Kenneth Younger, MP 


FABIAN TRACT 307 

TWO SHILLINGS 



'ˇ 

HUGH THOMAS recently resigned from the Foreign Office 
where he had been working since 1954; he was a member 
of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations 
Disarmament Sub-Committee in 1955 and 1956. 

FABIAN TRACT 307 

THE FABIAN SOCIETY 
11, Dartmouth Street, S.W.l 


Note.-This pamphlet, like all publications of 
the FAB{AN SOCIETY, represents not the collective 
view of the Society but only the view of the 
individual who prepared it. 'The responsibility of 
the Society is limited to approving the publications 
which it issues as worthy of consideration within 
the Labour Movement. 

March, 1957 


FOREWORD 


by The Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger, MP 


A
A
NOTHE'-R round of disarmament talks is beginning. Despite ten 
years of disappointments, world opinion continues to hope for some 
new initiative which will break the deadlock which prevents international 
agreement. 
There is ground for this renewal of hope in the fact that the strategic 
and political situation is always changing, and the problem facing each 
new meeting of the Sub-Committee is never quite the same as it was on 
the previous occasion. The speed of technical development in the field 
of armaments is, alone, sufficient to ensure this. 
This constant process of change, however, gives the negotiations a 
batHing quality which confuses all but the most industrious student of 
proceedings. At one time our side is insisting on treating atomic and 
conventional weapons together, at another on keeping them apart. At 
one time the West blames the Soviet Union for linking disarmament 
with the settlement of outstanding political issues; on the next occasion 
the roles are reversed. These apparent perversities reflect real changes 
in the calculations made by the different powers regarding the current 
state of the arms race, but to the public at large they present a perplexing 
picture. 
The writer of the present pamphlet has had unusual opportunities of 
assessing the real intentions of the Powers and the possibilities of agreement. 
His analysis helps the reader to understand what the rival proposals 
are and what have been the main stumbling blocks. 
He also suggests a policy for the West. Some of his ideas are, of 
course, controversial, but they present a challenge to those who reject 
them to put forward something better. A moment when official thinking 
seems to be at something of a dead end is appropriate for the publication 
of this stimulant to fresh thought within the Labour Movement on 
one of the most important issues of our time. 


DISARMAMENTTHE 
WAY AHEAD 


HUGH THOMAS 


Introduction 


THE Sub-Committee of the .Unite? Nations Disarmament Commission 

-Canada, France, the Untted Ktngdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
are its five members -meets again in London on 18th March, 1957. 
The General Assembly recently gave the Sub-Committee the widest 
possible terms: to take into account all the proposals made during its 
eighty-six meetings since May, 1954. 

Will the Powers, as usual, agree to differ? Or will something really 
happen? 
Part One of this pamphlet examines what can be done. Part Two 
suggests what should be done. 

Part One 


THE PROSPECTS 


I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS (all nuclear weapons -thermonuclear, 
atomic and 'tactical' atomic -are considered together). 
Elimination 

1. It is now certain that no control system can be devised to 
guarantee, within an acceptable margin of error, the destruction of all 
existing stocks of nuclear weapons. The acceptable margin would be 
practically non-existent, since a very few nuclear weapons would be 
enough to give world domination to any state which alone possessed 
them. 
2. It has been argued that nuclear weapons kept in store for a 
number of years would have to be re-processed before use; and that, 
therefore, if production of nuclear weapons were effectively halted, and, 
say, ten years were to elapse, old stocks would be useless. But this 
decline in potency is, however, confined to those (as yet) few H-bombs 
made with lithium. Other H-bombs, and all atom bombs, keep perfectly 
in store for an unlimited period. 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

3. Even in 1946, at the time of the 'Baruch Plan',1 control of the 
elimination of nuclear weapons could only have been based on a check 
of the total quantity of nuclear material produced against the declared 
quantity, and checking the answer against declared stocks of weapons. 
It is doubtful whether this could have given a one hundred per cent. 
guarantee-and the Soviet Union (who did not possess atomic weapons 
till 1949) could have accepted nothing less. ˇ 
4. The truth about the possibility of a guaranteed total elimination 
of nuclear stockpiles was kept a diplomatic and scientific secret until 
1955. Possibly the Great Powers' spokesmen who, for so long, during 
the Cold War, advocated the 'total elimination of all nuclear weapons 
. . . under effective international control', did not know the snags. 
Perhaps they felt that their respective publics would find the truth too 
much to bear. At all events, the Soviet Government was the first to be 
candid on this matter, in its proposal of lOth May, 1955. The publicreaction was tepid; could it be that they had suspected all along? 
5. The Western Powers have since been careful not to provide for 
the elimination of nuclear weapons in any pf their proposals (though 
they do speak of prohibition of production). Western spokesmen, nevertheless, 
have talked of their hopes for a 'nuclear break-through', in terms 
which, though not optimistic, might arouse expectations. The Anglo-
French Plan of 19th March, 1956, for instance, provides for 'an international 
scientific conference to examine the possibilities of eliminating 
nuclear weapons'. This provision can only serve to blunt the full realisation 
that there is, in fact, no hope whatever of progress in this department 
of the disarmament problem. The sooner this is finally admitted the 
better. 
6. Immediately after their proposal of lOth May, 1955, and throughout 
the short summer of co-existence that followed it, the Soviet Union 
also avoided mention of 'elimination' of nuclear weapons, though they 
continued to speak of their 'prohibition'-a word vague enough to apply 
to any, or all, of the possible ways whereby, theoretically, nuclear 
weapons may be dealt with. Latterly, the Soviet Government has returned 
to its old appeal for a 'destruction of stockpiles'. This is essentially a 
cold-war appeal and a lift in the international atmosphere will probably 
be followed by less obviously impractical demands. 
Also known as the United Nations Majority Plan, since it was later supportedby a majority of the General Assembly. This was the U.S. Plan for the international 
control of atomic energy, launched by Bernard Baruch in the U.N. Atomic EnergyCommission on 13th June, 1946. Although greeted by the world as an 'extraordinarily 
generous offer' -the words are Lord Cherwell's in the House of 
Lords, 18th February, 1948 -the Baruch Plan was politically inept: (i) it postponed 
the measures for the destruction of stockpiles until the very end of a 
complicated control system, thus making it easy for the Soviet Union to arguethat the U .S. were interested in control, not disarmament; (ii) offending states 
were to suffer 'immediate, swift and sure punishment'; in this instance, the 
veto in the Security Council would not apply. The Soviet Union could thus 
accuse the U.S.A. of seeking to get round the Charter-which was indeed their 
aim. 


DISARMAMENT-TilE WAY AHEAD 

Production 


7. 
The future manufacture of nuclear weapons could be banned by 
(i) 
a total ban on all future production of nuclear weapons, i.e. 
whether made from existing stocks of nuclear material or from 
future manufacture of such material, or 
(ii) 
a ban on future production of nuclear weapons made from 
future manufacture of nuclear material. 
8. Since extensive stocks of nuclear material already exist which 
could be converted into weapon-grade material without difficulty, it is 
almost as difficult to control (i) as the full-scale elimination of stockpiles. 
9. But an inspection system of all nuclear material in use, able to see 
all the working documents and statistics in nuclear installations actually in 
production and with the right to inspect at will any installation where 
secret weapon-making was suspected, could give a guarantee in respect 
of (ii) where the margin of error would be acceptable provided stockpiles 
were not to be eliminated. 
10. The only countries at the present time which might be able to 
evade a total ban under 7 (i) are the United Kingdom, the United States 
and the Soviet Union -and possibly Canada and France. The two last 
named countries have announced that they do not intend to make nuclear 
weapons. Even if they keep to this, by the early 1960's a number of 
other countries will be eligible for membership of the world's nuclear 
power club. The most likely early candidates are the Euratom countries 
(including Germany), Sweden, Australia, Argentina and China. Other 
countries will be in the running by 1970. What price the 'deterrent' 
darling of the West in the '50's, when new countries follow Britain's 
example and build an H-bomb mainly for prestige reasons? 
11. The Statute of the U.N. Atomic Energy Agency provides, in its 
Article XII, that no nuclear material that it supplies to member states 
shall be used for weapon-making. Negotiations on the implementation 
of this Article are understood to be going on between the twelve leading 
nuclear states who drafted the statute. Various techniques may be 
developed which treat either nuclear material or reactors supplied by the 
Agency so that weapons cannot be made. This would presumably mean 
that only low-yield nuclear material would be supplied to receiving states 
and 'fast breeding' (the uncontrolled fission or fusion processes which are 
the basis of nuclear weapons) would be impossible. Such safety devices 
would inevitably hamper states' development of nuclear energy and may 
eventually be resisted as attempts by the possessor Powers to establish 
nuclear trade empires. 
12. Even if effective, these Atomic Energy Agency schemes do 
not embrace the whole problem. Native nuclear projects, which 
would eventually be able to rival the present possessor Powers regardless 
of the U.N. Agency, will shortly take their place on the 
world stage. Nuclear material may be supplied, as it already has 
been supplied, by one country to another outside the Atomic Energy 
Agency. Britain, for example, has agreed to send an annual supply of 
medium-grade nuclear material to Australia. Other bilateral arrangements 
no doubt exist between the Soviet Union and China or the 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

Satellites. It cannot be absolutely excluded that a possessor state may 
hand over finished bombs, by gift or sale, to their allies. This is politicallyunlikely -if the relations between two such close allies as the United 
Kingdom and the United States are any guide. Arrangements certainly 
exist whereby allies will come to each others' aid with nuclear weapons. 
This is the basis of N.A.T.O. strategy, and, no doubt, similar arrangements 
have been concluded between the Soviet Union and China. But 
it is doubtful whether a possessor state would ever hand over complete 
control of a high-yield nuclear weapon to any ally or dependency.
Although, therefore, acquisition by 'fourth' countries of nuclear weapons 
in this way cannot be absolutely excluded, it is fairly safe to leave the 
contingency on one side at any event for the purposes of this pamphlet. 
Such acquisition would, of course, be impossible to control, although 
one might expect the gift of an H-bomb by Russia to, say, Egypt to be 
attended by publicity rather than stealth. 

13. The problem is, therefore, to prevent, both within and without 
the Atomic Energy Agency, new countries, other than the present three 
possessor states, from acquiring in any way nuclear material outside 
international control, whether organised by the Agency or by some 
body set up to supervise the carrying-out of the Disarmament Treaty. 
However, it is inconceivable that states would accept the full rigours 
of a control organisation supervising their nuclear development unless 
the three possessor states were similarly treated; particularly since the 
control organisation could not, of course, guarantee complete security 
against nuclear war. Further, the control of the future production of 
nuclear weapons would nominally have to be comprehensive, i.e. including 
the proposal in 7 (i) as well as 7 (ii); the Great Powers would have to 
give a comprehensive undertaking, in company with the lesser Powers, 
not to produce henceforth any nuclear weapons. Although the Great 
Powers' undertaking could not be absolutely guaranteed (see paragraph 8 
above), it is arguable that they have nothing to gain from breaking their 
word, since what Sir Winston Churchill called 'saturation point' has 
already been reached. Certainly, a few more weapons on either side could 
hardly make much difference to the balance of world power. 
14. A settlement on these lines, with control as suggested in paragraph 
9 combined with those plans already under way in connection with 
the U.N. Atomic Energy Agency, would go far to mitigate the worst 
dangers of the most formidable political and strategic problem of. the 
century -the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries. 
Use 

15. A ban on the use of nuclear weapons without any qualification 
would be a moral ban, similar to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting 
the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (the United Kingdom 
accepted this protocol with the common-sense reservation that she would 
have to be free to use such weapons in retaliation). Such a ban could 
not, obviously, be controlled. 
16. All the Great Powers have made proposals for the prohibition of 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

the use of nuclear weapons, though they have differed on the timing of 
the coming into effect of the prohibition. 

17. Proposals have also been made for a ban on the use of nuclear 
weapons with qualifications: 
(i) 
a ban on use except in retaliation from the same kind of 
weapon.
(ii) 
a ban on use except in defence against aggression. 
(iii) 
a ban on use unless some permission is given by e.g. the 
Security Council. 
18. Of these, (i) is the same as an outright ban with an obvious 
reservation which would inevitably be made by any signatory state, 
even if only tacitly. A state might reasonably argue that, legal or not, 
the use of nuclear weapons against her would mean the lapse of the 
disarmament treaty, which would no doubt anyway include some general 
provision, perhaps in its preamble, that signatory states renounced the 
use of force. 
19. (ii) first appeared in the Anglo-French plan on timing of 11th 
June, 1954. It has reappeared in later Western proposals, in particular 
in the latest Anglo-French plan of 19th March, 1956. It means precisely 
nothing. All states will remain free to decide what they consider to 
constitute aggression; e.g. Britain named the Egyptian nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal aggression and Egypt so named the Anglo-French intervention 
of October-November 1956. A U.N. Special Committee has been 
desultorily considering the question of defining aggression ever since 
1951 -without result. It would be preferable if -merely in the interests 
of clear-thinking -future Anglo-French proposals were to drop this 
meaningless provision. 
20. (iii) has been put forward by the Soviet Union at different times 
since May, 1955. Its shortcomings are obvious too; if any state -i.e. 
for the present, either the United Kingdom, the United States or the 
Soviet Union -felt that its security was threatened to such an extent 
that it felt itself bound to take the suicidal, final step of nuclear attack, 
there can be little practical doubt that the country it was proposing to 
attack would be either another nuclear weapon power or a state supported 
by a nuclear weapon power. The veto would inevitably be used. In fact, 
of course, the intention of any state to use nuclear weapons would be 
itself a matter to be raised at the Security Council under Chapter VII 
of the Charter; it would be very hard to argue that Article 51 of the 
Charter (guaranteeing states' rights to self-defence until Security Council 
action) actually justified a nuclear reply to a conventional attack, however 
threatening. At all events in effect this qualification does no more 
than dress up the substantive ban. 
21. The representatives of the Western Powers -Mr. Dulles in 
particular, at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers in November, 
1955 -have lavished scorn on what they term 'paper' prohibitions, 
though they have usually themselves included such prohibitions at some 
stage of their proposed disarmament programmes. However, a ban on 
the use of nuclear weapons is not absolutely without value, since the 
implementation of a disarmament programme, i.e. the start of cuts in 

DISARMAMENT-THE WAY AHEAD 

conventional weapons and the establishment of control, would create the 
kind of world where moral prohibitions would have more force than 
they do at present. The acceptance of such a ban by the possessor states 
might also, illogical though it may seem, help to persuade the non-
possessor states to accept the kind of rigid control of their nuclear 
development programmes suggested in paragraph 13 above as essential. 

Tests 

22. It is possible to devise a system of control to act as an effective 
sounding board for all tests of high-yield nuclear weapons. Tests of 
low-yield, tactical weapons could probably take place without detection. 
It would also be possible to establish fairly precisely where such high-
yield tests took place. 
23. Tests might be totally prohibited or limited to a certain number 
each year. Such a regulation of tests would be valuable from the disarmament 
and medical point of view; the development of new types of 
nuclear weapons would certainly be held up, if not altogether halted, 
and, despite the generally optimistic reports of the British Medical 
Association and the U.S. Council for Medical Research, the continuing 
uncertainty as to what is the safe limit for radiation makes it highly 
desirable that tests should be at least limited without delay. 
24. All possessor states have behaved in this matter with a single-
minded selfishness that, once more, gives an extremely bad ex_ampleto all other states. The first appeal for a ban on H-bomb tests came 
from Mr. Nehru in April, 1954, after the series of U.S. Marshall Island 
tests. The United States treated the appeal unceremoniously and the 
Indian appeal was not even discussed in the Disarmament Commission 
where it was lodged. For some time the Soviet Union lay low. Theythen carried out their own series of H-bomb tests in the Spring of 1956. 
The Soviet Union then included a ban on tests as one of the measures 
to be put into effect during the course of its disarmament programme 
proposed on lOth May, 1955. After a further series of tests, theylaunched a proposal for their immediate suspension. The United Kingdom 
and France provided for a limitation and then a prohibition of 
tests in their plan of 19th March, 1956. There was no likelihood whatever 
that this plan would be put into effect before the United Kingdom 
had its tests during 1957. Meanwhile, the United States Government, 
whose stockpile of different types of nuclear weapons is already indecently 
large, never speak of suspension of tests, but, in their working 
paper of 3rd April, 1956, mention limitation and monitoring. 
Means of Delivery 

25. It has been argued -particularly by United States spokesmen-
that, if it is impossible to control nuclear weapons through nuclear 
material, an approach might be made by controlling their means of 
delivery. But this would surely entail control of every aircraft which is 
capable of carrying nuclear weapons; i.e. the internationalisation of the 
air. The development of long-range guided missiles with nuclear war

DISARMAMENT-~HE WAY AHEAD 

heads makes such an approach even more unpromising. Individual 
nations may develop a defence system of sorts by means of ground-to-air 
and air-to-air missiles; but this could not be a means of international 
control. 

II. BACI'ERIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
26. Most proposals, by both the Western Powers and the Communists, 
during the years 1946-55 referred to the need to prohibit 'nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction'. This was taken to include bacteriological 
and chemical weapons. Recent proposals have not mentioned this 
category of weapon. It is possible that no real thought has been given 
to the question on either side of the Iron Curtain. It would however be 
desirable to continue to classify these with nuclear weapons since in 
general they are as susceptible of control as are nuclear weapons. The 
same observations apply, i.e. that the control of the future production 
of such weapons would not present overwhelming difficulties, but that 
past production could easily be concealed. 
m. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
Manpower 

27. Given full inspection facilities it should be easy to check whether 
stipulated reductions of manpower have or have not been carried out. 
The only remotely relevant precedent -the allied control of German 
disarmament after World War I-worked perfectly although the Allied 
Powers chose to disregard the adverse findings of their control representatives. 
28. Ever since 1952, the Western Powers have been proposing definite 
levels to which the Powers should reduce their overall manpower. The 
proposal was first that the United States, the Soviet Union and China 
should reduce to between one to one and a half million men; and that 
the United Kingdom and France should reduce to between 700 and 800 
thousand men. Other states were to reduce to levels normally less than 
one per cent. of their populations. Later, this proposal was revised to 
give a level of between 650 thousand for the United Kingdom and France; 
and other states were to reduce to levels 'considerably lower' than these. 
29. The Soviet Union, throughout the Cold War proper -1948-1955 
-insisted on the immediate reduction of the armed forces of the Great 
Powers by one-third. Since no one knew the existing level of Soviet 
armed forces, this meant that the Soviet Union were proposing, as the 
French representative, Monsieur Moch, put it, a reduction 'from one 
unknown level to another'. On lOth May, 1955, however, the Soviet 
Union accepted the figures which had been proposed by the Western 
Powers. Soviet proposals have repeated these figures ever since. The 
Soviet Government have also proposed levels for all other states of not 
more than 150 to 200 thousand. 
30. After the Soviet Union had accepted the Western figures the 
Western Powers argued that those figures had been proposed dependent 

DISARMAMENT-THE WAY AHEAD 

on the solution of 'outstanding political problems' (see below). The 
Anglo-French plan of March, 1956, does not name any figures for the 
three stages of reductions it stipulates. The United States, however, proposed 
for the first stage of disarmament -having refused to commit 
themselves to any further stages -reductions by the United States, China 
and the Soviet Union to 2.5 million men and by the United Kingdom 
and France to 750 thousand men. The United Kingdom gave general 
support to these figures and said that they 'were willing to negotiate on 
final figures'. Western cautiousness at the meetings of the Disarmament 
Sub-Committee in the Spring of 1956 was perplexing, particularly since 
it was they who insisted, at that time, on the need for a 'comprehensive'plan and since, despite their talk of the inter-relation of the two matters, 
they were not willing to specify precisely the outstanding political problems 
which would require solution before the old figures could be finally ... 
agreed. However, in November last, the Soviet Government took a ' 
further step towards agreement by accepting the United States' figures 
for the end of the first stage. Provided the United States does not refuse 
to negotiate on disarmament beyond the first stage and provided a 
reasonable settlement is reached as to how the collateral political problems 
should be solved, agreement ought to be reached at the forthcoming 
meetings of the Sub-Committee on levels, at all events those to which the 
Great Powers should reduce. It is in fact rather hard to see why agreement 
was not reached in 1956.1 

As for levels for other states, the United States' figure of 500 thousand 
is absurdly high. The Soviet figure is certainly nearer the mark though 
no doubt it will be resisted by the West because of the figures 
which it is still argued German forces must attain. A one per cent. of 
the population level, or one of 300 thousand -whichever is the lower would 
probably be as fair and safe a proposal as can be put forward 
for other states; but the West and the Soviet Union agree that the figure 
for other states must be decided in conjunction with the states in question. 

Armaments 

(Conventional weapons have been defined as all those which -exceptfor the Nagasaki and Hiroshima A-Bombs-were used in World War II.) 

31. Ways of controlling the reductions of conventional armaments, 
including those in production, store and use, could be devised. 
32. The most favoured way of approaching this problem has been 
to stipulate that reductions in armaments should be proportional to 
reductions in manpower. Lists of categories of weapons would presumably 
be prepared and levels fixed for each. Difficulty would be experienced 
in, say, judging what reductions in tanks should be made by a 
state reducing from 400 to 300 thousand men since the existing equipment 
and the requirements of different states varies enormously. But the difficulties 
are not insuperable, though it is as well to remember that it was 
Approximate present levels for the Five are: U.S.S.R., 4 million men; U.S.A., 

2.9 million men; China, 2.5 million men (with perhaps up to 10 million militia); 
United Kingdom, 800,000 men; France, 850,000 men. 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

this problem alone which took up the whole time of the 60-nation League 
of Nations Disarmament Conference of 1932-1933. 

33. Guided missiles should be included in the conventional disarmament 
programme. However, nuclear warheads would have to be 
treated with all other nuclear weapons. The same rule of separation 
of parts would apply to atomic artillery. 
Budgets 

34. Like armaments, reductions of overall military expenditure have 
been linked in the proposals of both West and East with the reductions 
in manpower -'an agreed reflection' is the latest U.S. jargon. Though 
not a rational link, it is the most obvious way of approaching the 
matter, and, provided it applies to all countries, is a reasonable one. 
The Soviet Government, incidentally, have not only called for a proportionate 
reduction of military expenditure in the classic style, but also 
for an immediate, and apparently, uncontrolled fifteen per cent. cut in 
present military expenditures. 
35. Control would be comparatively easy. A duplicate false set of 
figures -such as would be required for effective cheating -would be 
very hard to produce, especially since the control authority would be 
able -under both Western and Soviet plans -to check on-the-spot 
any apparent discrepancy. 
36. Budgetary control has been suggested as a possible means of 
controlling conventional armaments; and certainly, while it would not 
be effective without on-the-spot inspection, it would be a very useful 
check on other inspection methods. 
37. Monsieur Edgar Faure, then Prime Minister of France, proposed, 
at the 'Summit' meeting at Geneva in 1955, that increasing proportions of 
military expenditure should be channelled to give aid to under-developed 
territories. This was to take place prior to the Disarmament Plan proper. 
Later, to please its allies, the French Government agreed to link this 
plan to the Disarmament Plan proper. The Faure plan now survives 
only as an occasional reference in a preamble of Western sponsored 
General Assembly resolutions; it means as little as the United Kingdom 
pledge to devote a certain amount of the funds made available after 
Disarmament to the still unborn Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development (SUNFED). 
IV. CONTROL 
38. The Soviet advances of the last two years have now broughtagreement on control within grasp. The respective position of the three 
groups in the Sub-Committee -the Soviet Union, the United States (who 
have pursued a separate policy since mid-1955) and the United Kingdom 
and France -appears, on the eve of the fourth series of meetings of 
the Disarmament Sub-Committee, to be as set out on pages 12 to 15. 
(Canada -the fifth member of the Sub-Committee -usually steers a 

,......

CONTROL PROPOSALS N 

Soviet 


ORGANISATION 
OF C ONTROL 

MEMBERSHIP 

ACCESS 

The Soviet Union apparently envisages 
the control authority as 
something near to a U.N. Specialised 
Agency, with no 'Assembly' 
of its own and no executive committee 
of separate states. The 
authority itself would be able to 
handle all minor matters; majordisputes would go to the SecurityCouncil. 

' International '. 

The Control Organ is to have unlimited 
access to all 'objects of 
control', i.e. military units, stores 
of equipment and ammunition,
bases, armaments factories. The 
Soviet proposals of 27th March,
1956, only provided for conventional 
cuts. The Soviet Note of 
17th November, 1956, propos_ea 
again, in a general way, the 
prohibition of nuclear weaponsand included a general provision 
for control 'vested with all the 
powers and functions necessary'. 

U.K.-France 


An international Disarmament 
Organisation, is envisaged, with an 
executive committee of 5 permanent 
members + 10 non-permanent 
members, and a General 
Assembly of all participating states. 

An international secretariat, with 
an international Director and local 
posts, But 'at least at first' inspection 
teams would be chiefly on 
loan from national armed or civil 
services. 

It is proposed that the control 
authority's inspection staff should 
have access-as in the Soviet Plan 
-to all declared objects of control, 
i.e. at the first stage all armed 
forces, conventional armaments, 
chemical and bacteriological weapons 
(thus implicity regarding this 
group of weapons as conventional) 
all military establishments, all 
merchant vessels above an agreedsize and civil aircraft, and all military 
budgetary documents required 
to verify the above : at the second 

U.S.A. 
A Preparatory Armaments Commission 
under, and hence, apparently 
composed of, the members 
of the Sub-Committee. 

0 

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Alarmingly, the latest U.S. paper ~ 
on the topic suggested that the 

U.S. were still thinking in terms I 
of a bilateral exchange with the 1-J 
Soviet Union; control was to be ~ 
b~ member states acting as exec-~ 
utlve agents. > 
The control system will include 
~ 
'control posts' (see below), aerial ~ survey, mobile inspection units 

~ 

and a communication system, but 
there is no specification in the 
latest U.S. plan for rights of access. 
It is possible the U.S. sticks to its 
old proposals-which the Western 
Powers proposed throughout the 
Cold War proper -for unrestricted 
access. Once, however, it 
is admitted that the Control Organshould have the right to investigate 
all possible breaches of the 


U.S.A. 
Treaty-as the Soviet and Anglo-

Soviet 


ACCESS 

(continued) 

ESTABLISHMENT 

POWERS 

This phase must be expanded to 
detail objects of control in the 
nuclear field. The control authority 
is also to have free access to 
military budgetary documents. 

The Soviet Government made the 
really important concession in 
March 1956 that the control organshould be established 'within two 
months following the entry into 
force of the agreement. It shall 
establish its local branches . . . 
and position its inspectors in good 
time to ensure that they are able 
to begin carrying out their functions 
at the moment when states 
begin the execution of the measures 
provided for in the agreement'. 
The latest Soviet control 
plan does, therefore, admit that 
control should be in position before 
disarmament actually begins. 

U.K.-France 


stage in addition, all militaryequipment, factories and naval 
shipyards, merchant vessels and 
civil aircraft of specified size under 
construction and nuclear weapontest explosions; at the third stage 
-in addition-all nuclear installations. 


The Anglo-French Plan of 19th 
March, 1956, did not stipulatewhen the control organ is to be 
set up, but it is to be assumed 
that it would be immediately after 
the entry into force of the agreement; 
certainly this was the attitude 
of all previous Anglo-Frenchproposals. 

French proposals both 
admit, then unrestricted 
becomes an inevitable right. 

The U.S. wish their control organ 

>

to be set up 'without delay'. 

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tacitly 
access 


0 

..... 

U) 

~ 

s:: 


All now apparently agree that it would be impossible for the Control authority itself to be vested with anyactual powers vis a-vis signatory states. It has been interesting to observe the movement, in Western papers, 
away from 'punishment' (1946) to 'enforcement' (1954) to 'supervision' (1955) and finally to 'inspection' (1956)
which has been advocated throughout by the Soviet Union as the only power which can realistically be 

~

wielded by the control authority. 

w 


BREACHES OF 
THE TREATY 

DISCLOSURE OF 
INFORMATION 

AERIAL SURVEY 

Soviet 


' The international control organshall make recommedations to the 
Security Council on measures of 
prevention and suppression with 
regard to violators.' 

Figures to be submitted to the 
control organ within one month 
of its establishment. 

The proposal of 27th March, 1956, 
provided that 'at a specified stage 
in the execution of the generaldisarmament programme when 
confidence among States had been 
strengthened, the countries concerned 
shall consider the possibility 
of using aerial photography 
as one of the methods of control'. 
The Note of 17th November, that 
the Soviet Government were willing, 
in the interests of reaching 
agreement, to consider using aerial 
photography to a depth of 800 
km. on either side of the line at 
present dividing Europe. (Seebelow-political settlements). 

U.K.-France 


The Anglo-French plan, at much 
greater length, reaches in effect 
the same decision : breaches or 
delays in the carrying out of the 
Treaty must ultimately be referred 
to the Security Council. 

Initial declaration of levels and 
budgetary information immediatelyfollowing the start of control. 

The Anglo-French Plan introduces 
control by aerial survey at the 
start of the programme, and continues 
to advocate its use throughout. 


~

U.S.A. 
~ 

The latest U.S. pHm only refers to 
this question in passing. 

Full disclosure of military information 
'concurrently' with control. tl 

1-< 

C/l

>

:::0 

~ 
The most recent U.S. Disarmament ~ 
Plan is little more than an exten-tTl 
sion of the Eisenhower ' Open ~ 
Skies ' Plan for control by aerial I 

survey with a few nugatory disarmament 
measures, thrown in for td 
decency's sake. Looking back, it m 

is hard to decide whether the 
Eisenhower Plan was put forward ~ 
with naivety or cynicism. All pre--< 
vious Western plans for control > 

had included the use of aerial sur-~ 
veys. Eisenhower used part of an E;
old plan to hit the world's headlines 
at the 'Summit' meeting, largely, 
one suspects, because neither 
the U.S. nor any other Western 
Power were ready to declare themselves 
on the recent conciliatoryand realistic Soviet proposal of 

lOth May, 1955. What began as a 
stalling move became an entire 
policy. The 'Open Skies' Plan 
comprised all U.S. Disarmament 


U.K.-France

Soviet 

AERIAL SURVEY 

(continued) 

U.S.A. 
Policy 1955-56. After a bit, the 

U.S. included in the 'Open Skies' 
Plan the Soviet idea for control 
posts, which (see below) had been 
worked out for quite a different 
purpose. The declared aim of the 
'Open Skies' Plan was to guaranteeagainst a 'great surprise attack'. 
In fact, it could give no security 9 
since it was not planned to cover ~ 
states allied to the U.S.A. and :;d 
Soviet Union, but only those states ~ 
themselves. It will be understood > 
why Bulganin, with great courtesy, ~ 
explained, in his letter to Eisen-Z 
hower of 18th September, 1955, ~ 
that he thought the plan nonsense, I 
unless it was linked to disarma-...., 
ˇ ment. 
~ 

~ 

~ 

CONTROL POSTS 
This idea was intended to give security against surprise attack with conventional arms at an early stage in the 
disarmament plan when the Soviet Government argued .that it was politically impracticable to allow the ~ 

>

control organ into every armament factory, in order to check precisely the quantities of weapons and stores. 0This was originally a Soviet proposal and included in the plan of lOth May, 1955. There should be control 
posts at certain key-points such as ports, rail-and road-junctions, airports, -so as to give warning about anyexcessive concentration of troops. The U.S.A., U.K. and France have since taken over the idea of control 
posts, though their reasons for so doing are obscure, since the control they advocate for the first stage of 
the disarmament programme is comprehensive and considerable. 

......... 
Vl 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

middle course between the United States on one hand and the United 
Kingdom and France on the other). 

Control -General 

39. The control organ should be a flexible and well-balanced international 
instrument capable of checking that the measures in the agreed 
disarmament plan are carried out with the minimum interference in the 
internal affairs of states. The International Disarmament Organisation 
proposed by the United Kingdom and France is a top-heavy structure 
laying itself wide open to political disputes. The place for such disputes 
is, of course, the Security Council. The control authority should therefore 
be an entirely executive affair, as suggested by the Soviet Union. 
It should be composed of international civil servants and, as the West 
suggest, national officers or officials on loan. The control organ should 
be established at the time of the signature of the Disarmament Treatyand should expand so as to be fully equipped to deal with each disarmament 
measure it comes up against in each separate stage. Certain 
objects and installations should be named for continuous control, but the 
control authority should have wide rights of further access so as to 
investigate suspected violations. States should, as has been generally 
agreed, make full military disclosures at the time of the entry into force 
of the Disarmament Treaty, so that the Control Organ would become, 
in fact, a repository of all the military secrets of the world. A report 
should be presented annually, but otherwise the Control Organ should 
keep its knowledge confidential. The control posts suggested to guarantee 
against surprise attack should be used to provide security against conventional 
attack at the start of the programme. while factories manufacturing 
conventional weapons remain immune. Aerial survey would 
clearly be a cheap and effective method of control and should expand 
generally outwards from a central area in Europe to cover all participating 
states. Breaches, if procedural, should be settled by the control 
authority, but all major breaches would have to be referred to the 
Security Council. There is no reason why an agreement on these line~ 
should not be reached by the Powers in 1957. 
V. ' EXPERIMENTS IN CONTROL ' 
40. The idea of trying out control experiments, before agreement on 
a disarmament plan. was seized upon by the West in mid 1955 more as 
a stalling move than a genuine attempt to solve the disarmament question. 
The West were flummoxed by the Soviet proposal of lOth May of that 
year which both revealed the truth about the possibilities of nuclear 
control (see paragraph 4 above) and made broad steps towards agreementˇ 
in every aspect of the disarmament field. Disarmament seemed a practical 
possibility. The Western Powers were unprepared for this eventuality. 
Hence the 'Open Skies' Plan. Hence other United States' plans for 
'experiments in control' the meagre outcome, incidentally, of the eight 
'task forces' , headed by a formidable array of industrialists, scientists 
and ex-generals which, said Mr. Stassen, United States representative in 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

the Disarmament Sub-Committee, had been set to bend their mammoth 
energies towards the solution of the control problem. Hence also the 
'Eden Plan' for an experimental control area on either side of the line 
dividing East and West in Europe-a plan which was silently dropped 
from the West's armoury when the West German Government complained 
that it would result in the tacit recognition of the East German 
authorities. The implementation of these plans, the West have argued, 
would create the necessary confidence required before the start of 
disarmament proper, that is, the West would have more time to think. 
In effect, the death-blow was given to all plans of this sort by Jules Moch, 
veteran French representative in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, when 
he stipulated that there should be no control not covering disarmament 
measures and likewise no disarmament without control. Both the Anglo-
French plan of 19th March, 1956, and the United States plan of the 
following April tacitly admit this, although the United States accompanied 
this document with two other proposals -one for a technical 
exchange mission, the other for a demonstration test area. The Soviet 
Union have had nothing to do with any of these 'confidence-building' 
schemes. 

VI. TIMING 
41. The Soviet Union has throughout wished to lay down fixed time-
limits for each stage of disarmament; the West have provided -and 
never more clumsily than in the Anglo-French plan of 19th March, 1956 
-for means of stopping the programme if things should go wrong. The 
Soviet Union fears that the West will use the least opportunity to stop 
the programme before disarmament proper, but after the establishment 
of control; the West fear that the Soviet Union will insist on the carrying 
out of the full programme, even although certain states have defaulted. 
42. The dilemma is a false one. It would clearly be desirable to laydown a time-table, of say, three years for the whole programme. If 
there were delays of a minor nature, the control authority would be 
able to settle the matter in an amicable manner, without reference to 
higher authority; if the delay or evasion were serious, and the consequences 
of bad faith, then the matter would inevitably have to be taken 
~unless prior agreement were reached -to the Security Council. The 
squabbles on this question over the years are symptomatic of the unreal 
atmosphere in which disarmament negotiations have hitherto been conducted: 
they are really disputes about the conveniently vague question 
of 'international confidence'-which would have to exist if there were 
to be a disarmament agreement at all, and whose very existence would 
itself liquidate such problems as this. 
Vll. CO-ORDINATION 

43. Both the Soviet Union and the West have long agreed that the 
two aspects of the disarmament problem -nuclear and conventional should 
be combined together in one programme. Immediately after 
World War II, both sides made proposals which corresponded with their 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

strategic needs: the Soviet Union called for the immediate prohibition 
of nuclear weapons, the West called for sweeping conventional reductions 
with nuclear weapons dealt with only at the end. Neither attitude was 
reasonable; how could the West agree to the abolition of nuclear weapons 
-and it was then supposed that they could be completely abolished at 
the start of a disarmament programme, thus leaving the Soviet Union 
with an enormous conventional preponderance? Similarly, how could 
the Soviet Union agree to massive cuts in conventional weapons if the 
West were to keep their nuclear weapons until the end of the process? 
The approach of nuclear parity, by Soviet development of first the atomic 
weapon in 1949 and then the thermonuclear weapon in 1953, and of 
conventional parity, by the development of NATO and Western rearmament, 
prepared, paradoxically, the way for international agreement 
on disarmament. The Soviet Union led the way by proposing that 
nuclear weapons should be dealt with fifty per cent. of the way through 
conventional reductions (30th September, 1954); the West responded 
with a seventy-five per cent. bid (19th April, 1955); the Soviet Union 
concurred (lOth May, 1955). 

44. The West, uncertain of its role in a world of co-existence, and 
befuddled by the admission of the truth about the possibility of eliminating 
nuclear weapons, apparently toyed with the idea of dropping nuclear 
disarmament and concentrating on conventional disarmament for the time 
being-an attitude voiced by Macmillan at the Geneva meeting of Foreign 
Ministers. Nothing daunted, the Soviet Government, when the Sub-
Committee met in the Spring of 1956, proposed a plan for conventional 
disarmament, to find that the United Kingdom had joined with France 
to present a new, modified and creaky comprehensive plan that pleased 
no one. Hence the debates in the Sub-Committee in 1956, when the 
United Kingdom and French delegations attacked the Soviet Union 
for not providing for nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union, in 
its Note of 17th November, has shown that it is willing to do this, and 
there is today a further chance that agreement may be reached on the 
field that the disarmament treaty should cover. 
VIII. DISARMAMENT AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS 
45. The Western Powers have long urged that the implementation 
of a disarmament programme must be dependent on the development 
of international confidence, i.e. a settlement of outstanding political 
problems. The Soviet Government gave up, in 1955, their long-urged 
demands for an immediate unspecified ban on nuclear weapons and 
linked their disarmament plans to (i) a proposal for the withdrawal of 
forces of the Four Powers from Germany, with limited contingents left 
behind pending an agreement for their complete withdrawal; (ii) the 
liquidation of 'foreign bases on the territory of other states'; (iii) the 
settlement of the Far East question according to the principles of 'sovereignty 
and international integrity' -an obvious dig at the Nationalist 
Chinese in Formosa. 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

46. The West have sometimes suggested that they thought disarmament 
impossible unless Germany were re-unified. But they have 
never made crystal clear how precisely they supposed the two problems 
are linked. Adenauer has actually gone as far as to say that disarmament 
would help to bring about German re-unification. It is thus difficult to 
see what exactly the West has hitherto thought should be done to connect 
the two problems. On foreign bases, a United Kingdom memorandum 
(21st May, 1954) has stipulated that 'military facilities of all kinds' 
should be covered by the Disarmament Treaty, but did not go into detail. 
47. The 're-assessment' carried out by the West in the summer of 
1955, following the lOth May proposal, was presumably intended to 
enable the respective Governments to put forward practical plans. One 
might have supposed, therefore, that they would have taken the obvious 
step of specifying the political settlements they required, if any, before 
disarmament. But this did not happen. Although Germany, European 
Security and Disarmament were discussed with the Soviet Union at the 
'Summit' meeting and the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the West, though 
agreeing to link the first two subjects, failed to fit in the third. A 
package-deal of all three could, given courage and imagination, have 
brought results. Unhappily this opportunity was not seized. The West 
stalled on disarmament, repeated cold war jargon on Germany, and were 
probably relieved when, in September, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal 
allowed them to slip back into their pre-co-existence attitudes. All the 
same, a more forthright Western acceptance of the challenge presented 
by the lOth May proposal might have altered, for instance, the whole 
course of history in Eastern Europe; the Hungarian tragedy -clearly a 
panic decision forced by the Soviet generals and the Stalinists headed 
by Molotov -need not have taken place. 
48. The latest Anglo-French plan -of 19th March, 1956 -touches 
on confidence, but fails to specify the problems concerned and at what 
stage they should be dealt with. It stipulates that the executive committee 
must agree that 'the necessary conditions of confidence exist for embarking 
upon the second (or third) stage of disarmament'. But we are not 
told what solution of what problem would be needed before confidence 
could be expected. 
49. The Western Powers, of course, had Germany in mind. Western 
statesmen certainly appeared -when they last revealed their views on 
the subject -genuinely to desire the re-unification of Germany. It is all 
the more odd that they did not see (i) how unacceptable their insistence 
on a re-unified Germany's right to join NATO would inevitably be to 
Soviet Russia, and (ii) how unnecessarily rigid their proposals actually 
were. A summary of the proposals put forward by the two sides on 
the subject of Germany during the past two years is given in Appendix A. 
It will be observed that they include measures which we might, had we 
not been told to the contrary, have supposed linked Disarmament to 
Germany. Sir Anthony Eden, indeed, actually used the same words to 
describe two of his proposals at the 'Summit' meeting; which Macmillan 

DISARMAMENT-THE WAY AHEAD 

at the meeting of Foreign Ministers, attacked Mr. Molotov for confusing.1 
Broadly, the West stuck grimly to insisting that a United Germany 
must be able to belong to NATO if it wished to, and sought, by means 
of a series of proposals designed to give security to the Soviet Union, 
to bring the Soviet Government to accept this. The Soviet Government 
moved from the idea of a neutralised Germany to a blunt statement 
that the time was not ripe for German re-unification, since the achievements 
of the East German regime had to be preserved. Both sides were, 
in fact, fighting battles which were already concluded; the twelve German 
divisions were not really essential 'to defend the West' in the nuclear 
warfare to which NATO was already committed in the event of war in 
Europe; and Germany is no longer a real threat to the Soviet Union, 
whose industrial output is now so far ahead that Germany can never 
catch up. The Soviet possession of nuclear weapons, also, should have 
prevented her government from psychopathic fears of revived German 
militarism. 

50. The Soviet Government have offered several interesting concessions 
to make their attitude more acceptable; in particular, the two 
proposals of 27th March and 17th November, 1956, for (i) a zone of 
limitation of armaments in Europe and (ii) for applying the 'Open 
Skies' plan to a 800 kilometre stretch in Europe, deserve a great deal 
more attention than they have received. (They are fully described in 
Appendix A). The first -with the exception of the proposal for the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons within the zone -is much the same 
as Sir Anthony Eden's first plan at the 'Summit', though that was 
'proposed in the context of European security'; the second, put forward 
during the middle of the Hungarian and Suez crises, suggests that the 
Soviet Government were still genuinely looking for some means of 
withdrawing from Hungary without losing face. Both proposals were 
treated unceremoniously in the West. 
On 18th July, Sir Anthony Eden proposed 'a discussion'-in the context of 
European security -about the total of forces and armaments on each side in 
Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany, supervised by a system of 
reciprocal control. This 'was intended', Sir Anthony Eden stated, 'to make a 
practical experiment in the operative control of armaments. This, if locally 
successful, in Europe, might, as it were, extend outwards from the centre to the 
periphery'. On 21st July, Eden introduced his disarmament proposal (see paragraph40 above). Of this, Eden remarked: 'I suggest that we should consider whether 
we cannot set up a simple joint inspection system of the forces confronting each 
other in Europe. It should not be impossible to decide that, over a specified area 
to be agreed between us extending perhaps by a fixed depth on either side of the 
line which now divides Eastern and Western Europe, there should be supervision 
by inspecting teams . . . . This proposal is not, of course, connected with 
our discussion for the unity of Germany ... this suggestion could, however, be a 

practical experiment in the co-operative inspection of armaments, an experiment 
which, if it were locally successful, might extend outwards from the centre to 
the periphery'. The same words about two different proposals! And yet the 
two topics -German re-unification and European security on the one hand and 
D isarmament on the other -were supposed, in Western orthodox thinking to be 
entirely separate. ' 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

IX. 
PROCEDURE 
51. The U.N. Disarmament Sub-Committee has hitherto conducted 
itself more like an unruly legislature than a committee. The representatives 
of the different Powers have made speeches, read speeches rather, 
and have hardly attempted to settle down to a business-like discussion. 
They have strayed from one topic to another. It is suggested that the 
Sub-Committee should take a lesson from the House of Commons, 
which, at the Committee stage of discussion of bills, really turns itself 
into a committee. There is absolutely no reason why the Disarmament 
Sub-Committee should not similarly settle down to discuss proposals 
word by word, clause by clause and chapter by chapter. That is the 
only way that the Sub-Committee will get through its business. The 
Sub-Committee is served by a highly competent secretariat supplied bythe U.N. Let it be competently used. 
Part Two 


WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 


1. Part One showed how the ends of the disarmament tangle are 
lying loose. Part Two shows how they must be tied up. 
2. Part One suggests that the kind of disarmament programme which 
should now be sought should comprise the following: 
(i) 
a controlled prohibition of the future production of all nuclear 
weapons. Ther~ will be a margin of error in respect of the 
observance of this prohibition by states already possessing 
stocks of weapon-grade nuclear material, but these states are 
those already possessing nuclear weapons. Other states must 
be persuaded to accept, in the general interest, not only this 
margin of error but also international control over their future 
nuclear energy programmes. This is the price they must pay 
to avoid a global nuclear arms race, resulting in final catastrophe;
(ii) 
controlled prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions; 
(iii) 
an unqualified ban on the use of nuclear weapons by possessor 
states; 
(iv) similar treatment of other weapons of mass destruction, i.e. 
bacteriological and chemical weapons; 
(v) 
conventional reductions -manpower and weapons -down 
to levels already proposed and agreed ; 
(vi) 
expanding control; 
(vii) proposals 
on German re-unification and European Security 
to be tied to the staged disarmament plan so as to increase, 
at each step, the security of both West and East. 
3. A five-stage plan for disarmament, German re-unification and 
European and world security is set out below. It may appear over

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

ambitious. In particular, the sections dealing with the Middle and Far 
East are not fully developed. But it is surely desirable to have a draft, 
however inadequate, to work upon. The principle of the draft plan is 
that security and disarmament must advance together from the solution 
of the central problem of Germany. 

FIVE STAGE PLAN FOR DISARMAMENT, GERMAN 
RE-UNIFICATION AND WORLD SECURITY . 

Stage I -Simultaneously : 

(i) 
The United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union 
start to withdraw 50 per cent. of their troops at present stationed 
in Germany. 
Any conceivable weakness suffered by the West as a result of this 
should be offset by the Soviet withdrawal. There is no intention here 
of neutralising Germany; but both the West and the Soviet Union must 
be prepared to make some concession to secure German re-unification. 
A Four Power withdrawal is all that is suggested; West Germany will 
not be required to withdraw from NATO, nor East Germany from the 
Warsaw Pact: see Stage IV (z). The Soviet Union must not insist that 
Germany leave NATO and the Westerq Powers must not insist that a 
re-united Germany must be able to belong exclusively to NATO. The 
modus vivendi suggested in Stage IV (i) is practicable and all faces are 
saved. Of course, it is possible that the withdrawal of troops from 
Germany in this fashion will actually be welcomed by powers such as 
the United Kingdom (see also Stage II (i) ).

(ii) 
Freeze at existing levels all conventional armaments, overall manpower 
and military budgets. 
This would not be controlled; but it is difficult to see how states' 
security would suffer from a ban on the increase in the present level of 
armaments -which is anyway being reduced. This proposition is a 
gesture, an agreement at least to maintain peace at its present precarious 
consistency.

(iiz) 
Limitation on nuclear weapon test explosions. 

i.e., to a certain number each year. It would be preferable to reach 
an agreement on a complete ban, even at this early stage. But there is 
apparently no likelihood of securing Western agreement to this. 

(iv) A U.N. expeditionary force shall take up position along the fj:ast-
West demarcation line in Europe. 
So far as is known, this proposal is made here for the first time. It 
has the great advantage of associating the U.N. with the disarmament 
plan from the start. The aim of the proposal is to ensure that no frontier 
incidents wreck the disarmament plan at its start -and the likelihood 
of these is considerable, taking into account that the atmosphere in East 
Germany at the time of a Soviet withdrawal would probably be inflammatory.


The U.N. Force would have to be composed, like that at present in 
the Middle East, of representatives of smaller countries. There is a limit 
to the amount of troops such smaller countries are able to contribute 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

to a U.N. force, but this has not yet been reached. It is possible that 
the force at present in the Middle East, or elements of it, could eventually 
be transferred to Europe. Certainly the European force should be formed 
in the same way as the Middle Eastern. 

The demarcation line, though nominally the East-West line in Europe, 
would in fact be probably limited by the line of demarcation in Germany, 
since the Austro-Eastern and Yugoslav-West European frontiers do not 
constitute dividing lines between the Western and Communist blocs; the 
Greco-Bulgarian and Russo-Norwegian frontiers might, however, be 
additionally given token U.N. forces. 

An earlier draft of this pamphlet proposed a U.N. force along the entire 
Western-Communist demarcation line-from Turkey, Persia, Pakistan 
to Korea and Indo-China, with U.N. naval units in the China seas; but 
it is felt that this is, for the time being, at least, an extravagant idea. 
But is is a proposal which would certainly repay further consideration-
perhaps as a development of the Soviet plan for control posts at strategicpoints suggested in the Soviet proposal of lOth May, 1955 (see above, 
Part One, end of paragraph 3 8). 

(v) 
An international control organ shall be set up with facilities adequate 
to guarantee (i) and (iii) and to gain infonnation about (ii).
It is recommended that the control headquarters should-at any 
rate at present-be in Berlin-the effective meeting place of 
West and East. The control organ should be staffed by an international 
secretariat, though it is recognised that, at least at first, 
the work of the control organ will have to be done by nationals 
of the different states. These will none the less be bound by the 
rules governing the conduct of international civil servants (Articles 
100 and 101 of the Charter). 
(vi) 
Aerial survey shall take place-on a reciprocal basis-of territory800 km. either side of the demarcation line dividing East and West 
Europe.
The Soviet Government agreed, in its Note of 17th November last, 
to make this limited concession to the 'Open Skies' plan. At first, the 
operation would have to be carried out by nationals, in nationally-owned 
aeroplanes, of the two sides; but they should be bound by the same 
international obligations as those in the control organ. 

(vii) 
Representatives of the Federal German Republic and the East 
German Government shall confer together, under the chairmanship 
of the Commander of the U.N. expeditionary force, on the organisation 
of free elections. 
This proposal is likely to be hotly contested by the West. The Federal 
German Government has resolutely refused to meet the East German 
Government at the Conference table; and the other Western Powers have 
fully supported this attitude; yet officials of the two countries have been 
meeting unofficially, on administrative affairs, for a long time. The 
meeting now proposed would also be essentially administrative, yetwould enable the East German authorities to say that they had helped 
to make the arrangements for free elections. It is, however, arguable 
that the proposal should come in Stage II, not Stage I. 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

On the completion of Stage I, 
Stage II -Simultaneously : 


(i) 
The United States, Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom 
start to withdraw the second 50 per cent. of their troops in Germany. 
See comment on Stage I (i). Other developments in Stage I and concurrent 
developments in Stage II should make this further step acceptable. 
The Federal German Republic and East Germany will continue as 
essential elements in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 

(iz) 
Representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, France and the 
United Kingdom shall meet together-perhaps at Geneva -to 
produce a guarantee of the German-Polish and German-Czech 
frontiers. There may be some minor adjustments, in Germany's 
favour, but, in the main, the frontier shall be concluded before the 
last troops of the Four Powers leave German territory. 

There is no use pretending that this will be easily accepted by Germany; 
but any other solution would bring further suffering to the peoples 
of Eastern Europe. The guarantee is an essential part of German reunification 
and is the price Germany must pay for it. 

(iiz) 
Nuclear weapons shall be prohibited in Germany. 

This proposal has been included in several recent Soviet plans. If the 
West were to withdraw from West Germany, nuclear weapons would 
automatically be banned from the Federal German Republic, who undertook 
not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons by the Paris Agreement. 
This proposal thus merely extends the Paris Agreement to East 
Germany. 

(iv) The United States, 
Soviet Union, and China reduce their total 
armed forces to 2.5 million men and the United Kingdom and 
France to 750 thousand men. Conventional armaments and overall 
military budgets shall be correspondingly reduced. 
There should be no difficulty about these figures since they had been 
agreed by the Sub-Committee as appropriate for the first stage of disarmament 
by the end of last year. The allocation of figures to China 
means that, by this time at least, the Chinese People's Government will 
have to be filling the Chinese seat in the U.N. The figures are naturally 
subject to negotiation, since, for example, the United Kingdom expects 
to have reduced as low as 700 thousand by April, 1958. 

(v) 
Control posts shall be established at large ports, road and raflway 
junctions and in aerodromes throughout the territories of the NATO 
and Warsaw Pact powers, in order to warn against any dangerous 
concentration of troops. 
All Powers in the Sub-Committee have now accepted this proposal, 
though it is here restricted to the territories of the two grand alliances 
for the first time. As suggested above, this proposal might be used so 
that the U.N. force might take up positions all along the edge of the 
Iron Curtain. Control and the reductions under (iv) will not (see (viz]
below) be fully effective at this stage; the control posts should make up 
for any apparent loss of security. 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

(vz) 
The aerial surveys provided for in Stage I (vz) shall be extended 
to 1200 km. on either side of the line of demarcation between East 
and West in Europe. 

See Stage III (vii) below. 

(vii) The control organ shall establish central branches in the capitals of 
the five powers named in (iv). They shall have the right to inspect 
all governmental documents relating to military budgets. 
The control organ's powers will thus not be, at this stage, highly 
developed. Its functions will be to check, in a general way, that the reductions 
under (iv) are being carried out. It may be argued that these 
reductions are being inadequately controlled; but the control postsestablished under (v) should be adequate guarantee against surprise attack 
by conventional weapons; and states' facilities to guard against nuclear 
attack-if there are any-are not touched. The implications of evasion, 
at this stage, are thus not grave enough for the control, as envisagedhere, to be inadequate. 

(viii) Establishment of a denzilitarised zone fifty miles deep, guaranteed 
by the U.N. expeditionary force on either side of the line dividing 
East and West in Europe. 
This plan derives ulti1nately from one of Sir Anthony Eden's, at the 
'Summit' Conference. It was later taken up by the Soviet Government 
in their proposal of 27th March, 1956. This will be a further safeguard 
against attack and will be a very salutary experiment in international 
confidence. It should be considered whether similar demilitarised zones 
should not be established in the two other major theatres of international 
tension-the Middle and Far East. Plans for these are not included 
in the present draft plan; but they should be part of a final world 
settlement. 

On 
the completion of Stage II, 

Stage ill -Simultaneously : 

(i) 
Free German elections under U.N. supervision. A new all-German 
Government would then be formed, to draft a constitution. The 
constitution will be adopted and new elections will be ilnmediately 
held; as a result, the first Govern1nent proper of a re-united 
Germany shall be formed. 
(it) 
The Four Powers-in effect only the United States and the Soviet 
Union-shall withdraw 50 per cent. of their troops remaining in 
other countries of Europe. 

The way is thus paved for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East 
Europe. The West would, of course, have no need to maintain the full 
NATO machinery as the strategic need for it-Soviet troops in East 
Europe-was removed. But NATO itself would remain. 

(iii) 
Prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions. 
(iv) 
All States, other than those named in Stage II (iv), shall start 
to reduce their armed forces either to 300 thousand men or to a 
level of one per cent. of their total population-whichever is the 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

lower. This process shall be complete by the end of Stage IV. 
Armaments and military budgets shall be proportionately reduced. 

These figures represent a compromise between the 150 and 200 
thousand suggested by the Soviet Union and the figure of 500 thousand 
suggested -with United Kingdom support-by the United States. 
The one per cent. of population figure derives from a paper presented 
by the three Western. Powers in 1952. 

(v) 
The United States, Soviet Union and China shall reduce their total 
armed forces to 1.75 million men; and the United Kingdom and 
France shall reduce to 700 thousand men. Armaments and military 
budgets shall be correspondingly reduced. 
The final figures (see Stage IV) for those Powers will be 1 million to 

1.5 million for the first three and 500 thousand for the two latter. 
(vl) The control organ shall be expanded to guarantee (il), (iv) and (v). 
It shall have entirely free access at all times to all objects of control, 
i.e., all war-making or war-storing plants and installations and 
shall be able to carry out sur prise l!isits to any place or installation 
where breaches of the disarmament treaty are suspected. 

Such wide powers are essential if really significant reductions are going 
to be accepted by the Great Powers. Local rules-such as the warning 
given of routine inspections-should be worked out. Surprise visits 
should be carried out rarely and only with the agreement of the director-
general of the control organ in the country, or the group of countries, 
concerned. The delay involved in such a procedure would not be serious 
since breaches of the conventional aspect of the problem would not 
present risks to peace demanding immediate action. 

(vil) The aerial surveys provided for in Stage I (vi) and Stage II (vz)
shall be extended to the whole of the territories of state members 
of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and, in addition, to all 
countries in alliance with any of those states: this would include, 
therefore, China, Forrrwsa, North and South Korea, the Indo-China 
successor states, the Bagdad Pact and SEATO powers not members 
of NATO. 

Aerial survey is certainly the most convenient and the cheapest way of 
controlling disarmament in large tracts of territory. The Soviet Government's 
concession on 17th November, 1956, following that on 27th 
March, 1956, suggests that this is a matter upon which agreement can be 
negotiated. 

On completion of Stage III, 
Stage IV -Simultaneously : 

(l) 
The re-united Germany signifies adherence to both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. 
Probably the only way of saving faces on all sides. 

(il) 
The Four Powers withdraw their remaining troops in foreign territory; 
but arrangements may be made whereby the United States 
will be permitted to retain troops in the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union will be permitted to retain troops in the republics 
of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

The qualification may not be required. But if the United States keeps 
troops in the United Kingdom, then the Soviet Union must have a quid 
pro quo. To find this in the Baltic States is perhaps far-fetched; the 
Soviet Government may perhaps put in another claim. This should be 
heard with sympathy in the West. 

(iil) 
Total prohibition of the use and production of nuclear weapons. 

See below for control (v). 

(iv) 
The overall armed forces of the United States, Soviet Union and 
China shall be reduced to 1 million to 1.5 million and of the 
United Kingdom and France to 500 thousand. 
The figure for the three Powers is the old and agreed one. 500 
thousand is a new figure for the United Kingdom and France, but it 
ought to fit the defence plans of the powers concerned. 

(v) 
The control organ shall be expanded to deal effectively with (iz), (iii)
and (iv).
(vi) Aerial survey, 
as a method of control, shall be generally extended 
throughout the world. 
Here the Soviet Government would probably gain more than they 
would lose. 

Stage V 

(i) 
Three Security Pacts, to be later endorsed by the U.N. General 
Assembly, shall be signed, recognising existing frontiers, and agreeing 
to settle disputes by peaceful means, between 
(a) 
the States which are members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(b) 
a specified list of countries of the Middle East, including the 
members of the Bagdad Pact, states in alliance with Egypt or 
Israel and, again, the United Kingdom, United States, Soviet 
Union and France; 
(c) 
a specified list of countries of the Far East, including the 
Chinese People's Government, the Chinese Nationalist Government 
of Formosa, the Indo-Chinese successor states, North and 
South Korea, and the members of SEATO. 
(ii) 
The control organ shall remain permanently in existence and shall 
co-operate throughout with the U.N. Atomic Energy Agency. The 
U.N. expeditionary forces shall remain in permanent existence, 
with changing personnel. 
(iii) 
The General Assembly shall consider what further reductions can 
be made in the armed forces of member states towards those levels 
required for the maintenance of internal security. 
Such a provision was included at the end of the Anglo-French plan on 
timing of 11th June, 1954. 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

CONCLUSION 


T
T
illS PAMPHLET is written in the conviction that disarmament or, 
rather, internationally controlled reduction of armaments, is both 
desirable and practicable. It is desirable, firstly, because of the obvious 
beneficial effect on national economies of reductions in defence expenditures; 
secondly, because of the great lightening in the international atmosphere 
which would follow a controlled disarmament plan linked with a 
general settlement of outstanding political problems. The alternative to 
disarmament is a global nuclear arms race with no holds barred; the 
alternative to a settlement of, say, the German problem is a world 
permanently on the brink of world war. 
Disarmament is also practicable; not merely unilateral disarmament, 
or reductions, as being planned in the Ministry of Defence, which is 
merely an internal adjustment; but internationally controlled disarmament. 
Admittedly, the implementation of a plan such as suggested in 
Part Two would demand sacrifices of sovereignty by nation states; it could 
be argued that the setting up of an effective control system would imply 
intolerable interference in states' freedom to settle their own affairs. 
But the whole problem of human affairs in the twentieth century is one of 
control; human control of the present wave of the industrial revolution. 
Disarmament must be an experiment in international control, control, 
that is, for the common benefit, of competing national attitudes. It is 
unduly pessimistic to suppose that the Soviet Union will inevitablyrefuse to share in such a project: the Soviet political system is itself a 
form of economic control of a rapidly industrialising society; we in the 
West believe it a perverted form; but it is the perversion none the less 
of what was originally a Western attitude and is not, therefore, quite 
irreconcilable. And the Soviet Union has as much to lose from a global 
nuclear arms race as ourselves. It will no doubt be said that the present 
state of international relations would forbid the start of a comprehensive 
disarmament programme. But 'international confidence' is not demanded 
at the start. Confidence is created as the programme goes along. Confidence 
will come. 

The Disarmament Sub-Committee might have reached agreement in 
the spring of 1956. Now it is reassembling. The occasion is more favourable 
than ever. A draft which seeks to take into account the fears and 
demands of all has been set out in Part Two. If the Four Powers' experts 
on Germany, German re-unification and European Security are not 
present in the Music Room at Lancaster House, let them be sent for. 
Now is the time for decision. It is the golden moment of opportunity. 
It may never come again. 


DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

APPENDIX A 


PROPOSALS ON GERMANY 

THE WEST 
Proposals at Geneva III (Foreign Ministers meeting-October-November 1955) 


(a) Re-unification 
(i) 
Free all-German elections, resulting in 
(ii) 
Formation of National Assembly, which would draft 
(iii) A Constitution, which, being adopted, 
(iv) 
An all-German Government would be formed, which would 
(v) 
Conclude a Peace Treaty. 
(b) Security (re Germany) 
(i) 
Military forces in a zone comprising areas of comparable size, depth 
and importance on both sides of the line dividing the re-unified 
Germany and East Europe should be 'limited and balanced'. 
(ii) 
The Soviet Union would have the right to operate a radar system in 
the West part of the zone and the Western Powers in the East. 
(iii) 
Armed aggression by any NATO member v a non-NATO member and 
vice-versa would oblige all parties to take 'appropriate action to meet 
that common danger'. 
(iv) 
These measures would come into effect progressively at stages to be 
agreed; the signature would be concurrent with the signature of the 
agreement on the plan for re-unification. The final stage would only 
come into effect when a re-unified Germany decided to enter NATO. 
(It will be seen that the Security proposals, though nominally concurrent with 
those on re-unification, would really only come into effect at the conclusion of 
the re-unification plan; for (i) of the Security proposal pre-supposes a united 
Germany; and it is difficult to see how Germany could be re-united in any legal 
sense until at least (iii) of the re-unification plan, and, probably, not until (iv) ). 

Proposals at Geneva II (the 'Summit' Meeting-July 1955) 

(a) 
Re-unification 
As (a) at Geneva III. This plan in all its essentials was first put forward 
at the Berlin Conference of 1954. 

(b) Security 
(i) 
After the re-unification of Germany, a European Security Pact between 
the U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R., France and Germany. Proposed by Sir 
Anthony Eden. 
(ii) 
'A system of reciprocal control' of total forces and armaments in 
Germany and in the countries neighbouring Germany; out of this grew 
plan (b) proposed at Geneva III by Sir Anthony Eden. 
(iii) A 
demilitarised zone should be set up between East and West proposed 
by Sir Anthony Eden. 
(c) 
Disarmament 
Joint inspection of forces confronting East and West. This was supposed 
to have no relation to any of the German or European Security plans of 
the West, but,if it were implemented in Germany-as it was clearly 
intended to be when first proposed -then the two German governmentswould inevitably be involved. 

DISARMAMENT-THE WAY AHEAD 

Other Proposals 

(a) 
Sir Anthony Eden, at a speech at the English Speaking Union just before 
the 'Summit' meeting, launched a plan for the control system at present in 
force in W.E.U. to be 'extended eastwards'. Of this plan, nothing more 
has been heard. 
(b) 
In November, 1954, Monsieur Mendes-France was apparently thinking in 
terms of a plan whereby the control system envisaged for the then as yet 
unformed W.E.U. should be repeated in the Warsaw Pact countries; and 
that, thereafter, the two control systems should be merged. 
W.E.U. Control 
The Paris Agreements provide for an inspection system of the armaments 
of the W.E.U. countries This system has now at long last been set up, 
under the Italian Admiral Ferrari. It can hardly be said to be either a 
Disarmament or a European Security Plan; but it does provide a possiblelesson and example for future control plans, if it works according to its 

statute. 

THE SOVIET UNION 

November 17th, 1956 

(i) 
Aerial photography of 800 km. on each side of demarcation line at 
present dividing East and West. 
(ii) 
Controlled reduction, during 1957, of one-third of the armed forces 
of the U.K., U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
(iii) 
Liquidation within two years of foreign military bases on the. territory 
of other states. 
(iv) 'Considerable reduction' during 1957 of the armed forces of the U.S.A., 
U.S.S.R., U.K. and France stationed on the territories of NATO and 
Warsaw Pact countries. 
(v) Non-aggression 
pact between members of NATO and members of 
Warsaw Treaty. 
March 27th, 1956 

(i) 
Zone of limitation and inspection of armaments 'including the territory 
of both parts of Germany and states adjacent to them', with ceilings 
to be agreed (in conjunction with the states concerned) for U.K., 
U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and French troops within the zone; atomic and 
hydrogen bombs would be prohibited within the zone and there would 
be joint inspection. 
(ii) 
Prior to (i), atomic weapons would be banned on German territory. 
October-November 1955 German Re-unification (Meeting of Foreign Ministers) 
Mr. Molotov suggested that there could be no immediate plan for German 
re-unification, but that an all-German council should be formed ofˇ representatives 
of West and East Germany to consider contacts. 
The Soviet delegation, both at Geneva II and Geneva III, -proposed a 
Security Pact along the lines of (v) of the proposal of 17th November, 
1956 (above). 

May lOth, 1955 

(i) Staged elimination of foreign bases over two years-as in (iii) of 17th 
November plan. 
(ii) 
Immediate withdrawal of U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and French troops in 
Germany, except limited contingents temporarily left pending an agreement 
for their complete withdrawal. 

DISARMAMENT-THE WAY AHEAD 

APPENDIX B 


DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS 1945-1957 

I. 
THE PREIJMINARIES 
1. 
June, 1945. Art. II(i) of the U.N. Charter provided that the 'General 
Assembly may consider' ways and means of permitting disarmament and 
'may make recommendations' to Member States or to the Security Council. 
Art. 26 stipulated that the Security Council 'shall be responsible for 
formulating ... plans .. . for the establishment of a system for the 
regulation of armaments'. 
2. 
November, 1945. U.S., U.K. and Canadian Declaration proposing establishment 
of a U.N. Commission to eliminate the use of atomic energy for 
war and to promote widest use for peaceful ends. 
3. 
January, 1946. U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopts resolution 
setting up the Atomic Energy Commission. 
4. 
February, 1947. U.N. General Assembly unanimously approves setting 
up of the Conventional Armaments Commission. 
ll. THE U.N. ATOMIC ENERGY AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS 
COMMISSIONS 
Atomic Energy Commission 

5. 
June 13th,1947. Western plan for complete international ownership of 
use and possession of all fissile material (Baruch Plan); an international 
authority would own all fissile material from mine to end-product. The 
two weaknesses of the Plan are described in the footnote to paragraph 3 
of the text above. 
6. 
June, 1947. Soviet Government proposes 'simultaneous' prohibition of 
atomic weapons and control of atomic energy. 
7. 
October, 1948. Atomic Energy Commission, in its third report, declares 
that an impasse has been' reached and recommends suspension of its work. 
8. 
November, 1948. General Assembly approves report and 'Baruch' plan 
is endorsed as 'The U.N. Majority Plan'. Soviet representatives at Atomic 
Energy Commission and at the General Assembly oppose majority proposals. 
Conventional Armaments Commission 

9. 
Western view: international confidence is a prerequisite of disarmament, 
i.e., disclosure of existing military strength and establishment of an 
effective system of verification required before start of disarmament. 
10. 
Soviet view : an all-round reduction of existing armed, forces by one-third 
to take place immediately. Control to be established 'simultaneously'. 
11. 
No agreement reached, even on plan of work. 
m. 
THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION 
12. 
24th October, 1950. President Truman proposes amalgamation of Atomic 
Energy and Conventional Armaments Commissions. 
13. 
11th January, 1952. In consequence, Disarmament Commission established. 
14. 
28th May, 1952. Tripartite (U.K., U.S.A. and French) proposals in Commission 
for reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces; U.S.A. 
U.S.S.R. and China to reduce to between 1 and H million men; U.K. and 
and France to between 700,00 and 800,000 men; the armed forces of all 
other States normally to be less than 1 per cent. of population. 

DISARMAMENT-THE WAY AHEAD 

15. 
12th August, 1952. Supplementary Tripartite Proposals, proposing principles 
for the co-ordination of nuclear and conventional disarmament in 
one balanced programme. 
16. 
29th August, 1952. Western proposals rejected by Soviet representative. 
IV. 
THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION 
17. 
28th November, 1953. General Assembly approves resolution suggesting 
that the Disarmament Commission set up a sub-committee of 'Powers 
principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution' 
(Soviet bloc abstains). 
18. 
19th April, 1954. Disarmament Commission sets up Sub-Committee composed 
of representatives of Canada, France, U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. 
A 
May-June, 1954. First meeting of Sub-Committee. 

19. 
21st May, 1954. U.K. memorandum proposes (i) that the Disarmament 
Convention should cover: 'All types of weapons, all types of armed forces, 
and military facilities of all kinds'; (ii) the weapons to be covered should 
be divided into two groups: (a) weapons to be prohibited, and (b) 
weapons to be limited and reduced. 
20. 
11th June, 1954. Anglo-French Plan on timing, with the following main 
provisions: (a) States should regard themselves as prohibited from the 
use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction except in 
defence against aggression. 
(b) After the positioning of a control organ (to be effected within a 
specified time), and as soon as the control organ reports it can effectively 
enforce them, the following measures should be successively carried out : 
(i) A freeze 
of overall man-power and expenditure at 31st December, 
1953 levels. 
(ii) 
One-half of the reductions of conventional armaments and armed 
forces (figures to be agreed). 
(iii) 
Prohibition of manufacture of all nuclear and other prohibited 
weapons. 
(iv) Second half of the agreed reductions. , 
(v) 
Total prohibition and elimination of all nuclear and other prohibited 
weapons, and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials 
for peaceful purposes. 
B 
Second Meeting of Sub-Committee, February-May and August-October, 1955 

21. 
8th March, 1955. Revised version of Anglo-French Plan of 11th June, 
1954, now supported, in addition, by Canada and the U.S.A. 
22. 
29th March, 1955. Anglo-French memorandum on reductions of armed 
forces proposes that :(
a) U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and China should reduce to between 1 and 1t million 
men. 
(b) 
U.K. and France should reduce to 650,000 men. 
(c) 
Forces permitted to all other States should be 'considerably lower' 
than the above levels. 
23. 
19th April, 1955. Anglo-French proposal advancing the prohibition and 
elimination of nuclear weapons from the end to three-quarters of the way 
through the conventional reductions. 
24. 
lOth May, 1955. Soviet proposals: main points:(
a) Acceptance 
of Western view that development of confidence is a 
prerequisite of disarmament and of acceptance by states of rigidcontrol. 

DISARMAMENT -THE WAY AHEAD 

(b) Acceptance 
of Western proposals on timing of nuclear prohibitions 
and figures for reductions of armed forces. 
(c) 
Statement that 'there are possibilities beyond the reach of international 
control for evading this control and for organising the 
clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons'. 
C 
The 'Summit' Meeting, July, 1955 

25. 
During the course of the discussion on Disarmament at this meeting the 
following proposals were made :(
a) Eisenhower ('Open Skies') 
Plan for exchange of blue prints of militaryestablishments and verification by aerial survey. 
(b) 
The Faure Plan for proportional reduction of military expenditures 
and devotion of portions of sums saved to the improvement of livingstandards in under-developed countries. 
(c) 
Eden Plan for joint inspection of forces confronting each other in 
Europe. 
(d) Bulganin Proposal, repeating Soviet proposals 
of lOth May, 1955, but 
proposing also : 
(i) A level of 
armed forces of 150-200,000 men for all States other 
than the Great Powers. 
(ii) 
Great Powers should pledge themselves not to be the first to 
use nuclear weapons. 
26. 
Resumed session of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in New York, in 
August-October, made no progress. This was mainly due to the U.S. 
decision to place all its past proposals 'in the deep freeze' and to pressonly the Eisenhower Plan for 'Open Skies'. Deadlock continued at the 
Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers in November, 1955. 
D 
Third Meeting of Sub-Committee, March-May, 1956 

27. 
19th March, 1956. Revised Anglo-French Plan, including a preliminary 
stage to be put into effect immediately, 'before confidence established', 
providing only for conventional weapons. 
28. 
27th March, 1956. New Soviet proposal, making advances on control, 
and proposing a European zone of limitation of armaments. 
29. 
3rd April, 1956. U.S. plan for the 'first phase of a comprehensive disarmament 
plan. 
30. 
3rd May, 1956. Anglo-French control plan. 
E 
Later Developments 

31. 
17th November, 1956. Soviet proposal recapitulates past Soviet proposals 
and proposes, in addition, that the Eisenhower 'Open Skies' plan should be 
put into effect in a test area on each side of the line at present dividing 
NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers. Acceptance also of U.S. figures for 
'first phase' reductions. 
32. 
18th March, 1957. Fourth Meeting of Sub-Committee begins. 

Recent Fabian Publications 
Research Pamphlets 
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175 
176 
177 
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179 
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183 
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Norman Wood 
P AN FOR THE AIR A lNDU TRY 
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THE FuTURE o RETAILING 
Richard Evely 
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A. H. Hanson 
THE WE T INDIAN IN BRITAIN 
larence enior and Douglas Manley 
LEAS HOLD ENFRAN ill EMENT 
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John Murray 
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A Fabian Group 
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T. F. Betts 
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H. J. D. ole 
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R. H. S. ro sman, M.P. 
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F. T. Willey M.P. 
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Recent Fabian Publications 
Research Pamphlets 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
185 
Tracts 
298 
299 
301 
3 2 
3 3 
4 
3 5 
R NT AND So IAL POLl 
Da id Eversley 
FooD PoLI Y 
Norman Wood 
P AN FOR THE AIR A lNDU TRY 
Frank Beswick, M.P. 
THE FuTURE o RETAILING 
Richard Evely 
FINAN ING Lo AL GOVERNMENT 
A. H. Hanson 
THE WE T INDIAN IN BRITAIN 
larence enior and Douglas Manley 
LEAS HOLD ENFRAN ill EMENT 
Arthur keffington, M.P. 
PLAN FOR COTTON 
John Murray 
PLAN FOR COAL D ISTRIBUTION 
A Fabian Group 
BULK PuR HASE AND THE COLON! 
T. F. Betts 
FACTS FOR So IALISTS 
H. J. D. ole 
Ju TI E AND THE ADMIN! TRATION 
Gordon Borrie 
S IALISM AND THE N W D POT! M 
R. H. S. ro sman, M.P. 
PLAN F R SHIPBUILDING 
F. T. Willey M.P. 
TALI M AND NATION LI A ION 
Hugh ait kell M.P. 
WH T I WR NG WITH THE TRAD NION ? 
. D. H. ole 
K A Q I N: AN AFRI A R 
T m Mboya 
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B R 
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Pr nt I rn London b ' Ri lr s ofIf mm r mrtlr, ( T. .) Dolling Road, W6 
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