fabian tract 397 the TUC: a plan for the 1970s chapter 1 a new TUC? 2 recent developments 3 a programme for the 1970s 4 future organisation ~p_pe_n_d~__________n_e_w__T_U_C__ru_l_es__1_1_a_n_d__1_2_________ this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, represents not the collective view of the Society but only the view of the individual who prepared it. The responsibility of the Society is limited to approving the publications which it issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour move- ment. Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street London SW1 . October 1969. SBN 7163 0397 3 fabian tract 397 the TUC: a plan for the 1970s chapter 1 a new TUC? 2 recent developments 3 a programme for the 1970s 4 future organisation ~p_pe_n_d~__________n_e_w__T_U_C__ru_l_es__1_1_a_n_d__1_2_________ this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, represents not the collective view of the Society but only the view of the individual who prepared it. The responsibility of the Society is limited to approving the publications which it issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour move- ment. Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street London SW1 . October 1969. SBN 7163 0397 3 a new TUC? The public in 1969 woke up to the notion of an extended role for the rue. But the struggle with the Government over the proposed use of "sanctions" in industrial disputes may have given the impression that it is only with an assertion of authority on this front that a new rue has emerged. In fact, the new intervention in disputes set out in the rue's Pro- gramme for action is only part of the transformation and elaboration of rue function that has been building up in i the 1960s. It is, besides, only a sma1l part 1of the extension of ·the rue's work that will be needed in the interests of the trade union movement in the 1970s. Both the trade unions and the entire system of industrial relations they work within have been swept by dynamic changes in the last decade. That process is so far from exhausting itself that it can well be argued that the greatest changes are yet to come. In particular a new emphasis is needed as to co-ordinated trade union action and ·response, to the operation of the trade unions as a movement. In consequence it has become urgent to examine both what these changes have already meant to the rue's activities, and what is already fairly firmly estrublished as to their further development, but also what potentialities lie within the grasp of the trade unions-as a movement. No comprehensive analysis of its changing function has come from the rue. The evidence submitted by the rue in 1966 to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (the Donovan Commission) under the title Trade Unionism, remains valuable. But it is already significantly out of date over many important fields of activity. Since then a stream of reports, surveys, discussion documents, "interim" statements and policy programmes have poured. from the rue. These are sign enough of the quickening pace ; but they are notable too (be it said to the rue's critics) 1 for taking the trade unions towards a more co-ordinated strategy, and for their grasp of trade union principles and prac tice en route. The trade union movement has not yet digested more than a fraction of these new initiatives, and their significance is inadequately understood in the wider labour movement. With discussion and action on so many fronts it is understandable that there should be a cultural Jag, a .time interval before the new relationships are recognised. People .Jiving in a revolution are not necessarily the best interpreters of the overall impact of the many changes that are under way. With the momentum of development still building up at the rue one can hardlyexpect from its restricted and overloaded staff a comprehensive account of what the whole process means, of the final purpose of the new policies. After all, between 1968 and 1969 Congresses they had to handle (over and a:bove the usual extensive network of committees, advisory conferences, and bargaining with the Government): I. Discussion conferences on equal pay and on industrial training ; 2. A conference of executives ; 3. Six sectoral conferences on "Collective bargaining and trade union development"; 4. A special congress. In doing so they produced several documents of major importance, including Action on Donovan (November 1968), Economic review, 1969 (February 1969), the Introductory documents on collective bargaining and trade union development (March 1969), and Programme for actio~ (May 1969). All in all, this is a far cry \ from the air of "routine as before" of a, 1 decade or so ago. Donovan and the TUC We might expect the Donovan Commission for its part to have analysed the position of the rue and charted its way ahead. But in fact the Commission failedf to provide any serious account of the role of the rue, and no more than a few fragmentary suggestions for its future work. Partly, this weakness arose from the concentration of attention in the Commission's report on various aspects of collective bargaining-so that trade union structure and function were viewed largely as an adjunct to ideas on more "orderly" bargaining. Partly it indicates different views as to the future working of trade union government. The absence , of guidelines from the Donovan Corn-'\ mission as to the work of the TUC might /1 in more detail be explained in the following ways: ·1. The Commission largely avoided the complex issues presented by incomes ·policy and its relation to other aspects of · national economic management and to collective bargaining. Yet this is an area where the TUC is directly involved in co-ordinating trade union policy (including collective bargaining policies). It has the responsibility for relating trade union interests and policies to governmental influence on economic development-notonly intervention in income determination, but also the development of investigatory and planning agencies, the operation of fiscal inducements and controls affecting business, growth and employment policy, and policies on income and wealth distribution. 2. The Commission's failure to arrive at any constructive conclusions on the democratisation of industry led them to exclude a significant area of TUC concern. One might use as an example the major questions as to workers' rights and interests when caught up in companytake overs and rationalisation, which the TUC has been pursuing. 3. The Commission's limited approach to the organisational and governmentalneeds of the trade unions led to limited and somewhat mechanical proposals. These fell short both of the needs and potentialities of TUC action . 4. The Donovan Commission were intent on developing an array of new state agencies to oversee the industrial relations system. In applying this approach to trade union government too (proposals for. statutory rules requirements, penal- ISatiOn _of non-registration, appeals and complamts to a new judicial body and so on) the Commission largely ignored the potential of self regulation by the trade union movement. The relevant chapter of Donovan (chapter xr) contained no reference to the evidence offered by the TUC as to its possible role in improving union rules and providinga membership appeal system (TUC, Trade . Unionism, para 447-452). Thus the scopefor self regulation by the trade union movement was not examined and rejec-, ted, but rather was ignored. Thus the Donovan Commission enters the picture not for any fruitful analysis of the role of the TUC, but rather because some of its recommendations evoke a response from the trade union movement that takes the form of an extension of TUC functions. The positive response by the Government to the Donovan Commission report, with the addition of "hawkioshness" as to the state's role in industrial disputes, pushed this trade \ 'union response further. But nobody'should have expected the British trade union movement to watch passively while new state agencies, judicial, investigatory, and regulatory, were added to existing statutory authorities (such as the National Board for Prices and Incomes) in areas of direct concern to the trade unions. Put negatively, there was here at eas e danger of an emasculation of the independent development and self-determination of the trade unions. Put positively, these new agencies were all to operate in areas where the TUC could play a major, if not the dominant, role, and therefore it became the more important for the trade unions to ensure that the TUC should play its rfull part in initiative, in policy formation, and in a principled regulation of union conduct. _./ the choice before the unions Thus the trade union movement may accept a statutory Commission on Industrial Relations as an investigatory adjunct to collective bargaining. At least until the 1969 Congress it largely accepted a statutory National Board for Prices and Incomes as a further investigatory agency. But it cannot accept state, or statutory agency, dictation of income priorities in place of its own formulation as a movement of priorities in pay and conditions. Equally it cannot allow the development of trade union organisationto be determined by statutory agency ; it is driven, here too, to identify its own co-ordinated path for development. .gncroac~ nt by the~. first on the outcomeof ~gairung,then on its disputes, and subsequently, if Donovan is implemented, over a still wider range of industrial relations subjects, are producing a new situation. For only the unified and highly responsible operation of a trade union movement can be put forward as an adequate alternative to state \ initiative. The trade unions are offered th~tw~continuingas a loose collection ofSectional organisations, jealous of their "autonomy", and therebydecisively handing real power and initiative to the state, or becoming a more coordinated trade union movement than they have ever been or ever, at least, since the 1920s, thought of becoming; This is therefore a period of real challenge to the trade unions.· For what they attempt to build now has to meet a double requirement. It not only has to overcome the many obstacles that have stood in the way of a co-ordinated trade union movement so far-that is to carrythe great majority of trade unions and trade unionists towards sweeping changes in the conduct of trade union affairs. It has also to offer a constructive enoughresponse-in its approach to collective bargaining policies, its economic strategy, its handling of disputes and their causes, its management of trade union government and member interests-to win the political battle, to convince not just this Government today, but enough people and future Governments that this alternative is superior to an increasing element of state dictation and legal coercion in industrial relations. 2. recent developments Piecemeal development in the scope and functions of the TUC has been a feature of the 1960s. It is important to recognisewhat is involved in the commitments already undertaken and in the development of the rue's own organisation. general council membership The 1960s have witnessed marked shifts in the size of major unions affiliated to the rue. They have also seen the affiliation of major "non-manual" unions, so I that the risk that appeared in the early1960s, of the rue mainly representing manual unionism whilst important non- manual unions grouped elsewhere, has disappeared. The rue with 155 affiliated unions comprising almost 9 million mem/ bers is more representative of the whole \of organised labour than ever before. ' Indeed, only three important unions with a third of a million members between them, are not affiliated-though increasingly their leaderships favour affiliation (the National Union of Teachers, the Institution of Professional Civil Servants and the Society of Civil Servants). During the 1960s trade unions in public administration and teaching with a membership of half a million affiliated to the rue for the first time; these included NALGO (373,000 members), the Associations of Teachers in Technical Institutions (28,000), the National Association of Schoolmasters (42,000), and several smaller civil service unions. The "publicemployees" and "civil servants" groupsof the TUC now have a combined membership of 1 ,500,000. I The main response to shifts in membership, so far as General Council representation was concerned, came only in 1968, and was clearly inadequate. There were minor modifications to the industrial grouping, some scaling down of representation from groups whose membership had fallen, and some increase in representation where groups had increased in size. The group system, we were told by the General Council "is intended to produce a General Council which, as far a possible, mirrors and represents the trade movement as a whole, and the need to preserve a fair balance of different interests and experience has always taken precedence over the simple approach of distributing seats on a purely arithmetical basis" (GeneralCouncil report, 1968, p37). They went on to say that it was "inevitable" that there would be "some anomalies". Perhaps so, in a system in which unions find themselves allocated to an industrial group that has virtually no other function apart from the peculiar process of election of General Council members, and where nominees then have to face the additional hazard of attracting sufficient votes, not simply within their own group, but from the whole Congress of affiliated unions. (The argument for the voting system is that a General Council member is not put there simply to represent the interests of his particular section of the members of Congress, but to serve the interests of the whole movement. The electoral process may symbolise that aim, without guaranteeing its achievement.) But the "anomalies" are made more serious bythe protocol that has grown up that over representation of a particular group is dealt with only on the "retirement, resignation, or death" of existing General Council members from that group. Thus in the name of a "fair balance" the General Council in 1968 proposed (and Congress accepted) that the "railways" group with 323,000 members, should eventually have its representation reduced from 3 to 2. But it denied to the "printing and paper" group, with 381,000 members, its request for an addition to it one seat on the General Council. Given that on an "arithmetical basis" the average membership per seat on the General Council is about a quarter of a million, one can see the difficulties in reallocation while still not accepting the General Council's 1968 re-allocation as adequate. But what is needed is not an abstract exercise in representational justice. The industrial groupings, the systemof election, and the balance of repreentation are best considered in the light of the functions that the General Coun cil are taking on. Consequently, we have to return to this question later on when the developing functions of the ruc have been examined. But one serious problem that has emerged already, and lies behind manyof the demands for reorganisation of the TUC, is the sense of isolation and inadequate consultation felt by major unions/ that have no representative on the GeQ} era! Council. The more significant the decision making of the General Council for the lives and future prospects of unions and their members, the more inadequate the traditional constitutional pattern of the ruc and its committees appears. There are, for instance, a fairly large number of growing unions with membership near or over 100,000 who have no direct representation on the General Council. The biggest trade union not directly represented is the Civil and Public Services Association with 174,000 members in 1969. The other growingunions, lacking such direct access as membership of the General Council involves, include the National GraphicalAssociation (107,000), Post Office Engineering Union (106,000), Association of Scientific, Technical and ManagerialStaffs (101 ,000), Clerical and Administrative Workers (86,000), and the Bank Employees (82,000). Of course, smaller unions may feel that their opportunities for participation are even more restricted. Thus what is required is not merely to patch up the industrial composition and balance of the General Council, but to re-shape in more ways than that, the participation in rue affairs by affilGJ ated unions. planning agencies The trade unions, and -mo_r_e_p_a_r_tJ,-.c-ulaif the TUC, have become linked to planning agencies and involved with major processes of structural change going on in jparticular sectors. In the first place, the TUC saw the National Economic Development Council, together with Economic Development Committees (Encs) for particular industries, as giving the trade union movement an opportunity to par ticipate in shaping economic objectives. The NEDC itself had its role in the planning process limited when Labour came to power, but some of the EDCS were more productive. The rue has been sufficiently convinced of the potential of these bodies to press for their extension, for example, to cover the financial sector and local government. Nevertheless, trade union participation in such bodies has not yet been very effective. Thus, when the TUC in 1966 brought together trade union members of EDCS (somethingit does all too infrequently), "they admitted frankly that until now employers had made more effective use of the Encs. Trade union officials were usually busy with all sorts of other problems and could not find time to take part fully in the work of the committees . : . Another criticism was that they had yet to establish any standard machinery for passing information back and forth to workers in the industry ... All agreed that unions working on Encs should have the backing of a research department, for despite the services of the rue staff there was a real need for union experts on the industry concerned-its technical aspectsas well as its economic performance . . . All said they were happier scrutinising the efficiency of individual firms in detail than looking . . . at the industry at large" (rue, Industrial News, November 1966). One has here all the ingredientsthat limit the effectiveness of the trade union presence on planning agencies. Much the same might be said of the trade union presence on the ten Regional Economic Planning Councils (REPCs) ; here, if anything, the briefing and servicing provided by the TUC and individual unions has been even less adequate. The General Council, however, pressed for increased trade union membership of REPCS, and several additional appointments were made in 1968. It need hardly be said that in a period of rapid structural change in industry, and with majorproblems of employment prospects and earnings levels in many sub-regions, effective trade union participation in regional development strategy is increasingly im· portant. There is, besides, a direct organis. ational interest since detailed know ledge of the establishment of enterprises can heLp direct union recruitment effort. It is equally obvious that trade union participation in Industrial TrainingBoards (rTB) has very great significance. The main features of trade union concern in ITB work emerge clearly in the rue's Industrial training since the 1964 Act, a report of a conference of union members of ITBS . These boards already cover some 16 million workers, though some major boards are barely beginning to function. The annual flow of levies and grants is now £120 million. Not only is this work important in its influence on employment opportunities and the adaptability of workers. It connects with collective bargaining interests in job security and wider questions of employmentpolicy. Increasingly ITB work requires more serious attempts at estimation of manpower requirements, generates more pressure for manpower planning, and connects with the development and planning work of EDCS and REPCs. Here too there is a direct trade union organisational interest, since training grants can be used to finance the training of employees' representatives, particularly shop stewards. It becomes obvious that the trade union movement should reap a cumulative advantage from trade union membership in this array of planning and trainingbodies. But the necessary conditions for this have to be provided, and so far there has only been the provision of vestigialservicing and liaison. Even the briefingof members on related rue policies has not been adequate, and co-ordination and wider consultation have been rare. Given the connection of subject matter and development policies as between industrial training, regional planning, and the economic development of particular industries, the linkages and exchange of experience required should have been treated more seriously. None of this is helped by a departmental division of labour at the rue in which rTBs are the concern of the organisation department, REPCS of the production department, and EDCs of the economic department. Nor by the exiguous resources of these de partments. Thus, the trade union movement, although committed ·in principle to participation in planning agencies (and indeed to a firmer planning framework for all of them) has yet to treat seriouslythe requirements of effective participation . The response of the General Council to major changes in industrial structure has shown up further inadequacies in its procedures. Because of the existence of a standing Nationalised Industries Committee, and of staff with the requisiteexpertise, the many important changes in transport organisation and policy have been accompanied at every stage by rue initiated analysis, policy and bargaining. In many ways this has been a model of what the rue can achieve by way of coordination of policy and action, despite the absence of any specific "federal" grouping of transport unions. Nevertheless, major questions of organisation remain unresolved, and it is doubtful whether the Nationalised Industries Committee has been equally alert and constructive in other parts of its domain (such as IRe's strange handling of the major organisational upheaval of the Atomic Energy Authority) . The unresolved constitutional problemsof "industrial" groups of unions within the framework of the rue have been made glaringly obvious by the behaviour of the Steel Industry Trade Union Consultative Committee. The committee appears to have acquired a life of its own rather than operating within terms of reference related to the work of General Council committees such as the Nationalised Industries Committee or the Organisation Committee. The confusion is apparent in the 1968 General Council's report (para 409) ; the OrganisationCommittee considered the question of union recognition in the steel industryand finally produced a statement on the matter which the General Council endorsed. The Steel Consultative Committee decided they could not accept the General Council's v·iew, and without more ado informed the British Steel Corporation of their own views as to what recognition should be afforded. This action was subsequently "noted with regret" by the Organisation Committee, and "noted" by the General Council. In essence the General Council had called into existence a quasi-federal body, and then did not know what to do with it. Yet the body concerned was able to trade on its status as a TUC committee, while advancing its own views and rejecting those endorsed by the General Council. Thus the Pearson Committee reported that the Steel Consultative Committee's letter to the Steel Corporation(after the Consultative Committee had rejected the General Council's view) "was written on behalf of the ruc and was naturally treated' by the Corporation as conveying the recommendation of the TUC" (Pearson Report, Cmnd 3754, paras34-36). This epitomises both the uneasy relations between the TUC and other federations, and the gap in rue structure due to its abandonment of industrial committees. The patchiness of the Tuc's review of\structural change in the economy, due to the deficiencies of its committee structure can be seen also in its late responseto the widespread process of merger and 1 take-over sweeping the private sectori/ Not until 1969, and then within the context of its Economic Review, did the TUC provide overall guidelines for union bargaining to protect worker and union interests in face of company "rationalisation", and shame (rather than bargain) the Government and its agencies of rationalisation (especially the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation) into seeking some guarantees from merging companies about their employee policies. ~ncomes policy A further major development-in-rue functions has emerged from the tangledhistory of incomes policy. In the early stages of the incomes policy the initiative to a quite surprising extent rested with the Government ; this was particularly true of the dra:fting of the criteria that were to be used by the Nationa'l Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) . These criteria subsequently became Schedule 2 of the 1966 Prices and Incomes Act. In a piecemeal fashion the rue learnt that if it did not want to see the steady encroachment of state dictated criteria, of Government dictated norms, of state machinery for reviewing the bargaining process, and of legislative sanctions, then it had to achieve its own independentreview machinery and collective bargaining objectives. The key parts of this rue response, which has had some success in wresting initiative from the state and lodging it instead in the rue, have been the setting up of the Incomes PolicyCommittee to review union claims, and the publication of an annual Economic review, which has identified criteria for a co-ordinated collective bargainingpolicy. The Incomes Policy Committee is not concerned with the compatabilityof claims with the Government's incomes policy criteria, but with their "compatibility with the incomes policy endorsed by Congress". (The Government's criteria have diverged for some time from those of the TUC. The rue's "norm" has been expressed in flat rate terms-attemptingto hold out a helping hand to lower paidworkers-whereas the Government has persisted with a percentage norm.) Thus we should raise a small cheer for the action of the Incomes Policy Committee when reviewing claims in June 1969 for going out of their way to write to two unions (Shop and Distributive Workers, Tailor and Garment Workers) "welcoming their decision to seek a significantcontribution to attaining equal pay for women workers". At least t:his is a move out of the negativeness of "restraint" towards a positive policy. The response of the rue to incomes policy might be characterised as follows: l. It has been responsible in the sense that it accepted broadly the need to accelerate productivity improvement and stabilise wage costs as part of an economic growth strategy. 2. It has become increasingly independent, in the sense of substituting its own criteria, its own notification system, for those of the Government. The TUC criteria are developed in chapter 3 of the 1969 Economic review; no equivalentanalysis of principles and practice has come from the Government recently. The TUC has, in particular, provided an extended analysis of the position of the low paid and a comprehensive approach to a policy that woul'd improve the position of low paid workers. It has besides identified its own "norm" for mid-1969 to mid-1970 (arguing that productivitytrends would enable an earnings increase of 18s a week without jeopardising stable prices), and adapted it to situations where local bargaining plays a major role. And it has identified exceptions to the normal rate of increase, for situations such as "comprehensive rationalisation of wagestructure", "a substantial increase in guaranteed minimum earnings", and "progress towards the establishment of equal pay", which the Government has not yet given adequate recognition to. 3. It has repudiated state agencies and legislation which have a mandatory and penal role. Thus it has persuaded the Government to remove the temporarylegislation that involved extensive power to intervene to delay settlements, and is now opposing even the much more limited provision of part 2 of the 1966 Act (which the Government has indicated it will use), which delays pay or price increases while the NBPI proceedswith a reference. 4. It has accepted, at least until the 1969 Congress, the existence of an investigatory state agency in the field of pricesand incomes. The 1969 Congress resolution, which by a narrow majority opposed the statutory basis of the NBPI, is perhaps best seen as a further consequence of the trade union movement's total repudiation of a "penal" approach to the handling of industrial relations. In many ways the trade unions suffer in bargaining from a deficiency of information, while their own policy decisions and the progress of their claims are in public view already. So they have much to gain from the expertly staffed investigatory processes of the NBPI, and little to lose. 5. The TUC has been constructively critiea! of the Government's policies for economic management and growth ; it has not accepted the Government's assumptions and analysis. Instead it has made its own study of the economy and presented its own alternative economic strategy. This is a novel departure for the TUC . It has succeeded in presenting a coherent statement of TUC aims in economic management, in manpower and employment policy, on regional development, on social benefits and taxation, and on collective bargaining itself. It has highlighted specific issues of immediate urgency, such as the handling of industrial mergers, but related these to its overall startegy, such as to employmentand income distribution. 6. The TUC has sought to bargain with the Government from the position of strength afforded it by the co-operation of member unions within TUC machinery, and by a clearer view of overall economis policy than it had previously had. This attempt to bargain may only have had patchy results, but combined with the critical analysis of the Economic review it has helped the TUC to take the initiative on many subjects, and the Government has begun the retreat from legislative dictation in the wages field. These characteristics of the eventual TUC response on incomes policy are not onlysignificant in themselves. They are repeated with only minor changes of em· phasis when the TUC in 1969 had to confront a Government proposing to introduce new penal sanctions in the field of industrial disputes. In a sense the price the trade unions have had to pay in order to extricate themselves from state initiative, and state dictation of terms, in income determination has been the creation of a more co-ordinated trade union movement. collective bargaining The re-direction of emphasis from an incomes policy of restraint towards a coordinated collective bargaining policy for the trade unions has gone along with an even wider initiative on the part of the TUC a1mmg at the reorganisation of the collective bargaining system. Here, the Donovan Commission's report has created new opportunities for change and development, and an urgent need for collective discussion and co-ordinated response from the trade unions. In all this it is clear that the TUC has to play a leading part not only in bringingunions together, but a;lso in seeking to identify acceptable principles and guidelines in a new situation. The upheaval caused by Donovan is better understood if some of its main ingredients are set down briefly : 1. There is very strong emphasis on the new pattern of comprehensive plant and · company bargaining, that has emerged in recent years. But is the emphasis to be on "plant" or on "company"? (Giventhe concentration of control of British industry in the 1960s into giant corporations, the bargaining process has in any case to be drastically adapted to face the new centres of industrial power, so that the company is perhaps the more important link. But this raises major questions of trade union structure as well.) How is this new pattern of bargaining to be related to "industry" bargaining ; is this to decline in importance or to be given a new role in supervising the pattern of company agreements? How do these categories apply to, for instance, public services such as health and local government? The TUC sharply criticised what it considered the too sweeping generalisations of the Donovan Commission and, in response, is forced to carrythrough a sector by sector appraisal of these questions with its constituent unions. 2. In many ways Donovan points to the universal recognition of unions, bargaining by companies, and in consequence, the provision of facilities for union organisation. But if this offers an extension of union organisation and bargaining facilities, it also raises further questions of policy and of trade union development. For instance, what role is to be accorded to the Wages Council system, which at the moment, besides agriculture, covers 3t million workers in half a million "establishments"? Are wagescouncils going to be given new functions and powers to accelerate the development of self sufficient trade union organisation and collective bargaining? Or just how it the transition of these underorganised sectors to effective bargaining to be managed? The Commission's report is least constructive at this point, and the Government have not produced any constructive proposals either. 3. Another facet of the post Donovan discussions has been the concern to es- t~blish appropriate industrial relations procedures. This vexed question has not been helped by the somewhat hysterical attitude of press and Government towards industrial disputes ; especially as this concern over disputes has been more directed to suppression of dispute action than to remedying the causes of disputes. It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the awkwardness of the problems bequeathed to those involved in industrial relations under this heading. There are obvious re~ons why some sections of industry should have become more dispute prone. Both degenerated wage systems and their extreme fragmentation create points of dispute. There is, besides, wide disagreement over unilateral prerogatives claimed by both sides, though more especially by management. The complex integration of production processes in many industries magnifiesthe indirect consequences of stoppages. (Professor H. Turner sought in Is Britain really strike prone to put the problem in perspective. But with a rise in strike incidence in recent years in the engineering and transport sectors, which are important for expor·ts, the subject remains a sensitive one. The same author was largely responsible for the NBPI report(no 65) on Payment by results systems. This empha·sised, some might think in this case the statistics exaggerated, the wage drift (4 per cent) associated with payment •by results. Taking the two studies together it is tempting to conclude that the dispute proneness of payment by results systems in certain circumstances, and the strategic bargaining power accorded to many work groups under such systems, have been even more significant in generating cost inflation than in .producing strikes, but maywell have been producing more of both.) Here too, although the Donovan Commission opened a process of argumentand change it did not identify some of the crucial requirements for the immediate future. For all that it had to sayabout .procedures it avoided the central issues of the extent of managerial prerogative and unilateral initiative that operates at .present in many industries, such as in engineering. The TUC, by contrast, took the opportunity afforded bythe argument over the penal clauses of l n place of strife to advance more clearlythan ever before a demand on the partof the trade union movement for procedures to embrace, and make subject to "status quo" provisions during procedure, matters at present treated as managerial prerogative. This somewhat sloganised demand for the "status quo" has important implications for trade union objectives in negotiabing new procedure agreements. The argument is that where the subject in dispute is an improvement in wages and conditions, the "status quo" operates until settlement is reached (in fact some back dating of settlements may occur, but this is rare) . But under many procedures, or in their absence, management will unilaterallyintroduce changes in operating practice which may deeply affect workpeople'sinterests and produce disputes, without being subject to any procedural constraint. Hence, it is argued, there exists real inequality in the way proceduresoperate, and this can only be overcome by bringing far more of the changessought by both sides, management and workers, within the scope of procedures. normally subjecting them to "status quo" while procedure is gone through, and providing too for speedy instead of protracted di putes procedures. Tt is therefore significant that the TUC, in its Programme for action, in which it committed itself to acting to secure a return to work in "unconstitutional" toppages, made clear that it meant bythis ea es where there were procedure with status quo provtstons covering the issue in dispute but where workers struck before procedure was exhausted. The Government itself managed to show some recognition of the relevance of the "status quo" in the handling of disputesprocedures, but it did so in a confused way. In its proposals 1in In place of strife (now withdrawn) it offered the "status quo ante" as the normal arrangement to be dictated under penal sanction during the proposed 28 day "conciliation pause" (paras 93-96). It thus succeeded in implying that a normal resort to "status quo" during conciliation procedures was desirable, but that it was only likely to lie within the grasp of trade union negotiator if they resorted to "unconstitutiOilal" strikes. It is no wonder that the Government was forced to retreat in disarray from such a false position. Not only did the Donovan Commission blur the important points of principle, and controversy, involved in reform of procedures. It gave little guidance on intervention to reduce "unconstitutional" disputes in the period, which might be a protracted one, during which the focus and subject matter of collective bargaining are being sifted, major changes in the wage system are being attempted, and new procedures are being argued over. The Ford dispute eadier this year was one example of the tensions producedduring such an upheaval. Donovan saw the unsuitability of legal anctions" those resorting to unconstitutional action should not be threatened with anv disadvantages imposed ·by law until new procedures have been put into operation" -but did not consider the possibility of any new approach of a non-legal kind. The Government stepped in with propo als for sanctions, but fortunatelystepped back again. In the event the TUC has equipped itself with changes in rule which involve a dramatic extension of its previous scope for intervention tin disputes by including "unauthorised and unconstitutional stoppages of work" in its revised rule 11 (see appendix). Thus, on all the major changes stemming from the Donovan Commission report. ll the TUC has found itself playing a majorpositive and reforming role. The lack of precision in Donovan proposals at decisive points, the sheer complexity of the collective bargaining arrangements and associated trade union organisationalquestions in each sector, has gJiven unprecendented importance to the initiative of the rue. For the rue now has not only the responsibility of co-ordinatingtrade union responses, though it has to have that, but also for a great deal of initiative in policy making. Already, in its earliest statement Action on Donovan the rue had departed decisively from some parts of Donovan's analysis and conclusions. And this meant putting its own alternative analysis and proposals. It was as part of this response that the TUC broke new ground in Jts six sectoral conferences held in March 1969 on "Collective bargaining and trade union development". The sectors chosen for this purpose were engineering and shipbuilding ; construction ; public sector ; wages councils sector ; private sector non-manual; and other private sector. The new potentialities and new responSJibilities falling on the rue requirethe development of some functional sectoral grouping of its membership. Here, therefore, was another new beginning in place of the abortive industrial grouping created in the 1920s, but never successfully developed. The General Council also used a new technique in these conferences, that of "introductory documents" which were not General Council policy statements, but wrnch raised sharply and precisely the main issues that the conferences had to address themselves to. The next steps in this sectoral review are not yet clear, since the critica- l negotiations with the Government over the penal clauses of In place of strife intervened and dominated General Council business. trade union organisation A further area where the rue's role has been greatly extended is that of trade union organisation and structure. For some years prior to the Donovan Corn mission's report the rue had added to its long established intervention in inter- union relations, through the so-called "Bridlington principles" and its operation of the rue Disputes Committee, a series of more positive inter-union talks. It is by no means clear that these repeated efforts by the rue to bring together unions with overlapping interests, or working within the same sector, were paruicularly productive. The 1960s have been characterised by many importanttrade union mergers, some of which have represented both a valuable process of rationalisation and considerable skill in constitution making (see my research paper for the Donovan Commission, Trade union structure and government, Research paper 5, pt 1). But rue "goodoffices" have not generally played an important part. It might be truer to saythat the rue's efforts have served to reinforce the new found readiness of manytrade unions to examine their relations with other unions ; in this, limitation of inter-union competition, joint working arrangements, and amalgamation !itself, all have to be considered. The rue, for its part, put forward in 1966 recommendations for "structural improvements" particularly amalgamations, involving over 50 unions. In 1967 the Tuc's emphasis changed to encouragement of spheres of influence agreements and regrouping of membership within particular industries. But the pace of tills was slow and uncertain. Since the Donovan Commission report it has become clear that there are three distinguishable, though related, fields of TUC intervention and initiative: 1. The TUC has been surveying union rules. Already an analysis of rules covering admissions and discipline has been put before the General Council. Further studies of the coverage by rules of the procedure for calling strikes, and of union elections, are to follow. The significance of this lies in the rue's opposition to the Donovan proposals for compulsory registration of unions, and within that for rules to be subject to some degree of statutory definil!ion, and for appeals and complaints to be handled by a new kind of legal tribunal. At the special Congress in 1969 the General Council resolution, which was overwhelmingly endorsed, went out of its way to stress that the "Movement is unalterably opposed" to "compulsory registration by trade unions of their rules". In consequence, the rue is seeking to move into this disputed territory. In pa·rt, this involves the identification of "basic principles". Already, on membership admission and discipline the TUC has identified 18 basic prinoiples and recommended that union rules should clearly cover each point. It is not clear yet whether a new Congress rule will be required to ensure that member unions comply. In part, the rue's response may have to extend also to the creation of a rue systemof membership appeals, as originally suggested in their evidence to the Donovan Commission. 2. The TUC has taken sweeping powers to settle inter-union disputes. Since manyworkers may find themselves in a particular trade union because of a TUC award, one can see that the TUC is under an increasing obligation to take seriously the observance of "basic principles" within union government. Both the rue initiatives are connected. The revised version of rule 12 of Congress puts affiliated unions under obligation to notify anydispute with other unions, not to take official strike action, to take "immediate and energetic" steps to end unauthorised stoppages, and to give the rue the opportunity to examine the issue and make an award or recommendation. This approach covers the whole field of disputes over trade union recognition, trade union membership, demarcation of work, and "any other difficulty"-by which Pro- gramme for action makes it clear is meant any difference as to the policies to be pursued over wages and conditions. It need hardly be said, that if the rue does intervene in this way on recognitiondisputes it would largely take from the Commission for Industrial Relations the exercise of initiative in determining the appropriate bargaining agent. This is important, as there are a number of reasons why the rue should strive to keep the criteria used in determining trade union development within the decision of the trade union movement. 3. The TUC has begun, although so far a.Jl too tentatively, to intervene more positively in trade union development. It is, to say the least, an anomaly that the trade union movement which so regularly demand's positive and co-ordinated planning in economic and social affairs should not yet have formulated a development .plan for the trade unions themselves. So far, the TUC has taken the initiative in some sectors in bringingunions together for talks on "closer working", and in Programme for action recognises the need for "more clearlydefining" spheres of •influence as part of t:1e review of the Bridlington principles. These long established restraints on inter- union competition are least effective in preventing the emergence of multi- unionism (and indeed miscellaneous unionism) where new and non-unionised enterprises are concerned. So the promise that the rue "will take a fresh look at the question of trade union rationalisation" in relation to changes in industrial structure, "notably the growth of large combines", is one that needs to be taken up urgently. Already at the March post-Donovan sectoral conferences a number of pertinent questions and suggestions were put to the unions. But this has not yet progressed to the stage of a real plan for strengthening and extending trade unionism. This positive development is what is needed to produce organisational benefits to trade unionism from the greater self- discipline the movement has accepted so far as disputes are concerned. In other words, although the rue has intervened over strikes, this by itself is negative and inadequate. It has to be seen as only one aspect of a positive programme for dealing with the causes of disputes through a co-ordinated collective bargaining strategy; it has to be seen as only one side of a co-ordinated development of trade union organisational strength. a programme for the 1970s How should the TUC develop ·its new role in the 1970s? To understand that, it is necessary to identify the main issues involved in the development of trade union organisation and policy. But first, we need to look at the underlying principles of any adequate and acceptable programme. In part these are concerned with the standards trade unions set themselves in pursuing workers' !interests; in part with the relations between the trade union movement and the state. underlying principles I. The first principle, which illuminates both these aspects, is to emphasise the independence, the self-determination of the trade union movement. The prior.itiesof its development and policies have to be determined by the movement itself, not by outside agencies. The forms in which it exercises its influence have to be the creation of the movement itself. The discipline lit necessarily requires from member unions, and from members of unions, must be based on the moral force of democratic decision within the movement and not on an apparatus of coercive power directed from outside. The General Council of the TUC rightly saw that TUC authority on intervention in disputes could not operate ,jn harness with over-riding penal powers directed by the state. Such an association would have been crippling to the long run acceptability of TUC action ; the principles of intervention, the machinery of intervention, and the moral basis for the exercise of authority would have become increasingly confused. That could onlyhave ended in the alienation of manyorganised workers from the TUC. The General Council were the more sure of this, since in the area of incomes policy only an increasing.Jy independent stance by the trade union movement, and retreat by the state from outright dictation, offered a way to resolve the confusion and al•ienation that had developed. 2. Secondly, the trade union movement is socially and politically, a highly responsible movement. It does not seek to denythe seriousness and the complexity of the problems of economic management -of efficiency, of costs, or structural change-that influence the prospects of growth, and the prospects for real incomes and employment. As a movement, therefore, it cannot retreat towards a simple minded money wage militancy. Its responsibiMy of approach doesn't, on the other hand, mean that it feels it has to a:::ce;Jt the Government's analysis or measures. The same attitude is apparent over the Donovan Commission and its follow up ; the fact that the TUC does not accept the Donovan analysis as gospeldoesn't mean that it is in any doubt about the extensive reform and development of the industrial relations system that is required. When the Government becomes seized with the need to curb industrial disputes, the response of the trade union movement is one of serious concern to tackle the causes of disputes -to deal more effectively with grievances and institutional weaknesses than before. There are, of course, many in the trade union movement whose repudiation of the power structure and economic relationships of a capitalist economy is so total that they would deny, or at least much more sharply confine, this felt sense of social responsibility that characterises the modern British trade union movement. But while the trade unions have nearly half their membership in the public sector, are still deeply involved in the practical politics of the Labour Party, and retain a strong sense of concern as to the interests of the least protected work~rs, the characteristic responsibility remams. 3. One distinct aspect of this responsibility is the wide acceptance of social accountability in the field of industrial relations. In part this is simply an extension of the traditional emphasis of British trade unions on a framework of protective legislation for the labour force. It seems natural to trade unionists that basic r.ights of trade union organisation should be made explicit in legislation, and upheld by public agencies. Nor is there any serious resistance to the deployment of public agencies to investigate industrial relations, and the wider operation of commercial firms. f'or one thing, trade unions are at some disadvantage in many bargaining situations through lack of adequate information and analysis; as the National Board for Prices and Incomes has shown, the presence of publk agencies may enable a great deal of information to be made availa:ble and thus help a re-appraisal of disputed issues. The same result is to be expected from the work of the Commission on Industrial Relations. 4. There is now much more· awareness in the trade unions of the need for the trade union movement to respond to industrial and social change by a conscious and co-ordinated determination of policy. This, given the dynamic nature of the unions' economic environment, cannot be restricted to a piecemeal and defensive response to events. A coherent analysis of economic and social development, a critical eva-luation of Government analysis and policies, and an aotive and pers, istent follow up to major issues, are all required. The General Council has realised as a result of its Economic reviews the advantage of having a relatively comprehensive view of development, to which particular policies can be related. n(The Confederation of British Industry by contrast has suffered from the absence of any equivalent "strategic" view.) The co-ordination of the movement's ~ ~ policies is required not only to see the wood for the trees, but in order to maximise the influence that the trade unions can bring to bear on economic and social policy. For it is obvious that if the trade unions speak in an uncertain voice, or offer contrasted views of what should be done, they deny themselves an effective impact on future policy. This is the more important since many issues in industrial relations-not only incomes policy, for instance, but the phasing of "equal pay" and the character,istics of a policy on minimum wages and conditions, not to mention many of the manpower planning questions that are now urgent-callfor this co-ordinated response. ~ 5. Such co-ordination of policy requires too the co-ordination of the organisational efforts of trade unions. But this need for a co-ordinated response by the movement has to respect the real diversity of worker interests that is reflected in the variety of forms of trade union constitutions. In other words, it would be dangerous to pursue the goal of the combined response of the whole trade union movement by ignoring or suppressing particular occupational or industrial needs. One should beware of those who unselectively crit