BRITISH LIBRARY 
OF POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 



LONDON SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 



fabian tract 376 
has Israel really won?· 

Colin Jackson introduction 

E. F. Penrose Arab politics 
Dan Gillon policies for Israel 
H. G. Nicholas the role of the UN 1 
Neville Brown strategic aspects 1 
Frank Judd integrating Israel 1 
Elizabeth Collard suggestions for peace 1 
--------------------------~-


this pamphlet, like all publications of the Fab1an Societ 
represents not the collective view of the Society but only tt 
view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility c 
the Society is limited to approving the publications which 
issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour movE 
ment. Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London SW 
October 1967 7163 0376 


1. introduction 
Colin Jackson 


This Fabian pamphlet is an attempt to 
provide some thoughtful and constructive 
views on the Middle East crisis for 
average readers. No doubt those with 
extreme partisan views both on the Arab 
and on the Israeli side, will find the 
essays too lukewarm, but in fact, a little 
less fury in this part of the world won't 
do any harm. Unlike some other Fabian 
pamphlets, each chapter represents the 
views of the writer concerned and does 
not commit the other contributors. It is 
mainly concerned with looking forward 
because the Fabians are anxious for an 
answer and not just a debate. 

Looking •back for a moment though, one 
is struck by the appalling inevitability of 
the war of 1967. Any intelligent observer 
was bound to think that the conflict must 
come, but almost nobody did anything to 
prevent it. Extremist Arab views and a 
violence of language used by leaders of 
the Palestine Liberation Army went unchecked. 
So the Israelis were able to proclaim 
that the intention of the Arabs was 
the physical destruction of the people of 
Israel. Therefore if a tense situation arose 
a pre-emptive strike could be justified. 
It was only after the war that Mr Heikal, 

, 
in AI Ahram, deplored the verbal excesses. 
Then the Israelis, after beingcondemned by the UN for aggression in 
1956, showed little or no inclination to 
tackle the problem that has poisoned the 
atmosphere of the Middle East since the 
end of the British Mandate in Palestine ; 
namely, the many thousands of refugees.
Also, a regular visitor to lsrael could see 
that country becoming progressivelymore nationalist and forgetting the greatinternational philosophy that inspired 
some of the founders like Nathan Goldman. 
The younger generations in the 
Arab states and in Israel between 1956 
and 1967 were systematically taught to 
despise and fear each other. 

If the Arabs and the Israelis are to blame 
for the 1967 war, with a;JI its tragic aftermath, 
so are the Big Powers. Despite an 
attempt since 1964 by a Labour administration 
to come to terms with Arab aspirations, 
basically London has not been 
able to exercise a moderating influence 
because of its colonial image. The United 

States has continued to provide overwhelming 
financial support for Israel 
and, after a brief improvement in relations 
with the Arab world during the 
days of President Kennedy, Washington 
seems to have sunk back, in the months 
before June 1967, into a kind of negativeapathy. Some observers have said that 
the us has been so busy in Vietnam that 
it has been inclined to leave the Middle 
East to the Russians. The Soviet Union, 
for its part, whilst partly trying to keepChina out of the area, has in other 
aspects failed to restrain the extremist 
elements in the Arab world and supplied 
arms that lulled Arab leaders into hopes 
of a military victory. The UN, perhaps,
comes best out of this sad story with the 
devoted service of UN personnel both in 
the Gaza Strip and in the observer units. 
But the UN leadership has been slow to 
point out in the loudest and clearest 
terms the inevitable consequences of the 
arms build up and the border raids. 

Now what of the future? In any agreement 
that brings •peace to the area, one 
of the major elements must be an acceptance 
by the Arab states of the Israeli 
people's right to exist free from harrassment. 
Israel, like other countries, should 
be able to sail for peaceful purposesalong the maritime highways of the 
globe. It is possible in the future that 
Israel may enter into some political confederation 
embracing that part of the 
world from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Arab Gulf. Certainly there's no future 
for Israel as a Western outpost in this 
part of the Afro-Asian world. Perhaps 
one of the most significant developments 
which could help in the future is the 
increase in Israel of people of Jewish 
faith drawn from the Arab world and a 
relative decrease of European and American 
Jews. 

Israel should strive to present a friendly 
and a modest front to her Arab neighbours 
and stop the kind o~ arrogant posturing 
of General Dayan. Perhaps the 
Israelis might do worse ·than take as their 
motto for living relations with the Arab 
peoples that tune, "I've grown accustomed 
to your face". Of course, just as 
the Arabs must recognise the existence 


of Israel so the Israeli armies must draw 
back from their recent conquests. There 
can be no peace in the Middle East if the 
Israeli leaders claim the right alone to 
possess Jerusalem. The West Bank, too, 
must go back to Jordan, otherwise the 
Israeli leaders will merely absorb the 
poison of an alien population. 

The Arabs, in accepting Israel as a fact, 
would do well to concentrate on the 
more positive aspects of life in that partof the world. They should have more 
constructive reasons foc unity than 
simple hostility to Israel. In fact the Arab 
nations could take a leaf out of the Commonwealth 
book and organise in more 
practical terms their co-operation in the 
fields of science and technology, medicine, 
communications and the press. An 
obsession with Israel has created a kind 
of pervasive inferiority complex amongst 
many of the Arab leaders. It is time tJhat 
the Arab peoples once again gave a 
major positive contribution to world civilisation 
; through co-operation and unitythe question of Israel would fall into 
perspective. 

The Arabs and Israelis will not, however, 
agree to live together in peace of their 
own accord at this moment in time. One 
of the greatest dangers, in fact, in this 
immediate post war period is the wayin which extremist elements in both 
Israeli and Arab circles are now coming 
once more to the fore. When tlhe General 
Assembly convenes this autumn, Russia 
and America, with the backing of influential 
nations such as Britain, Sweden. 
India and Canada, should promulgatetheir firm terms for a Middle East settlement 
which would basically involve the 
recognition of Israel in return for no 
territorial aggrandisement. Permanent UN 
officials of the highest level should press 
for permanent UN forces on both sides 
of the frontiers. The case could be 
argued for a permanent UN reserve and 
staging base being set up in one of Britain's 
sovereign base areas in Cyprus, 
that could be leased to the UN. Similarlythe General Assembly this autumn will 
need more than talk, it will need action 
for a refugee re-settlement plan on a 
much vaster scale than anything that has 

been seen before and Israel will have to 
be seen to be contributing. Finally, again 
on the basis of the Russian-American 
initiative, fresh and more urgent talks 
will be needed over the problem of arms 
control. 

The cynics and the partisans will no 
doubt describe these proposals as impossible 
of achievement or unfair to their 
side. At the moment the odds seem 
against a peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East because the mood of drift 
at the highest level in world councils 
seems to be re-asserting itself. The 
chances must be, therefore, that a third 
round between the Arabs and the Jews 
will become inevitable. A t!hird round 
with nuclear weapons could lead to a 
third war on a world scale. The international 
community has almost certainlyless than a decade before violence overwhelms 
the region again. If the human 
race has any real collective intelligence 
it must get together to solve the Arab-
Israeli problem, otherwise the outlook 
for the globe is grim. 


Arab politics 

E. F. Penrose 
Ever since the downfall of the Ottoman These po.litical stirrings have occurred in 
Empire, those Middle East countries, a times when, apart from the special case 
majority of whose populations are Arabs, o.f Israel, the whole Middle East has 
have lead a turbulent political life. Di-been struggling to bring itself fully into 
vided by geographical and historical cir-the modern world, leaving behind the 
cumstances, by varying local interests, remnants of mediaevalism which survive 
and by the arbitrary actions of rival great in rural areas, in the small towns and vilpowers, 
into a number of separate states lages, and on the outskirts of the largerof uneven size and development, they cities. Important advances have already 
have achieved unified action only fitfully been made, but they fall short of what 
and incompletely, and mainly for the is desired, and the impatience of younger 
purpose of eliminating foreign domina-Arab nationalists has drawn them in 
tion and control. The common senti-some countries into co-operation with 
ment which they share and which is de-ambitious army officers who, havingsignated by the Arab words gaumiya and seized .po.wer, initially with popular apwataniya, 
reflects a deep and important proval, have entrenched .themselves as 
sense of kinship and special relationship authoritarian rulers no more, and usually 

, 
which the outside world can only ignore even less, subject to representative con-
at its peril, but whiah falls short of what trol than their traditional predecessorsEuropeans understand by nationalism. had been. 

Arab nationalism, however, is strong "Arab socialism" was added to Arab naenough 
to create an ambiguity of allegi-tionalism as part of the drive for modance 
in the Arab states. The Charter of ernisation. Michel 'Aflaq, the Ba'thist 
the Arab League affirms-and Egypt was philosopher, had propounded it from the 
foremost in demanding that it should beginning, but in general terms only. 
affirm-the principle of independence After the Egyptian revolution in 1952 
and non-intervention of each Arab state and the Iraq Revolution in 1958, the 
in its relations with the others. But two landowning and richer merchant classes 
political parties or movements were which had been sources of capital in-
founded on the opposite political prin-vestment, fell into political disfavour and 
ciple, the Ba'th Party and the Arab Na-when, in the late fifties and early sixties, 
tionalist Movement, tihe headquarters of economic plans to hasten modernisation 
the first being usually in Syria and of the were adopted, the avant garde of the 
second in Beirut. Emphasising that there younger planners began to favour in-
is only "one Arab nation", their activi-creased state enter:prise as a means of 
ties have spread into several Arab states controlling investment. Other special cir-
and they have sometimes aimed at the cumstances also contributed to the sweep-
downfall of governments and individual ing nationalisation measures in Egypt in 
ministers in more than one country on 1962 and similar measures in Iraq and 
the ground tha:t they were untrue to Arab Syria later, ex·tending to financial and 
nationalism. The two movements have many distributive as well as to producoften 
been in conflict with one another, tive activities. But these measures did not 
especially when the Ba'th clashed with find favour everywhere, nor is it clear 
President Nasser. As to their relations that in themselves they hastened develop-
with the latter, both of them were ready ment. 
to recognise him as "leader of the Arab 
world", but in any form of union both However, their effect was to place the 
of them expected him to share power, at more traditional Arab states on the deleast 
local power, with them. This he was fensive and to divide the forces of Arab 
never willing to do. Without aiming at nationalism. Conflicts of regional inter-
the annexation of other Arab countries, ests within the Middle East were aggrahe 
aspired to be undisputed "leader of vated by doctrinal wrangles and by as-
the Arab wor.Jd", an aspiration difficult to pirations for leadership. The Egyptianharmonise with non-intervention in the occupation of the chief centres of popuaffairs 
of other Arab states. lation in the Yemen was a means of 


asserting Egypt's influence and that of 
the modernising forces against the traditional. 
But in practice the sense of kinship 
between Egyptians and Yemenis 
proved to be slight, and the majority 
even of the would-be modernisers among 
the Yemenis came to look on Egyptians 
as foreigners. The war soon showed 
striking analogies on a smaller scale with 
the United States war against Vietnam. 
It provoked Saudi Arabia, which had 
quickly taken on new importance and 
strength following the displacement of 
King Ibn Saud by the Emir Feisel, into 
giving aid to the Yemeni resistance. 

Syria's influence 

The cold war between Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia broken, until the Khartoum 
agreement, only by a short lived truce 
after the Jeddah agreement and the 
Harad conference, gained only a few outright 
adherents on each side. Several 
counties, like Iraq, which has recognised 
the Yemeni republic, attemped to maintain 
friendly relations with both Egyptand Saudi Arabia. Moderating tendencies 
were showing themselves in a number 
of the Arab countries before the 
Israeli-Arab war, but Syria was a notable 
exception, after the seizure of powerin Damascus in February 1966 by army 
officers of the Aliwiya sect of the Shi'a. 
In disfavour with the Sunni majority of 
the country, they resorted to demagogicappeals to the radical left in the Arab 
world, accentuating divisions, further 
weakening the ability of the Arab countries 
to face outside dangers, and tending 
to push President Nasser into a more 
venturesome external policity than he 
had been prepared to follow earlier with 
respect to Israel. In 1967, Jordan, itself 
the victim of an Israeli military assault in 
November 1966, replied to Cairo propaganda 
by taunting President Nasser with 
seeking shelter behind a United Nations 
screen. It is not clear how far the "pinprick" 
raids into the fringes of Israel 
were organised by ad hoc autonomous 
groups among discontented refugees and 
how far by groups under direct control 
of the Syrian government, since the 
latter in any case wished to claim credit 

for them. The violent Israeli riposteagainst Jordan last November was the 
worst possible way of dealing with them. 

In discussing Arab policy towards Israel 
a wide misconception in the Englishspeaking world must first be considered. 
It has sometimes been suggested that 
Ara·b opposition to Israel is the work of 
extremist groups mainly in Egypt and 
Syria, and that a number of other countries 
would come to terms with Israel. 
To those who have lived in different 
parts of the Arab world, this is a dangerous 
misconception. The "conservative" 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Kuwait, and Morocco have again and 
again made their attitude known in no 
uncertain terms. The interposition of 
Israel into the Middle East was certainly 
not less offensive to the conservative 
Islamic states than to the progressiste 
states. Actually, President Nasser has 
been a moderating force on this question 
for most of the period since 1952. 
In particular, by calling a "summit" 
meeting in 1964, he was able to check 
the rash tendencies then appearing in 
some of the other Arab states. 

The fundamental grounds of Arab hostility 
towards the state of Israel are independent 
of the divisions among the 
Arab states, such as those between 
"right" and "left" or republican and 
monarchist. To Arabs, regardless of 
shades of political opinion, Israel is a 
foreign intrusion into their midst, established 
at a time when decolonisation had 
appeared to be practically complete in 
Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. The 
modern Zionist movement was founded 
and sustained by European and North 
American Jews to carve out for their 
members an enclave of Asian territory 
inhabited by a majority of Arabs over 
many centuries. If one of its main objects 
was to settle permanently an unlimited 
number of Jewish people, some 
of whom had been subjected to persecution 
or discrimination or both, in Europe 
~nd North America, then, in Arab eyes.
It was an attempt to redress wrongs perpetrated 
by Europeans and their overseas 
descendents, at the expense of Asian 
peoples, who had played no part in corn



mitting them. It was aot surprising,
therefore, that the partition of Palestine 
in the face of Arab opposition should 
have been regarded as a return of occidental 
imperialism, creating . a state 
directed by leaders of European and 
North American origin, and sustained by 
occidental immigration to which no limit 
was set, and by large imports of capital,
mainly from·the United States. 

This impression was strengthened by the 
uncompromising attitude of Mr Ben 
Gurion's government on the question of 
the refugees created by the war and bythe policy of stimulating as much occidental 
immigration as possible, regardless 
of population pressure which, in an 
area lying within the arid belt that encircles 
the globe, might lead to demands 
for expansion at the expense of neighbours. 
The Anglo-French-Israeli aggression 
of 1956 seemed fully to confirm the 
Arab view thlllt Israel was an occidental 
inspired creation to serve as a bridgehead 
for imperialist aims. The British 
Government's role in this discreditable 
affair has been justly condemned by the 
British people, but it should not be overlooked 
that Israel was responsible for 
similar deception and lawlessness. 

The war of June 1967 also appears to 
Arabs to fit into the same picture. Here, 
it must be agreed, President Nasser's political 
judgment was seriously at fault, 
when he allowed pressure from Syria and 
Jordan to draw him into measures for 
which the military forces of the Arab 
countries were ill prepared. The "cold 
war" which had divided the Arab countries, 
the frequent political purges of 
army officers, the disastrous war in the 
Yemen, and the war in northern Iraq,
had destroyed all chances of a cohesive 
Arab army able to face Israel on equal 
terms. But the actual course of events 
seemed fully to support the standard 
Arab views on the nature and role of 
Israel. On the eve of the war Britain at 
once took sides against the Arab countries 
by seizing on the question of the 
Gulf of Aqaba, in isolation from the 
other and even more deep seated issues, 
notably the refugee question, on which 
Israel had shown little respect for the 

United Nations. When Mr Wilson hastened 
to Washington amidst reports that 
he wished to confer on forceful measures 
to keep the Gulf open, the damage to 
British interests was already done. 

But the final confirmation in Arab eyesof "Anglo-Saxon" collusion with Israel 
came in the circumstances of the eve of 
the Israeli attack, when U Thant, President 
J ohnson and the Soviet Premier all 
asked President Nasser not to open hostilities, 
and he accepted the request and 
acted accordingly. When Israel ignored 
requests and unleashed full scale warfare 
on June 5, the "Anglo Saxons" refused 
to join in any condemnation of the 
act and the Arabs found that by keeping 
their word they had gained nothing and 
lost the advantage of the first "strike" 
(General Dayan was kind enough to 
point this out to them. See Le Monde, 
21 July 1967, p4). We may ask, would 
the act of starting the war have been 
condoned by the English speaking countries 
if Egypt had struck first? The Egyptian 
Vice-President, known for his moderation, 
was about to leave for Washington 
to discuss the issues and a compromise 
might well have been worked out if 
the broader issues of the refugees had 
been taken up in addition to the question 
of the Gulf. Israel's attack was a disaster 
for the world that has gone unreproved. 

actions of the US 

Much remains to be uncovered regarding 
the precise role of the United States 
in the critical hours on the eve of and 
during the outbreak of the war. How 
seriously did they attempt to restrain 
Israel from starting the war? What were 
the attitudes of the White House advisors 
and the us State Department respectively? 
What was the mission of the uss 
Liberty in the area? While we can reconstruct 
diplomatic events in Cairo in 
considerable detail we know very little 
or nothing of exchanges between Washington 
and Tel-Aviv, orally and on 
paper. 

It follows that Arab peoples see the war 
and the post · war discussions in the 


United Nations as confirmation of their 
conviction that Israel is an outpost of 
occidental and especially United States 
imperialism. Their case has often been 
spoiled through exaggeration, but in its 
essentials it remains strong. Feeling as 
they do, it is chimerical to suppose that 
any Arab statesman, even if (which is 
unlikely) he wished to do so, could enter 
into bilateral negotiations with Israel. 
The differences among the Arab states 
in respect to Israel are differences only 
in tactics, arising out of differences in the 
interests of the different Arab countries. 
No tentative or even provisional settlement 
is possible without total withdrawal 
of Israeli troops. On the other hand, 
there may be an opportunity to modifythe Arab attitude towards non-recognition 
of Israel if the refugee question is 
tackled comprehensively. The best line 
of approach here is to keep on emphasising 
that the "eastern" as well as the 
"western" countries and most of the 
Third World, disagree with the Arabs on 
non-recognition and the latter will weaken 
their general case if they persist in it. 
The best statement yet was that made 
on 5 July 1967 on behalf of the ForeignMinister of Tanzania, who said that his 
country had, by recognising Israel, implicitly 
condoned the act of aggressionin establishing it, but this was solely because 
the world recognised an exceptional, 
unique case here, arising out of the 
inhuman treatment received by the Jews 
from Europeans. But, he added, no further 
aggressions, like those in 1956 and 
1967, could be condoned. This attitude 
might form the basis for attempting to 
obtain recognition from one side, and 
comprehensive measures for dealing with 
refugees by return of a certain number 
and adequate compensation for the rest, 
from the other. 

In the long run, however, the only hope 
for the acceptance of Israel in the Middle 
East lies in what the French call "desionisation", 
including the abandonment of 
unlimited immigration of European and 
North American Jews. This aim would 
be assisted by an actual decline in immigration 
from overseas and an increase in 
that of Asian Jews with higher birth 
rates. Gradually Israel might find accept


ance as an Asian national state. Otherwise, 
there is little reason to suppose that 
in the long run she will outlive the span 
of life of the Crusader Kingdom of 
Jerusalem. 


3. policies for Israel 
Dan Gillon 


In the immediate aftermath of the Arab 
Israeli war the chances for peace seemed 
brighter than at any time in the pasttwenty years. Yet in the period that has 
elapsed since the ceasefire there has been 
a hardening in the public positions adopted 
by the two sides. In this situation of 
apparent deadlock the Israeli government 
will have to prepare itself for a number 
of alternative possibilities : 

1. An Arab readiness to forego belligerence 
and sit down at the negotiating 
table. 
2. The possibility of bi-lateral negotiations 
with any one of her Arab neighbours. 
3. A de facto peace settlement, but one 
which did not include formal Arab recognition 
of Israel's existence. 
4 A refusal on the part of the Arabs 
to enter into any substantive negotiations. 

The chances of a negotiated settlement 
are obviously slender. There was a time 
when Israel would have been prepared 
to do almost anything to bring about 
peace. Continued Arab intransigence,
however, particularly in the face of 
Israel's latest victory, has resulted in an 
almost equally tough approach on the 
part of Israel. 

Although it is clear that divisions within 
the Israeli Cabinet do exist, three irreducible 
conditions for a final peacesettlement have now emerged : rec6gnition 
of Israel's right to exist, freedom 
of passage through the Gulf of Aqabaand the Suez Canal, and a united Jerusalem, 
although not necessarily under 
total Israeli control. From the Arab 
point of view the ruthlessness with which 
their armies were defeated this time has 
added considerably to the humiliation 
they already feel as a result of their defeats 
in 1948 and 1956. This may increase 
Arab determination to gain revenge 
on the battlefield. Pride cannot be 
restored through negotiations, even if 
refugees and lands can be. Moreover, 
the "Palestine problem" has become such 
a major factor in the drive for Arab 

unity that its resolution at this stagewould mean the removal of the one 
cause for which the Arabs are prepared 
to come together. For Nasser and President 
Al-Atassi of Syria peace with Israel 
is to be avoided, if their dream of a 
united Arab nation from the Atlantic to 
the Persian Gulf is to be fulfilled. A final 
contributing factor to the difficulty of 
achieving a negotiated settlement has 
been the almost total inability of the 
major powers to reach agreement on anyof the issues. In their disunity and their 
continued willingness to supply arms, 
they have failed to weaken the resolve of 
either side not to abandon their adopted 
positions. 

Yet, at this juncture, Israel's prime objective 
must remain the achievement of 
a negotiated settlement. Arab numerical 
superiority combined with Russian or 
Chinese military, economic and technical 
assistance, may well mean a fourth or 
fifth round with disastrous consequences 
for Israel. Israel cannot count on always 
being able to achieve the sort of sweeping 
military success she has had in the 
past. Arabs may draw from their mistakes 
the lesson that they must reach a 
higher standard of training and preparedness, 
rather than the more obvious 
lesson that they are likely always to be 
defeated by Israel. If a negotiated settlement 
is to be reached now it would be 
ir. Israel's long term interests to adopt 
a more compromising attitude than that 
held at present by the powerful "hawks" 
in the Israeli Cabinet. 

An obvious stumbling block in this connection 
is the question of Jerusalem. 
Israel's real need in the case o.f Jerusalem 
is freedom of access. If Jordan continues 
to insist that a state of war exists, access 
can be secured only by Israel's retaining 
possession of the whole city, including 
the holy places. In the event of a negotiated 
settlement it would be unwise to 
rely on Jordanian promises. Even under 
British mandatory rule, predominantlyArab control of the Old City made it 
more often than not a dangerous place 
for Jews to be in. The restoration of 
peace would, however, open the door to 
the establishment of international con



trol or, alternatively, to a joint Jordanian 
Israeli rule over the holy places. 

In a negotiated settlement, Israel must 
strive to eliminate Arab fears of her ambition 
to acquire more territory by a 
willingness to withdraw from all lands 
occupied since June 5 (with the exception 
of the Jerusalem area). As it is, the 
1948 war added some 23 per cent of the 
land area allotted to the Jewish state by 
the UN partition resolution of 1947. Arab 
acceptance of the 1949 armistice lines 
must be accompanied by Israeli readiness 
to forego any further enlargement 
of her territory. As a condition for her 
withdrawal, Israel would be bound to 
insist on firm international guarantees of 
her right of innocent passage through the 
Suez Canal and Straights of Tiran. In 
addition withdrawal would have to be 
conditioned by the demilitarisation of the 
Gaza Strip, an area of the west bank of 
the Jordan and the Syrian Heights-important 
not only because it has been used 
to shell Israeli settlements, but also because 
it controls one of the sources of 
the River Jordan. An Israeli withdrawal 
would not exclude the possibility of border 
rectification for security reasons. It 
would, however, mean that such rectifications 
would be based, not on the fact 
of Israeli occupation, but on a mutual1y 
negotiated settlement in which the need 
to effect viable borders was agreed to byboth sides. Of course, Israel should be 
prepared for the possibility that frontier 
adjustments might in some cases be 
made at her expense. 

Such a withdrawal by Israel would leave 
a number of issues in need of clarification. 
In the first place there is the question 
of the refugees. A solution to this 
problem will require enormous capitalexpenditure, way beyond the means of 
any single state and certainly beyondthat of Israel. The refugee problem will 
require assistance from all interested parties 
; the major powers, the United Nations 
and other international agencies. 
However, in negotiating the return of 
the west bank of Jordan, for example, 
Israel should be prepared to offer to 
assist generously in financing the economic 
resettlement of the refugees. 

Closely allied to this is the problem of 
the Gaza Strip. Before 1948 this strip 
was an integral part of Palestine. The 
UN partition proposals envisaged Gaza 
as forming part of the Arab state which 
was to be created as the result of partition. 
Returning this region to Egyptiancontrol makes little sense, since it is a 
poor, densely populated and under-developed 
territory two hundred miles from 
the centres of Egyptian population. 
Nevertheless, it would be in Israel's interest 
to allow Gaza to be incorporated 
into Eg}'lpt as part of a negotiated settlement. 
If Egypt will not negotiate, or if 
the Egyptians should regard Gaza as a 
liability they would rather do without, 
then Israel, with assistance from other 
governments and international agencies, 
may be forced to accept the burden of 
developing the area herself. 

second best 

Second best for Israel would be a settlement 
involving only Jordan and possible 
at a later stage the Lebanon. Such a 
solution would leave unresolved the questions 
of Suez, Tiran, the Syrian Heights 
and possibly Gaza. In addition the durability 
of such a settlement must be in 
doubt since the dangers to Hussein's 
position of "going it alone", particularly 
if Israel were to remain in occupation 
of Syrian and Egyptian territory, are 
enormous. Yet the possibility of such a 
settlement is worth considering from an 
Israeli point of view. In return for Jordanian 
recognition and a non-belligerence 
pact, Israel might be prepared to 
return the west bank to Jordanian control, 
given, of course, suitable arrangements 
for the demilitarisation of this 
region. Furthermore, although the problem 
of the refugees tends to be viewed 
by the Arabs as an "Arab problem" it is 
in the final analysis an Israeli-Jordanian 
one. So far as Gaza is concerned, it is 
tempting to suggest that in the absence 
of Egyptian co-operation, the stripshould be ceded to Jordan, since this 
would offer two advantages to Israel. 
Jordanian acceptance of the offer would 
further weaken Arab solidarity by driving 
a wedge between Jordan and Egypt. 


Secondly Jordan would then have a 
powerful motive for maintaining friendly 
relations with Israel since communications 
between the two parts of the country 
would be through Israeli territory. 
The appeal to Hussein of such a scheme 
is less <l!pparent. Yet it is conceivable that 
the idea of Jordan becoming the 6UCcessor 
state to "Arab Palestine", coupled 
with Israeli and increased UN assistance 
in solving the refugee problem, would 
have its attractions. Finally Jordanian 
control of Gaza may also give the 
Israelis and the Jordanians a vested interest 
in the utilisation of the Jordan 
river waters. 

While the future of Jerusalem would be 
no more negotiable in the event of a 
bilateral settlement than it would have 
been in a global agreement, Israel in 
order to bolster Hussein's position would 
have to offer among other things Jordanian 
access to a Me<Merranean port, a 
joint development plan, a mutual defence 
pact and possibly the integrationof the communication systems of the two 
countries, all of which would greatlybenefit Jordan and her economy. 

A solution which is apparently favoured 
by a number of leading Egyptians, including 
Nasser, involves the arrangementof a de facto peace settlement without 
the accompanying Arab recognition or 
non-belligerence pacts. Israel's unhappyexperience with the settlement reached 
at the end of the 1956 war has made it 
unlikely that she would be prepared to 
budge an inch without rigid guarantees 
of her future security and rights of innocent 
passage through Tiran and Suez. 
Yet it is feasible that in return for a 
series of demilitarised zones in Syria,
Jordan and Gaza plus firm international 
guarantees for the rights of passage, 
Israel might be induced to withdraw her 
troops from occupied Arab territory with 
the exception of areas she considers 
essential to her future security in the 
absence of a final settlement. It is clear 
that this is considered by the Israeli government 
as a last resort and would probable 
only come about either as a result 
of strong international pressure beingbrought to bear on Israel or because of 

the extreme economic strain of keeping 
an army of occupation in all the conquered 
territories. 

If tlhe major powers were, on the other 
hand, to agree to an embargo on arms 
shipments to the area, or at least limit 
such deliveries, the Israelis might be 
more inclined to accept such a position. 

annexation 

At the time of writing no Arab countryhas indicated a willingness to enter into 
direct negotiation and it may be that this 
position will be maintained for some time 
to come. In these circumstances there 
would be many Israelis including a number 
of cabinet ministers who would 
strongly advocate the annexation of all 
conquered territory with the possible exception 
of Sinai, the latter remainingunder Israeli military occupation until 
such time as the Canal becomes open to 
Israeli ships. A slightly less drastic view 
taken by some is that Israel should annex 
those areas which are of vital strategic 
importance. This would mean the incorporation 
into Israel of the Syrian Heights, 
a section of the West Bank so as to 
widen the narrow Israeli "neck" north of 
Tel Aviv, and the Gaza Strip. For 
neither group would the future status of 
Jerusalem be in any sense open for negotiation. 
So far as Sharm el Sheikh is concerned, 
those who favour total annexation 
would clearly not favour an Israeli 
withdrawal from this position either, 
while the second group would requireextremely firm guarantees of Israeli rights 
of passage before such a withdrawal 
could be considered. 

refugee problem 

There is, however, an alternative which 
gives Israel the added security she would 
derive from either of the above solutions, 
while at the same time keeping the door 
open to an eventual settlement. l!nd~r 
this proposal Israel would rem<l!n .m 
military occupation of all the terntones 
she currently holds; it being clearly understood 
that the future status and ar



rangements for all these areas would 
remain open to negotiation if and when 
the Arabs decided that the time had 
come to negotiate. Meanwhile Israel 
would set about dealing with the problem 
of the refugees. This would necessitate 
a massive scheme of economic development 
to be carried out by Israel 
(with outside assistance) on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The successful 
rehabilitation of the Arab refugees by 
Israel would surely go a long way towards 
removing what has become over 
the last twenty years the most severe 
source of friction between Israel and her 
neighbours. 

A lengthy Israeli occupation of Gaza and 
the West Bank would undoubtedly create 
many problems of its own. As it is, the 
lot of the refugees under Jordanian and 
Egyptian rule has not been a happy one. 
A negotiated settlement in, say, ten years' 
time, with a whole new generation of 
politically conscious Palestinian Arabs, 
would surely have to take account of 
their wishes as to their future status. 
While at the moment it may be assumed 
that given the straight choice between 
living under Israeli or Jordanian rule, 
they would chose the latter, their decision 
at some indefinite point in the future 
i:> not so predictable. The example of the 
300,000 Arabs already living under 
Israeli rule is a case in point. To overcome 
this difficulty it may be necessary 
to conduct a plebiscite amongst Palestinian 
Arabs in which they would be 
asked to choose between (1) a return to 
Jordanian rule, (2) an Israeli-Jordanian 
condominium, (3) an autonomous state 
in treaty relations with both Israel and 
Jordan, which would guarantee both its 
future security and economic viability. 


4. the role of the UN 
H. G. Nicholas 
The role of the UN in the settlement of 
the present Middle East conflict must 
be marginal, but may be crucial. When 
I say that it must be marginal I mean 
that at the present stage of its development 
the organisation has only a limited 
capacity for modifying the aims and the 
relative power balance of its members. 
The UN in essence is an instrument which 
nation states try to use for the advancement 
of national interests. That they use 
such an instrument at all implies a recognition 
that national interests must be 
more widely conceived than within the 
previous state system. 

The fact nevertheless remains that the 
UN's capacity to transcend national interests 
is limited ; it depends at any given 
moment upon three variables: the sense 
of shock and crisis, the existence or 
otherwise of a voting consensus, and the 
capacity of the Secretary-General and 
his staff to take action on behalf of the 
international community. No one of 
these factors alone is sufficient ; shock 
and crisis did not energise the Security 
Council in the hectic days of Israel's 
blitzkrieg, though coupled with the 
emergence of at least a "negative consensus" 
in the General Assembly, it has 
produced a willingness to Jet the Secretary-
General go ahead with the establishment 
of an observer corps along the 
Suez Canal. 

To estimate how much father the UN 
can go one must know how far the negative 
consensus can be positively developed, 
bearing in mind that the present 
Secretary-General, as his action 
over the withdrawal of UNEF revealed, 
is not likely to take a creative or adventurous 
view of his powers or responsibilities. 


Yet, given these limitations, the UN's role 
may yet be crucial. Short of a fresh flare 
up, involving great power intervention 
and the wiping out of Israel (and no 
doubt many other things besides), the 
only possible solutions to the presentpro.blems of the Middle East requireact10n from outside the area itself, action 
of the kind which only the UN is equippedto supply. 

However determined either side may be, 
they are quite incapable by themselves 
of coping with the refugee problem, of 
bringing some kind of economic development 
to the area, of solving the problems 
of access to fresh water resources 
and salt water outlets, of establishing an 
administration of shrines deemed holy by 
faiths represented all over the world, or, 
above all, of creating and maintaining 
any reasonably peaceable and stable national 
frontiers. Moreover, with the 
emergence of the USSR as a super power 
with a Middle East presence, the dayhas gone by when the Western powers 
singly or together could do these tasks 
for the Middle East by a kind benevolent 
paternalism at-extra-even if Arab 
nationalism would let them. 

One starts then with the two assumptions, 
that there is an indis·pensable role for 
the UN to play and that the obstacles 
in the way of it discharging it, are enormous. 
How enormous can be simplyappreciated by reading any day's Security 
Council or General Assembly debates 
and seeing the :range of intransigent animosities 
therein expressed. No idealistic 
"ground design" is going to survive the 
barrage of suspicion, resentment, mortified 
pride and religious fanaticism which 
will be fired <~Jt it, by veto in the SecurityCouncil or by the hamstringing of resolutions 
in the General Assembly. In face 
of such sentiments, effort expended on 
thinking up ingenious, quasi-governmental 
UN roles is effort wasted. The problem 
is to get the UN re-admitted at all 
into an area ·where one side sees it as a 
dangerous sham, a sort of dove in hawk's 
clothing, while the other views it as the 
reverse, an agency of neo-colonialism. 

In such a dilemma the only way forward 
i3 to build on what exists, ruinous though 
its condition may be. The two UN presences 
sti.ll operative in the Middle East, 
however shakily, are the refugee organisation, 
UNRWA, and the observation 
corps, UNTSO. Harrassed and molested 
though both have been, neither of the 
two sets of combatants has demanded 
their withdrawal-a remarkable tribute 
to their continuing indispensability. The 
competence of each is limited, but war 


has, of course, intensified the need for 
their ministrations. 

The scale of the refugee problem IS Immense 
and any solution will necessarily 
arouse the most violent passion and obstruction. 
Yet it is now surely clear that 
no piecemeal solution can possibly be 
effected. Israeli action has destroyed the 
old basis for what might be called "permanent 
refugeeism", at Gaza, or elsewhere. 
The way is therefore clear for a 
sweeping scheme of refugee re-settlement 
which, even if it involves additional 
transfers of population, cannot but be 
more humane than any perpetuation of 
the slum camps of Gaza and the latest 
Jordanian diaspora. Re-settlement on 
such a scale, however, is going to be 
costly. It will require imagination, drive, 
patience, diplomacy and money. It cannot 
be done from below as it were, by 
the efforts of UNWRA administrators, however 
devoted. H will require the initiative, 
political leverage and economic resources 
of a great power, though no 
single power, even the United States, 
should be expected to carry tJhe burden 
alone. Once launched, it would need an 
administrator of the energy and enterprise 
of a Paul Hoffman. 

Almost certainly any such refugee pro-
gramme would require as a corollarythe development of the national resources 
of the area. Having regard to what these 
are, this is going to involve the costly 
schemes of de-salination and j or development 
of the Jordan Valley, which have 
already been defined in the:ir technological 
and administrative implications by 
many experts, from David Lilienthal to 
Edmund de Rothsohild. It is true to say 
indeed that any proper solution of the 
refugee problem would involve a far-
ranging transformation of the whole 
environment, political as well as economic, 
of the area. For this reason alone 
it wiH have to run the gauntlet of greatand many sided pol.itical criticisms. But 
then so will any plan which attemptsto defuse the Middle East, while at least 
an approach such as this allows a possibility 
of subordinating the impossiblyintractable political issues to economic 
considerations which, however contro


versial, are at least susceptible of discussion 
in the rational terms of more or 
less rather than the absolutes of yes or 
no. It is also true, of course, that if the 
UN puts its hand to any such programmeof refugee settlement and regional development 
it wil.l have to find the money 
to foot a substantial bill. In fact, however, 
it does already pay out substanti<d 
sums every year to UNWRA simply to keeprefugees alive, with no constructive design 
for ending the dole. Though a comprehensive 
programme would cost more 
at first, it would give clear promise of 
becoming self-liquidating within a measurable 
period. And if it succeeded there 
should properly be credited against its 
costs the economy of not having a major 
war in the Middle East every decade, 
w1th a closed canal, blocked pipe lines, 
suspended oil production and the like. 

But this, it wi],l be objected, ignores the 
political problems and the need for territorial 
settlements and the like. Not at 
all. It is not difficult to draw up a catalogue 
of the desiderata-a clear and 
policed set of frontiers for the State of 
Israel, a Jerusalem under international 
protectors and supervision, a guaranteeof free passage through the Straits of 
Tiran and the Suez Canal. Nor is it difficult 
to think of UN instrumentalities for 
securing them-a UNEF stationed on both 
sides of the frontiers it supervises, a 
trusteeship administration for at least the 
Old City of Jerusalem, a UN naval police 
unit in the Gulf of Aqaba, a revised 
treaty to secure valid users' rights in the 
Suez Canal. The problem is to secure 
acceptance by adequate UN majorities of 
the aims which seem so self evidently 
desirable and to persuade those majorities 
to equip the UN with the powers 
necessary to secure them. For this there 
is no easy solution ; there are only the 
old techniques of diplomacy, of persuasion, 
of pressure, of bargaining. 

But however successful these techniques 
may be-and no once, I imagine, will 
rate them very high-they cannot hopefor success by making a frontal attack 
on the political issues. Their only hope 
lies in linking the political objectives to 
the economic and social possibilities. It 


i.; only by marrying the politically distasteful 
to the economically imperative 
that any progress can be made. There 
must be a package deal, devised with 
skill and with complete indifference to 
short term European and American interests. 
This is asking a lot. But does 
anyone think, after 1956 and 1967, that 
peace in the Middle East can be had 
for less? 

' 
FinaLly, a footnote. The Middle East 

' 
war, though short, was brutal. Some of 
the brutality was inescapable, some was 
not. The practice of roasting men alive 
is no more admirable in Jordan for having 
become routine in Vietnam. The 
use of napalm ought to be brought within 
the ban of the Geneva Convention. 
Any such ban may, of course, be flouted . 
As Egypt has flouted the ban on poisongas in the Yemen. This is no reason for 
any civilised country condoning it after 
we have seen what results it produced 
in the streets of Jerusalem and in the 
jungles of Vietnam. 


5. strategic aspects 
Neville Brown 

Reaching a permanent solution to the 
Arab-Israeh problem is going to be a 
long and difficult process. Instant blueprints 
for lasting peace are unlikely to 
make an impact on an Arab leadershipthat is still wallowing in the aftermath of 
one of the most cataclysmic military defeats 
in history. And to involve the 
United Nations in too elaborate a system 
of safeguards too soon may be to jeopardise 
both the safeguards and the UN . 
Besices, since the Arab armed forces are 
now too weak to consider cha!.lenging the 
Israelis to any full scale conflict for 
several years at .least, a permanent settlement 
is not an immediate prerequisite of 
stability. So perhaps it is best to eschew 
too strong a sense of urgency in the 
search for a lasting peace and concentrate 
for the moment on a further examination 
of some of the factors that must 
ultimately be taken jnto account. 

What must surely be obvious is that 
Israel dare not risk an eventual reversion 
to a situation Hke that which obtained 
on the eve of her June offensive. For 
she was then virtually hemmed in by an 
Arab milita·ry alliance with a combined 
strength weU in excess of hers. Egypthad available (i.e. exclusive of the 50,000 
men in the Yemen) some 150,000 soldiers, 
1,000 tanks, and 500 warplanes.
Iraq, Jordan, and Syria had mustered 
150,000 soldiers, 700 tanks, and 200 warplanes. 
Israel had 200,000 soldiers mobilised, 
800 tanks, and 350 combat aircraft. 
So even a modest build up of Arab field 
units in West Bank Jordan would have 
made it hazardous for Israel to retain in 
the Negev sufficient strength to offset 
the Egyptians in the Sin-ai. Furthermore, 
Israel's air force, being concentrated on 
only four bases, would have been so exposed 
to possible "Pearl Harbor" strikes 
from several directions as to have made 
it hazardous for her to have attempted 
localised retaliation by air and land 
against an Arab guerilla campaign that 
seemed bound to intensify. 

A classic air and land blitzkrieg has 
eliminated the threat for the moment,
but a repeat performance if there was a 
confrontation along the 1967 borders in, 
say, 1977, cannot be taken for granted. 

For Egypt's decision to mass in the Sinai 
was a sudden one, made (perhaps in case 
Israel moved against Syria) despite her 
genera:! feeling that, in view of other internal 
and external commitments, war 
against Israel would be inadvisable for 
several years. Next time Egypt may precipitate 
a crisis when the situation seems 
to her more ripe for one. Next time also 
her officers and Ncos may be better both 
a~ administration and at operationalleadership. So may those of her allies. 
The Israeli soldier is, of course, likely to 
remain more highly skil.led and motivated 
than his Arab counterpart for decades to 
come. It is also .likely, however, that the 
gap will graduaUy narrow, as indeed it 
appears to have done during the last 
twenty years. 

'_fhe Israeli air force played a key partm the recent campaign, swiftly knocking 
its Egyptian counter.pa·rt out on the 
ground and then exploiting its command 
of the skies to the full. A massive Egyptian 
neglect of the rules for the dispersal 
and protection of aircraft parked on the 
ground qoes much to account for this. 
So does the unsuitability of the presentgeneration of Soviet ground to air missiles 
for use against low altitude attack. 
Both these weaknesses are remediable 
and s<?, in an¥ f~ture conflict, Israel mayfind a1r supenonty harder to achieve and 
to exploit. Her own inherent vulnerability 
to low level intrusion could then 
become a cause for extreme concern. 

Among the more dramatic militarybreakthroughs since 1945 has been the 
advent of . guided missiles light enough 
to be earned by men or small vehicles 
and powerful enough to cripple battl~ 
tanks at ranges of perhaps a mile or so. 
France has led the world in the development 
of such weapons and has exported 
many to Israel ; the USSR has laggedbehind badly (apparently because of the 
blirnpishness of its armoured corps) and 
so therefore have Egypt and the other 
recipients of Soviet arms. Herein probably 
lies an important clue to the Israeli 
success in the big tank battle that took 
place around Gaza during the first night 
of the war. But the Red Army is now 
bringing anti-tank guided missiles into 


service and Egypt, in particular, is likelysoon to follow suit. This, coupled with a 
greater immunity to Israeli air power,
could enable her to slow down the tempo 
of an Israeli onslaught in the event of 
another war ; and one corollary of the 
fact that Israel maintains an order of 
battle that is remarkably large in proportion 
to her national resources is that 
she would find any full scale conflict 
lasting more than a week a considerable 
strain on her arrangements for battlefield 
supply and maintenance. 

Israel's present dominance renders her 
able to embark upon a milit,ary nuclear 
programme, should she so wish, without 
being liable to trigger off an Arab preventive 
war; and a fear of future conventional 
inferiority could make such a 
course of action appear attractive. Her 
experimental 24-megawatt civil nuclear 
reactor at Dimona (which the French 
provided) is thought to produce enough 
plutonium each year to make two fission 
bombs. But plutonium has to be very 
pure to yield an explosive reaction and 
a special chemical separation . plant is 
needed to achieve this purity. Israel has 
not yet begun to construct such a plant, 
but she has made extensive studies of 
the technical problems involved. It would 
seem, therefore, that Israel could become 
a military nuclear power within a few 
years of taking a firm decision to do so. 

Egypt's civi'l nuclear programme is less 
advanced (e.g. she has only a 2 megawatt 
reactor) and the general belief is 
that she is unlikely to achieve military 
nuclear status before the 1980s. But 
Soviet technical aid could narrow this interval. 
Last December certain Egyptian 
sources indicated that President Nasser 
had canvassed a Soviet delegation, albeit 
unsuccessfully, for the sale of completenuclear warheads. So an Israeli decision 
te> go nuclear could lead directly to further 
nuclea·r prolifer-ation. Even if it did 
n.ot, it could still have serious repercus-
Sions. For one thing, it would create the 
precedent ·of a nation going nuclear in 
order to deter a non-nuclear attack. South 
Africa and Australia are among the 
countries that would take especial note 
of this precedent. 

The multinational control of arms exports 
to both Arabs and Israelis is not 
the panacea it is often seen as. For one 
thing it may be politica11y impracticable. 
For another it could have certain adverse 
results. Surely the contrast between 
the 1914-18 campaigns in France and 
those in World War Two is sufficient to 
demonstrate that open mobile warfare 

(i.e. the type involving many tanks and 
aircraft) is often less hideous than its 
more static counterparts. Besides, a restriction 
in the supply of heavy offensive 
weapons (i.e. aircraft and armoured fighting 
vehicles) could be much to Israel's 
disadvantage, because the elan and technical 
proficiency with which she offsets 
the Arabs' numerical superiority is particular.
ly associated with the use of such 
equipment. 
Another possibility being discussed is 
that Israel wiU eventua1ly be persuaded 
to forego both her recent territorial gains 
and her military nuclear option by the 
positioning of United Nations combat 
units around all her borders. But such 
a UN presence mi~ht simply leave the 
Arab states effectively free to sponsorguerilla infiltration whilst depriving Israel 
of her ability to retaliate by means of 
local sorties by land or air. So the deployment 
of a UN field force is more 
likely to be suitable as a means of consolidating 
a political settlement than as 
a means of achieving it. 

Western support 

How appropriate might be cast iron 
guarantees to Israel from Britain and the 
United States of decisive air and naval 
support in case of need? That such guarantees 
could pitch the balance of powerpermanently in Israel's favour is beyondreasonable doubt. The snag is that under 
certain circumstances such a line uo 
could, as has been sug·gested above, seriously 
damage the standing of all three 
countries in Afro-Asia as a whole. Just 
before the recent war ArchbishopMakarios declared his utter opposition to 
Britain's sovereign base areas in Cyprus 
ever being used against the Arabs ; and 
this admonition must be taken seriously, 


not because the Cypriots could ever make 
it impossible for the RAF to operate from 
the Akrotiri SBA, but because it shows 
how, in general, the tr·adition of Afro-
Asian soJidarity operates against the 
Israelis. For all those Afro-Asian regimes 

(e.g. Damascus and Peking) that behave 
as if they long for a showdown between 
the underdeveloped world and the 
West willingly depict Israel as beingessentiaHy an outpost of the l·atter ; and 
so, indeed, do all those people (e.g. in 
Pretoria and Salisbury) who favour the 
maintenance of some kind of "white 
supremacy". The rest of us should, therefore, 
try to prevent this view from gaining 
universal acceptance. 
It is in this context that an evaluation of 
Soviet strategy becomes crucial. Perhaps 
the most dangerous of alJ the fa!Jacies 
about the current balance of power is 
the one that the Cuban crisis of 1962 
"proved" that the Soviet Union will 
always back down quickly when presented 
with the threat of general war. In 
1962 the USSR was at a decisive disadvantage 
vis a vis the USA in respect of 
intercontinental rocket strength and so 
was vulnerable to American threats of 
nuclear action. But this is no longer the 
case. One handicap she does still labour 
under, however, is that her direct milita
·ry access to various parts of the wor:ld 
(e.g. Borneo, the Caribbean, the Congo,
the Mediterranean, and Vietnam) is much 
more restricted by geography and byhistorical precedent than is that of the 
United States and Britain ; and she naturally 
feels tempted to offset this weakness 
by stimulating (e.g. by diplomacy, economic 
aid and arms exports) conflicts embarrassing 
to the West in such areas as 
the Arab-Israel border zone and South 
Arabia. For a year or so past Soviet 
policy towards Egypt and her ambitions 
has had just the tentative quality youwould expect it to have if the Russian 
leaders were intent on keeping open the 
option of stepping the Middle Eastern 
confrontations up in the event of an 
American escalation of the war in Vietnam. 
And so the Arab-Israel border 
problem is one that is not likely to be 
resolved until the USSR has decided that 
she can safely forego her ability to ex


acerbate it at wiU. But this decision is 
one that she is unlikely to take unti]
she has made significant progress towards 
an accommodation with the West over 
Vietnam, nuclear proliferation and certain 
other related questions. Peace has 
never been less divisible than it is today. 


integrating 

~ 
~ 
With considerable foresight and characteristic 
courage U Thant had warned the 
; UN in autumn 1966 that peacekeeping 
· operations amounted to an expensive.l and cumulative process whioh of itself 
.did nothing to reconcile the potentialparties to a conflict. UNEF was not established 
by the Security Council, but on 
the recommendation ot the General 
Assembly, and therefore as Dag Hammarskjold 
had said on 6 November 1956, 
"It could not request the force to be 
stationed or operate on the territory of 
a given country without the consent of 

l 
the government of that country". Israel 
steadfastly refused to permit the presenceof the force on her territory and U Thant 
has emphasised that she was perfectlyentitled to do so. However, against this 
background, when Egypt requested the 
withdrawal of the force the SecretaryGeneral had no alternative but to complyimmediately. Whatever the private memoranda, 
the political reality of the Middle 
East situation, taken together with the 
fundamental debate on the UN's role in 
peacekeeping which had nearly wrecked 
the organisation in recent years, meant 
. that had he delayed by even a day, his 
position as an acceptable international 
civil servant would have been jeopardised 
; he would have been dismissed by 
almost half the world as a tool of Western 
imperialism. For Labour leaders to 
deny this is misguided. For Conservative 
spokesmen to do so is indefensible, because 
it was the Anglo-French veto in 
1956 which had prevented any effective 
action by the Secur.ity Counci.J ; a force 
created as part of such action could have 
stayed in the Middle East without the 
permission of the local powers. 

U Thant did consult the special Committee 
of nations participating in UNEF and 
there are grounds for believing that he 
hoped to reactivate the mixed armistice 
commission which would have brought 
the Arabs and Israelis into a more direct 
responsibility for the preservation of 
peace. 

One tragic aspect of the crisis is that 
fully nine months before the major conflict 
began, the Security Council was 
discussing the grave incidents on the 

Israel 


Syrian Israeli border as a threat to 
peace. Informed opinion at the UN believed 
then that the worst of the crisis 
was still to come. Because the greatpowers still regard the UN as peripheralto the main stream of their foreign policies-
although some statesmen like 
George Brown are sincerely convinced in 
theory of its vital significance--the international 
community became preoccupied 
with other issues and the outbreak of 
war in spring 1967 came a·lmost as a 
surprise. 

More recently, not for the first time, the 
indispensability of the organisation has 
become obvious. General Odd Bull and 
his UN Truce Supervisory Organisation 
pushed so unceremoniously aside during 
the fighting, have been essential to securing 
and supervising a cease fire. The one 
place where throughout the crisis the 
Arabs, the Israelis, the Russians, the 
Americans, the French and the British 
have been in constant contact, is the 
UN. An extension of the conflict was 
avoided by great power agreement formalised 
in the Security Council. The only 
way of persuading the Arabs to participate 
in serious negotiations is likely to 
be in a fairly wide international context 
provided by the UN ; in any case whether 
Dayan and others like it or not, the great 
powers will have to take part because 
they are already very much involved in 
the area. The ultimate peace settlement 
will almost certainly have to be guaranteed 
by the UN and interim arrangements 
beyond the immediate cease fire maywell necessitate a UN presence. 

As the Secretary General frequently reminds 
us the UN cannot be more effective 
than its members want it to be and for 
it to succeed in this area there will have 
to be a positive attitude on the part of 
both the Arabs and Israelis. Nuclear 
potential alone necessitates a final and 
durable peace settlement. There is no 
room for fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability 
of renewed conflict within the 
next decade. 

To achieve such a settlement there can 
be no question of unilaterally imposed 
solutions. George Brown was absolutely 


right to underline at the UN that to uphold 
Israel's right to survival in no way 
implies support for unilateral annexation 
of territory by her. However moving the 
case for her retaining control of Jerusalem, 
in the light of long term and 
more recent Jewish history, it must be 
forcefully argued that such retention 
may bar the way to a lasting settlement 
and that without a lasting settlement 
there can be no effective guarantee of 
permanent access to the holy places. She 
must a.Jso be told quite categorically that 
the precedent of international endorsement 
for uni·lateral action by her would 
deal a devastating blow to the principles 
of the Charter and to international order. 
Israel's leaders must a.ppreciate that 
many of those who argue this case do 
so because they care desperately for her 
future. 

Negotiations will have to deal with the 
shor.t term priorities of strengthening 
UNTSO and establishing a Security Council 
presence on both sides of the frontier. 
As a first step in the aftermath of 
such large scale hostilities new armistice 
agreements wiJ.l be essential. Re-settlement 
and compensation for both old and 
new refugees is also urgent. The Arab 
states will have to come to terms with 
the existence of Israel; she cannot be expected 
to live with exactly the same 
frontiers she has been compelled to endure 
for almost 20 years ; free movement 
of her shipping through Aqaba and Suez 
must be ensured. 

Before the recent crisis there were hopeful 
indications of a possible reconciHation. 
The moderation of Bourgui'ba in 
Tunisia had almost certainly found an 
echo in Arab minds nearer to the heart 
of the problem. Lebanon had shown 
signs of wanting to come to terms with 
Israel. Hussein had won considerable respect 
amongst the Israelis. It remains to 
be seen whether such trends can survive 
the extent of the Israel.i victory and the 
post war militant pronouncements of at 
least some of her leaders. 

When in Israel during the fighting I 
heard the story of a Jordanian soldier 
blinded by his wounds being carried in


to an Israeli hospital in Jerusalem, saying, 
"We are brothers; we are brothers". 
It is in this realisation that there lies the 
greatest hope. Israel has an outstandingrecord of technica-l assistance and development 
programmes throughout Africa. 
She could make a vital contribution 
to the economic and soda! developmentof the Middle East. Her foreign policy 
must now concentrate on economic, 
social and political integration into the 
region of which she is essential·ly a part.
She simply oannot live for ever as an 
outpost of the West perched precariously 
on the edge of a largely hostile Arab 
world. In the disillusion which must be 
shared by both Israel and her Arab 
neighbours at the inadequate supportfrom their erstwhile respective allies 
there might be found an appreciation of 
the value of a self reliant Middle East. 

Nobody should underestimate the courage 
required of leaders on both sides to 
seek a mutually acceptable negotiatedsettlement. Nobody can afford to ignorethe fundamental truth that unless a settlement 
is seen by both sides to be in their 
mutual self interest it can have verylittle permanent value. 


7. suggestions for peace 
Elizabeth Collard 

Provided that the Arabs get justice and 
reparation and the UN resolutions on 
refugees and Jerusalem are carried out, 
there is no reason why a permanentsettlement should not be worked out 
during the coming weeks. Meanwhile, it 
i~ worth looking lllt what the United 
Nations and .the great and smaller powers 
have been suggesting as the basis for 
negotiations since the end of the fighting. 

Apart from the unanimous cease fire resolutions 
of the Security Council, weeks 
of talk at the General Assembly resulted 
in two resolutions. By 99 votes to none, 
with 20 abstentions, ~he General Assembly 
considers the measures taken byIsrael to change the status of Jerusalem 
as inv·alid and calls on Israel to rescind 
all such measures already taken and to 
take no further actions which would 
alter the status of the city. Although the 
United States abstained in this vote, President 
Johnson made a White House 
statement that Israel should not take anyunilateral action on the status of Jerusalem, 
and not a single state or world 
statesman has app·roved Israel's action 
on the unification of Jerusalem. 

The second General Assembly resolution 
still relevant calls on Israel to "facilitate 
the return of those inhlllbitants who had 
fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities". 
The gesture was made by Israel. 
but only a fraction of those who had 
fled from the West Bank have in fact 
been able to return, the stream to the 
East Bank continues. and includes refugees 
from the Gaza Strip who have been 
encouraged to go and "find their relatives". 
The net result is an even more 
acute refugee problem than before 5 
June. Whatever happens, international 
aid on a vast scale wiU be needed to helpthe refugees and the money being poured 
in from the oil states cannot compensate 
for the lack of experienced people to 
plan and carry out the vast programmethat is needed, wherever the refugees are 
re-settled. As the Arabs see it, there is 
stil·l room for those refugees that wish 
to do so, to return to their homeland in 
Israel, for so long as Israel continues a 
policy of ingathering, of calling for Jews 
all over the world to come and live in 

Israel, then there is, prima facie, spacefor the refugees to return. In fact, the 
majority would probably prefer to settle 
in Arab lands, and then there must be 
not only reparation for their lost homes 
and property, but some measure of recompense 
for the sufferings of the past20 years. If Israel would accept the responsibility 
and organise reparations on 
the scale needed-and there have already 
been enough offers of aid on the scale 
needed-it would be to her benefit as 
weLl as to the unhappy, displaced people. 

The United States view of a permanentsettlement includes the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from occupied territory, an 
end to the state of belligerency, acceptance 
of Israel's right to exist, renunciation 
of the use of force, free maritime 
passage for all through the Suez Canal 
and the Gulf of Aqaba, regional economic 
development, a limitation on the 
arms race, the resettlement of refugees,
and an effective UN presence until treaties 
are agreed and an international mediation 
procedure. 

The Soviet Union has made it clear that 
it supports an immediate withdrawal of 
a·ll Israeli troops from Arab .territories as 
a prerequisite for further negotiationsand has also condemned the Israeli annexation 
of the Arab part of the city of 
Jerusalem. 

For the British Government, GeorgeBrown's statement to the United Nations 
General Assembly remains official policy. 
He referred to Article 2 of the Oharter 
of the Uni·ted Nations and stated categorically 
that "war should not lead to 
territorial aggrandisement" and also 
called on Israel not to take any steps in 
relation to Jerusalem that would conflict 
with this principle. He caJ.Ied also 
for a great international effort to aJ.leviate 
the refugee problem. He has suggested 
the appointment of a mediator 
between the Arabs and Israel in the 
settlement negotiations, and insisted that 
"any settlement must recognise the rightof all states in the area to exist, in true 
dignity and real freedom, and that must 
include the ability to earn their living 
in assured peace." . To the House of 


Commons on 7 July, George Brown 
added ~hat the way to open the Suez 
Cana.l was by political rather than bylegal action. 

There have been conflicting reports both 
of the results of the famous Johnson-
Kosygin talks at Glassboro meeting of 
23 June and of the content of President 
Tito's mediation efforts, which have now 
been extended to include Genera<! de 
Gaulle. Enough has come out of all these 
talks, however, to .predict the first steps 
of a way forward for a settlement, 
especially if the Arab States remain 
united enough collectively to accept some 
parts of such a settlement which might 
have been unacceptable in the past. 

Tha.t there must be a withdrawal of 
Israeli troops to their pre-5 June positions 
is an essential step which could be 
accompanied simultaneously by an ending 
of the state of belligerency between 
the Ara1b states and Israel. Everythingelse can follow naturally. There may be 
some form of Big Four guarantees of 
the frontiers of the Israel and the Arab 
States, to give both the security they 
need, and this wiU require a UN presence 
on both sides of the borders. 

There is an important proviso: no such 
agreement as outlined in the previous 
parag.raph wiH be acceptable to the Arab 
States unless it is contingent on a justsettlement for the Palestinian refugees. 
Then and then only can there be permanent 
peace in the area and all other 
questions reso.lved. 


abian society the authors 


1e Fabian Society exists to further 
·cialist education and research. It is 
filiated to the Labour Party, both namally 
and locally, and embraces all 
tades of Socialist opinion within its 
.nks-left, right and centre. 

nee 1884 the Fabian Society has en ll!
ed thoughtful socialists who are pretred 
to discuss the essential questions 
' democratic socialism and relate them 
' practical plans for building socialism 

a changing world. 

eyond this the Society has no collectiw 
>Iicy. It puts forward no resolutions o, 
political character, but it is not an 
·ganisation of armchair socialists. Its 
.embers are active in their Labou, 
arties, Trade Unions and Co-operatives. 
hey are representative of the labour 
1ovement, practical people concerned to 
udy and discuss problems that matter. 

he Society is organised nationally and 

•cally. The national Society, directed 
V an elected Executive Committee, pub;
hes pamphlets, and holds schools and 
>nferences of many kinds. Local Sociees-
there are some 80 of them-are 
:If governing and are lively centres of 
scussion and also undertake research. 
nqU:iries about membership should be 
:nt to the General Secretary, Fabian 
>ciety, ll Dartmouth Street, London, 
iVl ; telephone Whitehall 3077. 

Neville Brown is author of Britain in 
NATO (Fabian tract 357) and Britain 
and world security (Fabian research 
series 258). 

Elizabeth Collard is publisher of Middle 
East Economic Digest. 

Dan Gillon is a Research Fellow at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies,
London. 

Colin Jackson MP is chairman of the 
Fabian International and Commonwealth 
Bureau, and author of The new India 
(Fabian tract 306). 

Frank Judd MP is a former SecretaryGeneral of the International Voluntary 
Service. 

H . G. Nicholas is a Fellow of New College, 
Oxford. 
E. F. Penrose is Professor Emeritus of 
Geography and International Relations 
of the Johns Hopkins University; sometime 
Professor of Economics in the University 
of Baghdad. 
Cover design and typography by Geoffrey 
Cannon. Printed by The Walrus 
Press Ltd. (Tu), 769 Harrow Road, Sud-
bury, Wembley, Middlesex. 

Standard book no 7163 0376 0. 


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